Country Commercial Guides for FY 2000:
|
CHAPTER III: POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
A. NATURE OF POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES
Present US-Cameroon relations are good and continue to improve. Principal U.S. concerns center on lapses in the observance of human rights, slow implementation of good governance or fair elections principles, and corruption and fiscal irregularities which hinder sustainable economic growth. The GRC considers such concerns as undue pressure on its political evolution, flowing from a superficial understanding of its complex society and resulting in withholding development assistance.
Over the past ten years, the U.S. government has reduced its presence in Cameroon, with the closing of the U.S. Information Service's (USIS) American Cultural Center in Douala (1990), the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service's operations (1992), the U.S. Consulate in Douala (1993) and the Agency for International Development (USAID) mission (1994). The U.S. Government continues to finance projects valued at over half a million dollars through the African Development Foundation (ADF) and provides substantial funds to International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank Group and the African Development Bank Group, which accord key project and infrastructure support to Cameroon. Two regionally funded USAID projects provide limited development assistance in Family Health and AIDS Prevention as well as the Central African Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE). The Ambassador's Self-Help Fund and the Democracy and Human Rights Funds together finance $250,000 worth of small grass-roots projects. In addition, about 150 Peace Corps volunteers currently work in the fields of agricultural extension, education, health, and environment. Peace Corps plans to ramp up its number of volunteers to a total of 170 over the next year, in an effort to include a cadre of volunteers who will work on small business promotion. USIS organizes and funds, inter alia, discussions on economic and civic issues and education and cultural exchange programs.
B. MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUES AFFECTING BUSINESS CLIMATE
While political violence is not likely in Cameroon, a threat of political strife continues to be a factor. A vocal minority composed of the English-speaking population advocates restoration of the decentralized federal structure comprising separate anglophone and francophone regions that prevailed from 1961 until unification in 1972. A few anglophone groups support secession of the two English-speaking provinces. Both options are unacceptable to the Government. It has a less radical decentralization program, but implementation of measures for a senate and increased provincial power has been progressing at a snail's pace.
Cameroon's highly controlled and incremental progress toward liberalizing and reforming its economy has engendered opposition, even within the ruling party. The reform program includes a reduction of civil servants and privatization of public enterprises. The latter of these two initiatives has been criticized as slanted in favor of French investors, as not transparent, and as not fully inclusive of local investors, let alone other nationalities. Rampant corruption and a dysfunctional judicial system severely hamper development of Cameroon's economy and society. Although the government continues to pay lip service to the desire to fight corruption, the results of recent government campaigns against corruption have been slight.
Cameroon is part of the Central African Economic and Monetary Committee (CEMAC), which was formalized in June 1999 in Malabo, and which is to superceded the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC). Nevertheless, Cameroon's relations with its CEMAC partners and other regional neighbors remain uneven. Political rivalries between Gabon and Cameroon, the latter with over half of the Central African region's population and commerce, retard the development of worthy initiatives such as a viable customs union, a securities exchange, a single market and a genuine economic community. Further diluting the possibility of real progress toward regional economic integration are the efforts to revitalize the mineral rich 90 million people strong Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC). Created in 1984, CEEAC encompasses the CEMAC states as well as three former Belgian colonies (Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC), and Rwanda) and the region's two Lusophone countries (Angola and Sao Tome and Principe). At a meeting in Douala this year, a decision was also reached to create a regional securities exchange, such as the one recently established in Abidjan. One remaining stumbling block, however, is its location, as Douala and Libreville each aspires to host the new stock exchange, targeted to become operational in November 2000.
The Central African region is well placed for expansion and development, sandwiched as it is between two giants -- the huge, rich, under-performing, war-torn market of the Democratic Republic of Congo (ex-Zaire) and the Nigerian economic powerhouse. The chaotic situation in Congo-Kinshasa (ex-Zaire) has had a significant impact on its Central African neighbors, and its effects are expected to be felt for years. Cameroon's conflict with Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula has been described by some observers (on both sides of the border) as a political red flag to be waved as necessary to turn public attention away from internal problems rather than a case of economic greed by either country over still unconfirmed oil in the area. While the territorial dispute is making progress before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), procedural and other delays mean that the case remains a long way from resolution. On a positive note, a recent warming in the relations between the two countries has resulted in increased contacts between government officials at the highest levels. If the two neighbors resolve their differences, they could limit military expenditures and devote more resources to economic development and social integration. The free, if sometimes illicit, exchange of goods and traffic in persons between the two nations is testimony to an already vibrant and natural, if informal, commercial entity of over 125 million consumers.
C. BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF POLITICAL SYSTEM, SCHEDULE FOR ELECTIONS AND ORIENTATION OF MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES
Cameroon is a republic dominated by a constitutionally-strong chief executive. Since independence, a single party, now called the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM), has remained in power and limited political choice. In October 1997, CPDM leader Paul Biya won reelection as President in an election boycotted by the three main opposition parties and generally considered by observers not to be free and fair. The Government legalized opposition parties in 1990, after widespread protests. However, international and local observers generally consider the election process, which is controlled by the Government's Ministry of Territorial Administration, as fundamentally flawed. No President has ever left office in consequence of an election. The President retains the power to control legislation or to rule by decree. In the National Assembly, government bills take precedence over other bills, and no bills other than government bills have been enacted since 1991, although some legislation proposed by the Government has not been enacted. The President repeatedly has used his control of the legislature to change the Constitution. The 1996 Constitution lengthened the President's term of office to 7 years, while continuing to allow Biya to run for a fourth consecutive term in 1997 and making him eligible to run for one more 7-year term in 2004. The Government has taken no formal action to implement other 1996 constitutional changes that provide for new legislative institutions, including a partially elected senate and elected regional councils, and a more independent judiciary, even though the President had announced in 1997 that most of these reforms would be implemented in 1998.
In the largely free and fair multi-party municipal elections of January 1996, a number of opposition parties were successful in gaining control of many municipalities. The municipalities are the provincial sub-regions, each of which is governed by a directly-elected Municipal Council, which in turn elects the major. The opposition success in the municipal elections was offset, however, when President Biya expanded the number of municipal governments headed by presidentially appointed "delegates" rather than headed by mayors, especially in large pro-opposition cities like Douala. This move was widely criticized as anti-democratic and led two of the main opposition parties to call a general strike, which was not considered to be highly effective. Although the political opposition supported strike actions in the early 1990s, they proved unsuccessful, and most opposition leaders now appear to be abandoning such tactics.
The Government remains highly centralized. The President names and dismisses cabinet members and judges, ratifies treaties, leads the armed forces, and has considerable authority in other areas. He appoints the governors of Cameroon's ten provinces and his government has wide authority to re-organize electoral districts in ways favorable to itself. The judiciary is subject to political influence and suffers from corruption and inefficiency.
Cameroon has more than 150 legalized political parties, but many are of no real substance or appear to seek political power only for financial rewards. Cameroon's substantive political parties profess to support multi-party democracy, and individual freedoms and liberties. Few have well-defined economic programs, but almost all advocate a mixture of state intervention and vigorous private entrepreneurship. Political parties are free to voice their opinions since the 1996 constitutional revisions abolished censorship, although government repression against dissidents is not unknown. The people of Cameroon appear generally dissatisfied with the ruling party's management and pace of democratization.
|
[end of document] Note* International Copyright, United States Government, 1998 (or other year of first publication). All rights under foreign copyright laws are reserved. All portions of this publication are protected against any type or form of reproduction, communications to the public and the preparation of adaptations, arrangement and alterations outside the United States. U. S. copyright is not asserted under the U.S. Copyright Law, Title17, United States Code.
Next Chapter | Table of Contents
|