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ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE HEAVY BOMBER
EXHIBITIONS AND INSPECTIONS PROTOCOL
The Protocol on Exhibitions and
Inspections (the Protocol) consists of a Preamble and two Sections and sets
forth detailed procedures for the conduct of exhibitions of heavy bombers, as
well as for the conduct of inspections conducted incident to those exhibitions.
PREAMBLE
The Preamble links the Protocol to the
basic rights and obligations with respect to heavy bomber exhibitions and
inspections set forth in Article IV.
SECTION I
EXHIBITIONS OF HEAVY BOMBERS
Section I provides for heavy bomber exhibitions that are different from the
heavy bomber exhibitions required under the START Treaty. Paragraph
1 repeats the requirements of Article IV for three types of exhibitions:
Exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped
for nuclear armaments. Paragraph 4 of Article
IV specifies that the purpose of such exhibitions is to demonstrate to
the other Party the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is
actually equipped. Paragraph 5 of Article IV
requires a similar exhibition if the number of nuclear weapons for which a
heavy bomber is actually equipped is changed. (See the analysis accompanying
Article IV for a discussion of the meaning of the phrase
"number of nuclear weapons for which a
heavy bomber is actually equipped.")
Exhibitions of heavy bombers reoriented
to a conventional role. Paragraph 12 of Article
IV specifies that the purpose of such exhibitions is to demonstrate to
the other Party the specified differences between such reoriented bombers
and other heavy bombers of the same type or variant of a type with a nuclear
role. Paragraph 8(d) of Article IV mandates
that such differences be both observable by national technical means of verification
and visible during on-site inspection.
Exhibitions of heavy bombers
reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role.
Such exhibitions serve both to demonstrate the number of nuclear weapons for
which the heavy bomber being returned to a nuclear role is actually equipped and
also to demonstrate the differences between the heavy bombers being returned and
heavy bombers of the same type and variant tha are either (a) still in a
conventional role or (b) were never reoriented to such a role. Providing
observable differences between heavy bombers returned to a nuclear role and
those of the same type and variant that were never reoriented to a conventional
role helps enforce the prohibition of paragraph 9 of Article IV against
subsequently reorienting to a conventional role any heavy bomber returned to a
nuclear role.
Paragraph 2 of Section
I provides identical basic rules on location, date, duration, and inspection
team composition for each of the three types of exhibitions. Pursuant to
paragraph 1 of Article V, the procedures of
the START Treaty apply to these exhibitions, except as modified by the Protocol.
Subparagraph 2(c)
limits the time that each heavy bomber shall be subject to inspection to no more
than two hours.
Subparagraph 2(d)
requires that inspectors for these exhibitions be drawn from the list of START
Treaty inspectors. The list referred to is that specified by Section II of the
Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty, which also sets forth the legal status
of such inspector.
Subparagraph 2(e)
requires the provision of certain photographs of observable differences. The
number of such photographs is determined by the inspected Party, but the
photograph or photographs provided must be sufficient to show all relevant
differences.
Subparagraph 2(f)
ensures that these exhibitions do not count against any START Treaty inspection
quotas.
SECTION II
INSPECTIONS OF HEAVY BOMBERS
Section II provides rules
for the inspections of heavy bombers during the exhibitions provided for in
Section I. In addition, Section II provides additional procedures for data update
inspections and new facility inspections conducted pursuant to the START Treaty
beginning 180 days after the entry into force of the START II Treaty. New facility
inspections are included since, under the provisions of Section
VII of the Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty, such inspections include
inspection of applicable heavy bombers at new air bases.
The delay of 180 days is to allow the initial
exhibitions required by paragraph 4 of Article IV
of the START II Treaty to be conducted. These exhibitions provide an initial
demonstration of the number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of a
given type and variant are actually equipped. The additional inspection procedures
for data update and new facility inspections allow periodic reconfirmation of
this number.
The Protocol does not specify whether or
not actual, simulated, or no weapons are to be used during these initial
demonstrations. During the negotiations, U.S. negotiators told their Russian
counterparts that U.S. heavy bombers would have either weapons or training
shapes loaded on launchers, pylons, and bomb racks during the exhibitions in a
way that demonstrated an operational load. The Russian negotiators were also
told, however, that during data update and new facility inspections their
inspectors would normally see heavy bombers without weapons. Since the United
States has discontinued the practice of maintaining U.S. heavy bombers on
peacetime alert, it is normal that these bombers not be loaded with weapons on a
routine basis. The purpose of the additional inspection rights provided under
this Protocol for data update and new facility inspections is fully satisfied by
access to weapons bays and external weapons stations with no weapons loaded.
The Parties understood during the negotiations that weapons bays are normally
empty and that no requirement exists to load armaments for inspections.
Members of inspection teams conducting
data update and new facility inspections pursuant to the START Treaty could be
citizens of Belarus, Kazakhstan, or Ukraine, as well as of Russia. Although the
START II Treaty is only between the United States and Russia, the United States
intends to grant access to all members of such inspection teams without regard
to nationality.
Subparagraph 1(a)
covers inspections to confirm the number of nuclear weapons for which a specific
heavy bomber is actually equipped does not exceed the number specified in the
Memorandum on Attribution. The access inspectors are given is, therefore,
limited to that necessary to accomplish the stated purpose. Provided that this
requirement is met, the extent of access is at the discretion of the inspected
Party. There is, for example, no requirement to give direct access to the
underside of the wings of the B-2 heavy bomber in order to "prove"
that no weapons are located there. The Parties agreed there would be no access
to the interior of heavy bombers (except for weapons bays) because it is not
required to fulfill the purpose of the inspection.
Subparagraph 1(b)
covers inspections of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role in order
to confirm the observable differences required by subparagraph 8(d) of Article
IV. Once again, access is limited to those areas required to fulfill the
purpose of the inspection.
Subparagraph 1(c)
covers inspections of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role and
subsequently returned to a nuclear role. In essence, inspections conducted
pursuant to this subparagraph are a combination of those conducted pursuant to
subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b).
Paragraph 2 of Section II
provides a right to shroud portions of a heavy bomber that are not subject
to inspection. This right applies to any heavy bomber, but is primarily
intended to protect the B-2 heavy bomber, as well as future advanced technology
bombers. Shrouding time shall not count against the period of inspection. The "period
allocated for inspection" refers both to the two hours allocated by
subparagraph 2(c) of Section I of this Protocol
for inspections during exhibitions, and to the maximum 32-hour period allowed
by paragraph 31 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty for
the conduct of data update or new facility inspections.
Since the Inspection Protocol to the
START Treaty requires that inspectors return to the point of entry immediately
following the allowed 32-hour period, there is a possible conflict between the
two Treaties. In order to provide for the situation where a longer time would
be required than allocated by the START Treaty, the United States will, if
necessary, seek, in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission established
by the START Treaty, the right to extend the period of inspection to allow for
the completion of START II inspection procedures.
Paragraph 3 of Section II
requires the in-country escort to provide explanations to the inspection
team, for inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph
1(a) or 1(c) of this Section, of the number
of nuclear weapons for which the heavy bomber is actually equipped.
Paragraph 3 of Section II also requires the in-country escort to provide
explanations, for inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph 1(b) or 1(c)
of this Section, of the differences that are observable by NTM and visible
during inspection.
A final provision
provides that, pursuant to subparagraph 2(b) of Article V, additional measures
may be agreed upon by the Parties with respect to the Protocol to improve the
viability and effectiveness of the START II Treaty. The Parties agree that if
changes need to be made to the Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or
obligations under the START II Treaty, then such changes as are agreed upon
shall be made within the framework of the Bilateral Implementation Commission
(BIC), without resorting to the amendment procedures set forth in Article VII of
the Treaty.
Pursuant to Article VI, the Protocol is
deemed to be an integral part of the START II Treaty.
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