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Ministerial Panel III: Responding to Threats to Democracy Sharing Best Practices Toward a Community of Democracies Ministerial Conference, Warsaw, Poland, June 25-27, 2000 U.S. Department of State, June 15, 2000 |
Warsaw Ministerial Agenda "What are the most pressing problems and threats to democratic, constitutional governments? What mechanisms and understandings currently exist under which democratic governments can come to the support of elected governments that are in danger of being illegally overthrown? What improvements deserve consideration?" I. Background The end of the 20th century witnessed a remarkable expansion of democracy in the world. Today, nearly two thirds of the nations worldwide have instituted democratic rules. However, in many of those nations, democratic regimes are precarious and subject to serious threats. The international community follows with concern the political situation of a relatively high number of countries of very different regions of the world. We are still confronted with real threats to democracy, and consequently to political stability, which carry along grave social and economic problems. II. Existing Regional Mechanisms What can the international community and the democratic nations do in order to assist countries facing threats to their democracy? Until now, most of the answers have been provided by regional institutions, with different degrees of effectiveness. The Commonwealth adjures its members to promote and protect the democratic principles. In most of Europe, democracy and human rights enforcement mechanisms are codified and associated to the membership in integration processes such as the European Union. There are applicable norms also in the frame of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (COE), the European Convention on Human Rights, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), etc. In general, it can be said that in Europe there is an important level of consensus regarding this issue, and the concept of collective action has developed significantly. In the Latin American region, the Organization of American States (OAS) also established regulations and procedures to safeguard democracy. Resolution 1080, adopted in 1991, commits member states to act collectively and immediately to protect democracy when the latter is interrupted or overthrown in a member state. An amendment to the OAS's charter in 1992, allows the suspension of a member country if its democratically constituted government is overthrown by force. The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) has set similar procedures. In Africa, entities like the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as coalitions of states and individual countries, have condemned ten coups déEtat from 1992 to this date. Further steps are also being taken toward the institutionalization of procedures to safeguard democracy, particularly within the OAU's framework. In East Asia, incipient conversations on the issue of safeguarding democracy are expected, despite a long-standing policy of non-interference in the affairs of other countries. Thus, within the Association of South Eastern Asian Nations (ASEAN), there are promising signals in terms of the given conditions for other countries of the region to join the organization. III. Toward a New International Framework In the past, international action in the area of democracy was limited by a rigid interpretation of the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty, which were generally regarded by the smaller and weaker states as safeguards against the interference and pressure of the hegemonic powers. Although almost no government or political leader in the world is willing to renounce to these principles, their interpretation has tended to vary substantially during the last decades. The international scenario is increasingly recognizing that foreign concern, or even action in favor of democracy in the world, can be an acceptable and legitimate practice under a series of circumstances. The evaluation of the latter is open to the interpretation of political actors, and ultimately it is a political decision. This evolution has been facilitated by the essentially dynamic and changing nature of international law, which has never constituted a rigid and unmovable legal order. International action in fostering democracy has its own operational dilemmas. How far can the international community go when it comes to defend democracy? How do we conciliate the defense of democracy with the principle of non-intervention? How does the international community define a threat to democracy? How do governments conciliate different policy interests in this regard? How can double standards be avoided in this field? There are no easy answers for these questions. Sometimes the same legal instruments that create international obligations in the areas of human rights, and support to democracy, bar any interference in the domestic affairs of member states. The national sovereignty concept retains its force as one of the great political ideas of our times in different regions and countries: Latin America, United States, or France. The argument that international action against a government which denies to its own citizens the exercise of popular sovereignty, does not necessary violate the sovereignty of that country, is undoubtedly attractive, but presents certain risks and it is open to rather subjective interpretations. Although international action in favor of democracy is still controversial, it seems clear that it is no longer subordinated to, or conditioned, by the principle of non-intervention. The relationship between both principles is not immutable. Intervention in favor of democracy, under very precise conditions, is already a political reality. It is important to add that the international action, which is becoming legitimate in this respect, assumes a multilateral character and, in consequence, requires significant international consensus, as well as abidance by norms and procedures established for this purpose by global and regional international organizations. These considerations are precisely the ones that allow to establish a clear contrast between unilateral interventionism practiced by countries mainly during the first part of the 20th century, and multilaterally sanctioned interventions seen in the '90s. For the same reason, UN sponsored international action, or at least collective action backed by democracies throughout the world will always be more legitimate than unilateral external action. The world lives an extraordinary opportunity to strengthen democracy and to protect it with legitimate mechanisms convened by the international community. The time is right and conditions are excellent. But, as in any emerging process, prudence is required in order to prevent defensive reactions and setbacks. Transformations should be gradual and need to consider diversity as a reality among nations.
In this sense, the concept of constructive engagement -- that has been a useful tool in democratization processes -- can be successfully applied as part of an international strategy to respond to threats to democracy. Support to political parties and NGOs in countries with military regimes, contributed decisively to maintain a positive attitude in the civil society. Frequent resolutions and diplomatic démarches of international organizations and foreign governments, inhibited efforts to legitimize dictatorships, and acted as a constant pressure for political change in the country. International monitoring of critical elections to recover democracy, proved not only important but helpful. Active interest in the fate of political prisoners and other victims of authoritarian regimes helped to save many lives. Many others examples confirm that external support, especially through constructive engagement, can contribute significantly to the preservation and strengthening of democracy. International action as an answer to threats to democracy will continue to grow. However, the action of foreign governments and institutions in support of democracy should be wise, balanced, and professional. On the other hand, non-governmental action should be directed to those institutions and practices that make up the very fiber of democracy in each case. Regarding such efforts, multilateral or institutional programs are more likely to be effective over time than bilateral ones, which are too easily perceived as partisan and interventionist. IV. Proposed Discussion Topics 1. The debate could focus on preventive and repressive measures. The possible set of preventive measures is large and varied and an an evaluation should be made on which of those measures are to produce more effective results in preserving democracy in any given situation. On the repressive side, possible action goes from the delivery of official statements by governments, parliaments, international organizations, to the use of political or economic sanctions, and finally to the use of force in any form, particularly military force. Special emphasis should be put on the use of so-called "democratic conditionality" on states' relationships, as well as on the statutes of international organizations. Notwithstanding the fact that all these matters need further analysis, it should be appropriate to deal with them. 2. In regions where practices and procedures to safeguard democracy exist, what are the next logical steps that should be considered to improve the coordination and effectiveness of: diplomacy, including public reactions to a coup d'état, the use of good offices to assist a return to democracy, and preventive action; economic leverage (MERCOSUR in Latin America is an example); and, collective military action (intervention by ECOMOG and SADC in Africa are examples)? 3. What lessons can states in each region learn from practices and procedures in the other regions? For example, should the OAU consider adopting the OAS' move toward earlier intervention in order to prevent interruptions of a democratic rule? Should the EU and MERCOSUR share lessons learned regarding economic leverage with other regional organizations? 4. How can Warsaw participants coordinate effectively to reinforce efforts made by regional and global organizations to safeguard democratic rule? 5. What role should multilateral institutions play in helping to safeguard democratic rule? For example, in which situations is the UN Security Council authorization of Chapter VII intervention appropriate? How can international financial institutions (World Bank, IMF, and Regional Developments Banks) coordinate more effectively to avoid contributing to crises and to help stabilize new or fragile democracies? 6. How should democratic states react when the outcome of a democratic process threatens the quality of democracy in a given country? For example, electoral gains by extremist parties may place their representatives in a position where they can work to promote intolerance and instability, or to rescind previously established rights and freedoms. Should such governments be held to benchmarks established by existing regional and international instruments? 7. How to obtain an effective coordination between the action of governments and civil society in promoting and defending democracy against threats? 8. The explosive development of new technologies in the field of communications, and the Internet, open unsuspected possibilities for democratic participation and for the control of state institutions. This is the so called techno-democracy, tele-democracy, or democracy online. Many dictatorships would have not survived if they had confronted at their time systems to disseminate information, as we know today, inorganic and uncontrolled. Those systems allow the exercise of an interactive democracy of which advantage must be taken, as to permit citizens to participate in the decision making process. The Warsaw group should reflect on the importance of those technologies as a mean to protect democracy against threats, and therefore on the need to encourage its use by the people. Appendix: Mechanisms and Practices -- Factual Examples Below are selected examples of multilateral and regional mechanisms and practices that have already addressed immediate threats to democracy. These are enumerated as examples for the purpose of assisting discussants and participants to ascertain next logical steps in strengthening and developing them. These mechanisms and practices have often been applied with support by democratic states outside of the region or organization in question, and in one case, with support from the United Nations Security Council. Multilateral The British Commonwealth adjures members to promote and protect democratic principles in its 1971 founding principles and through a 1991 Harare Declaration. The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), which was set up in 1995 to promote democracy in member states, plans to establish guidelines related to the democratic performance of member states, such as the health and freedom of civil society. The Commonwealth has suspended a number of member countries following coups, commonly with support by democratic states inside and outside the region in question, while the CMAG follows up with quiet diplomacy. Europe In much of Europe, democracy and human rights enforcement mechanisms are codified and indirectly linked to economic privileges. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE) enshrined a universal right to democracy in 1990 by enacting the Charter of Paris, which made adherence by members to principles of human rights and democracy irreversible. A year later, signatories produced a communiqué committing them to vigorous support for democratically elected governments in danger of being overthrown. The Moscow communiqué explicitly called for an independent judiciary, freedom of expression, and all other elements of a constitutional democracy. EU membership and EU economic prerogatives are implicitly linked to membership in the Council of Europe (COE), which has created a binding democracy and human rights regime. States aspiring to EU membership are expected to ratify the COE's European Convention on Human Rights, which subjects them to intergovernmental monitoring and the jurisdiction of the Human Rights court in Strasbourg. On the military side, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members and aspirants are strengthening civilian control of the military through NATO's Partnership for Peace program, and NATO membership is conditioned on having a democratic government. The OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG), with support from the EU, the United States, and Central European states, is attempting to bring one regime and its opposition together to negotiate a return to democracy where a president remains in office after the legal expiration of his term. The concept of collective action was also advanced at a new level when fourteen members of the European Union (EU) enacted bilateral political sanctions when another member incorporated an extremist party into a coalition government. One democratic state withdrew its ambassador, and another, after criticizing inclusion of the party in question, decided to evaluate the coalition's actions against commitments established by their governing agreement. Latin America In the Latin American region, the Organization of American States (OAS), although traditionally a strong supporter of the non-interference doctrine, has established regulations and procedures to safeguard democracy. Resolution 1080 adopted in 1991 commits member states to act collectively and immediately to protect democracy when it is interrupted or overthrown in a member state. In 1992, the OAS approved an amendment to its charter - the so-called Washington protocol - allowing suspension of a member country by a two-thirds vote in the OAS General Assembly if that nation's "democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force." A draft OAS resolution now under consideration will strengthen the Secretary General's authority and give him the resources to send special missions and implement programs to assist democracies where internal conflicts could lead to an interruption of democracy. On the economic side, the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) has set procedures to suspend a member's rights and obligations during an "interruption of democratic order" until democracy is re-established. MERCOSUR has played a leading role in deterring coups in the Southern Cone. OAS Resolution 1080 has been invoked five times since 1990, once accompanied by the first Chapter VII use of force to remove a regime that had deposed a democratically elected government in Haiti, and at least once with direct MERCOSUR support. Africa African states have also taken collective action to preserve democracy. The OAU has in the last few years begun to codify democracy enforcement procedures. At the 1997 summit in Harare, OAU members passed a resolution condemning coups d'etat. The Heads of State Assembly at the 1999 Algiers Summit then produced a resolution barring 2000 Lome Summit attendance by members whose governments have been deposed since the Harare Summit and who have not held credible elections. Another resolution adopted by Foreign Ministers in Algiers calls on the OAU Committee on Anti-Constitutional Changes to determine the appropriate OAU response to coups and report to the Council of Ministers at the Lome Summit. The Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and coalitions of individual African states have condemned ten coups since 1991. In most cases, democratic rule was restored through good offices and diplomatic pressure, although in two cases, coupmakers were subsequently elected president through a flawed process, and one other remains in power. In 1996, the OAU imposed an economic blockade to force a leader who had seized power to reinstate parliament, allow political parties to operate, and resume peace negotiations with opposition rebels. In 1997, ECOMOG, the ECOWAS West African peacekeeping force, restored an elected president overthrown in a coup, although civil conflict followed. In 1998, troops from two southern African countries helped restore a democratically elected government in another southern African country under a SADC agreement. During a recent coup in West Africa, condemnation was strong by regional leaders, ECOWAS and the OAU, and was supported by other democratic states outside of the region. The coup regime is barred from attendance at OAU summits until democracy is restored. Asia The member states of the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN), despite a long-standing policy of non-interference in the affairs of member countries, in 1998 and 1999 debated ways to "constructively engage" their non-member neighbors before expanding membership to several new states. Regarding one country in particular, ASEAN members continue to informally explore ways to encourage democracy, since a political party won but was denied the majority of seats in a 1990 election, and its leader remains under virtual house arrest. Note: This paper is for informal discussion and does not represent the formal views of any government. [end of document]
Official Texts | Community of Democracies Initiative | Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
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