| ||||||||||||
| ||||||||||||
| ||||||||||||
| ||||||||||||
Today, as a result of the Agreed Framework, signed in October 1994, the North Korean nuclear program is frozen, and that freeze is being closely monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency--IAEA. North Korea's existing spent nuclear fuel is being stored under IAEA safeguards and eventually will be removed. As part of the framework, North Korea will receive two light-water reactors, to be built and largely financed by South Korea, to replace its existing nuclear program.
Implementing the Agreed Framework will take many years, and we have ahead of us some critical tasks, including most importantly:
But the Agreed Framework is in place, and its implementation is on track. This sets the stage for removing the nuclear threat to regional and global stability posed by North Korea.
Just a year ago, we achieved the renewal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty--NPT--both indefinitely and unconditionally. The NPT is now a permanent feature of the international landscape.
The NPT parties also agreed to give priority in 1996 to negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty--CTBT. That effort was given an important boost over the weekend in Moscow, when the P-8 countries--France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, Germany, Japan, the U.S., and Russia--agreed to support a truly comprehensive test ban treaty and to work toward its signing this September at the United Nations.
The CTBT will ban any nuclear explosion, including weapons-test explosions. It will serve our disarmament goals by constraining the development of new or improved nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers. It will serve our non-proliferation goals by gaining the agreement of the nuclear threshold states to forego any nuclear testing.
U.S. leadership was critical in achieving the Agreed Framework with North Korea and in extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It will be essential if we are to conclude a CTBT in 1996.
At the Moscow Summit, we agreed among the P-8 to work more closely to keep nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands. Prevention is the most important first step. The P-8 called for greater international cooperation to strengthen physical security for nuclear materials and to put effective accounting systems in place. U.S. assistance provides the foundation for this cooperation.
This year, the U.S. will spend some $85 million for security improvements at nuclear facilities in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union. These facilities include some highly sensitive Russian weapons laboratories. The Russians are installing everything from upgraded locks and video monitors to sophisticated computer-based radiation detection systems.
Our assistance also will help improve the security of the nuclear materials themselves by:
The summit attendees also agreed to create a joint program to fight trafficking in nuclear materials, including greater cooperation and exchanges of information among law enforcement, customs, and intelligence authorities. Starting from the P-8, we will seek to involve others in this program, and, at the summit, Ukraine announced its adherence.
This "action plan" caps a year of activities, demonstrating that our cooperation is already underway. One example of such activities is a recent meeting of P-8 law enforcement experts to discuss forensic laboratory procedures to help identify the origin of nuclear materials seized as evidence in criminal cases. Another example is a program sponsored by the U.S. Customs Service with countries in central Europe and with the New Independent States, in which the U.S. has provided training and nuclear-detection equipment to help detect smuggling closer to the source.
Over the longer term, we must reduce the large stockpiles of excess nuclear materials to reduce the risk both of proliferation and of illicit nuclear trafficking. Under a bilateral U.S.-Russian agreement to purchase low-enriched uranium derived from 500 tons of highly enriched uranium--HEU--extracted from former Soviet nuclear weapons, Russia delivered six tons--on the order of 250 warheads--in 1995. This represents the first-ever use of weapons-HEU for peaceful purposes.
In Moscow last week, we achieved Russia's final approval of transparency measures that will give us confidence that the material provided under this contract originated from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons. Let me note that implementing this HEU contract has been highly complex, involving financial and trade law considerations, as well as sensitive national security issues. The deal is now on track and functioning, to the benefit of both the United States and Russia.
Disposing of excess plutonium will be harder still, since there is no viable commercial market for this material. At the summit, the P-8 leaders took the first step toward multilateral cooperation to deal with the hundreds of tons of excess plutonium now accumulating.
Working together on small-scale technology demonstration projects and in an experts' meeting scheduled for October 1996, the P-8 countries will explore options for the safe and secure long-term disposition of plutonium. Some countries--particularly Russia--favor burning plutonium in civilian power reactors--the so-called mixed oxide fuel, or MOX, option. The U.S., while not ruling out this option, is also actively evaluating the possibility of mixing plutonium with high-level radioactive waste to create a material similar to the spent fuel from nuclear power plants that already exists in large quantities. We will use the up- coming P-8 conference to ensure that all reasonable technical possibilities are looked at carefully, with due regard to non-proliferation, security, environmental, and economic considerations.
At the summit, Russia announced its adherence to the International Nuclear Safety Convention and, for the first time, Russia joined the G-7 in asserting the importance of "safety first" in nuclear power operations. It committed to the highest internationally recognized safety level for construction, operation, and regulation of nuclear power facilities.
The summit preparations led both Russia and Ukraine to take the necessary steps to join the Vienna Convention on Third Party Nuclear Liability. Thus, if another accident takes place, they recognize their responsibility for compensating victims even beyond their borders.
The P-8 also endorsed the importance of the efforts ongoing through the IAEA in Vienna to draft an international convention on the safe management of nuclear waste. Russia joined in affirming the importance of stopping all dumping of nuclear material in the ocean.
In an additional important step, Russia supported the G-7 agreement to close the Chernobyl reactor by the year 2000. We also agreed with President Kuchma to tackle one of the most severe safety problems Ukraine faces--the threat of a sarcophagus collapse--and to do this based on an international experts' study, which will be completed by year's end.
At the same time, we have more to do with Russia in this area of nuclear reactor safety. Russia maintains that its reactors can be raised to internationally acceptable standards and continues to press the West to help them fix rather than shut down their older reactors. We have, nevertheless, achieved some Russian recognition of the problems their reactors represent and have agreed to expand our cooperation with them on reactor safety projects in Soviet-designed reactors in central Europe and the NIS. And we will continue to press the Russians to agree to concrete steps toward decommissioning their older reactors.
We continue to urge the Russians to ratify the START II Treaty. But it is clear that nothing will happen until after the Russian election. At the same time, we were able to make important progress in distinguishing between anti-ballistic missile systems that are limited by the ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses which are not. We will send our negotiators back to Geneva next month with the aim of concluding an initial demarcation agreement covering low velocity systems this June. Such an agreement will ensure that we maintain the integrity of the ABM Treaty--in our view the cornerstone of strategic stability--and the ability to go forward with all of our planned TMD programs.
In the case of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, we moved closer to a solution to the flank issue, within the framework that has been agreed among the 30 parties--namely, a map change and limits on equipment in areas removed from the flank. We hope to be able to reach an agreement acceptable to all parties prior to the upcoming treaty review conference in mid-May.
But we still have differences with the Russians, and an important one has to do with their continuing nuclear cooperation with Iran. The President made clear that we believe that any such cooperation contributes to Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and that it should end.
Perhaps the most important step was the public recognition on Russia's part that there are serious nuclear security and safety problems that need to be addressed, and they agreed to cooperate with the G-7 to deal with them. Just a few years ago, Russia was resisting giving serious attention to these problems.
Our critics suggest that these nuclear security and safety problems are not being given sufficient priority. I take exception. We are addressing the full range of potential dangers involving nuclear security and reactor safety, and the United States has made major commitments of effort and resources, within those that are realistically available.
We cannot promise that the dangers are over. Indeed, much more still needs to be done. These are problems that will require attention and resources for many years to come.
The Moscow Summit was a critical step--indeed, a turning point in gaining Russian cooperation. American leadership was critical to the success of the Moscow Summit. Our leadership will be required in the years to come if we are to meet these important challenges.
[end of document]
Back to G-7 Economic Summit Page
Back to U.S. Economic and Trade Policy Page
Home Page
| What's New
| Hot Topics
| Policy
| Travel
| Careers
This is an official U.S. Government source for information on the WWW.
Return to the DOSFAN
Home Page
This is an official U.S. Government source
for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links
does not imply endorsement of contents.
