|For Immediate Release|
January 5, 2001
|Contact: Damien LaVera|
Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation, and the Test Ban Treaty
- Strengthen bipartisan support for U.S. leadership of an integrated non-proliferation strategy.
- Appoint a Deputy National Security Advisor for Non-Proliferation.
- Conduct a high-level review of Test Ban Treaty-related issues in light of the Treaty's contributions to an integrated non-proliferation strategy.
- Continue U.S. moratorium on nuclear tests and build-up of International Monitoring System to watch for nuclear tests worldwide.
Monitoring, Verification, and Foreign Nuclear Programs
- Assign higher funding and intelligence collection priorities to monitoring for nuclear tests and other nuclear weapon activities by other states.
- Ensure that national intelligence, the international verification regime, and other data are combined in an all-source approach to verification.
- Accelerate the transition from research to operational use for new verification technologies and analytical techniques.
- Continue preparations for inspections and confidence-building activities.
- Increase transparency at known nuclear test sites.
Stewardship of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile
Minimizing Uncertainty with a Treaty of Indefinite Duration
- Complete a comprehensive review of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP).
- Give surveillance, refurbishment, and infrastructure revitalization highest priority and adequate funding.
- Decide about the need for a large-scale plutonium pit remanufacturing facility soon after decision on stockpile size.
- Establish a dedicated infrastructure revitalization fund.
- Place the SSP on a multi-year budget cycle, probably with some increase in funds.
- Continue steps to improve interagency management of stockpile stewardship matters.
- Ensure that the performance margins of various weapon types are adequate when conservatively evaluated.
- Exercise strict control over changes to nuclear weapon designs.
- Establish a high level external advisory mechanism for the SSP.
- Commit to conducting an intensive Administration-Senate review of the Test Ban Treaty's net value for national security ten years after U.S. ratification, and at regular intervals thereafter, with the understanding that if grave problems that could not be otherwise addressed, the President would be prepared to withdraw from the Treaty.
View the Report on-line at:
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