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U.S. Department of State
96/05/10 Daily Press Briefing
Office of the Spokesman
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SPECIAL BRIEFING
ON
U.S.-CHINA DISCUSSIONS
ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR-RELATED EXPORTS
May 10, 1996, 2:07 P.M.
MR. BURNS: Good afternoon ladies and
gentlemen. Welcome back to the State Department
briefing.
I want to read a U.S. Government statement on
China and non-proliferation. After I read the
statement, I want to make a couple of comments to
put this into context, and then I'll be glad to
answer a few questions. I say "a few questions,"
because what I would like to do, fairly quickly,
is to move this off camera and then to go to a
BACKGROUND briefing by the people who negotiated
the agreement that I'm going to announce.
Let me read the statement. This is a
statement by the U.S. Government on China and
non-proliferation:
In the last few months, the United States and
China have engaged in intensive discussions on the
question of nuclear non-proliferation and
nuclear-related exports. These discussions have
addressed United States concerns about Chinese
nuclear cooperation with other countries,
including the transfer of ring magnets.
In the course of these discussions, especially
the April 19th meeting in The Hague between
Secretary of State Christopher and Vice Premier
Qian Qichen, the Chinese provided clarifications
and assurances regarding China's policies towards
nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear cooperation
with other countries.
Of particular significance, the Chinese
assured us that China will not provide assistance
to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and the
Chinese will now confirm this in a public
statement. In addition, senior Chinese officials
have informed us that the Government of China was
unaware of any transfers of ring magnets by a
Chinese entity, and they have confirmed our
understanding that China's policy of not assisting
unsafeguarded nuclear programs will preclude
future transfers of ring magnets to unsafeguarded
facilities.
On the basis of a close review of the evidence
available in this case, and the clarifications and
assurances provided by China regarding past
transfers and Chinese nuclear export control
policies, the Secretary of State has concluded
that there is not a sufficient basis to warrant a
determination that sanctionable activity occurred
under Section 825 of the Nuclear Proliferation
Prevention Act of 1994. Accordingly, sanctions
will not be imposed in the current situation, and
Export-Import Bank operations in support of United
States exports to China are now returned to normal.
The United States looks forward to continuing
consultations with China on export control
policies and other related issues. These
consultations can help us to develop a common
understanding on fully effective export control
policies and practices and to strengthen national
export control systems, and thus will help avoid
future problems and provide an additional avenue
to advance our common non-proliferation goals.
That is the end of the United States
Government statement. Let me try to put this into
some context for you. Barry, are you taking a
filing break?
MR. SCHWEID: (AP) Yes.
MR. BURNS: Okay. AP has called a filing
break. Since the start of the Clinton
Administration in 1993, the President and the
Secretary of State have made preventing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, of
nuclear weapons, one of its highest priorities.
The understanding worked out with China on the
question of nuclear exports embodied in the
statement that I've just read to you, and the
Chinese statement that will be issued tomorrow
morning in Beijing, is another important step on
the road to our goal. Through intense high-level
discussions, including between Secretary of State
Christopher and Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign
Minister Qian, last month, we believe the United
States and China have reached a better
understanding regarding China's policies towards
nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear cooperation
with other countries.
The Chinese have given us, in the decision
that we arrived at this morning, clarifications
and commitments regarding their nuclear export
policy. Specifically, I want to draw your
attention to four important elements that have
emerged from the discussions between the United
States and China.
First is that China will issue a public
statement. I expect that that will be Saturday
morning Beijing-time. For all of you that will
mean, of course -- that statement will probably
appear sometime this evening here in the East
Coast of the United States. They will issue a
statement that China will not provide assistance
to unsafeguarded nuclear programs in any country.
We believe the Chinese undertaking represents
a significant, new public commitment by China with
respect to its nuclear cooperation with other
countries. That's the first thing I wanted to
point out.
Second, the Chinese have confirmed our
understanding that this new commitment means that
they will not transfer ring magnets in the future
to unsafeguarded facilities.
Third, China has agreed with the United States
to hold consultations on national export policies
and practices. The understanding we've arrived at
provides for continued consultations on export
controls.
These will help the United States and China to
develop common understandings on export control
policies for nuclear-related items, but they will
also facilitate cooperating in strengthening the
export control systems. It will also serve as a
promising foundation, we think, for advancing the
broader goal we have of eliminating, preventing
the spread of dangerous weapons.
On the Ex-Im question, Secretary Christopher
sent a letter to the Ex-Im this morning apprising
the Ex-Im of the understanding that we've reached
with China. As a result of the receipt of that
letter in Ex-Im -- and it has been received --
Ex-Im operations will now return to normal,
meaning that final decisions on loan applications
for American companies pertaining to China can now
be made.
I would also draw your attention to another
point. The statement that I've read, and the
commitments obtained from the Chinese, were
precisely what we would have sought as a basis to
remove sanctions had it been necessary to impose
sanctions. I think that is a particularly
important point.
I can also tell you that once the decision was
made this morning, the Secretary began a series of
Congressional calls. He was assisted in this by
others in the Department of State -- other senior
officials here. We have contacted a number of
members of Congress to inform them of the
decision. We, of course, are also contacting a
number of governments, including the Government of
Pakistan to inform them of the decision that we
have made.
What I would like to do is propose that if you
have any general questions about this, about the
context of these decisions, I'll be glad to answer
them. If you have specific questions about the
negotiations themselves, about how we arrived at
this, what I'd like to suggest is that we turn off
the lights, take a short break to allow the wires
to file -- a short break of maybe 10 minutes or so
-- and then I'll bring up to the podium our two
senior State Department officials who were
responsible for negotiating this with the Chinese.
David.
Q: Does the United States Government accept
the Chinese Government's statement as true, that
it had no idea that ring magnets were being
exported to Pakistan?
MR. BURNS: First of all, David, I think as a
result of the very intensive, complex set of
discussions that we've had over a considerable
period of time, where we've worked very hard to
arrive at an understanding of what happened and
whether or not these activities were sanctionable,
I think two things are evident.
First, I think there's no question that there
was a ring magnet transfer to Pakistan on the part
of the State entity in China. The Chinese,
however, have assured us that the government in
Beijing -- the policymakers in Beijing -- were not
aware of this transfer. There's a statement that
I've made today. I've characterized that in the
U.S. statement that we've made. Certainly, we
accept that now as a result of the work that we've
done with the Chinese. I think you'll see that in
what the Chinese release tomorrow.
Steve.
Q: Do I understand you to say there will be
no sanctions of any kind, not under a Chafee
Amendment, not under any kind of decision to come
from the White House against any Chinese company
or entity involved in this transfer?
MR. BURNS: Yes, pertaining to this issue of
the allegation of ring magnet transfers. Yes,
that's right.
Q: So no sanctions -- just to be clear --
against the Chinese Nuclear Fuel Corporation of
any kind.
MR. BURNS: That's right, Steve, yes.
Q: Nick, what makes these assurances from
the Chinese more credible or persuasive than the
assurances they gave that they would stop pirating
software, or a few years
ago the assurances they gave they were not
exporting Silkworm missiles or any number of other
assurances that turned out not to be the case.
Q: Prison labor.
MR. BURNS: Norm, I think it's very important
that not only did we have expert-level discussions
over the last couple of months with the Chinese on
this issue, but Secretary Christopher was able to
have an important discussion with Vice Premier and
Foreign Minister Qian in The Hague. They had a
lengthy discussion of that.
There's been a high-level discussion of this.
There's been a good deal of cable traffic, of
telephone conversations, of diplomatic
conversations. The commitments that they have made
to us are important commitments, and we accept
those as commitments by the Government of China.
Of course, the United States will monitor this
agreement very carefully. Of course, we'll want
to make sure, as well as the Government of China,
that there are no such transfers in the future.
In monitoring this agreement, we will see then the
proof of the agreement. But we certainly expect
that this agreement is going to be carried out to
the letter.
Bob.
Q: Can you bring us up to date on the other
issue involving the transfer of M-11 missiles,
where that investigation stands now and whether
any conclusions were drawn as a result of these
long, protracted --
MR. BURNS: I can tell you, Bob, that we've
not made any decisions on that particular issue.
But let me do this: Let me leave that for our
BACKGROUND briefing, because one of the officials
that's going to brief is expert on that expert.
Jeff.
Q: Nick, will the Chinese accept that there
was a transfer, because they denied it publicly
consistently and repeatedly ever since we first
put that allegation forward? Do they now admit
that there was such a transfer of ring magnets?
MR. BURNS: Jeff, let me do this. I think
what I'd like to do is on specific questions about
what was said in the course of the discussions
over the last couple of months, I'd rather let our
background briefers get into that and present it
to you in a comprehensive way. If you have
any questions at the end of their presentation,
we'll go to that.
Q: The reason I asked is that I think it
goes to the heart of whether the Chinese accept
that something here was done that properly raised
U.S. concerns.
MR. BURNS: Jeff, I think it's self-evident
from the statement I've made that we believe, and
I think on the basis of the agreement it's
understood by all, that there was a transfer of
ring magnets. What is really critical about this
agreement, of course, is that the Government of
China -- the policy-makers in China, the senior
level -- have assured us that they were unaware of
the transfer of ring magnets.
I think I can answer your question in that
respect. But I do want to give our background
briefers a chance to lay this out to you in a
fairly comprehensive way. They're the people who
have negotiated this agreement.
Let me go to Jim and then Sid and then maybe
Steve, and then I think we're going to wrap it up
and we'll go to the BACKGROUND briefing.
Q: There are two parties involved in this
transaction. Is there any blame or any sanctions
attached to Pakistan?
MR. BURNS: I think that in the case of
Pakistan, we certainly informed the Government of
Pakistan of the decision that we've made, and I
can tell you that the Brown Amendment is in place,
and there's no reason, I think, to change the
Brown Amendment. So we'll go ahead with the
Government of Pakistan as we can.
Q: Well, according to your information sheet
-- the background sheet -- the Glenn Amendment
provides economic sanctions for countries "that
deliver or receive nuclear reprocessing equipment
or technology." That would appear to include
Pakistan.
MR. BURNS: In the case of Pakistan -- and I
think the background briefers can give you a lot
of detail on this -- there will be no change in
the implementation of Brown. But some items are
covered by Symington in the case of Pakistan, but
let our background briefers go into that in more
detail.
Sid.
Q: Is this a written understanding, or is
this verbal?
MR. BURNS: The understanding is expressed in
the statement that I read to you, which is the
United States Government statement, and also the
statement that will be issued by the Government of
China. The reason why we are announcing --
reading to you the United States Government
statement is because we arrived at this decision
this morning.
We wanted to announce this decision as soon
thereafter as possible. We've made that
commitment to you. We hadn't forgotten that. But
given the time difference, it's really not
possible for the Chinese to make their statement
at 2:20 in the morning, so they'll do that in just
a couple of hours.
Q: Will there be instruments exchanged --
written instruments exchanged that reflect this
arrangement?
MR. BURNS: What we have here are two
statements: one by the United States Government,
one by the Chinese Government. They know what's
in our statement. We know what's in their
statement. I think we know what this agreement
is. We're confident that it is a good agreement,
and we're confident that it can be implemented
effectively.
Let me go to Steve, Carol, because I promised
him I would do that.
Q: Nick, you said that the statement by the
Chinese is what you would have expected from them
had sanctions been imposed and then subsequently
lifted. This was a requirement. Did Secretary of
State Christopher make this proposal to Qian
Qichen in The Hague, and did it take them nearly a
month for the Chinese to agree to this? Was there
then -- what I'm asking is was there a threat in
The Hague that sanctions would be imposed if you
do not make this agreement?
MR. BURNS: I think the Chinese knew that --
have known all along during the course of these
discussions that we were concerned about the
allegations of the sale of ring magnets, and we
believe that transfer did take place, and
sanctions was always a possibility. But because
we were able to work through this issue and gain
the assurances that we have received, we do not
believe that it is proper to go to sanctions based
on the understandings that we have, and we believe
that that's fully consistent, obviously, with the
law here.
Q: Did the Secretary, though, say, "If you
don't make such a statement in public, we will
impose sanctions after the meeting"?
MR. BURNS: It's not fruitful or helpful for
me to go into what the Secretary said privately to
Foreign Minister Qian. I don't want to do that.
Carol.
Q: Nick, is it your understanding that this
is broader than just ring magnets? It's a
commitment that goes beyond that specific case?
MR. BURNS: Yes. I tried to highlight for you
when I got into the context after the statement
what we think is important about this. I would
just refer you to the four points that I read.
But certainly it does, because it gets to the
issue of non-proliferation in general, about the
commitment of China to that, about the commitment
to consultations with us about national export
practices, about strengthening capabilities.
That's very important, and we do look forward to
those discussions.
Q: And what do you think turned them around?
MR. BURNS: I think that's certainly a
question for the Chinese Government, but I think
we were able to communicate to them over the
course of very long, difficult discussions, and I
think Secretary of State Christopher was able to
do this quite convincingly on April 19 -- that
this is a major concern of the United States.
This is not an issue that can be treated as a
secondary or tertiary issue. It's a central issue
in our foreign policy concerns globally -- not
just in our relationship with China.
The other concern, I think, that we expressed
quite effectively to the Chinese is that the
United States Government is accountable to
American law and all of us here in this building
are. We had to make sure, as we worked through
this issue, that obviously any result of these
discussions was fully consistent with our law, and
it is. I think those points were impressive
points for the Chinese side.
Q: Nick, can I just ask you quickly,
Christopher said today in his speech, the line
between domestic and foreign policy has
disappeared. Did you wait until after Dole backed
MFN to make this decision today?
MR. BURNS: No. I can tell you this, Steve,
because I followed the issue closely enough to
know, and I've certainly been in the meetings with
the Secretary as he's deliberated over a very long
time. Had we been able to achieve the
understanding that we achieved this morning -- had
we been able to achieve it two weeks ago or three
weeks
ago or four weeks ago, we would have announced it,
because we had no interest in prolonging this
debate.
You were asking about it every day. It was a
thorn in the side of the U.S.-China relationship.
We did not link it to Senator Dole's speech. We
did not link it to the IPR problem that has
arisen, the implementation of the intellectual
property rights agreement.
We have to take these issues on a case-by-case
basis, and we've done so today.
Q: Then what was it that happened this
morning, or what made the Chinese decide this this
morning? And, secondly, do you accept the Chinese
assurances? You've said three or four times that
the Chinese have given us assurances that they did
not know in Beijing at the policy-making level
about this transfer. Do you accept that as a
correct statement?
MR. BURNS: Jeff, on your first question, we
simply concluded the discussions today. When
you're in the middle of discussions --and we know
this from our experience in the Middle East
shuttle -- sometimes you're not quite sure what
the end point is going to be. You can't forecast.
This gets back to Steve's question about linkage.
You can't forecast in the middle of a complex set
of negotiations when you're going to come out at
the end.
We were able to agree on the final documents
and the final letter of the documents this
morning, and that's why we've gone forward with an
announcement today.
On your second question, we certainly accept
the assurances of the Chinese Government.
Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 2:26 p.m.)
[end of document]
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