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Ambassador Holbrooke Interview on ABC's Nightline, March 24, 1999 |
MR. KOPPEL: And joining us now from Budapest, U.S. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke. Ambassador Holbrooke, give us a little bit of an understanding of Milosevic. He becomes more and more interesting with each passing day to an American audience. What was it that went on between the two of you -- because after all, you did engage in fairly protracted talks? Was it just no win from the beginning?AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I've been negotiating with him and meeting -- and met with him now for 3 1/2 years since the summer of 1995, and the sessions in the last 2 days were the most bleak and the least engaged that we've ever had. As a person, he is very agile, he's adept. He can make rapid mood changes, but I believe they're controlled. I do not buy the theory that he does not have control of himself; I see no evidence of that. But I do believe that he's quite isolated.
A tremendous amount of our non-negotiating exchanges -- and it isn't continuous negotiating, a lot of it is a discussion -- a lot of it concerns what is wrong with the Western press; how it's being used and abused and tricked by now the Albanians -- once it used to be the Muslims. I remember when the bomb fell in the marketplace in Sarajevo in August of 1995. He actively argued that it was Muslims killing themselves in order to lure us into an air war. We got exactly the same version of more recent events in the last 2 days.
MR. KOPPEL: Do you think he actually believes that autonomy is inevitably in 3 years going to lead to independence?
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: His answer to that was that he is offering the Albanians autonomy; we are covertly supporting their independence. He made this statement not withstanding the fact that the United States, every member of the European Union, and every other major country in the world has stated repeatedly that we do not support independence of Kosovo and that we do not support involuntary changing of borders through violent means.
MR. KOPPEL: When you were talking before about Milosevic's mood swings, you left me with a clear impression that he does it for effect, either to distract you, break off a certain part of the conversation. Get into that a little bit; what's he after?
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: It has been said of Slobodan Milosevic two things, which I think are worth repeating here -- neither of them are original insights of mine -- that he is not an ultra-extremist nationalist like some of the wilder men of Bosnia like Karadzic, Mladic, and Sesilj, in Belgrade; that he is really a former communist with a business background, an apparatchik whose primary goal is simply to obtain power, whatever the costs. But he does not have a sustaining ideology or a grand design.
The second thing that's been said of him, which is very relevant to your question, was said by a Yugoslav journalist, who observed of him once, that he is both the arsonist and the fireman of these crises. At this point in time, of course, he is only the arsonist.
MR. KOPPEL: Do you have any instincts as to how long it will be before we get some sort of a diplomatic feeler from Milosevic?
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: None at all, Ted. If I did, I would certainly shape my recommendations to the President and Secretary Albright accordingly. But when I left the presidential palace yesterday morning -- with President Milosevic's final comment to me being, will I ever see you again, and my response being, that's up to you, Mr. President -- I could not tell where we were going, except that we were crossing a decisive and possibly historic watershed.
MR. KOPPEL: Let's just take a very brief pause if we can, Mr. Ambassador.
(Commercial break)
MR. KOPPEL: We're back once again with Special Presidential Envoy, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. Ambassador Holbrooke, you had probably as much opportunity to speak with President Milosevic as any American diplomat. What is it that ultimately will cause him to change his mind, do you think?
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I can't answer that question, Ted. All I can tell you -- and I want to be very clear on this -- is that when I left his office yesterday morning -- actually early afternoon -- I did not leave until I was absolutely sure that President Milosevic understood the full consequences that would follow from the positions he had taken on the two key issues which we were focused on: the continuation of the offensive, which he first said was not taking place at all, and then said he wouldn't stop -- even though it wasn't taking place; and secondly, his adamant refusal to even discuss the question of an international NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo. That force has been portrayed in the Serb media as an anti-Serb, pro-Albanian force but, in fact, it was designed to bring peace to an area where the two ethnic groups have such deep-seated animosity that an outside presence is necessary under the Rambouillet agreements for some interim period.
MR. KOPPEL: Isn't it inevitable that the Yugoslav Government will now depict the NATO air force as being, in effect, an arm of the Kosovar Albanians?
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: For sure; they're doing that already.
MR. KOPPEL: And given that, isn't it going to be extremely difficult then for him to back away from where he is right now? In other words, when I ask you what will cause him finally to reach some kind of an agreement, he's in a bit of a corner here himself, isn't he?
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I can't see inside his mind, despite the amount of time I've spent with him. He has put himself in a box. He triggered the military actions that are now taking place and which will lead to the destruction of his military establishment by swift, severe and sustained military action. At what point he will ask us to stop is something none of us can answer. But he will know how serious the damage is and how accurate it is.
MR. KOPPEL: You better than anyone alive know what Milosevic's customary pattern is. When the pain threshold gets a little bit too high, when he is beginning to feel real pain, inevitably then he tends to come back and say, all right, let's talk. Is a "let's talk" enough to end the bombing?
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: That's a very good question. You know, today his brother, who is the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, said we're ready to continue talking on political issues and immediately the world press said there's a new offer from Belgrade; but in fact, it was an old offer. If President Milosevic is willing to discuss the international peacekeeping force led by NATO, as envisaged in the military part of the Rambouillet agreements, within the framework of the agreements that bring autonomy and self-governing to Kosovo, if that's what he means by let's talk, then that is the basis for a resumption of the diplomatic dialogue. But what his brother said in Moscow today was really, frankly, just the same old stuff.
MR. KOPPEL: Well, let me ask you to focus on what you have just defined as being enough, then, to stop the bombing. In the past what he has done is said let's talk, but in the time that it takes to get the talks started he tends to continue his military operations. What guarantees will we have that he doesn't do that?
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Well, let me be very clear on this. My previous answer should not be misunderstood. If the offensive is continuing, "let's talk" turns into a talk-talk/fight-fight strategy. You and I both grew up some 30 years ago when that happened in Vietnam -- you covering the Paris peace talks and I as junior member of the American delegation to the American talks with the North Vietnamese. That was talk-talk/fight-fight, and it went on for 3 or 4 years. We're not going to get into something like that, not even for 3 or 4 weeks or 3 or 4 days.
The on-the-ground military situation must also dramatically change. The enormous offensive, which the Yugoslav security and military forces are now undertaking, which is causing tens of thousands of new refugees -- people who had been able to return to their homes after the October cease-fire agreements and now are being driven out again by their flagrant violation -- must come to an end.
MR. KOPPEL: President Milosevic, Ambassador, has probably been led to believe that certainly not the United States and probably not any of the other NATO governments would be inclined to send ground troops into Yugoslavia or Kosovo for any other purpose than peacekeeping after a cease-fire. Doesn't that give him a tremendous advantage, knowing that no ground troops will come in to force his hand?
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: The United States and its allies have said that what we're talking about is an invited -- that is a permissive -- peacekeeping force, not an army of invasion.
MR. KOPPEL: Let me see if I can get you to focus a little more precisely on my question, because he seems to be under the impression that all he has to survive is air attacks, that he does not face any danger of ground troops coming in.
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Well, you said "all he has to survive" -- that minimizes what damage -- and the damage is substantial and will be more substantial -- that he is going to suffer. I don't think now is the time to discuss a ground troop option. It has been ruled out at this time by the President and the Secretary of Defense. The Congress is debating it. It's not my authority to discuss this issue. I want to be clear simply on what my mission was and the consequences that flowed from President Milosevic's continuing refusal to deal with the two issues I put on the table before him.
MR. KOPPEL: On that note Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you very much. Always a pleasure talking to you, and I appreciate your coming on.
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Thank you, Ted; good to be with you again.
[End of Document]
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