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| Stanley O. Roth
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Address on U.S.-China Relations at World Economic Forum Hong Kong, October 14, 1997 |
U.S.-China Relations on the Eve of the Summit
As we meet today in Hong Kong, we reflect on the historic crossroads we are approaching as the United States and China prepare for their first summit meeting in the United States in 12 years. China's growing importance in regional and international affairs is particularly evident in the Special Administrative Region, where China resumed the exercise of sovereignty just three months ago.
The Hong Kong reversion symbolized for many observers China's re-emergence as a great power. American and Chinese leaders understand the significance of China's increasing importance in world affairs, and we are mindful of the unique opportunity the upcoming summit affords to establish an enduring partnership ensuring continued peace, stability and prosperity into the 21st century. Both nations also realize that failure to take advantage of this opportunity could prevent bilateral relations from reaching their full potential, and could have harmful implications for our Asian-Pacific neighbors.
The Summit
President Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States is a key event in U.S.-China relations. The summit can stabilize the foundation for the relationship as we near the 21st century. Those of us who have been preparing for the summit meeting have been particularly struck during pre-summit discussions by the broad scope of the Sino-American relationship.
Areas where we can expand common ground and enhance coordination are many and varied. Our presence here in Hong Kong highlights for us the shared interest of both the United States and China in Hong Kong's continued stability and prosperity. Sino-American cooperation in the Korean four-party talks reflects our common interest in maintaining stability in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. We have a similar interest in preserving stability and continued access to oil from the Persian Gulf, and in avoiding a nuclear arms race in South Asia.
The United States and China also share interest on transnational issues. Efforts are under way to further cooperation on energy resources and environmental quality issues. The U.S.-China Environment and Development Forum inaugurated by Vice President Gore and Premier Li Peng during the Vice President's visit to China in March 1997, has an ambitious agenda for collaboration in energy policy, environmental policy, science for sustainable development, and commercial cooperation. The combined efforts of our two Environmental Protection Agencies have already resulted in China's recent decision to eliminate the use of leaded gas and in the undertaking of joint studies on the health effects of air pollution.
We have been exploring ways to work together to combat international crime, terrorism and narcotics trafficking. The Chinese Government has worked with us quite effectively in resolving a number of cases involving attempted smuggling of Chinese nationals into the United States.
It is helpful to identify and acknowledge areas where common ground exists, but we cannot ignore our differences. We still have a long way to go on a range of issues, including nonproliferation, human rights, and market access. Issues such as Taiwan, Tibet and religious freedom remain significant concerns for the American body politic. And, since I'm in Hong Kong, I must also emphasize that the Administration remains concerned that the upcoming elections in May 1998 be free, fair and fully representative.
American and Chinese leaders will acknowledge those differences at the summit, but will also recognize that bilateral problems are best addressed through a balanced approach where no single issue dominates the relationship. We want a frank exchange of views with our Chinese counterparts that involves real dialogue, not meaningless compromises. Ultimately, the results of the summit will be measured by the degree to which high-level meetings lay the foundation for a constructive relationship and a fuller integration of China into international systems and organizations.
U.S. Strategy: Comprehensive Engagement
U.S. policy makers hope that the summit will further our policy of engaging China on a comprehensive basis. We seek increased engagement in the belief that China's emergence as a secure, open and successful nation promotes the well-being of both of our nations. We want China to take its place as an active and responsible member of the international community. Engagement is not, however, synonymous with endorsement. We will differ with China in certain areas, but we intend to deal constructively and openly with China. Moreover, we will oppose any efforts to contain and isolate China, which would be misguided and in the end unsuccessful.
Engagement must be comprehensive because our bilateral relationship is complex. Specific issues can affect relations, but the overall relationship has expanded beyond the limits of any single issue or concern. For that reason, the United States seeks regular bilateral contacts with Chinese officials at all levels. Meetings between senior U.S. and Chinese officials should be standard practice, not a "concession" in a bargaining game.
In the multilateral arena, engagement also involves encouraging China to join and abide by the rules of multilateral institutions, including the World Trade Organization and the Zangger Committee on nuclear export controls. In recent years, China has increasingly assumed the responsibilities that one expects of a great power and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. In that regard, we are hopeful that Chinese leaders will work with us to support United Nations reforms.
In any event, Chinese participation in international regimes is increasing, and China's stake in ensuring that those regimes are effective is growing. China's traditional "principled" insistence on non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations is being tempered by a de facto recognition that all countries have an interest -- and an obligation -- to uphold and enforce international agreements.
The Clinton Administration believes that our strategy of engagement with China holds great promise. We recognize, however, that there are limits to the progress that we can expect to achieve. Change does not occur overnight, and China has resisted change in various areas. Human rights is a particular area of concern because Chinese human rights practices continue to fall well below international norms.
Change will surely continue in China's economic, political and social life, and our challenge is to exert a positive influence on that change. We cannot do that if we isolate ourselves from China or cut off our relationship in pique over their behavior. Indeed, if we fail to engage China, we risk reinforcing inward-looking, nationalistic forces that will move China's policy in a negative direction.
U.S.-China Relations: The Stakes
What is at stake? The record of the past few years demonstrates not only that Chinese foreign policy has changed considerably in recent years, but that those changes have profoundly influenced Asia-Pacific affairs. For example:
-- China once viewed itself as our enemy, but now sits with us in the four party peace process striving for the common goal of a permanent peace arrangement to replace the Armistice on the Korean Peninsula.
-- China once supported Communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia, but now it is a "dialogue partner" -- along with the U.S. -- of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China is also a member of the cooperative-security grouping of Asian-Pacific countries known as the ASEAN Regional Forum.
-- China once refused to acknowledge and abide by international agreements on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Since 1992, however, China has committed to upholding the principles set forth in the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the Chemical Weapons Treaty; the Missile Technology Control Regime; and the Test Ban Treaty. Most recently, in 1997, China joined with other members of the IAEA in negotiating and then recommending that the IAEA Board of Governors adopt a new safeguards arrangement that will strengthen the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities in states with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
Even in the area of human rights, where we have some of our most serious differences with China, increased international contacts have highlighted for China international concern about Chinese human rights practices. We are by no means satisfied with the pace of progress in this important area, but China's traditional refusal to permit interference in internal affairs has given way to recognition in principle that human rights are universal. We have a long way to go on human rights, but that is precisely why we need to continue engagement on this sensitive topic.
The Future
Our hope is that as we deepen our bilateral dialogue and manage our relationship, our dialogue will cover the full range of both countries' interests. In many areas, our objectives coincide, and we want to build on mutual understanding and common cause. In areas where our interests continue to differ, our objective is not simply to understand and accept those differences, but to narrow them. U.S. decision makers recognize that China will determine its own course in international affairs. We know, however, that the policy choices the United States makes -- and the kind of relationship America seeks to develop with China -- can influence Chinese decisions and the outcomes they produce. We see comprehensive engagement as key to the future of the U.S.-China relationship, and hope that the upcoming summit will lead to friendly, cooperative, and fruitful relations in the 21st century.
[end of document]
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