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International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999
Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC, March 2000
Continuation of Africa and the Middle East
KENYA
I. Summary
Kenya is a transit country for hashish and heroin, mostly bound from Southwest Asia for markets in Europe and, to a lesser extent, North America. It is a major regional supplier of a mild narcotic known as Khat, which is legal in Kenya. Cannabis/marijuana is grown commercially for the illegal domestic market. There is a small local heroin market. Kenyan anti-narcotics police cooperate well with U.S. and other nations' law enforcement agencies. Extensive training in air passenger profiling has helped reduce airborne heroin shipments. Interdiction of sea shipments of heroin, cannabis, hashish and other drugs has been less successful, but a program for profiling shipping containers is in effect and has resulted in some seizures. To date, however, there have been relatively few prosecutions of major drug traffickers in Kenya. The Kenyan government still has not finalized a long-awaited national drug control master plan. Although government officials profess strong support for anti-narcotics efforts, the overall program suffers from a lack of resources. Kenya is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and has enacted full implementing legislation.
II. Status of Country
Kenya is a significant transit country and a minor producer of narcotics, but there is no evidence drugs reaching the U.S. from Kenya have a significant impact on the U.S. The country legally grows Khat for domestic and regional markets. Khat is a mild chewable narcotic, used traditionally in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. Cannabis or marijuana is produced in commercial quantities for the domestic market; there is no evidence of a major impact on the United States.
Kenya's sea and air transport infrastructure, and the network of commercial and family ties that link some Kenyans to South Asia, make Kenya a significant transit country for Southwest Asian heroin. Europe is the primary market for narcotics transiting Kenya, with North America serving as a secondary destination, but the amount of drugs moving to North America is not large enough to have a major impact on the U.S. In the past, Kenya has also been an important transit point for Southwest Asian cannabis resin (hashish), although there were no seizures in 1999. There were also no seizures of Southwest Asian-origin methaqualone (Mandrax), a drug which transits Kenya en route to consumers in Southern Africa. Although Nairobi serves as a regional financial center, there continues to be no direct evidence that Kenya is a major money laundering country. Kenya does not produce significant quantities of precursor chemicals.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1999
Policy Initiatives. Kenyan Government officials, donors and others held a workshop in May 1999 to review and modify a draft drug control master plan for Kenya. A government committee then reviewed the plan, revised some sections, and presented it to the relevant minister in November 1999. The minister recently gave assurances that the plan would be presented to the cabinet no later than early 2000. Although this progress is encouraging, officials still are not sure when the master plan will be enacted.
The Anti-Narcotics Unit (ANU) of the Kenyan police force remains the focus of government anti-narcotics efforts. A key element of the proposed master plan is the identification of a senior civil servant to liaise with donors and coordinate a broad anti-narcotics effort, including a much expanded preventive education campaign. The ANU would then be free to concentrate on its interdiction mandate.
Accomplishments. The ANU continues its professionalization efforts. Many ANU officers have undergone training, much of it through the UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP) and bilateral programs sponsored by the U.S., German, British, Japanese and other governments the ANU and the Kenyan Customs Service now have a cadre of officers proficient in profiling and searching suspected drug couriers and containers at airports and seaports. There have been some good results with profiling at airports, although only for couriers not major traffickers, and positive but even more modest results at seaports. The ANU deploys drug-sniffing dogs, thanks to a UNDCP training program, although this program has so far not resulted in any significant seizures. The ANU cooperates fully with the USG and other nations on investigations and other operations. The ANU is building its surveillance capabilities, but still lacks the capacity to conduct sophisticated undercover operations. Inadequate resources, a problem throughout the Kenyan police force, significantly reduce the ANU's operational effectiveness.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Kenya seized 17.5 kilograms of heroin in 1999 and arrested 18 people on heroin-related charges. The amount of heroin seized in Kenya has increased steadily over the last three years, but is still below the all-time high of 29.7 kilograms seized in 1995. Police report that traffickers are shipping heroin in smaller quantities, perhaps in response to increased interdiction efforts. Many individuals caught attempting to smuggle heroin into Kenya are of South Asian origin. An increasing number, however, are from East Africa. Heroin continues to be delivered principally to criminals of West African origin for onward delivery to Europe and North America. In 1999, the brother of a prominent Mombassa businessman was sentenced to jail for attempting to smuggle 6.5 kilograms of heroin into Kenya.
Cocaine seizures in Kenya have fluctuated widely in recent years. Police made only two arrests and seized 110 grams in 1999.
The killing of four high school prefects in May 1999 by students allegedly high on cannabis and other drugs prompted increased government efforts to limit the production, sale and consumption of cannabis. The ANU and other police units destroyed about 450 acres of cannabis in 1999, principally in the protected Mt. Kenya forest. In 1999, 7,762 kilograms of cannabis and its derivatives were seized, a significant increase over 1998. In addition, the ANU mounted its first-ever roadblock operations in cannabis-producing areas, which yielded significant quantities of cannabis and a better understanding of cannabis trafficking patterns. Officials report increased importation of cannabis from Uganda and Tanzania, where the quality is said to be better than Kenya's domestic product.
Kenyan authorities have made several multi-ton hashish seizures in Mombassa in recent years, but no such seizures occurred in 1999.
There were no significant changes in the organization or budget of anti-narcotics initiatives in Kenya in 1999. Several new officers were, however, assigned to the ANU, which has grown steadily from three officers in the early 1980's to over 100 today. ANU personnel report adequate policy support from central government, but inadequate financial and transportation resources. ANU appears to prioritize effectively, and targets major traffickers.
Officials have never identified any clandestine airstrips in Kenya used for drug deliveries, and believe that no such airstrips exist. On the seacoast, however, small boats meet with larger vessels anchored offshore and transport drugs to small landings away from major ports.
Corruption. Public corruption remains a significant barrier to effective narcotics enforcement. Despite Kenya's strict narcotics law, which encompasses most forms of narcotics-related corruption, there are continued, unconfirmed reports of public officials being involved in narcotics trafficking. There were no prosecutions of public officials for narcotics-related corruption in 1999. A member of a prominent and politically-connected Mombassa family, however, was successfully prosecuted for importation of heroin in 1999.
Agreements and Treaties. Kenya is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, which it implemented in 1994 with the enactment of the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Control Act. Kenya is also a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol. Kenya's national assembly, however, has not ratified the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, in spite of government promises to make ratification a priority
The 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty remains in force between the United States and Kenya through a 1965 exchange of notes.
Under a 1991 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), amended in 1996, the USG donated surveillance and computer equipment to the ANU in 1997. The MOU also provides for sharing of narcotics-related information. The three nations of the East African Cooperation (EAC) group (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) continue to consider a draft protocol designed to enhance regional anti-narcotics cooperation.
Cultivation and Production. Increasing numbers of Kenyan farmers illegally grow cannabis or marijuana on a commercial basis, for the domestic market. Fairly large-scale cannabis cultivation occurs in the Lake Victoria basin, in the central highlands around Mt. Kenya, and along the coast. Foreign tourists export small amounts of Kenyan marijuana. Kenyan officials say about 450 acres of cannabis was destroyed in 1999, up from about 200 acres in 1998 and 80 acres in 1997 (the first year of large-scale efforts to eradicate cannabis). Cannabis eradication efforts were aided in 1999 by an extensive aerial survey of the Mt. Kenya region. The Kenyan government has no estimates of crop size or yield. Khat is widely grown as a cash crop.
Drug Flow and Transit. Kenya is strategically located along a major transit route between Southwest Asian producers of heroin and markets in Europe and North America. Heroin normally transits Kenya by air, carried by individual couriers. These couriers were once primarily West Africans. More recently, however, couriers are more commonly South Asian (Indian, Pakistani) or East African (Tanzanian, Ugandan). Once in Kenya, heroin is typically delivered to agents of West African crime syndicates. Some of the heroin goes from Kenya to West Africa for re-export to consumer markets. An increasing amount, however, enters Kenya for direct re-export to Europe or to a lesser extent the United States. The ANU focuses on airport heroin interdiction. Although the total amount of heroin seized has increased over the last three years, the average size of seizures has declined. Traffickers continue to dispatch couriers, officials say, but are unwilling to risk seizure of large quantities. We have no evidence that heroin from Kenya reaches the United States in quantities sufficient to significantly affect the United States.
Postal and commercial courier services are an increasing conduit for narcotics shipments through Kenya. Kenyan-grown Khat is legally exported by air from Kenya to Somalia, Ethiopia and Yemen. In the past, Kenya has been a transit country for methaqualone en route from India to South Africa. There have been no methaqualone seizures in Kenya, however, for the last two years. In the past, Mombassa has been a major transit port for hashish. Containers with hashish were reportedly re-documented or repackaged in Mombassa for onward shipment. Most hashish transiting Kenya has been bound for Europe, although some shipments have reached the United States and Canada. There were no hashish seizures in Kenya in 1999.
Domestic Programs. Kenya has made little progress on demand reduction, although government officials express increasing concern. In addition to alcohol, illegal cannabis and legal Khat are the domestic drugs of choice. Heroin abuse is limited to members of the economic elite. Solvent abuse is widespread (and highly visible) among street children in Nairobi and other urban centers. There are no reliable statistics on domestic consumption of illicit narcotics.
Demand reduction efforts are largely limited to a poster campaign sponsored by private donors and a UNDCP project to bring anti-drug education into the schools. Kenyan officials have expressed interest in demand reduction and rehabilitation, but there are no government programs other than occasional speeches to schools and community groups by members of the ANU. There are no special government rehabilitation or drug abuse treatment facilities, but some churches and non-governmental organizations provide limited rehabilitation and treatment programs for solvent-addicted street children.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
The principal U.S. anti-narcotics objective in Kenya is the encouragement of a strong Kenyan government commitment to narcotics interdiction, and the strengthening of Kenyan anti-narcotics capabilities.
Bilateral Cooperation And Accomplishments. The USG provided a grant in 1999 to permit a senior official of the ANU to visit the United States and observe U.S. drug control programs. The U.S. Coast Guard also provided training to the Kenyan Navy in May and October 1999 in techniques for boarding and inspecting suspicious vessels. The United States donated $40,000 of surveillance and computer equipment. In recent years, the Department of State has provided funding for ANU officers to attend several DEA and U.S. Customs training programs. Kenya routinely provides samples of seized narcotics to DEA for laboratory analysis.
Road Ahead. The USG will continue to take advantage of its good relations with Kenyan law enforcement to build professionalism, operational capacity, and information sharing. The USG will encourage progress on a planned national anti-narcotics strategy, and provide input where appropriate. The USG hopes to provide a basic drug interdiction course for new ANU officers (and colleagues from neighboring countries) in 2000. The adoption and implementation of a drug control master plan in 2000 will be a significant benchmark of Kenyan progress in anti-narcotics policy.
LEBANON
I. Summary
Lebanon is not a major illicit drug-producing or drug-transit country. Local cannabis production is insignificant and there is practically no lab processing. Drug trafficking across the Lebanese-Syrian border has substantially diminished as a result of Lebanese and Syrian efforts to deter illicit cultivation and smuggling activity. There is no significant money laundering, and banks comply with a self-regulating due diligence guidelines. Lebanon is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
II. Status Of Country
For the tenth consecutive year, the Government of Lebanon (GOL) continued to combat forcefully illegal crop cultivation. Strict control was imposed on areas that traditionally cultivated cannabis. In 1999, the Lebanese International Security Force (ISF) destroyed hashish cultivation in Deir al Ahmar, Yamouneh, Yunin, Irsal, and Btadi'. However, some plots escaped control in the remote areas of the eastern mountains (Yamouneh, Ainata, Ouyoun Urgush, Jabab al-Homr, Marjahin, Kalaat Aruba, Kanisset al-Kobeyat) and of the western mountains (Brital, Haam, Ma'rabun). Also, some very limited cannabis cultivation persisted among tobacco crops in the Biqa' valley, but on a small scale. (The areas planted were much less than in years preceding 1989, when Lebanon started the eradication of illicit crops.)
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1999
Policy Initiatives. Following his election in 1998, Lebanese president Emile Lahoud renewed a platform promise and vowed to extend his anti-corruption campaign to the war on drugs. In early 1999, the second-in-command of the Beirut narcotics unit, Colonel Michele Chakkour, was tried on charges that he directed the torture of a narcotics suspect who subsequently died. Chakkour was convicted and sentenced to three years incarceration.
Cultivation/Production. The GOL, in cooperation with Syrian authorities, continues to suppress the illicit cultivation of opium and cannabis in the Biqa' Valley. In May 1999, the Internal Security Forces announced they would increase patrols and crack down on illicit cultivation, warning violators they would face penalties of life imprisonment and heavy fines. Nevertheless, dissatisfaction continued among farmers who cited the UNDCP failure to provide adequate funds for crop substitution. GOL authorities maintain that as a result of destruction of hashish and poppy plantations, the production of hashish and heroin was nearly eliminated, although small quantities of morphine and heroin are smuggled overland from Turkey for local use.
Transit/Trafficking. Lebanon is no longer a major transit country; any transit is done by amateurs, outside the major drug trafficking networks. Established smuggling routes have been substantially weakened. The transport of hashish across the Syrian-Lebanese border was drastically reduced in quantity and value in 1999. This is attributable to the general attitude of both the Lebanese and the Syrian government's toward fighting drug trafficking. There were less significant quantities of drugs imported by sea or air in 1999 as a result of tighter control by the Lebanese security apparatus. Syrian authorities seized seven kilos of hashish from a large bus battery modified to conceal the drugs. When interdicted, the bus was transiting Syria as it journeyed from Lebanon to Saudi Arabia. More significant than the seizure was the fact that the bus had been transporting hashish in this manner every week for the past four years. Eight Syrians and four Saudis were arrested in connection with this case.
Three types of drugs are available in Lebanon: hashish, heroin, and cocaine. Hashish and heroin are no longer available in large quantities; sales of user quantities continue at the local level. South American cocaine is smuggled into Lebanon primarily via air and sea route connections with Europe, Jordan, and Syria. Lebanese nationals living in South America in concert with resident Lebanese traffickers often finance these operations.
Law Enforcement Efforts. In March 1999 a Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldier was killed in an exchange of gunfire between his patrol and several unidentified persons in the Hermel region of the Biqa'. Following the incident, the LAF raided several houses in the area, arrested several suspects, and confiscated weapons and one kilogram of opium.
In July 1999, five individuals were arrested for distributing large quantities of cocaine, opium, and hashish to a reported two hundred college students in the Massourieh/Metn area of the Biqa'. The group sold half a gram of heroin for $20, half a gram of cocaine for $25, and hashish cigarettes for $15. The deals were transacted using cell phones.
In August 1999, GOL officials at Beirut International Airport arrested a Kuwaiti woman after seizing from her person nineteen (19) grams of pure cocaine and five grams of heroin. In September 1999 the commander of the judiciary police announced that a joint ISF/LAF operation had resulted in the arrest of a notorious drug dealer, the object of more than sixty outstanding warrants of arrest. The GOL also arrested dozens of the fugitive's associates. GOL authorities reportedly seized massive quantities of hashish, cocaine, and cannabis seeds as a result of this joint operation. In October 1999 an Egyptian national was arrested for attempting to smuggle four hundred forty-five (445) grams of heroin in a washing machine through Beirut International Airport. The drugs were outbound to Egypt. In November 1999, an LAF tank was rocketed in the village of Hourtaala, Biqa' Valley, injuring three soldiers. The subsequent sweep by the LAF resulted in seizures of weapons and drugs from the homes of the alleged perpetrators. In December 1999 ISF anti-narcotics personnel seized a reported four tons of hashish plants from an isolated storage site between Deir al-Ahmar and al-Kneisseh.
In 1999, the GOL orchestrated several controlled delivery operations in concert with their European counterparts, resulting in significant drug seizures. The GOL, through its Ministry of Health, the Anti-Narcotics Bureau, and the Customs Directorate General, monitors the legal importation of all precursor chemicals into Lebanon.
Corruption. President Lahoud successfully campaigned in 1998 on a platform of attacking corruption at all levels of government. Efforts continue in support of that position, including anti-corruption legislation passed in late 1999, popularly known as the "Illicit Wealth Bill". In 1999, several key government administrators, including a former minister of petroleum, were arrested on embezzlement and fraud charges. Some were subsequently released, others remain incarcerated pending trial.
Agreements and Treaties. Lebanon and the United States have no formal bilateral agreements addressing the issues of narcotics trafficking or extradition. There continue to be renditions to other countries of Lebanese citizens suspected of drug-related offenses. Legislation passed the Lebanese Parliament in 1998 authorizing seizure of assets if a drug trafficking nexus is established in court proceedings. Lebanon is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, as well as the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances.
Cultivation/Production. It is roughly estimated that only 240-260 hectares of cannabis cultivation remain in Lebanon, a very similar accounting to that identified in 1998. The total value of the season's crop ranged between $2.88 and $3.75 million. It is worth noting that one metric ton of green cannabis yields the following according to crop quality: 5 kgs of first category hashish, 5 kgs of second category hashish, 5 kgs of third category hashish, and 2 kgs of hashish seeds.
Domestic Programs. Personal drug abuse is not perceived as a significant problem in Lebanon. As a result, there are few programs designed to raise drug abuse awareness. There are, however, several private drug treatment clinics in Lebanon.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. USAID, in close cooperation with the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, is planning to implement a four-component program to aid and empower key Lebanese stakeholders, local government, media, and civil society in their efforts to fight corruption. The program aims to increase public awareness of the costs of corruption, strengthen investigative journalism, foster transparency and accountability at the municipal government level, and provide small grants to support anti-corruption efforts by local groups.
Bilateral Cooperation. As noted, there are no bilateral narcotics-related agreements. Cooperation takes the form of counternarcotics training courses and operational cooperation with regional DEA Agents.
Road Ahead. Given the level of Syrian involvement in Lebanese domestic affairs, success in combating narcotics cultivation and trafficking depends on Syrian as well as Lebanese government will. Syria has demonstrated, however, a continued commitment to anti-narcotics actions in Lebanon. We expect Syria and Lebanon will both continue to pursue this policy. The GOL has not done enough to develop a socio-economic strategy to tackle the problem of crop substitution. The government was successful in destroying the illegal crops but has yet to find a suitable crop to replace the lost revenues and sustain the livelihoods of the local farmers.
LESOTHO
I. Summary
Lesotho is a small, landlocked, mountainous country completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa. It is becoming attractive to narcotics traffickers seeking to enter South Africa, and from there move on to Europe and North America, including the U.S., but there is no evidence drugs transiting Lesotho have a significant impact on the U.S. Lesotho is a source country, but not a major source country, for marijuana. It is not a major producer of other narcotics or precursor chemicals, nor does it have drug processing labs or high levels of money laundering. Lesotho is a transit country for illicit narcotics from South Asia and the Andean region of South America to South Africa and onwards to Europe. Recent indications suggest an influx of Asian heroin and Andean cocaine transiting Lesotho with involvement of Nigerian and other crime syndicates. This trafficking pattern is associated with the trade in small arms that contributes to political instability, violent crime, and incidents of cross-border livestock theft.
Lesotho lacks adequate financial and institutional resources to mount a comprehensive, sustained and effective counternarcotics campaign. The USG does not have a counternarcotics agreement with Lesotho. Lesotho has no bilateral counternarcotics or mutual legal assistance agreements with other countries either, but cooperates closely with South Africa in joint operations. Lesotho is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol. The 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty, applicable to Lesotho since 1935, continues to be in force, though there have been no extradition requests made by either country. Lesotho also approved the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Combating Illicit Drugs in 1997.
II. Status of Country
Lesotho does not currently have a modern "offshore" business and financial services sector, and is not believed to have extensive money laundering. The banking sector is small, risk averse and provides limited financial service options that could facilitate significant money laundering. Supervision of the banking sector by the central bank is guided by legislation and regulations that require banks to be aware of clients who routinely make large cash deposits and to share information on suspicious transactions with central bank regulators. Policy discussions to promote the business and financial services sector actively include recognition of the risks associated with money laundering.
Landlocked Lesotho is emerging as a transit country for illicit narcotics from South America and South Asia to South Africa. This traffic is made possible by Lesotho's relatively open frontier, inadequate control of the movement of people and goods, and proximity to major transport hubs in South Africa. Andean cocaine and South Asian Mandrax are the most commonly observed substances transiting Lesotho. There is limited evidence of the availability in recent years of crack cocaine, hashish, opium, and amphetamine-type stimulants. However, authorities are concerned about recent indications of an influx of Asian heroin and Andean cocaine, with Nigerian and other crime syndicates in South Africa and elsewhere on the continent working with traffickers in other distant regions. This traffic is linked with the significant amounts of counterfeit U.S. and South African currency being passed in Lesotho and regionally.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1999
Serious political, institutional and statutory limitations have constrained the ability of the GOL to mount an effective counternarcotics campaign. The lack of funds, training, materials and helicopter transport seriously hampers local law enforcement efforts. There is no comprehensive counternarcotics master plan to coordinate the roles of the police, army, intelligence, customs, and immigration services. There is no joint intelligence gathering system or data base, though less than dependable procedures exist for the timely sharing of relevant information among law enforcement and the political directorate. No training facilities, programs or training aids exist to support officials responsible for counternarcotics activities, but efforts are underway to establish a U.S.-supported International Law Enforcement Academy in the region. There are no drug sniffing dogs or crop substitution development initiatives. Physical cutting and burning of marijuana fields occurs only when police receive tips and can get to the location, but there is no program for manual or aerial spraying of herbicides or defoliants to eradicate marijuana fields. Local authorities suspect that traffickers use airstrips in Lesotho, but law enforcement lacks the capacity to monitor them. Containerized export shipments are also being used to surreptitiously transport drugs across international borders.
The GOL successfully concluded an extradition treaty with South Africa in 1994, and strengthened sentencing guidelines and criminal codes to allow for the seizure of vehicles involved in a drug trafficking offense. New procedures coordinated by the Ministry of Justice allow for counter narcotics cooperation among airport and border control officials. A division within the police and the national intelligence service was established to coordinate law enforcement against drug syndicates. New legislation to counter official corruption of government elected officials and civil servants-the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences Act No. 5 Of 1999-was under consideration in early 1999. No other new legislation or policy directives have been implemented. However, the cabinet is actively considering new laws, to implement the 1988 UN Drug Convention's provisions on money laundering and the seizure and forfeiture of assets gained via narcotics trafficking. Additionally, discussions are underway about negotiating a series of mutual legal assistance treaties that might support a broader, more coordinated counternarcotics effort.
There were no arrests or prosecutions of major drug traffickers in recent years, but a large number of small operators and individuals have been successfully prosecuted. Periodic police road blocks result in the arrest of individuals transporting illicit narcotics and small arms.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Two Lesotho police officers participated in a U.S.-funded SADC regional counternarcotics training program in 1998. The U.S. is also making administrative arrangements to establish a law enforcement academy in the region. Since law enforcement training is desperately needed all over Africa, this new Academy should have a very positive effect on regional counternarcotics and law enforcement efforts. USG officials are concerned with growing evidence that drug trafficking organizations use Lesotho as a transit country into South Africa, and continue on trafficking routes leading to Europe and North America, but there is no clear indication yet of significant impact on the U.S. Lesotho officials participated with U.S. Customs and DEA agents in controlled deliveries of narcotics from Colombia, via Lesotho, to South Africa; and from Pakistan to Nicaragua (via Lesotho and Miami).
MAURITIUS
Mauritius is a minor consumer and transshipment route for heroin from South Asia, primarily to South Africa. A small amount of cannabis estimated at 75,000 plants maximum is produced and consumed locally. The absence of an anti-money laundering law could facilitate narcotics-related money laundering in the rapidly expanding offshore financial and re-export sectors, although there is no concrete evidence of such activity to date. Despite repeated assurances from the government over the past two years, no anti-money laundering legislation has yet been presented to parliament. Although the current anti-drug law provides for forfeiture of assets used in or derived from narcotics trafficking, no forfeitures have ever been finalized. Mauritius signed the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but has never ratified it. It is, however, a party to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs and its Protocol, as well as the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.
A 268-person Anti-Drug and Smuggling Unit (ADSU) within the national police force has primary responsibility for narcotics law enforcement. It has implemented a cooperation agreement with its counterpart agency in India, and is developing formal links with Southern African Development Community (SADC) partners pursuant to the SADC protocol on illicit drug trafficking. Relations with the U.S. DEA are good.
The government provides drug education and demand reduction training and programs to its affected citizens. It supports similar projects undertaken by NGO's. The ADSU is preparing a counternarcotics master plan for submission to the government in early 2000. Corruption is moderate by regional standards, and does not appear to affect counternarcotics efforts.
There is no bilateral narcotics assistance agreement between the United States and Mauritius. The 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty continues to be in force between the U.S. and Mauritius.
The United States periodically provides training for Mauritian law enforcement authorities, and two ADSU officers attended a regional training course in 1999. The U.S. embassy provided $ 4230 in assistance to two NGO's involved in drug education and rehabilitation.
MOROCCO
I. Summary
Despite the Government of Morocco's (GOM's) law enforcement efforts, Morocco remains a major producer and exporter of cannabis. While there continues to be no evidence that Moroccan cannabis reaches the United States in significant amounts, an estimated 2000 tons is believed to reach Europe annually. Estimates vary, however, regarding the extent of cannabis cultivation in Morocco. The Ministry of Interior estimates that an average of 50,000 hectares of cannabis are cultivated illicitly in the Kingdom of Morocco annually. Since 1995, the GOM's Royal Center for remote sensing, a scientific research facility, independent of UCLAD and the Interior Ministry, estimates primary cannabis growing areas in Morocco in the range of 15,000 to 40,000 hectares. In contrast to these lower Moroccan figures, the European Union (EU) estimates the area of illicit cannabis cultivation at between 80-85,000 hectares. There are reports that Morocco is used as a transshipment point for hard drugs such as heroin and cocaine entering Europe. Clearly, the threat from Moroccan enforcement efforts, as they are, has not been enough to deter drug traffickers. This reality coupled with GOM counternarcotics budgetary constraints does not bode well for near-term or even long-term progress against hashish cultivation, production, and trafficking in Morocco. Morocco is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
II. Status of Country
Morocco consistently ranks among the world's largest producers of cannabis and its cultivation and sale provide the economic base for much of northern Morocco. According to EU law enforcement officials, Moroccan cannabis is typically processed into hashish, resin, or oil and exported to Algeria, Tunisia, and Europe. To date, money laundering and precursor chemicals have virtually been non-factors within the Moroccan drug market.
While cannabis is the traditional drug of choice for Moroccans, there is also a small but growing domestic market for harder drugs, such as heroin and cocaine. Newspaper reports on Morocco's role as a major producer and exporter of drugs allege a connection between local drug traffickers and international cartels such as Latin American cocaine rings. However, these allegations have never been substantiated.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1999
Policy Initiatives. In 1996, the GOM established a coordination unit for the fight against narcotics (Unite de Coordination de Lutte Anti-Drogue or UCLAD) in an effort to improve coordination between the various law enforcement services involved in the counter narcotics effort. UCLAD is subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. UCLAD officials report that they have been instrumental in reworking legislation to increase the maximum allowable prison sentence to 30 years and also increase fines for narcotics violations to a range of $20-$80,000. Ten years imprisonment remains the typical sentence for major drug traffickers arrested in Morocco. Coordination among law enforcement agencies remains weak. In short, UCLAD's centralized control of all drug-related matters is not yet completely realized. However, European diplomats believe UNCLAD's problems result partly from a lack of resources to fulfill its mandate.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Approximately every six months, as part of an anti-drug initiative launched by the late King Hassan in 1992, 10,000 police are rotated into the Rif Mountain region to maintain drug control checkpoints. Moroccan forces also man observation posts along the Mediterranean coast, and the navy carries out routine sea patrols and responds to sightings by the observation posts.
Corruption. The GOM does not promote drug production or trafficking as a matter of policy, and it disputes allegations that government officials in the northern territories are involved in the drug trade. However, most international observers believe that some drug-related corruption exists in that region.
Agreements and Treaties. Morocco is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. With respect to agreements between the U.S. and Morocco, a bilateral narcotics cooperation agreement has been in force since 1989, and a convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters has been in force since 1993. Morocco also has anti-narcotics and or/mutual legal assistance treaties with the EU, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the UK. Morocco is a party to the World Customs Organization's International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation, and Repression of Customs Offenses (Nairobi Convention), Annex X on Assistance in Narcotics Cases.
Cultivation/Production. Small scale farmers cultivate most Moroccan cannabis in the northern or Rif region, although some is also grown in the Souss Valley of the south. The average hectare of cannabis produces 2 to 8 metric tons (MT) of raw plant, and although the GOM has stated that it is committed to the total eradication of cannabis production, given the economic dependence of the northern part of the country on cannabis-cannabis crops are estimated to yield two billion U.S. Dollars in revenues annually-eradication is only feasible if accompanied by a highly subsidized crop substitution program.
Drug Flow/Transit. There are reports that Morocco is used as a transshipment point for hard drugs such as heroin and cocaine entering Europe. However, with the exception of the six tons of cocaine which inadvertently washed up on the Moroccan Coast in July 1997, there have been no substantial seizures of hard drugs in Morocco.
Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). The GOM does not acknowledge a significant hard drug addiction problem and does not actively promote reduction in domestic demand for cannabis, or other narcotic drugs. It has established a program to train the staffs of psychiatric hospitals in the treatment of drug addiction.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiativesa Programs
Policy Initiatives. U.S. policy goals in Morocco are to: encourage GOM anti-narcotics efforts; cooperate with Moroccan law enforcement officials in curtailing production and transshipment of drugs; provide training in law enforcement techniques; promote GOM adherence to bilateral and international agreement requirements; provide support, as appropriate, for existing Moroccan-European cooperation; and encourage greater international cooperation to control Moroccan production and export of drugs.
Bilateral Cooperation. The U.S. has trained some Moroccan law enforcement officers in basic narcotics enforcement techniques, and provided anti-narcotics intelligence. The GOM is expected to participate in additional training in FY2000.
The Road Ahead. The U.S. will continue to monitor the narcotics situation in Morocco, cooperate with the GOM in its anti-narcotics efforts, and, together with the more directly affected EU, provide law enforcement training, intelligence, and other support where possible.
MOZAMBIQUE
I. Summary
Although there is a small but growing awareness in Mozambique that it is time for the government to focus on the problem of drug trafficking and drug abuse, narcotics control issues do not top the government's list of priorities. Mozambique's unpatrolled coastline and porous borders make it a potentially convenient transit point for narcotics intended mainly for South Africa and Europe. Information on domestic abuse is sparse. Mozambique is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
II. Status of Country
Information on Mozambique's domestic consumption of illicit drugs and role as a transit country is sparse. It is known that marijuana and hashish are the drugs most commonly abused, while cocaine and heroin usage is confined to the country's small wealthy elites. United Nations, South African and Mozambican officials fear Mozambique is becoming part of a "Portuguese-Speaking Connection" bringing cocaine into South Africa from Brazil. Mozambique also serves as a channel for Mandrax (Amphetamine Type Stimulant) imports to South Africa from South Asia.
Mozambique's ability to detect, interdict, and deter narcotics trafficking within its borders is nearly nonexistent. Law enforcement and security entities are poorly trained and equipped, and susceptible to corruption due to their extremely low salaries. Mozambique's "narcotics police" is not a specially trained force, but merely a small group of police officers who are currently incapable of meaningful drug investigations or interdiction operations.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs
Mozambique's national assembly passed anti-narcotics legislation in March 1997, which made trafficking illegal and specified penalties for the trafficking and use of narcotics. The assembly will resume consideration of anti-money laundering legislation when it reconvenes in January 2000.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Over the past several years there have been some large seizures of illegal substances. However, no major seizures have been reported for 1999. Efforts at prosecution have been less than successful. A total of 130 traffickers were arrested in 1998 (the latest year for which figures are available), of which 39 were found guilty and sentenced to prison. In November 1999, police in Manica Province announced that they had destroyed 13 metric tons of marijuana in plantations over the past twelve months.
Mozambique lacks basic coastal and border control capabilities. Police units are under-equipped and most are without radios, telephones or transportation. Mozambique continues to express an interest in assistance in counternarcotics techniques, and international donors have responded to these requests in some cases:
The Italian government is funding two programs of $600,000 each under the auspices of the UNDCP (United Nations Drug Control Program)regional office in South Africa. The first is a joint Mozambique, Swaziland and South Africa project designed to improve interdiction capabilities at the borders. The second is designed to build Mozambican capacities to craft anti-drug legislation, improve enforcement of laws, and create better forensic capabilities.
The Spanish government, supported by the Netherlands and Germany, continues to fund in-country training (conducted by a thirty-two member Guardia Civil unit) for six hundred Mozambican policemen.
In December 1998, donors and potential donors formed a 'Mini-Dublin Group' to coordinate assistance and share information.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
In fiscal years 1999 and 2000 the U.S. is offering training in the following areas from a variety of U.S. law enforcement agencies: law enforcement safety and survival; police science; assessment of the justice system (legislation and enabling regulations), and investigating and prosecuting public corruption. Total assistance will amount to approximately $260,000 over these two years.
The Mozambican government has requested USG assistance in formulating a coastal protection policy, which would include counternarcotics interdiction efforts. A USG coast guard assessment team visited Mozambique in early May 1999 to assist the Mozambican government with this plan.
In June 1998, the Minister of the Interior, leading a delegation that included officials from the Ministries of Justice and Health and the Prime Minister's office, attended the UNGA Special Session on Drugs, at which time the government of Mozambique deposited the instruments of ratification for the 1988 UN Drug Convention. During that visit the Minister met with officials from the U.S. Departments of Treasury, Justice, and State to discuss USG assistance to Mozambican counter narcotics efforts. The outcome was a program featuring training of the police and key members of the judicial system. The U.S. will continue to work with Mozambique to improve narcotics law enforcement in the years ahead.
NAMIBIA
I. Summary
Namibia does not produce any drugs or precursor chemicals. The transshipment of narcotics through Namibia to South Africa, however, remains a concern. Cannabis and Mandrax (Amphetamine Type Stimulant) tablets constitute the majority of police seizures with cocaine running a distant third. Although Namibia is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, it is a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances.
II. Status of Country
The Government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN) acknowledges a growing problem with the transshipment of drugs destined for markets in South Africa. Financial and manpower restraints have limited interdiction efforts throughout the country. Despite this problem, domestic consumption levels remain low.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1999:
Namibia is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Anti-drug legislation has taken a back seat to other issues. Nonetheless, a Money Laundering Act, Drug Trafficking Bill, International Cooperation In Criminal Matters Bill, and the Proceeds of Crime Bill continue to be under consideration.
IV. U.S .Policy Objectives and Programs The U.S. Government encourages Namibia to enforce its anti-narcotics trafficking and abuse legislation within budget constraints, and looks forward to a time in the not-too-distant future when it will be able to provide training for law enforcement forces at a regional international law enforcement academy in southern Africa.
NIGERIA
I. Summary
Nigeria remains the hub of African narcotics trafficking. Nigerian poly-crime organizations operate extensive global trafficking networks, dominate the Sub- Saharan drug markets, and account for a large part of the heroin imported into the United States. They also transport South American cocaine to Europe, Asia and Africa, especially to South Africa, and export marijuana to Europe and West Africa.
As was the case last year, Nigeria's counternarcotics effort remains unfocused and lacking in material support. The strong public denunciation of narcotics trafficking and financial crimes by the new democratic government of President Obasanjo is a welcome departure from the high-level indifference that characterized most of Nigerian military rule. However, there have been no major new actions or policies to bring about change. The year 1999 saw the continuation of efforts limited largely to interdiction of low-level couriers and destruction of cannabis crops. Nigeria did not bring to successful closure any of the outstanding extradition requests by the U.S.. Well-drafted counternarcotics legislation is already on the books, but remains largely un-enforced.
Nigerian law enforcement agencies did not significantly improve their counternarcotics performance in 1999. The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) makes regular arrests of individual couriers, but few major traffickers were arrested or prosecuted. Total heroin seizures increased, due primarily to a large seizure at Kano Airport. The NDLEA has signaled a willingness to increase its professional expertise, but institutional limitations make it difficult for Nigerian law enforcement to make progress against increasingly sophisticated criminals. Awareness of the local drug abuse problem continues to grow, but demand reduction efforts have been limited in scope and success.
Nigerian money launderers operate sophisticated global networks to repatriate illicit proceeds from narcotics trafficking, financial fraud, and other crimes. In 1995, the Nigerian Government enacted a decree to combat narcotics-trafficking-derived money laundering, but enforcement has been uneven, producing few seizures and no convictions. To date, asset seizures have not proven a useful counternarcotics tool. Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
II. Status of Country
Nigeria produces no precursor chemicals or drugs that have a significant effect on the United States. However, Nigeria is a major narcotics trafficking hub and the base for trafficking organizations, responsible for a significant amount of the heroin used in the United States. Nigerian traffickers maintain establishments in all of the opium-producing centers of Asia and the markets of many heroin-consuming nations around the world. They have links to South American cocaine producers and permanent distribution networks in Europe, the NIS, and East Asia. Nigerians dominate the African drug trade. Cannabis is cultivated in Nigeria, and is consumed locally and exported to other West African countries and Europe.
Interdiction efforts at Nigeria's airports continue to have an impact on traffickers' use of individual couriers. In 1999, the NDLEA seized 67.5 kilograms of heroin and made two arrests in connection with the seizure at Kano Airport. The NDLEA's performance at the airport has increased traffickers' use of Nigeria's porous borders and bases in neighboring countries. Nigerian traffickers now rely less on individual couriers and more on increasingly sophisticated concealment methods and difficult-to-detect air, sea and land bulk shipments and express mail services. Traffickers' methods are moving beyond the capability of Nigerian law enforcement to detect or interdict.
As specialists in moving narcotics and other contraband, Nigerian criminal organizations are heavily involved in corollary criminal activities such as document, immigration, and financial fraud. Their ties to criminals in the United States, Europe, South America, and South Africa are well documented. Nigerian poly- crime organizations exact significant financial and societal costs, especially in West African nations with limited resources for countering these organizations.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1999
Policy Initiatives. Since its inauguration on May 29, 1999, the Nigerian government has taken no new major legislative or financial initiatives to fight narcotics trafficking. However, both chambers of the new National Assembly established narcotics affairs committees to monitor, among other things, the performance of the NDLEA. Wage increases that would give law enforcement personnel a living wage for the first time in more than a decade were again announced, but were not yet implemented. In October 1999, President Obasanjo appointed Ibrahim Lame as his special adviser on counternarcotics and financial crimes. The new Ministry of Police Affairs has promised comprehensive reform and re-organization of the Nigerian police and other law enforcement bodies. In its proposed year 2000 budget, the Obasanjo Administration requested the Naira equivalent of about U.S. $210 million for law enforcement, the third largest ministerial appropriation in the budget.
Accomplishments. According to the NDLEA, 226 persons have been convicted by Nigerian courts of narcotics offenses since the Obasanjo Administration took office on May 29, 1999. The NDLEA's aggressive presence at airports produced regular seizures of heroin from couriers. The NDLEA also conducted raids at seaports and border checkpoints. In addition, the NDLEA maintained cannabis eradication efforts in virtually every Nigerian State, with a focus on plantings in isolated areas. More progress against corruption within the NDLEA once again contributed to its reputation as Nigeria's most professional law enforcement body.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Numerous small-time couriers were arrested, but major traffickers and their controlling organizations remained largely unaffected. NDLEA attempts to prosecute narcotics and money laundering kingpins were again stymied by a weak judicial system and government corruption. Law enforcement agencies faced systemic shortcomings. The NDLEA, like virtually all Nigerian agencies, lacks proper funding, equipment and training. Widespread government corruption, especially in law enforcement, exists at least in part because salaries remain low.
Like last year, there has been little inter-agency cooperation among Nigerian law enforcement units with respect to systematic follow-up on investigations or targeting of major narcotics traffickers or their organizations.
Asset seizures from narcotics traffickers and money launderers are permitted under Nigerian law, but were not used as an effective law enforcement tool in 1999. Despite some seizures, there were no prosecutions. Asset forfeitures must be preceded by convictions.
Corruption. Corruption remains widespread in Nigerian Government and society. After resource constraints, lack of targeting of major traffickers, and inadequate inter-agency coordination, corruption is the most serious obstacle to effective counternarcotics performance. The Obasanjo Administration, however, has made anti-corruption a major political and legislative priority, recording some success in establishing a higher standard for government service and injecting new transparency into contracting and general economic decision-making.
Agreements and Treaties. Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty, which was made applicable to Nigeria in 1935, is the legal basis for pending U.S. extradition requests, including nine on narcotics or narcotics- related money laundering charges. Nigeria is a party to the World Customs Organization, Nairobi Convention, Annex on Assistance in Narcotics Cases.
Cultivation and Production. The only illicit drug produced in Nigeria in any volume is cannabis, which is cultivated in virtually all 36 states. Nigerian marijuana and marijuana resins are consumed in Nigeria and exported to neighboring countries and Europe. There is no evidence of significant Nigerian marijuana exports to the United States. The Nigerian government's eradication efforts focus on individual fields. There are no significant crop substitution programs.
Sizable quantities of ephedrine, both an amphetamine precursor and common ingredient in pharmaceuticals, are imported by Nigeria, but an illicit manufacturing link between the imports and some large amphetamine seizures has not been proved. Diversion of licit narcotics from the pharmaceutical industry appears to be common, and may explain the wide illicit distribution of sedatives in Nigeria and West Africa.
Drug Flow/Transit. Nigeria is still Africa's narcotics trafficking hub and a major transshipment point between the eastern and western hemispheres. Nigerian traffickers account for a significant amount of the heroin transported to the United States. Nigerian criminal organizations have expanded and shifted some activities to neighboring countries and other strategic locations. Large quantities of drugs go though Nigerian ports and land borders, which are poorly managed and patrolled. The NDLEA has made the airport transit of couriers more risky to the trafficking organizations, but traffickers use cargo and express mail services, as well as bulk land and sea shipments.
Demand Reduction. The abuse of psychotropic drugs (mostly cannabis) and, more recently, of hard drugs like heroin continues to rise in Nigeria, according to the NDLEA and Nigerian NGO's. Notwithstanding the change in government, many officials continue to deny that Nigeria has a serious problem, and some still say narcotics is a foreign issue and responsibility. The NDLEA has opened well-publicized anti- drug clubs at Nigerian universities, presenting them with anti-drug literature and videos. University officials state drug usage on campus is limited, but that student couriers were a serious problem until the NDLEA began arresting them in large numbers several years ago. There are indications, however, that university "cults," essentially criminal gangs involving, but not necessarily run by students, have become more active in transporting and distributing cannabis and hard drugs. Efforts by UNDCP and Nigerian NGO's in the area of demand reduction remain rudimentary.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. U.S.-Nigerian counternarcotics cooperation focuses on stopping individual couriers, combating local cannabis production and consumption, and attacking corruption within the NDLEA. Following a USG inter-agency team visit in 1998 to explore law enforcement engagement with the Nigerian government, a new law enforcement cooperation program was developed that included comprehensive training and some material assistance. In 1999, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service and the Secret Service conducted basic training courses in Lagos. USG working-level officials enjoyed good access to their Nigerian counterparts, who generally are willing to interact frankly and constructively. In July 1999, a joint U.S.-EU narcotics assessment mission to Nigeria produced a detailed action plan for engagement.
Bilateral Accomplishments. The expanding law enforcement cooperation program with the new Nigerian Government represents an important starting point in the United States-Nigeria law enforcement relationship. There were, however, few concrete changes in bilateral law enforcement efforts or results in 1999. The U.S. DEA office in Lagos continued to maintain close contact with NDLEA officials and operations.
The Road Ahead. The USG is working actively to take advantage of new opportunities for bilateral law enforcement cooperation presented by the Obasanjo Administration. However, the underlying institutional and societal constraints are deep seated and require comprehensive, long-term solutions. Major counter- narcotics policy initiatives with the new government will suffer from drift or inaction unless pursued with consistent attention and vigor. Implementation and adequate funding of Nigeria's own 1999 National Drug Control Master Plan will be a crucial test for the new Administration. It will be important to maintain a proactive approach to cooperation that allows us to demonstrate the concrete benefits to counternarcotics efforts to Nigerian law-enforcement agencies and Nigerian society.
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Continuation of Africa and the Middle East
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