|FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES|
1964-1968, Volume XXV
Department of State
19. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, February 24, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-3/64. Secret; Noforn. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. A stamp indicates it was received at the NSC on February 25.
New information has recently come to hand on the Indian reactor and plutonium separation facilities which suggests that within four to six months India will be able and may intend to produce weapons-grade plutonium free of any safeguards. While we have no other evidence that they are starting a nuclear weapons program, they are now in a position to put together a crude device within one to three years of the start up of their plutonium facility, scheduled for May of this year./2/
/2/ McGeorge Bundy highlighted the final sentence of the first paragraph for Komer's attention and noted in the margin: "RWK Interesting?"
While the psychological and political barriers to a weapons program remain strong in India, the Chinese threat makes somewhat less easy any confident assumptions on this score. We think it unlikely that the Indians would test a weapon barring further changes in its internal political or international position--for example a Chinese communist nuclear test or good evidence of Chicom intent to test. On the other hand, there might be some attractiveness to the Indians in a vigorous weapons research program stopping short of an actual test. Mounting a test, if it seemed politic to do so, could be quickly arranged if a device were at hand, and if preparation of a test site had gone forward during the weapon development period. It should be noted that the high capital cost of the fissionable materials component of a nuclear weapon has now been met.
Discussion. India has established a fairly advanced nuclear energy program which has been publicly described as being confined to nuclear research, the exploitation of basic nuclear raw materials, and the development of nuclear power. In addition to two small research reactors, India has a 40 MW(thermal) research reactor--the so-called Canada India Reactor (CIR)--which is capable of producing sufficient quantities of plutonium for one or two weapons a year. This reactor, which went critical in mid-1960, is no longer under safeguards, since Canadian fuel has been replaced with domestic uranium and U.S.-supplied heavy water was sold outright without controls. The Director of the Indian plutonium separation facility has stated that the CIR fuel load is changed approximately every six months. This is an exceptionally short period for normal research reactor operation. At the design power level of 40 MW(thermal), which has only been reached in the last few months of operation, this recharging cycle would result in plutonium of weapons grade, rather than the usual research reactor products.
The plutonium separation plant at Trombay is scheduled to start test operations this month, and will begin separation of its first active load from the CIR reactor in mid-May. Its capacity is such that an entire CIR fuel loading could be processed in about one month.
India has more than adequate fuel supplies to operate the CIR for the production of weapon-grade plutonium. In addition, the domestic production of uranium is being increased and the uranium metal plant and fuel element fabrication facility are being expanded./3/
/3/ On May 14, INR Director Thomas Hughes sent a memorandum to Rusk offering a further assessment of the prospects for Indian nuclear weapons development. The Canadian-Indian reactor at Trombay had begun operations and the INR report noted that the core of the reactor was being changed every 6 months. "This six months cycle is unusually short for a research reactor of the CIR type. While training or some other technical reason may explain this short cycle, it is appropriate for production of weapons-grade plutonium." Hughes noted that there was no evidence of a weapons research and development program, but concluded that the political environment in India for such a program was more favorable than it had been a year before. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, FSE 13 (INDIA)
The first nuclear power station, Tarapur, being constructed with U.S. assistance, will not contribute to an Indian nuclear weapon capability. Its large plutonium production will be entirely under US safeguards. Two more power reactors are presently planned. The extent to which they will add to Indian weapons potential will depend entirely on safeguard arrangements.
20. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 26, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. I, 11/63-2/64. Secret.
You may want to read attached two cables from Bowles./2/ Despite his wordiness, they bring into sharp relief how our India affairs are sliding backwards from the high point of our vigorous response to the Chicom attack in October 1962. This trend is largely inevitable, as the Chicom attack recedes and the more normal factors which plague our relations like Kashmir assume their usual place. But as Bowles points out, it is costing us.
/2 /Attached were telegram 2445 from New Delhi (Document 16), and telegram 2457 from New Delhi, February 20. In the latter Bowles sounded the alarm on what he saw as the steadily increasing role of the Soviet Union in Indian military procurement plans. Bowles noted that 3 months had passed since General Taylor had visited New Delhi and encouraged Indian officals to expect that U.S. agreement to a long-term military assistance program was imminent. With no subsequent word on that agreement, the Indian Government had begun to turn toward the Soviet Union to meet its needs. Bowles felt that the situation could still be salvaged and urged a rapid decision on military assistance.
The Soviets faltered when Peiping attacked India, while we responded magnificently. But as the Sino-Soviet split widens, Moscow has been making up for lost time. Soviets are now doing more than we to woo the India military establishment. Meanwhile, our Pak friends are doing their best to prove their thesis that India isn't serious about China, by forcing India to focus on Pak-Indian issues. The more they distract Delhi from Peking the more they hurt us.
This is not a trend likely to create great complications for us this year, or maybe next. Only if the Paks press Kashmir to the point of open violence is a crisis likely. But it is a trend of great long term significance. India, as the largest and potentially most powerful non-Communist Asian nation, is in fact the major prize in Asia.
We have already invested $4.7 billion in the long-term economic buildup of a hopefully democratic power. But our politico-military policy has never matched our economic investment, partly because Pakistan shrewdly signed two alliances with us as a means of reinsurance against India. For this Pakistan has gotten some $700 million in US military aid, all of which has in fact gone to protect it against India. Per capita, the Paks have got much more aid from us than the Indians. We can and should protect Pakistan against India, but we cannot permit our ties--or our taste for Ayub against Nehru--to stand in the way of a strong Indian policy. This would permit the tail to wag the dog, which is just what Paks are trying to do.
With India heading into a succession crisis, we have to keep a sharp eye out. If India falls apart we are the losers. If India goes Communist, it will be a disaster comparable only to the loss of China. Even if India reverts to pro-Soviet neutralism, our policy in Asia will be compromised. These risks are real, and the irony is that they are dangerous for Pakistan as well.
Bowles makes wordy sense on this problem, we think.
/3/Both Bundy's and Komer's typed signatures appear on the memorandum, but only Komer signed it.
21. Message From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Ambassador to India (Bowles)/1/
Washington, February 27, 1964.
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles. Secret. Notes on the message indicate that it was sent priority [text not declassified] as CAP 64063.
Bundy and I can't help but feel that Orpheus engine for HF-24/2/ is our secret weapon for sidetracking Soviet MIG and possibly SAM deals./3/ You yourself have pointed out how going ahead with HF-24 would also pander to Indian nationalism, while being the course least painful to the Paks. This track is also a lot easier than SAMs from here, which are out.
/2/ HF-24 was a fighter aircraft manufactured in India.
/3/ In a February 27 memorandum to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William Bundy, Komer noted that President Johnson had read telegram 2457 from New Delhi (see footnote 2, Document 20) and was concerned about the inroads the Soviet Union was making in the Indian military establishment. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, India, 091.31-320.2)
We understand that if UK would only get Bristol to put two of the test engines into flyable conditions, it should cost less than $1 million. Bristol of course is holding out for commitment on full development and tooling up cost first but surely HMG could make them see the light. Why shouldn't this be top priority claim on UK military aid?
We've been touting this here, and have gotten DOD to raise in London. But it badly needs another big push from you and Gore-Booth now, if we're not to shut the barn door just after the horse is gone. Needless to say, our intervention is private to you./4/
/4/The last sentence was added in Komer's handwriting. Bowles reported on February 28 that he had discussed U.S. concern over Soviet military sales to India with Defense Minister Chavan in the context of a possible 5-year military assistance program. Chavan indicated that Indian withdrawal from the agreement concerning the MIGs would be difficult, and he asked if the United States could provide some high-performance aircraft to fill the gap until the MIGs and improved HF-24s became available in 1967. (Telegram 2544 from New Delhi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 US-INDIA) On March 5 the Department instructed the Embassy to make certain that the Indian Government understood the circumstances under which they might obtain assistance for the Indian Air Force from the West, and also instructed the Embassy to ensure that the Indians understood the problems they would encounter if they relied on the Soviet Union. (Telegram 1782 to New Delhi; ibid.)
22. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/
Karachi, March 3, 1964, 8 p.m.
/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PAK. Secret; Priority. Repeated to USUN, Hong Kong, London, and New Delhi.
1. I had 45-minute breakfast appointment with President Ayub in Dacca March 2. Principal Secretary Farooqui only other person present. About half of conversation devoted to Kashmir issue and upcoming GOP tactics related thereto. President said his government has made firm decision to return to Security Council this month. Said FonMin Bhutto would leave March 9 for New York. He did not seem worried about sponsorship of item in SC or outcome.
2. Without making frontal attack on his decision, I raised question as to wisdom of hurried resort to SC again without full consultation with friends. I noted possibility that some SC members might be antagonized by Pak tactics and that voting prospect might be somewhat less favorable for Pakistan now than in February. Some difficulty might be encountered in mustering affirmative votes for usual type of resolution by all non-Communist SC members. The tactical situation might argue strongly for different type of approach or at least a delay in renewal of Security Council effort.
3. President said GOP really had no alternative since it was fully committed to SC effort which was merely recessed last month. Abandonment now would be misinterpreted at home and abroad. President indicated he was aware that GRC would be in chair during March and apparently assumed continued fairly benevolent ChiNat posture.
4. I told President that if die was cast on reopening of matter in SC, further consideration should certainly be given procedure best calculated to enlist GOI cooperation in settlement effort. We still thought consensus approach least abrasive and offered better prospects [than resolution?] opposed by GOI and certain to be vetoed by USSR. We thought that a consensus statement making three essential points stressed by GOP (reaffirmation of standing UN position, confirmation of validity of self-determination principle, and invocation of some mediatory effort with assistance of UN SecGen), might again be sought.
5. President said a good consensus statement would be acceptable to Pakistan as substitute for resolution if Soviets and Indians could be induced not to oppose it. But he was convinced that it would be impossible to avoid Soviet and Indian opposition. In that event the GOP would prefer traditional type of resolution, even though vetoed by the USSR. The force of a resolution blocked only by Soviet misuse of veto would be understood by all, whereas a consensus statement probably somewhat watered down, and still objected to by Indians and Soviets, would not have much weight or meaning.
6. I paraphrased language used by Secretary in his recent Washington meeting with Bhutto to effect that India could not be coerced into Kashmir settlement. A durable settlement could only be attained by voluntary agreement of interested parties.
7. President said that GOP has sought voluntary agreement with India for many years without success. His government must question whether a purely conciliatory approach will have any effect on the GOI. He did not imply that the threat of force should be invoked, but he felt that more energetic diplomatic action by Pakistan was only course open in present situation. He did agree up to a point about the futility of coercion, but he clearly felt that activist measures short of that must be resorted to in order to compel the Indians to see that a solution must be achieved.
8. President said deliberately and with emphasis that his government was now determined to press continuously on the Kashmir issue until settlement reached. He said his government will not give GOI any rest until then.
9. Other principal topic of conversation was recent Chou En-lai visit on which I obtained illuminating though not new or surprising background. This is covered in separate tel./2/
/2/ McConaughy concluded from his discussion of the Chou En-lai visit with Ayub that Ayub wanted to play the role of honest broker in establishing more effective communication between the United States and China, but was coming to recognize the stumbling blocks in the way of any detente. (Telegram 1665 from Karachi, March 5; ibid.) The Embassy's overall assessment of the effect of the Chou visit, provided in telegram 1589 from Karachi, February 25, was that the visit, which concluded on February 26, had not substantially altered the character of relations between Pakistan and China.The process of "normalization" continued but ties had not been visibly broadened in the economic, cultural, or political realms, and Ayub and Bhutto had publicly reaffirmed Pakistan's adherence to its Western alliances during the visit. (Ibid., POL 7 CHICOM)
23. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 8, 1964.
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. I, Memos, 11/63-5/64. Secret.
Two Pak/Indian matters pose immediate problems. Recent evidence suggests that Ayub smells blood in his effort to lean on India over Kashmir, at a time when India is weak. He just told McConaughy he wouldn't let up until he got a settlement (Karachi 1654)./2/ We see his tactics as totally miscast. India's weakness will just lead it to dig its heels in harder, so the only result may be a big Kashmir crisis, perhaps this summer, which could reduce rather than enhance the prospects for settlement and catch us in the middle again to boot.
/2/ Document 22.
Even more worrisome, that tough bargainer Ayub seems to think he has us on the run, given our mild reaction to the Ayub-Chou love feast and our continued benign tolerance of constant flaying of us by the Pak press, plus public criticisms by Ayub himself. He'll be convinced of it if we now go in and dangle a five-year Military Assistance carrot before him, without simultaneous blunt talk about having reached the limits of our tolerance over his playing with Peiping at the very time when it is squeezing us in Southeast Asia. Indeed, we planned the five-year package (which as you recall has been kept free of any price tag) for the very purpose of permitting us to talk bluntly.
We here believe Ayub fully realizes how his utter dependence on us sets limits of tolerance beyond which he cannot go. But State's intelligence chief/3/ (just back from Karachi) says that the Paks are very pleased that these limits are so flexible, and will keep stretching them as far as they can.
/3/Thomas L. Hughes.
So it's time for us to do a bit of hard bargaining with Ayub by setting out firmly to him the terms on which we will continue US military and, implicitly, economic aid (several hundred million dollars a year). A five-year MAP approach (even on a no-commitment basis) is such a big carrot that unless we put the quid pro quo clear on it he may see it as another evidence we're caving. This will only encourage him to step up his pressure on India thus putting us on a direct collision course.
Talbot, our Near East Assistant Secretary, will see Ayub Wednesday,/4/ which is the time for setting out where we stand. Only if Talbot is clearly speaking for you, however, will he carry the necessary weight. As you know, Ayub believes in direct dealing at the top. So we suggest that you arm Talbot with the attached message which is carefully calculated for effect./5/
/4/ March 11. Talbot was scheduled to visit India and Pakistan as part of a tour of posts in the Middle East and South Asia.
/5/ Bundy sent this joint memorandum and the attached draft message to President Johnson on March 8 under cover of a shorter memorandum in which he made the point that they were designed to begin the job of "staightening out Ayub Khan, which will take a lot of time." Johnson checked the option line that reads: "Speak to me." He added a handwritten note that reads: "I'm against sending message to Talbot. If I know Ayub it will only incense him." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. I, Memos, 11/63-5/64) Bundy discussed the proposed message in a telephone conversation with Johnson on March 9. Johnson reiterated that he felt it would be a mistake to send a stiff message to Ayub in his name which Ayub would be certain to resent. Bundy agreed but repeated the case for taking a firm line: "The reason for talking firmly is that if we don't change the signals our man is going in there with a military assistance package, and we do not want them to think that we come right around with more cookies." Johnson approved sending a firm message through Talbot, one he anticipated would "make him [Ayub] come to us." (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, March 9, 1964, 4:27 p.m., Tape F64.16, Side B, PNO 1)
24. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador to India (Bowles)/1/
Washington, March 9, 1964.
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles (cont.). Secret.
We here have reacted with lively sympathy to your paeans of woe from Delhi, and have been doing all we can to help./2/
/2/On March 9, Bowles sent a [text not declassified] cable to Bundy and Komer stating his desire to return to Washington and express his concerns about South Asian policy directly to President Johnson. (Telegram 901600Z from New Delhi; ibid.) Bundy responded [text not declassified] and reassured Bowles that his cables were reaching the President and receiving serious consideration. Bundy added that he and Komer did not see "any far-reaching decisions on Kashmir, aid to India, or pre-empting Soviets being made quite yet, and frankly doubt whether your return just now would prove especially satisfying." (White House telegram CAP 64069 to New Delhi, from Bundy to Bowles, March 9; ibid.)
For what it's worth, my feeling (and Bob Komer's, too) is that we're the victims of an inevitable falling off in US/Indian relations from the high point of Winter 1962. There's no use blaming ourselves unduly that neither Washington nor Delhi can sustain the high pitch of collaboration which emerged from the Chicom attack. We've had trouble on our side sustaining the momentum of our relationship, but the Indian slate is by no means clean either. VOA was a fiasco, Bokaro failed at least partly because of Indian stickiness, and Delhi's handling of its military program has been so tediously slow as to damp much of our enthusiasm here. These are facts with which we must live.
As I see it, we're also going through the painful transition of disengaging from the out and out pro-Pak policy of the 1950's, and shifting to one more consonant with our real strategic interests. This is not an easy process at best, and I must say that neither our Pak nor our Indian friends make it any easier.
Of one thing you may be sure--the President too sees your problem with lively sympathy. His actions to date should lay to rest any unfounded Indian (or Pak) suspicions that he sees matters differently from his predecessor, and I may add that he is annoyed by these suspicions. His authorization of five-year MAP approaches (which marks much more of a departure in the case of India than in that of Pakistan) is ample evidence of his position.
But you in turn will understand that the struggle over AID is critical here. The President cannot expose his flank right now by promising amounts on which he may be unable to perform. I'm sure you realize this. And I know from what he's said that he counts on you to get this across in Delhi as no one else really could.
On top of all this, we have an election year; the moratorium on politics is over, and we're going to have to steel ourselves for a lot of silly fuss. So if we're a little slow in answering your mail or in responding to your counsel, bear with us. Once every four years Washington is on the firing line and we're going to have to get through November before we can turn as fully to our foreign concerns as our far-flung viceroys would like. So be of good cheer.
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
25. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/
Washington, March 9, 1964, 8:55 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PAK-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted in the White House and approved by Don T. Christensen (S/S). A draft of the telegram, March 9, 6 p.m., was initialed by Rusk. (Ibid.)
1182. For Talbot and Ambassador. The President is deeply concerned over the indication that Ayub intends to continue his policy of leaning on India (and on us), using the Chicoms as a lever. He desires that before opening five-year MAP discussions with the Paks we seek to reach the necessary degree of understanding on future US/Pak relations.
To this end President wants Talbot to make frank, straightforward exposition of the obligations as well as benefits of Pakistan's alliance with the US. Ayub must be made to understand that there are limits of US tolerance beyond which he cannot go if he wants continued US support and that he is close to these limits.
Talbot should make presentation as his own and should not state it as direct message from President, but he is authorized to say he is expressing opinion of entire USG and not just his own view or even that of Department on importance of preserving the basic Pakistani-US relationship which has served us both so well in the past. We fully aware of Pak unhappiness over our policy toward India, but believe Paks are now fully aware that for reasons of global anti-Communist strategy we are determined to help India.
Despite our differences, we on our side have continued our full support of Pakistan's vital economic development, we have sought to help bring about a Kashmir settlement, we have tried in a number of ways to reassure Paks of our support against any aggression--including one from India. But we cannot continue to sustain past close US/Pak relationship if it becomes more and more of a one-way street. In effect, while continuing to give lip service to alliance, Paks are adopting tactics quite inconsistent with overall US anti-Communist strategy in Asia, which necessarily focussing largely on Chicom threat. We are determined to face squarely our responsibility for helping to maintain the security of free Asia against the Chinese Communists until the nations concerned are strong enough to preserve it themselves. Pak policy cuts across this grain. When we are trying to stop Chinese Communist infiltration in Southeast Asia, Paks in effect seem to be encouraging them to make hay in South Asia.
Moreover, though we understand Pak motivations in using China to help them lean on India, we gravely doubt that it will produce the results Paks want. The Free World cannot afford to let India, any more than Pakistan, succumb to Communism or fall apart. As to Kashmir, we see Pak pressure tactics as forcing India to dig in its heels at a time of weakness, whereas making common cause with India against China could be far more productive.
Nor is it consonant with the spirit of our alliance to find ourselves the object of constant public harassment in Pakistan, even including high-level pronouncements.
You may say that President himself, who feels he knows Ayub well and admires what he has done for Pakistan, has expressed confidence Ayub will appreciate straight talk from us, and not misconstrue our candor. It is President's own earnest desire to see end to mutual back-biting, and reaffirmation of those strong mutual interests which still underlie US/Pak relationship, in order prevent this relationship from slipping further downhill.
We do not want you to mention five-year MAP approach till we have had chance to sort out Pak reactions to your political approach. Nor do we want you to link our failure to be forthcoming yet on MAP to our concerns above. We prefer to let Paks make this link themselves. If Paks raise MAP question you may say that we had hoped to be able start talking about ongoing MAP, but general atmosphere in USG (including sentiment on Capitol Hill) is such that pending further sorting out of foreign aid prospects and other matters we feel it better hold off. Should Ayub raise Indian discussions, you can reply that all we are telling Indians as yet is to come up with austere longer-term defense plans so we can have basis for later MAP decisions here too.
This message supplements Deptel 1174 to Karachi/2/ and should of course supersede it in event of any conflict.
/2/Telegram 1174 to Karachi, March 7, provided guidance for Talbot's impending discussions with Ayub. The Department stated that the principal objectives of the conversations should be to get a fresh assessment of the results of the Chou visit, and to establish a framework of political understanding within which it would be possible to move into a discussion of long-term military assistance to Pakistan. (Ibid., POL 7 PAK-US)
26. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
New Delhi, March 10, 1964, 1 p.m.
/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Karachi, London, and USUN.
2646. Embtel 2639./2/ In followup conversation with Desai evening March 8, Talbot explained US view of question SC Kashmir debate as set out Deptel 1806 and as also reflected Deptel 1807./3/ Desai heard him out and then set out GOI position even more sharply than it had emerged previous day. He said GOI is not going to concur or participate in resumption SC debate at present time and under circumstances of Pak request.
/2/ Telegram 2639 from New Delhi, March 9, reported on the initial meeting Talbot and Bowles had on March 7 with M. J. Desai, Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs. Desai laid out India's objections to a resumption of the Secretary Council debate on Kashmir, and accepted Talbot's point that the United States could not oppose a request made by any UN member for Security Council consideration of a pressing problem. (Ibid.)
/3/ Talbot visited India March 6-10. In telegrams 1806 and 1807 to New Delhi, both March 7, the Department suggested to Talbot that the best line to take with Indian officials concerning the resumption of Security Council debate on Kashmir was that a rapid crystallization of a consensus statement that would not damage the interests of either party would be the best way to minimize debate and avoid further heightening of tension between India and Pakistan. (Telegram 1806 is ibid., telegram 1807 is ibid., POL 7 CHICOM)
Furthermore, GOI is not going to discuss Kashmir with GOP at least until communal questions discussed and communal tensions tranquilized. He sought to dramatize importance this matter by citing, among other things, issuance 120,000 migration certificates to residents East Pakistan for removal to India.
On the Kashmir question, Desai said British High Commissioner Gore-Booth had on last day previous debate come to him with proposition India accept reference either in resolution or consensus to past resolutions calling them any name that would suit India. Desai said he had explained that India could take references to resolutions of August 13, 1948/4/ and Jan. 5, 1949,/5/ but no others; and of course full compliance with all recommendations of these resolutions would be precondition for progress on substance of issue.
/4/Printed in U.S. Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1948 (Department of State Publication 3437, 1949).
/5/ UN doc. S/1196.
Talbot said it would help USG's thinking in all this to know how far GOI intends to carry integration of Kashmir, public discussion of which in India does not help. Desai said that there is no intention or prospect of repeal of Article 370 of Indian Constitution but he gave impression steps short of this by Kashmir government itself, such as adopting titles chief minister and governor, will probably go ahead./6/
/6/ Talbot also discussed the Kashmir issue with Shastri, whom he found to be moderate and impressive in a way that reminded him of former President Truman. (Telegram 2662 from New Delhi, March 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) Talbot discussed the proposed military assistance agreement with Defense Minister Chavan, and emphasized the need for an Indian defense plan that gave primacy to the needs of economic development. (Telegram 2637 from New Delhi, March 9; Johnson Library, National Security Files, Country File, India, Cables, Vol. I, 12/63-11/64) On March 9 Talbot and Bowles paid a courtesy visit to Prime Minister Nehru. Talbot was shocked by Nehru's mental and psychological deterioration, and reported that "it was quite impossible to communicate with him." (Telegram 2659 from New Delhi, March 11; ibid.)
27. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/
Rawalpindi, March 11, 1964, 2145Z.
/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PAK-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House at 7:11 a.m. The telegram is a joint telegram from CUSASEC MAAG and the Embassy Office in Rawalpindi.
47. Dept to determine distribution if any to other posts. Ref: Deptels 1182 and 1174./2/
/2/ See Document 25 and footnote 2 thereto.
1. Assistant Secretary Talbot and I met with President Ayub March 11 at Lahore for one hour and 35 minutes./3/ Discussion covered fundamental aspects US-Pak relations with Talbot setting forth in clear terms deep US Govt. concern over current GOP policies toward Communist China and India as set forth Deptel 1182. Ayub was cordial, gave Talbot full hearing but responded in firm terms expounding familiar Pak position on these issues.
/3/ Talbot visited Pakistan March 10-13. On March 11 he met briefly with Foreign Minister Bhutto in Lahore where they discussed the Kashmir issue and U.S. concerns about Pakistan's relationship with China. In discussing Kashmir, Bhutto said that Pakistan would be prepared to accept a consensus statement as the result of the Security Council debate if the statement did not dilute Pakistan's position under prior UN resolutions. (Telegram 46 from Rawalpindi, March 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) On March 13 Talbot and Mc- Conaughy met with Finance Minister Shoaib. McConaughy had to leave the meeting before it was concluded and reported on the conversation in telegram 1724 from Karachi, March 13. (Ibid., ORG 7 NEA) Talbot reported on the conclusion of the conversation in telegram 51 from Rawalpindi, March 13. (Ibid., POL 2 PAK) Talbot and McConaughy repeated the concerns they had earlier expressed to Ayub in their conversation with Shoaib. Shoaib told them that Ayub's government intended to make a strong effort to reduce the dangerously high level of tension between Pakistan and India. Shoaib also said that he felt that Pakistan had "turned the corner" in its attitude toward the United States and he anticipated that relations would improve.
2. In preliminary discussion Ayub expressed his admiration for President Johnson and asked particularly that his personal regards be sent to President and Mrs. Johnson and to Mrs. Kennedy. He questioned Talbot on impressions gained at previous stops during Talbot's current trip and was particularly interested in Talbot's appraisal of Nehru's health. Talbot told Ayub Nehru not at all well although others in Delhi say he much improved. Talbot said he found in Delhi a mood on impending change in leadership but it quite uncertain how long it will take for change to take place and could be weeks, months or even year or two. He found Shastri impressive, quiet, serious and as man willing reach beyond set patterns. He mentioned Shastri prepared start talks on communal, refugee and eviction problems at whatever level desired. Ayub pointed out that he had offered such talks and GOI had avoided reply.
3. Following preliminaries, Talbot stated he wished to discuss with President Ayub basic state US-Pak relationship and how relationship can be reaffirmed and strengthened. US understood quite fully Pak concern over US policy toward India and we think Paks likewise recognize both strong efforts assure military aid to India will not have adverse effects feared by Pakistan as well as role played by aid to India in our basic anti-Communist posture in Asia. Naturally in this part of world our anti-Communist efforts directed against Communist China. Although we are also concerned by Soviet maneuvering, as we making clear in India. We are determined to help threatened countries in Asia to protect their security until they are strong enough protect themselves. US policy is to contain the Chinese Communist threat and do what is necessary to keep ChiComs from breaking out.
4. Talbot said that while US did not regard Chou En-lai visit by itself as necessarily damaging to US-Pak relations, Washington is increasingly anxious over indications that US and Pakistan approaches to Communist China issue are growing further and further apart. While we try to confine ChiComs in Southeast Asia, Pak actions seem to enable them to make hay in South Asia. He could report that USG as whole profoundly disturbed by this situation.
5. Talbot said US obviously has stake in stability and security of subcontinent. We would still like to pursue an overall subcontinental policy but until this possible in future we are working with India and Pakistan individually. However, US fearful that current differences in US-Pakistan tactical and strategic actions will cause at minimum confusion and doubt and at maximum much more serious problems. Talbot went on to point out that US assumes there are several things GOP desires from us: (a) credible assurances--which have been given, and are subject to refinement to assist Pakistan if attacked; (b) US continued commitment to its obligations under regional pacts; (c) continuation of US military and economic assistance; and (d) assistance in seeking resolution of Kashmir issue. US has met all of these requirements of Pakistan.
6. Talbot pointed out that in return US has certain requirements from Pakistan: (a) maintenance of its commitments to CENTO and SEATO which Ayub has recently reaffirmed; (b) assurances that Pak-ChiCom relations will not be permitted to develop in such way as to affect adversely US-Pak relations or disrupt US efforts to support and prop up countries in Asia resisting ChiComs (Talbot noted for example we would take amiss any Pak support for ChiCom initiatives with Afro-Asian nations against US security interests); (c) rejection of use of force against India. On substance of Kashmir issue, US stand is clear as restated recently by Secretary Rusk. We wish to be helpful. However, when we differ on tactics to gain this end, US must reserve to itself choice of means whose pursuit it will support. US is persuaded that unremitting pressure against India over Kashmir at this stage will have more adverse than favorable effects, for several reasons. First, political transition from Nehru is now at hand in India and pressure now on Kashmir would give leg up to anti-Pakistan extremists in resulting struggle for power. Secondly, within Kashmir current ferment could in itself produce real change but chances of this desired end far better if process allowed to develop without external pressures. US recognizes it differs with Pak on this issue but feels there is firm basis for its judgment.
7. In summing up, Talbot emphasized US anxious that it and Pakistan enjoy full, solid relationship which to benefit of both. We disturbed that Pak actions undermining our efforts to be helpful. As one example, we would like to see Pak restraint on criticism of US actions particularly since we feel we have exercised restraint towards Pakistan. With respect to China we know that Ayub perceives long-range ChiCom threat, but unhappily we differ on how to deal with Communist China. Concluding, Talbot said that President Johnson, who feels he knows Ayub well and who admires what Ayub has done for Pakistan, had felt that Ayub would appreciate candid statement of what is troubling us. Certainly President looks to strengthening of our relationship in spirit of mutual confidence.
8. Ayub then responded with restatement basic Pak position. First he stressed that Pakistan considers us its "natural friend" and, in fact, the "natural friend" of all small countries of Asia. In every instance where trouble arises from powerful neighbors--Soviet Union, Communist China and India--Asian countries look for friendship. Country most interested in their future is US. He reaffirmed Paks intended to continue membership in pacts. CENTO he especially considered vital for GOP protection; GOP also will remain in SEATO, which it joined mainly for sake of friendship with US, since it has no basic national interest of its own in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Pakistan will not interfere with US actions to protect Asia and, in fact, Pakistan wants to promote strength and prestige of US.
9. Ayub said, however, that while GOP understands and appreciates reasons for US aid to India, it differs from US on this issue. Neither India nor Pakistan can be defended by itself and all invasions into subcontinent have succeeded when people in area divided. Therefore, defense of subcontinent needs some sort of Indo-Pak settlement, but US does not further this objective by its aid to India.
10. Ayub then set forth his concerns over Indian military buildup, over US failure point out to India danger of internecine war with Pakistan, and over US unwillingness to press India for Indo-Pak settlement. He said GOP had examined time and again Indian military requirements for defense against Communist China. At most ChiComs could use 16 brigades in northern area with one or two more in reserve. Therefore, he questioned where India could use 16, let alone 21, divisions and 45 Air Force squadrons. Ayub pointed out even Chinese railroad to Lhasa will not drastically improve Chinese logic position since railroad will not be open during winter months and at best will have capacity for maintaining two or three divisions. GOP has concluded India intends to revert to its initial focus on Pakistan as no. 1 enemy and there will be no further hostilities between China and India. Indian military build-up is constant threat to Pakistan and while GOP has US guarantee it feels in last resort it will have to depend on own resources. Furthermore, Indian military build-up has hardened Indian stance generally. This has had upsetting effect on Pak public and has contributed to difficulties such as eviction of Muslims and border firings. Therefore, while US is helping India as part of its worldwide involvements, Pakistan is more anxious about effect on it of India's military build-up.
11. Ayub then went on to defend Pak-ChiCom border agreement stating Paks merely wished to avoid very situation India faced. He felt that, given difficult terrain in north and untenable military situation from Pak viewpoint vis-à-vis, Communist China, there was legitimate basis for border demarcation.
12. Ayub recognized it tragic that US-Pak relationship had become strained but what could we expect except that Pakistanis would be unhappy over US aid to India. He reiterated GOP has no intention of interfering with US actions in Asia and in fact wants to see US influence stay in area. He had made this point repeatedly in his trips to Burma, Ceylon and Malaysia. However, US-Pak relations had eroded due to US and Indian actions and Pakistan must decrease its military and political commitments in order to be free to deal with trouble from India.
13. On Chou En-lai's visit, Ayub said Chinese had asked to come several times before Paks agreed. During visit he had spent half of discussion time urging settlement with US and pressing ChiComs not to do anything which would aggravate situation in Asia since Paks feel any turmoil in Asia will affect US interests.
14. Ayub thought basic difference between US and Paks is attitude toward India and assessment Indian intentions. GOP, having tried conciliatory policy without success, feels moderate approach will not achieve results. Ayub said there no statesmanship in India today and Pak people feel US siding with India against Pakistan. This is deplorable situation and prospect is, while US policy in India continues on present course, US-Pak relations will encounter difficulties. Ayub said he will continue endeavor to keep things in check and not let events be taken out of context. This will not be simple task since he under great amount of pressure. He is one who must defend established policy, and our present course in India throws added load on him here.
15. Talbot and Ayub then engaged in spirited exchange with Talbot continually pressing Ayub particularly on questions of Pak-ChiCom relations and Pak views regarding India.
16. In discussing Indo-Pak relations Talbot raised further points:
(A) US feels its involvement in military assistance to India helpful and useful to Pakistan in part because of restraining influence it enables us to exert on Indian program. Ayub acknowledged US role is not entirely fruitless.
(B) US feels Pak tactics of harassment of India are troublesome and against Paks' own long-range interests, and complaints against our aid to India not helpful. Ayub responded that Paks should at least have right to complain even if they could not change the course of US policy. GOP feels it has been restrained in view of public reaction to US military aid to India.
(C) US feels Pak-ChiCom relationship as means of leaning of US on India is making our task of seeking settlement in subcontinent more complicated. Ayub responded that US asking too much if it wishes reduction of pressure on India. India for years has been maintaining overwhelming pressures on Pakistan seeking its isolation, neutralization and surrender. In response Paks must "keep India engaged." GOP is not asking ChiComs to support it in this venture. GOP continues to exclude ChiCom influence from Pakistan, and has no capability to affect ChiCom efforts elsewhere. If India wants Pak-ChiCom relationship ended, it can achieve this by agreeing to Indo-Pak settlement. GOP is prepared to search for "honorable peace," but it will not surrender or in current circumstances give up its right to keep India "engaged." Pakistan today has no alternative but steady counter-pressure on India. It considers India aggressor and sees no basis for Indian fears of Pakistan since India is five times as strong as Pakistan.
(D) Talbot stressed US can be helpful only if there is reduction in Indo-Pak tensions. Ayub responded that reduction of tension can only take place at "power house" where generated. Pakistan only reflects emissions beamed on it by India. India continuing pressure on Pakistan as indicated by evictions, integration of Kashmir, etc. However, if India takes half step toward reduction of tensions GOP prepared to take full step. Ayub said he would give his personal guarantee in writing on this point. Talbot pointed out GOP actions however have effect of cancelling out efforts to decrease pressures.
(E) Ayub urged that we discuss first with Pakistan any initiatives we wish to take in India to reduce tensions and promised to give his best advice and lend full assistance. Talbot said all our efforts directed toward peace, security and progress in subcontinent.
17. Talbot returned to Pak-ChiCom relations, reiterating that these of major concern to us. He pointed out Pak-ChiCom relationship not only troubles us, but makes it more difficult for those Indians interested in Indo-Pak reconciliation to be helpful. Ayub responded "Let them be troubled." However, he again assured Talbot that GOP will do nothing that will jeopardize US interests. Talbot responded that ChiComs gaining opening in South Asia through Pak relationship which in fact cuts sharply across US policy.
18. When we pressed him, Ayub said that GOP seeking only "very limited relationship" with ChiComs based on three main requirements:
(A) A neighborly relationship with ChiComs but not developing beyond this point; (B) a window on Peking; and (C) Chinese markets for Pak exports since restrictive import policies of ECM and US hamper exports of manufactured goods to these areas. Ayub indicated Paks not prepared to cut back this relationship as thus defined, since GOP has other enemies besides Communists, e.g. India. When Talbot observed extension of Pak-ChiCom relationship would be of grave concern to us, Ayub replied that when Chou En-lai in Pakistan, Paks refused to discuss even innocuous cultural agreements because US is "touchy." Pressed further about intentions Ayub said that while relationship strictly limited today no absolute guarantee can be given about future. Ayub said Pakistan wants no changed policy and sees no need to shift from present limited relationships unless US should further compromise Pakistan's position, which would be great tragedy. Ayub also felt it against US interests not to have tentacles in Communist China while at same time viewing ChiCom policy toward US as "very foolish."
19. In somewhat repetitious final go-around on our concerns and Pak reactions, Talbot emphasized that US shaping its policies in South Asia with great care to assure minimum provocation and maximum helpfulness to both Pakistan and India. On military aid to India, for example, he could imagine no other country directly attacked by ChiComs which would have received so little US aid as it braced itself against possible invasion. We had limited our response to Indian requests primarily out of deference to Pak anxieties arising out of unresolved Pak-Indian disputes. Ayub described himself as grateful for this. Talbot continued with hope GOP in turn would understand US anxieties, foremost among them ChiComs breaking out through South Asia thanks to Paks. He wanted be sure Ayub understood depth of US feeling on this point. Ayub did not budge in his response. He said Paks do not wish to dictate US policy toward ChiComs but must have right to reduce tensions with other neighbors while India's power expanding. For good measure he added that while US has given assurances of support to GOP, Paks feel US might have difficulty delivering on these assurances. If it did Soviets might threaten to join in on India's side, thus escalating the struggle. Pakistan would prefer to fight its own battles.
As conversation shifted to general topics and meeting came to close, Ayub again asked that his highest respects be conveyed to the President.
Comments will follow in separate message./4/
/4/ Document 28.
28. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/
Rawalpindi, March 12, 1964, 1946Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Cental Files 1964-66, POL PAK-US. Secret; Immediate. Passed to the White House at 6:33 p.m. The telegram is a joint telegram from CUSASEC MAAG and the Embassy Office in Rawalpindi.
48. Dept to determine any further distribution. Ref: Emboff tel 47./2/ Fm Talbot. Ambassador McConaughy and I share several major impressions of Ayub's responses to my representation. We read his statements as again demonstrating that the American connection is fundamental to his policy. He sees no alternative to this for Pakistan, nor indeed any alternative to an American presence in free Asia if latter is to survive. Equally, I felt, he is directing Pak policies with assurance of a man persuaded that the US is reciprocally reliant on its Pakistan connection in an Asia awash in neutralism.
/2/ Document 27.
Ambassador suggests Ayub is also increasingly influenced by evidence that US is "allowing" other allies--e.g., France, Britain, and now Turkey and Greece--substantially greater latitude than previously to take independent and even disruptive actions without destroying alliance relations, and applies this lesson to what he sees as his political needs in Pakistan.
It was in this context, I believe, that Ayub replied to our démarche for restraint in his dealings with ChiComs and India. Paks feeling virtuous after having demonstrated capability of restraint during Chou's visit from which, they point out, emerged not even previously expected cultural agreement. Paks therefore feel we should be satisfied with their performance in dealing with ChiComs at no cost to West, leaving them free at will to use their new ChiCom connections as pressure against India. I am uncertain how far our talk led Ayud away from this comfortable assumption, but at minimum it should intensify debate that has recently occupied top echelons here over American limits of tolerance. Ayub obviously gave very little ground in conversation. Ambassador and I feel, however that he and his advisors might now consider that their actions have carried them closer to our toleration limits than some may heretofore have believed. This should increase their anxiety over effect on US of further "normalization" moves proposed by ChiComs and also their caution in openly using ChiCom relationship for ploys against India.
On India Ayub's line is even more defiant than last year. I made no visible dent on his expressed determination to put unremitting pressure on India until something gives on Kashmir. He scorned idea that a more cooperative posture would be more persuasive with those blessed Hindus. Repeatedly he brushed aside my argument that Pakistan's hard line, like its dalliance with China, renders ineffective US efforts to influence India toward compromise on Indo-Pak issues. He appraises Indian position on these, especially Kashmir, as adamant and reciprocates heartily by equal adamacy. If this is in part a posture assumed for our benefit, it obviously also carries explosive potentials. Ayub's attitude may rest on several separate judgments. In circumstances of today he feels he has more latitude than last year to press publicly and deliberately against India without damage to Pak interests. He presumably believes Pak's relations with other Afro-Asian countries stronger than last year while India's prestige has dropped. His philosophy of use of power clearly impels him to strive for settlement of dispute by pressing hard on opponent, taking full advantage of situations of weakness. This leads him to judgment Pakistan relatively stronger now vis-à-vis India than likely to be several years hence. Finally, in strong stand on Kashmir he appeals to emotions of Pakistani patriotism and solidarity which are mainsprings of support to his regime.
Ayub appears to be playing complicated game in mixed atmosphere of frustration and self confidence. Several recent actions, such as return to Security Council, suggest Paks in mood to follow impulses to act, but then anxious to try to bring US aboard. Object, of course, is to make every effort keep Kashmir question in motion, but not lose Americans in process. Meanwhile, it is increasingly clear that Ayub, for reasons of dignity or otherwise, has put out instruction that Paks shall not make any assistance requests. Paks have never mentioned deferred Dacca airport loan. General LeMay said nobody raised MAP questions with him, nor have I encountered any such request. It would seem evident Paks unwilling get themselves in begging position while sorting our present troubles in overall relationship with US.
At same time Ambassador points out Ayub's references to "cutting commitments" reflect his current unwillingness to commit troops outside Pakistan for CENTO or SEATO purposes, as well as evident reluctance to take on any new or expanded commitments.
Before leaving subcontinent I hope to send you some comments on our policy dilemmas in South Asia. Meanwhile it is apparent our problems in Pakistan have not been resolved./3/
/3/The telegram was transmitted via military channels and bears no signature.
29. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs (Buffum) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Gardner)/1/
Washington, March 23, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Limited Official Use. Drafted by John W. Kimball of UNP.
In response to your inquiry, the following is a digest of recent Security Council consideration of the Kashmir problem.
At the request of the Indian Representative (which was moved to a vote by the Czech Representative), the Security Council on March 20 agreed to adjourn debate on the Kashmir question until May 5. The non-communist "nine" of the Security Council subscribed to a statement made to the Council by Brazil's Ambassador Bernardes which inter alia reserved the right of the Security Council President or any Member to reconvene the Council before May 5 should new developments of a military or political nature alter or worsen the situation prevailing in Jammu and Kashmir. Bernardes also appealed to the parties to "refrain from any action or threat of action capable of endangering international peace and security or likely to make this already complex and delicate problem still more intractable."
As you know, Pakistan first requested the Security Council to deal with what it termed in January a worsening situation in Kashmir. The Council met between February 3 and 17 to hear Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto and Indian Minister for Education Chagla exchange views on this problem.
During these sessions in February, the United States did not assume its previous overtly-active role in the negotiations and tried to avoid the introduction of a resolution which we believed would be vetoed by the USSR. We wished instead to quietly arrange a consensus statement by the Council to the effect that communal harmony in the sub-continent should be restored, that the parties should resume negotiations to settle their outstanding differences, including Kashmir, and the possibility of third-party mediation, with some sort of assistance from the UN Secretary-General, should be considered. Although the "nine" favored this approach, the Indians rejected any mention of "past actions" or "past proceedings" (referring to past UN resolutions) in the operative paragraphs of the consensus and subsequently the Pakistanis withdrew their earlier agreement to a consensus, stating that a resolution, even if vetoed, would be preferable. At this point, Bhutto abruptly moved an adjournment, ostensibly to enable him to return home for further consultations, but apparently to play host to Chou En Lai.
After Chou left, Pakistan requested the Security Council to resume its consideration of the Kashmir issue, but India, in its turn, found it desirable to oppose this move, arguing that its ministerial-level personnel were occupied in budget matters before the Indian Parliament and could not travel to New York before late April.
Eventually, however, the Council met again on March 17, with Pakistan represented by Bhutto and India by its Permanent Representative, Chakravarty. After a moderate statement by Bhutto outlining his government's views on the situation in Kashmir, Chakravarty asked for an adjournment of the Council to late April or early May to enable India to be properly represented before the Council. The Czech Representative supported this call for adjournment and requested a vote under Rule 33 (3) for adjournment to May 5. Ambassador Bernardes, however, persuaded the Czech to withdraw his motion and suggested instead that the Council suspend discussion for several days in order to permit consultations among the Members on the question of adjournment for the longer period.
Between March 17 and 20, there was considerable activity in New York among the "nine" to see in what ways India's request for adjournment could be "conditioned" to show the Council's continuing interest in progress on the Kashmir question as well as to meet, at least in part, the desire of Mr. Bhutto to hold the line against further Indian moves (which were also contrary to the spirit of the UN's previous resolutions) to integrate Kashmir into the Indian Union.
Although the US tended to favor adjournment at this time in order to relieve the Indian domestic scene of as much pressure as possible during a difficult transition period, we were also reluctant to have Mr. Bhutto leave New York after such a short and inconclusive Security Council session. It was apparent that the non-permanent members of the Security Council were hopeful of achieving some progress on the Kashmir issue and somewhat irked at the manner in which India's Chakravarty was demonstrating a lack of cooperation in this regard. We further believed it desirable from the standpoint of Indo-Pak relations to leave as little "vacuum" as possible between the two SC meetings (March and May) on the Kashmir problem.
We thus encouraged and supported Ambassador Bernardes in his efforts to draft and obtain agreement for another consensus statement which would have been read by the SC President on March 20 when the Czech motion to adjourn was considered. However, the Soviets and Czechs, presumably at the behest of India, did not agree to placing "conditions" on the adjournment, arguing that no such conditions had been imposed on the earlier Pakistani request for adjournment. It was finally arranged for Ambassador Bernardes to read his own statement during discussion of the motion, and that like-minded members of the "nine" would subscribe to it in short statements of their own.
In an interesting exchange on March 20 after the SC Members had spoken, Foreign Minister Bhutto took the floor and praised Bernardes' efforts while at the same time noting that if events required a new Security Council meeting before May 5, it was his understanding and the understanding of a majority of Security Council Members that such a meeting could be called at any time. Bhutto pledged that no political, military, administrative, or judicial steps would be taken by Pakistan to alter the existing situation in the area, and asked for similar assurances from the Indian Representative. Chakravarty surprised the Council Members by responding that Jammu-Kashmir is an integral part of India, regardless of the opinion of the Pakistani Foreign Minister or SC Members, and that India would continue its integration moves, notwithstanding the feelings of the Pakistanis, Council Members, or anyone else./2/
/2/ The Embassy in New Delhi reported on March 26 that Lal Bahadur Shastri told the Lok Sabha that the Security Council had not placed any restrictions on India regarding the full integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India. He doubted that it would be possible to take action regarding Article 370 during the current session of the Kashmir state assembly, since the assembly was about to adjourn. But he added: "The Foreign Minister of Pakistan can say what he likes. We will do what we want." (Telegram 2841 from New Delhi; ibid., POL 10 INDIA)
This last exchange, reports USUN, dismayed members of the "nine" and led Benhima (Morocco) to tell Ambassador Yost after the SC Session that, should India persist in its integration moves in Jammu and Kashmir, he (Benhima) would call for a new Council meeting before the May 5 date.
[Continue with the next documents]