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ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE
PROTOCOL FOR THE
ELIMINATION OF HEAVY ICBMS
AND THE CONVERSION OF THEIR SILO LAUNCHERS
STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL
The Elimination and
Conversion Protocol consists of two Sections. The first Section sets forth
procedures for the elimination of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters. The
second Section establishes procedures for the conversion and confirmation of
conversion of silo launchers, silo training launchers, and silo test launchers
of heavy ICBMs. Although written as general procedures, these procedures were
designed for Russian SS-18 silo launchers.
SECTION I
PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION OF HEAVY ICBMs
AND THEIR LAUNCH CANISTERS
Paragraph 1 of Section I provides two alternatives for
eliminating heavy ICBMs. A Party may either use the procedures set forth in
Section I, which are to take place at elimination facilities for ICBMs specified
in the START Treaty, or it may eliminate heavy ICBMs by using them for
delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or outer space. For the former,
notice of elimination must be provided to the other Party, via the Nuclear Risk
Reduction Centers (NRRCs), 30 days in advance of the initiation of the
elimination process at the particular facility involved. If, however, the
elimination of a heavy ICBM is to be accomplished by the "space launch"
alternative, notification thereof shall be governed by the provisions of the
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988, which requires
notification 24 hours in advance through the NRRCs.
Paragraph 2 lists
several steps that either shall or may be taken, in any order, by the inspected
Party before the confirmatory inspection provided for in paragraph 3 of Section
I. The inspected Party shall remove the missile's reentry vehicles; may remove
the electronic and electro-mechanical devices of the missiles's guidance and
control system from the missile and its launch canister, as well as other
elements that are not ("shall not be" in the text is used in the
sense of "are not") subject to elimination pursuant to paragraph 4 of
Section I (which addresses the elimination process for heavy ICBMs); shall
remove the missile from its launch canister and disassemble the missile into
stages; shall remove liquid propellant from the missile; may remove or actuate
auxiliary pyrotechnic devices installed on the missile and its launch canister;
may remove penetration aids, including devices for their attachment and release;
and may remove propulsion units from the self-contained dispensing mechanism.
Paragraph 3 describes
the confirmatory inspection, which is to take place after arrival of the inspection
team and prior to the initiation of the actual destruction. During the confirmatory
inspection, the inspectors are to confirm the type and number of missiles to
be eliminated. Inspectors have the right to both visually observe and measure
items (including missiles outside of their launch canisters) presented for elimination
to confirm that they are SS-18 missiles and missile canisters. The elimination
process for the missiles and the launch canisters may begin once the above procedures
have been carried out.
Paragraph 3 requires that inspectors observe the elimination process. On-site
observation is necessary since NTM cannot confirm that the objects presented
for destruction are real. Other provisions governing the inspection team and
the inspection are found in the START Treaty.
Paragraph 4 specifies the elimination process to be
followed for destruction of heavy ICBMs. Missile stages, nozzles, and missile
interstage skirts are to be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size;
and the self-contained dispensing mechanism (as well as the front section),
including the reentry vehicle platform and the front section shroud, is to be
cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and crushed. In the
negotiations, the Russian side assured the U.S. side that this process would
ensure the destruction of all of the critical elements of the missile systemstages,
including propellant tanks; engines (since the nozzle, which is destroyed, is
the most critical engine element); interstage skirts; and self-contained
dispensing mechanisms and their elements.
Paragraph 5 states that during the process of destruction of
launch canisters of heavy ICBMs, the launch canister shall be cut into two
pieces of approximately equal size or, alternatively, into three pieces such
that pieces no less than 1.5 meters long are cut from the ends of the body of
the launch canister. These procedures apply to launch canisters eliminated
with their heavy ICBMs, as well as to launch canisters for missiles eliminated
through flight-testing, or through launching into the upper atmosphere or
space. They also apply to empty launch canisters existing at the time of entry
into force of the Treaty.
Paragraph 6 requires that the inspection team leader and a
member of the in-country escort confirm that the inspection team has completed
its inspection. Such confirmation shall be included in a factual written report
by them that contains the results of the inspection team's observation of the
elimination process. Such confirmation shall be made upon completion of the
requirements set forth in Section I.
Paragraph 7 states that heavy ICBMs will no longer be
subject to the limitations of this Treaty upon completion of the procedures set
forth in Section I. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with
paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol to the START Treaty.
SECTION II
PROCEDURES FOR CONVERSION OF SILO LAUNCHERS,
SILO TRAINING LAUNCHERS, AND SILO TEST LAUNCHERS OF
HEAVY ICBMs
Paragraph 1 requires
that conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs (including silo training
launchers of heavy ICBMs and silo test launchers of heavy ICBMs) be carried out
in situ and be subject to inspection. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article II of
the Treaty, launchers of heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities may not be
converted, but must be destroyed. Silo elimination, as opposed to conversion,
follows START Treaty rules.
Paragraph 2 provides
that, prior to the initiation of the conversion process for any of the silo
launchers described in paragraph 1, the missile and launch canister must be
removed from the silo launcher.
Paragraph 3 states
that a Party shall be considered to have initiated the conversion process for
silo launchers of heavy ICBMs (including silo training launchers of heavy ICBMs
and silo test launchers of heavy ICBMs) as soon as the silo door has been
opened and a missile and its canister have been removed from the silo launcher.
Notification thereof is to be provided in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Section IV of the Notification Protocol to the START Treaty.
Paragraph 4 sets
forth steps to be included in the conversion process for silo launchers of heavy
ICBMs (including silo training launchers of heavy ICBMs and silo test launchers
of heavy ICBMs). They are: opening of the silo door and removal of the missile
and the launch canister from the silo launcher; pouring of concrete into the
base of the silo launcher up to the height of five meters from the bottom of
the silo launcher; and installing a restrictive ring with a diameter of no more
than 2.9 meters into the upper portion of the silo launcher in a manner that
precludes removal without destruction of the ring and its attachment to the
silo wall.
Paragraph 5 provides
each Party the right to confirm that the procedures specified in paragraph 4 of
Section II have been carried out. For purposes of confirming that such
procedures have been carried out, the Party doing the conversion is required to
notify the other Party (through the NRRCs) (a) no later than 30 days in advance
of the date when the process of pouring concrete will commence, and (b) upon
completion of all of the procedures specified in paragraph 4 of Section II.
Once it receives the first notification, the inspecting Party has two options
for confirming compliance with the conversion procedures. These are set forth
in paragraph 6 and paragraph 7 of Section II. The primary difference between
paragraphs 6 and 7 is whether a Party chooses to observe the concrete being
poured into the silo (paragraph 6) or not (paragraph 7).
Paragraph 6 confers upon
the Parties the right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete into
each heavy ICBM silo launcher that is to be converted and to measure the diameter
of the restrictive ring.
Subparagraph 6(a) requires the other Party to inform the
Party converting the heavy ICBM silo no later than seven days in advance of
the commencement of the pouring that it will observe the filling of the silo
in question.
Subparagraph 6(b)
requires the Party converting a silo to take such steps as are necessary to
ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible to the inspecting Party
and that the depth of the silo can be measured by the inspecting Party. This
must be done immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring
concrete. The purpose of these requirements is to ensure that the inspecting
Party can view the bottom of the silo and accurately measure its depth prior to
the concrete being poured.
Subparagraph 6(c)
states that the inspecting Party shall have the right to observe the entire
process of concrete pouring from a location providing an unobstructed view of
the silo interior, and to confirm by measurement that concrete has been poured
into the base of the launcher to a depth of five meters. Measurements are to be
taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo door to the base of
the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of
the lower edge of the closed silo door to the top of the concrete fill, after
the concrete has hardened.
Subparagraph 6(d)
states that following notification of completion of the procedures specified in
paragraph 4 of Section II, the inspecting Party may measure the diameter of the
restrictive ring, that during such inspection the ring shall not be shrouded,
and that the Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections.
Subparagraph 6(e)
requires that the results of the measurements conducted to subparagraphs 6(c)
and 6(d) above be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed
by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort.
Subparagraph 6(f) states
that inspection teams are to consist of no more than ten inspectors, all of whom
are to be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty. The list
referred to is that specified by Section II of the Inspection Protocol to the
START Treaty, which also sets forth the legal status of such inspections.
Subparagraph 6(g)
states that such inspections shall not count against any inspection quotas
established by the START Treaty. In addition, heavy ICBM elimination
inspections do not count against START Treaty quotas.
Paragraph 7 provides
an alternative method for confirming conversion. It provides for the right to
measure the depth of each heavy ICBM silo launcher that is to be converted
before the concrete has been poured, and to return and remeasure the silo depth
after the concrete has hardened. This alternative was suggested by the Russian
side as a cost-reduction measure since the on-site presence required by it
could be considerably lower than that required by the first method. The U.S.
indicated an interest if appropriate equipment to confirm the integrity of the
concrete fill could be identified. In addition, paragraph 7 provides for the
right to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring.
Subparagraph 7(a)
requires the other Party to inform the Party converting the heavy ICBM silo no
later than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will
measure the depth of the silo in question both before and after the concrete has
been poured.
Subparagrph 7(b)
requires the Party converting a silo to take such steps as are necessary to
ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible and that the depth of the
silo can be measured. This must be done immediately prior to the commencement
of the process of pouring concrete. The purpose of these requirements is to
ensure that the inspecting Party can view the bottom of the silo and accurately
measure its depth.
Subparagraph 7(c)
states that the inspecting Party shall measure the depth of the silo launcher
prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete.
Subparagraph 7(d)
states that, following notification of completion of the procedures specified
in paragraph 4 of Section II, the inspecting Party may measure the diameter of
the restrictive ring, and remeasure the depth of the silo launcher, and that the
Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections. The restrictive ring may
not be shrouded during such inspections.
Subparagraph 7(e)
states that, for purposes of measuring the depth of the concrete in the silo,
measurements are to be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo
door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and
from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo door to the top of the
concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened.
Subparagraph 7(f)
requires that the results of the measurements conducted to subparagraphs 7(c),
7(d), and 7(e) above be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and
signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort.
Subparagraph 7(g)
states that inspection teams are to consist of no more than ten inspectors, all
of whom are to be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty.
Subparagraph 7(h)
states that such inspections shall not count against any inspection quotas
established by the START Treaty.
Paragraph 8 gives the
Party converting a silo the right to carry out further conversion measures
after the completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 6 or 7 of Section
II or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after
notification of completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 4 of Section
II.
In addition to the
reentry vehicle inspections provided for in the START Treaty, paragraph 9
authorizes four additional reentry vehicle inspections each year of ICBMs
deployed in silo launchers of ICBMs that have been converted pursuant to Section
II. Procedures set forth in the Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty will be
used during these inspections. In addition to confirming that the missile
installed in the converted silo has only one reentry vehicle, these inspections
permit the inspecting Party visually to confirm the continued presence of the
restrictive ring and of the launch canister (and missile) that the inspected
Party has placed in the silo. Towards this end, the inspectors have the right
visually to confirm both the presence of the ring and that the observable
portions of the launch canister of the deployed ICBM do not differ externally
from that of the launch canister that was exhibited pursuant to paragraph 11 of
Article XI of the START Treaty. While the sides agreed that launch- related
equipment and instrumentation could be placed on the ring and could be
shrouded, they further agreed that any shrouding of the upper portion of the
silo launcher shall not obstruct observation of the upper portion of the launch
canister and the restrictive ring. To further ensure that the necessary
observations could be made, the Parties also agreed that, if requested by the
inspecting Party, the inspected Party must partially remove any shrouding of the
restrictive ring, except for shrouding of instruments installed thereon, to
confirm its presence. In discussions of this provision, the Russian side
assured the U.S. that there would be places on the ring where equipment or
instruments would not be emplaced and inspectors could see the integrity of the
ring and that the ring was permanently attached to the sides of the launcher.
These additional rights apply only to the four extra inspections authorized by
this paragraph and do not apply to reentry vehicle inspections which are
conducted solely pursuant to the START Treaty.
Paragraph 10 states
that, upon completion of the procedures specified in paragraphs 6 or 7 of
Section II (or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30
days after notification of completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 4
of Section II), the silo launcher of heavy ICBMs being converted shall, for
purposes of this Treaty, be considered to contain a deployed ICBM to which one
warhead is attributed. Without this provision, the silo would continue to be
considered to contain a heavy ICBM until the installation of a new missile or a
new training model of a missile (which will remain the case with respect to
accountability under the START Treaty). This provision was included at the
Russians request to avoid exceeding START II Treaty limits in the event of delay
in the installation of the replacement single-warhead ICBM.
SECTION III
EQUIPMENT; COSTS
Paragraph 1 provides the
right to use agreed equipment to support the inspection activities of the
Protocol and requires the Parties to agree in the Bilateral Implementation
Commission on such equipment, including but not limited to equipment for the
measurement of the concrete fill in silo launchers of heavy ICBMs.
Paragraph 2 addresses
costs for inspections conducted pursuant to Section II of this Protocol. Such
costs shall be handled in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section V of the
Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty. For practical purposes, this means
that the United States will bear almost all of the costs of inspections under
this Protocol, since there are no U.S. heavy ICBMs to inspect. The United
States accepted this provision because of the great importance we place on
verification of heavy ICBM silo conversion.
This Protocol concludes
with a statement that it is an integral part of the Treaty, shall enter into
force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force
as long as the Treaty remains in force. The Parties agree that they may agree
upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and
effectiveness of the Treaty. They agree that, if it becomes necessary to make
changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations
under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to
reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making
amendments set forth in Article VIII of the Treaty.
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