97/10/15 Daily Press Briefing

The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released online from January 1, 1997 to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for current material from the Department of State. Or visit http://2001-2009.state.gov for information from that period. Archive sites are not updated, so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.

U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

HAITI
1,8-9	Secretary Albright's Visit to Haiti, October 17/Purpose/Itinerary

MIDDLE EAST
1	Statement on Behalf of the Chairman of the Monitoring Group in Lebanon
1,3-4	Doha Economic Conference/Meeting of Steering Committee to Discuss Preparations/Level of Participation in Conference


DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
1-2,7-8	Secretary Albright Asks UN Ambassador Richardson to Lead High-Level Mission to Congo/Purpose/Details


IRAN
2,4-5	Pipeline Project Proposed by Shell/Iran-Libya Sanctions Act
2-3	Total Contract with Iran
12	Iran's Threat to US Ships in the Region

REPUBLIC OF CONGO
5-6,13	Update on Fighting /Angolan Troop Involvement/Prospects for Peacekeeping Force

EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
9-10	EU Discussions on Helms-Burton

LATIN AMERICA
10	US Arms Sales Policy

COLOMBIA
11	Upcoming Local Elections/Intimidation

PANAMA
11	US-Panama Discussions on Multinational Counternarcotics Center

MALAYSIA
11-12	Prime Minister Mahathir's Comments re Fall of Malaysian Currency

IRAQ
12	Kurdish Fighting in Northern Iraq
12-13	Reported Turkish Air Force Involvement in Fighting

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. I have a few pieces of business, before we get to the all-important question and answer period.

First of all, Secretary Albright has adjusted her schedule a little further, and will be arriving in Haiti on Friday earlier in the day. So we'll have a full day of activities in Haiti, involving several meetings with the President and parliamentarians and other political officials, as well as a visit to several sites outside Port-au-Prince and the direct presidential capital.

We're still working on the schedule. Again, for those of you who are interested in joining us there, you should talk to Carrie Goux and Jim Foley. But the time there has now moved from four to five hours to eight to nine hours, so the schedule will fill up.

Secondly, we will have a statement posted on behalf of the chairman of the Monitoring Group in Lebanon. Thirdly, let me say the following about the Doha Economic Conference. The Doha Conference Steering Committee met yesterday, October 14, to discuss preparations for the fourth annual economic conference to be held in Doha, Qatar, November 16-18, 1997.

Delegations from Qatar, Egypt, Tunisia, Russia, Jordan, Morocco, Israel, Canada, the European Union, the European Commission, Japan, the Council on Foreign Relations and the World Economic Forum attended that Steering Committee meeting. Representatives affirmed participation in the event and discussed logistical preparations. It was a productive meeting. The Secretary of State is still intending to go to that meeting, and we are hopeful that meeting will be as successful as possible.

Turning to another region of the world before we go to your questions, Secretary Albright has asked US Ambassador to the United Nations, Bill Richardson, Special Envoy Howard Wolpe, and Representative Donald Payne, to participate in a high-level US mission to the Congo. Ambassador Richardson will lead that delegation. Ambassador Richardson will be available to travel the middle of next week. It is possible that Special Envoy Wolpe and Representative Payne could depart earlier, in light of Ambassador Richardson's schedule.

This is the mission you've heard a little bit about here and there. The mission is intended to try to bridge the differences between the United Nations and the Government of the Congo so that the human rights team of the United Nations can proceed to conduct a full investigation of reported abuses. We're trying to see what we can do to help break the impasse that has made it impossible for that team to do its work, and made it extremely difficult for the Congo to move beyond the cycle of violence that the civil war created and move toward the democratic process and move toward economic reconstruction.

So that mission will take place. Secretary Albright has asked those officials to go. Ambassador Richardson will lead the team. The exact details of their departure times are still being worked out, but it should be the middle of next week.

QUESTION: Over the long weekend, a story surfaced about Shell exploring or negotiating to build a $2.5 billion gas pipeline across Northern Iran. And the Turkmenistan foreign minister said he had a greenish light. He wanted a green one, but he said he could detect a greenish hue in the US attitude toward this project. I wonder if he is color-blind, and I also wondered if the deal in any way impinges on your difficult efforts to isolate Iran. These are your good friends; these are the British and the Dutch who own Shell - a British and Dutch concern, I mean.

MR. RUBIN: No. There has been no green, greenish, green-tinted, green-shaded, green- of-any-kind light. We have given no approval for any pipeline across Iran. We have said before, and let me repeat today, we will examine carefully any proposal for trans-Iranian pipelines in light of the provisions of our laws. If any such project is found to involve sanctionable activity, we will take appropriate action under the law. This project is no exception.

We did indicate last July that Turkey's gas plans, involving the purchase of gas from Turkmenistan, do not appear to constitute sanctionable activity under the law. We regard Turkey's decision to purchase gas from Turkmenistan rather than Iran as a positive development. We did not give approval for any pipeline across Iran, and any such project would be carefully scrutinized. That is our position.

Our strong preference is that Caspian petroleum resources reach Western markets by non-Iranian routes. The Total deal, unlike the Shell deal, involves the development of Iranian resources in an off-shore gas deal. The Shell project reportedly involves a pipeline to transport these very Turkmen gas that I've referred to.

We will look at it. The Turkish Government has assured us that Turkey's current gas plans do not include the purchase of Iranian gas, and we have confidence in those assurances. The pipeline that has been reported is one that involves a purchase of gas that we regard as better than the prospect of it being purchased from Iran, because it's being purchased from Turkmenistan. Again, we will take a look at any contract as we get hold of the details. But there's a difference between purchasing gas from Turkmenistan and purchasing gas from Iran.

QUESTION: While we're at it, is there anything to update the Total situation, the French?

MR. RUBIN: I don't have any new information for you, other than to say that we continue to investigate all the aspects of this contract and make sure that our people are in touch with the governments and the companies to the extent that we can get maximum information, so that when and if we do make a determination, that we're in a position to have all the facts straight and make that determination as complete as possible.

QUESTION: Just back on Doha, for a second, Jamie. You're saying that Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt all told you yesterday that they do plan to attend the summit?

MR. RUBIN: They participated in the meeting. We do expect those countries to send representatives, yes.

MR. RUBIN: I don't have all the details. I don't think that all of these countries that may or may not come have made decisions on that. We'll have to see what the level of representation is. The invitations were just issued last week.

We do believe there will be representation at the foreign minister level. How many foreign ministers go is still an open question. And as the Secretary made clear on her trip, and I have told you in the past, we do recognize reality; and the reality is that in the absence of continued improvements in the Middle East peace process, it will be difficult to get the best possible summit. That doesn't mean we have changed our view of the summit. We believe that participating in this event is in the self-interest of the countries of the Middle East; it is not a favor to Israel.

Ambassador Ross will be going back to the region at the end of this week. That is the next step in the peace process. He will be having meetings this weekend to discuss both the interim committee progress, as well as the four-part agenda on security, on the time-out, on further redeployments and final status negotiations.

Our goal is to begin the accelerated talks as soon as possible. To the extent that Ambassador Ross and Secretary Albright's efforts improve the situation, we would hope that it would improve the representation and therefore improve the success of the conference.

QUESTION: So, there has been some improvement in the peace process, and apparently these countries are responding to that.

MR. RUBIN: Well, the exact linkage between these countries' response and the improvement of the peace process, I would leave for them to say.

We don't want there to be a linkage, because we don't believe that linkage makes sense. We believe that developing the Middle East economically is in the interest of all the parties, regardless of whether there is an up or a down in the cycle of the Middle East peace process. And it's up to them to say whether their current willingness to send people or the level of their representation is a function of that process.

As a realist, the Secretary has said that in her meetings with the Gulf Cooperation Council ministers, it was clear to her that the more successful we are in the peace process, the more successful the Doha Summit will end up being.

QUESTION: Finally is it your understanding that the Saudis, at some level, and the Kuwaitis plan to attend the summit?

MR. RUBIN: I don't have an answer at what level. I do believe there will be representation from Saudi Arabia of some kind.

QUESTION: Could I go back to the pipeline deal? Two questions - the first one, a technical one. I thought the so-called --

MR. RUBIN: Excuse me. We would certainly hope that, as the process improves and as the Saudi Arabian Government looks at this issue, they would see the wisdom of sending the highest possible representation so the conference could be as successful as possible.

QUESTION: Jamie, not to be picky - although someone picked on something I wrote a while ago - you still call it a summit? I mean, summit suggests the top people. You referred to it as a summit. It looks like you'll be lucky to have a foreign ministers meeting. I mean, I know you --

QUESTION: Or putting it in a question form, how many heads of government do you realistically expect --

QUESTION: Back on the pipeline. First, a technical one - my recollection is that ILSA referred to oil and gas field investments. Does that include pipelines?

MR. RUBIN: We can get you a legal answer to that question. What I've been trying to do is deal with specific cases as best as I can here from the podium, and describe the difference between a deal that involves gas from Iran and gas from Turkmenistan. Precisely how you define gas from Iran, which is your question, I would prefer to let the lawyers give you an answer to it.

QUESTION: A non-technical question -- given this report of the British-Dutch proposal and the Turkmenistan pipeline, do you see or do you worry about any cumulative process which will have the effect of reducing the isolation of Iran that you hope to achieve?

MR. RUBIN: On the contrary, if one wouldn't take a snapshot and one would look at the process, one would see that the original proposals for gas that the Turkish Government was considering involved the possibility of gas from Iran.

After we worked the problem and worked with the Turkish Government, a proposal was proffered that does not involve gas from Iran. So therefore, the Iranian engagement, economically, was greatly and significantly reduced.

If you want to look at stories in a snapshot, just because that's when they happen to appear in the newspaper, you might get a different impression.

QUESTION: The Republic of Congo. As you know, the situation there is deteriorating. You have the introduction of Angolan troops. You have the Security Council considering a resolution for an arms embargo and for dispatch of a military team, and possibly the eventual deployment of peacekeepers. Do you have anything to say on any of that?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. The forces of former President Sassou are apparently in control of Brazzaville. Our Embassy in Kinshasa, located just across the river from Brazzaville, reports that as of this morning, there was no longer any significant firing in Brazzaville. We also understand that Angolan troops allied with Sassou have captured Pointe-Noire, the country's main seaport and second largest city.

We have raised the question of Angolan troop involvement directly with the Angolan charge here. Ambassador Steinberg, our able Ambassador in Rwanda, has raised it directly with the Angolan Foreign Minister. We have made clear to the Angolans, in this context, that we expect them to help safeguard US lives in Pointe-Noire.

The point is that we do not support their involvement there, that they don't belong there. They belong in Angola, and we would prefer to see the Angolan Government spending its time and energy focused on implementing the Lusaka Protocols and their own peace agreement, rather than in other countries involved in violence of this kind.

As far as the question of a peace-keeping force, we have not reacted negatively to proposals for a peace-keeping force. We have always supported the Secretary General's efforts to prepare for a possible peace-keeping force. But the Secretary General's own preconditions were not met.

The point now is that there is a new situation. That peace-keeping force was envisaged in a situation where there was going to be a cease-fire; where two factions, or parties, I guess - to avoid insulting any one of them - were going to engage in a cease-fire and a peace-keeping force might help to contribute to that cease-fire.

It looks like that situation has been overtaken by events. Now we're in a situation where Mr. Sassou's forces control Congo, Brazzaville. Therefore, we're in a different situation. And what we want to look to now--assuming the consolidation of his control--is a process by which elections can be organized, civilian rule can be returned, and then this country can return to some degree of normalcy.

We are working, and hope to continue to work with the Secretary General's Special Representative, Mr. Sahnoun, as well as the President of Gabon, on this process. But I think the context in which the peace-keeping force was examined has dramatically changed. We're dealing with new circumstances, and we assume that these new circumstances will be discussed in the UN Security Council. The question of a peace-keeping force would then be addressed under these new circumstances, where you don't have two parties engaged in a cease-fire.

And in that context, we would want to look to the future, and be open to the possibility of some UN role in trying to achieve the objectives I laid out for the future there.

QUESTION: Well, do you have anything on the proposal for a military team, a small military team as a prelude to an eventual peace-keeping force?

MR. RUBIN: First let me say that the context has changed dramatically in the last day or so. That is the most important point. We would have to see what that team would be proposing to do, and then we would be prepared to take a look at it.

Let me state flatly, we don't oppose such a team, but we want to make sure that any discussion or action in this area now reflects the new and dramatically changed circumstance.

QUESTION: Jamie, I don't quite understand. Do you or do you not support Kofi Annan calls for a peace-keeping mission there?

MR. RUBIN: I think I've been clear. The answer is, Koffi Annan's call for a peace-keeping force was in the context of a very different situation on the ground.

Koffi Annan himself proposed the possibility of a peace-keeping force under certain conditions - that there was a cease-fire, that there was a political settlement, and that the mission of the force could be set forth.

One doesn't need a cease-fire in a case where one party now owns the real estate. One is in a different context. So what we would be prepared to do is to take a look at any proposals for an advance team and/or peacekeeping or UN involvement of some kind, so long as they were in the context of the new situation. The new situation doesn't require the separation of forces or the monitoring of the separation of forces. It requires getting the country's leadership to agree to free and fair elections, to agree to civilian rule, and to agree to a process by which one gets there.

QUESTION: On the Congo, can you tell us a little more about this delegation that Richardson is going to lead? And what is it that he's going to bring, I presume to the President there, that he didn't in his meeting a couple months ago?

MR. RUBIN: Well, there were a number of people considered for the mission. Secretary Albright's selection of Ambassador Richardson, Special Envoy Wolpe and Congressman Payne was based on their availability, their familiarity with the situation, and very importantly, all three of them have met and know President Kabila. He is the key actor. He is the player who has put his country outside the norms of international behavior by refusing to allow this UN team to go in and investigate.

We are hopeful that through direct dialogue, Ambassador Richardson can use the diplomatic skills that he has demonstrated around the world--as well as Congressman Payne and Special Envoy Wolpe--to convince Mr. Kabila that a failure to resolve this problem will redound to the permanent disadvantage of his people. Every leader occasionally needs to be reminded that he is supposed to be leading for the purpose of improving the lot of his people.

A failure to the UN investigation to go forward will only serve to prevent Congo from reentering the community of nations, from having access to international financial support, from having the diplomatic support of key countries in the region as well as the United States, and from being able to be considered a normal country. A failure to allow that mission is the kind of behavior that only the most outcast kind of states have taken.

So what we're hoping is, because they know him, because they may have a fix on what he needs to know about the mission and what he needs to satisfy himself that there are carrots at the end of the road, that they may be able to dissuade him from this intransigent position that has put his people in such economic and political jeopardy.

QUESTION: Is it premature to say that if their mission is not successful, that the United States will then move to consideration of sanctions of the type you just mentioned?

MR. RUBIN: I think what I was suggesting was that we have made clear that our support for the Congo -- assistance, bilateral and multilateral -- is contingent upon resolving this problem. As far as moving to a negative sanction, meaning trying to pursue a Security Council resolution prohibiting X, Y or Z, that is premature. We are still hopeful that if this mission gets moving next week, and if Ambassador Richardson does the job that he's done in the past, that Mr. Kabila will get the message, will be in a position to change his behavior. If that doesn't work, I'll be prepared to entertain that question at that time.

QUESTION: Jamie, to follow up on that, if I remember right, it was basically the same message, though, two or three months ago. So at what point do you consider -

QUESTION: -- look, Kabila, if you want international recognition, then you need to behave in a way that the international community accepts as normal. Is he going to reiterate that?

QUESTION: Is he going to bring a new thing - maybe short of threatening sanctions, or a negative response, as you put it?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of that kind of package of carrots and sticks in his quiver. Sometimes leaders need to hear a message more than once if they're going to get it. Yes, you can fit carrots and sticks in a quiver.

Sometimes you need to repeat a message for a leader to get it. And hopefully, Mr. Kabila will get it when the message is delivered by Ambassador Richardson.

MR. RUBIN: The details of his trip are still being worked out, and we'll try to get you them. But the planning is for next week.

QUESTION: I just want to go back to Haiti. I wasn't here yesterday, so please forgive me if I'm asking a redundant question.

QUESTION: Listened to it on C-SPAN a little bit, but that was about it. Just to ask the why about why the Secretary's going now. Why is this a good time? I don't think there's been an visit by an official since '95, I read of the State Department.

QUESTION: And I'm just curious as to what she hopes to really be her mission here by this visit, and why we're having it now.

MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright has been involved in the Haiti issue from the beginning. As UN Ambassador, she was directly involved in seeing the consequences for the United States and for the world of the regime that was in place there - including refugees on our shores, including human rights abuses of a horrific kind, including thwarting the will of the international community. And the process by which Haiti's democracy was restored is something that she was a prime participant in. She has visited there before twice as UN Ambassador, and believes very strongly that one of the reasons why some of these problem countries stay problems is because senior officials fail to sustain an interest after the crisis is over.

So she has encouraged Under Secretary Wirth, Director of AID, Brian Atwood, other senior officials, Deputy Secretary Talbott--former National Security Advisor Lake went there-- as part of a process which is designed to underscore for the Haitian people, for the Haitian Government that we have a continuing interest in this problem. We've made a large investment there. We're going to continue to pay attention because we care about what happens to Haiti.

In order for the democracy to blossom, that we helped restore, and in order for the economic development to be created, senior officials need to stay involved and visit and learn the situation, and then encourage the necessary action.

Obviously, it's geographically convenient to return from South America through Haiti, and that's part of the factor. Scheduling was part of the factor. But the overall policy has been, by her, to encourage senior officials to go there to demonstrate our continuing interest. And that's why she's going.

QUESTION: I'm sorry, you seem to be suggesting a tone of neglect, in a way, toward Haiti. Was this at all in response to --

MR. RUBIN: No, on the contrary. I'm saying as a general proposition, she has observed around the world that a failure to follow up, following a peace-keeping force, following the crisis has harmed countries around the world - not Haiti, but a recognition of that phenomenon-- is what has led her to encourage senior officials to pay attention to Haiti, and is one of the factors that led her to decide to go.

QUESTION: Back on sanctions, today is October 15, and business is closed in Europe. Have you any idea whether the European Union is going to go ahead with its threat to go to the WTO on Helms-Burton?

MR. RUBIN: My understanding from the delegation is they are continuing their intensive consultations with the European Union in Brussels. These talks are expected to continue into the night. It is just starting to be night there. We expect to have a more definitive read-out on their progress tomorrow.

QUESTION: And has anything changed on the US interpretation of Helms-Burton?

MR. RUBIN: I mean, I can review with you the statement that Assistant Secretary Larson issued, but nothing has changed.

QUESTION: Jamie, going back towards the Southern Hemisphere, what will the lifting of the ban or prohibition on sales of certain kinds of arms to Latin American countries -- and the President there now - I was curious if the United States has put into place any sort of machinery to deal with that process. Are there deals that are aborning? Anything new on that front?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. Briefly stated, again, the change was from a presumption against advanced arms sales to a consideration on a case-by-case basis. There wasn't a ban; there was a presumption against it, and now they are being treated on a case-by-case basis.

There is a senior level interagency committee, including senior officials from the State Department, the Defense Department and elsewhere, that examines both requests for information from civilian governments in Latin America, as well as potential equipment that American contractors might have available - American companies might have available.

What happens is that the requests can come in two forms. They can come in the form of requests for information about a system that a country is potentially interested in buying, and they can also come in a request for a sale. I have been advised by the participants in this process that there have not been any major proposals for arms transfers in this advanced category that have come about as a result of this change in policy.

So we are not seeing the floodgates opened to major arms sales in Latin America. That hasn't happened. In fact, Latin America is a region that has the lowest per capita spending on the military of all the major regions of the world. So this change in policy is a reflection of a mature relationship with civilian governments in Latin America, has not opened the floodgates to new arms sales of any significance, major arms sales.

There were some requests for information that were in the pipeline prior to this change to a case-by case basis. Those have still not been made public and have not been acted upon. They have to be consulted with Congress. The only real action that has occurred is that, as the President and the Secretary have made clear, we are prepared, in principle, to sell advanced aircraft to Chile, but there has been no request to purchase such aircraft. That decision by the Chileans will presumably come soon. We have made a decision that we have a mature relationship with Chile, that it won't provoke an arms race in the region, that the other economic and political factors that we have said would be part of our decision-making have been met.

So in short, we have not helped create an arms race. On the contrary, there is no major flood of requests. We're going to continue to treat this on a case-by-case basis, and we have a mechanism by which we can examine these specific requests.

QUESTION: Also on the region, if you don't have an answer to this, maybe you can take the question. In Colombia, is the Administration concerned that upcoming local elections in Colombia - are you concerned about them, given the intimidation campaign by the FARC and the ELN, two groups you named last week?

MR. RUBIN: Let me say that we condemn strongly guerrilla and paramilitary violence against those Colombians who wish to run for office in Colombia's municipal elections. These elections, which are a new feature in Colombian political life are important because they allow greater deepening of grassroots democracy in Colombia.

For that reason, the US supports a Colombian Government request to the Organization of American States that a team of OAS election monitors go to Colombia later this month. We strongly believe in the legitimacy of the October elections, despite the death threats, kidnapping and murders from the guerrillas and the paramilitaries. We expect a vast majority of municipal elections to proceed in a normal fashion, and call on Colombia and the international community not to give in to the guerrilla demand that the elections be canceled.

QUESTION: Moving north gradually, do you have anything on the talks with Panama, which I believe were held today at the State Department?

MR. RUBIN: Ambassador McNamara is leading an inter-agency team in discussions with the Panamanians today and tomorrow here in Washington. Both sides believe an MCC would be mutually beneficial.

We are cautiously optimistic that an agreement can be reached. But there are still some important questions that need to be worked out. Again, we're hoping to achieve an agreement by the end of the year.

QUESTION: Can we go back to Haiti for a minute? Can you say specifically who Mrs. Albright is going to be meeting with? And is one of the issues going to be the privatization of the state monopolies that the US Government has been talking to --

MR. RUBIN: Yes, I expect Secretary Albright to meet again with President Preval, with some leading members of the opposition parties. I expect her to be meeting with UN officials there, police officials, ICITAP officials, members of the civilian police force, the UN political presence, as well as dealing in some way with some humanitarian issues, some issues related to privatization. That issue will come up in her discussions. There may be an event in that context. So, yes, all those subjects will be discussed, including privatization.

QUESTION: Jamie, the Prime Minister of Malaysia has concluded this country's troubles are caused by George Soros and other international financiers who are Jewish. Does the State Department have a view of that tiger's remarks?

QUESTION: Tigers are all in trouble. Malaysia, though, seems to find a Jewish reason for it.

MR. RUBIN: Let me say that we have seen reports of his comments. We note that the Prime Minister subsequently denied that he had said there was a Jewish conspiracy. But one way or another, let me make clear that we strongly condemn any statements linking Jews or other ethnic groups and the financial difficulties of Malaysia or other countries.

We would find the purported statement, if it were made, unfounded and unjustified and difficult to comprehend. It would not contribute to finding solutions to resolving the problems, and would stem from an illogical understanding of the international system.

QUESTION: Can we go back to the Persian Gulf? For the second day in a row Iran has threatened US warships in the region. Also, a UN investigator is going to Northern Iraq to investigate the Kurdish fighting that you talked about yesterday. Despite your comments from the podium, is there a general growing concern about the Gulf, about keeping the tension there?

MR. RUBIN: On the contrary, we have not been able to substantiate many of the press releases put out by the Iranian side on specific actions of specific ships. I'd refer you to the Pentagon for specific answers to specific non-events.

As far as we're concerned, our ships are there for very good reason. We have a very high presence there in normal times. This isn't a particularly enormous deployment. The Iranians, for whatever reason, have chosen to make these statements, but they're not substantiated by our military officials. But I'd refer you to them for any specific discussions.

As far as the fighting in Northern Iraq is concerned, we do understand the fighting continues at roughly the level it was yesterday. We were in touch again yesterday with both the parties to try to halt the fighting. We will continue to work with the parties to defuse the situation and restore the cease-fire. We believe renewed fighting serves neither the Kurdish parties involved nor the people.

The monitoring group involved here has called on both parties to cease their clashes immediately, without preconditions, to observe the cease-fire. So that is what we are doing to try to eliminate any chance that that situation will spin out of control.

QUESTION: On the same subject, do you see any sign that the Turkish air force is involved in that fighting, as charged by the PUK?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not in a position to substantiate press reports to that effect. I've seen the press reports, but I'm not in a position to substantiate them. When we are in a position to substantiate them, we would then be in a position to have comment about them.

QUESTION: You've been out here almost an hour, and I figure you would have said --

MR. RUBIN: The no-fly zone is a no-fly zone. If the Turkish Government is participating in monitoring the no-fly zone, of course it wouldn't apply.

QUESTION: Having been out here as long as you've been, I don't suppose you would know whether this is so, but there's now a report that the government of the Republic of Congo has fallen, the militia has taken control of Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire, and Angolan troops alongside Congo militia.

MR. RUBIN: Now, I know that subject may not be of direct interest to all in the room, but I believe I did substantiate that claim in an extended discussion with your colleague, George.

MR. RUBIN: That Sassou is in charge of Congo, Brazzaville, and the government is not in charge - the former leader, Lissouba.

QUESTION: I mean, is it a civil war because he's - there were outside forces all over the place.

MR. RUBIN: -- but I believe that if it's within the country and it's a war, we can call it a civil war. So there was a civil war, and Mr. Sassou is now in charge.

Back to the Press Briefing Calendar.
Return to the Home Page.
This is an official U.S. Government source for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links does not imply endorsement of contents.