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| Martin S. Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs Remarks to the Middle East Insight College of William and Mary Conference Williamsburg, VA, November 12, 1997 |
The Gulf, U.S. Policy and Peace
Thank you, Jonathan.My dear friend George Nader, Professor Jim Bill, my distinguished colleagues, friends, it is a pleasure for me to appear here at this "coming out party" for me as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. I am delighted to have the opportunity to do it at Middle East Insight, together with the College of William and Mary. I have long admired the work that George has done, together with his colleagues, in putting out this Middle East Insight journal, which does a great service to all of us who are interested in developments in the region. I hope you will continue to do that for many years to come.
My topic today is "The Gulf, U.S. Policy and Peace." The first point I want to make is that you should relax--I am not here to announce a new policy. I have only been in the job three weeks, and half of that time I have already spent on the road in Egypt, Yemen, and the Gulf Cooperation Council states. I made that trip early for three reasons:
First of all, to stress Secretary Albright's and my own interest in developing the political dialogue with our friends and allies in the Gulf. Understandably, our relations have come to be dominated by military issues because of the character of that neighborhood. But, we have felt--the Secretary has felt--that we need to fill up the other side of the ledger and to enhance the political dialogue with our friends there. So my first purpose was to demonstrate our interest and to go out there and to listen to their concerns--to consult with them.
Second, I went there to manifest the Clinton Administration's interest in promoting peace, security, stability, and prosperity for all of the peoples of the region, a region that is vital to American interests. That's why I included in my trip a visit to Yemen, because of our belief that much can be done in that country, not only to improve our relations, but as President Salih advances on a program of political and economic reform, there is great potential to improve the conditions of a country which has the largest population, by far, in the Gulf.
Thirdly, I went there to brief the leaders on what the Secretary, with the full support of the President, has been doing to try to get the peace process back on track, and to discuss with them and with Egypt, what they could do in that effort which serves our common interests. I went there to discuss this in the Gulf because I am very conscious of the fact that we do not have two or three Middle East, but one, and the issues of war and peace affect all the countries and peoples in the region.
There is indeed a symbiotic link between what happens in the peace process and what happens in the Gulf. We have long believed that the more progress we could make in the peace process, the more effective we would be in containing the threats from Iraq and Iran. Indeed, one important reason that we have pursued a comprehensive peace is that a peace with Syria and with Lebanon would do much to remove opportunities for Iran's exploiting of the conflict there, to meddle in southern Lebanon. It would also render Iran's opposition to the Middle East peace process essentially irrelevant were we to achieve a real, lasting, comprehensive peace between Israel and its northern neighbors. By the same token, we all know that the Coalition's success in the Gulf war helped make the Madrid Peace Conference possible. Unfortunately, the negative corollary is also true. A stalled peace process makes it more difficult to rally support against those who would threaten the peace of the region. We cannot rule out the possibility that this was part of Saddam Hussein's calculations in precipitating the latest crisis with the United Nations.
As usual, it was a miscalculation. You surely will all remember how Saddam tried to portray the invasion of Kuwait as an act he undertook for the sake of the Palestinians. That was nonsense then--although some were taken in. Now, Saddam is trying to link his defiance of the UN to alleged attempts by the United States to challenge Arab dignity; that he is somehow the Arab "victim" of American aggression. But as we can see, far fewer people have been taken in this time. Jordan, Yemen, and others have long since given up on Saddam because of his behavior; and now the most that occurs is that a handful of Palestinian demonstrators came out to lend their support for Saddam.
But the broader point is more important: Because the region presents us with many cross-cutting issues and challenges, we need to develop an integrated strategy for the region. In developing that strategy, we have to focus, on the one hand, on pursuing peace--a comprehensive, lasting, secure peace--and on the other hand, containing the threats from those who would seek to undo the efforts of the leaders of the region to change circumstances for the better. At the same time as that, we must find ways to help governments in the region engage in the process of economic and political development that will better serve the needs of their people.
In the process, it is important to emphasize that our policy is not stamped out on some assembly line. "Dual containment" was never meant to be a "one-size-fits-all" approach. As Tony Lake pointed out in an article in the Foreign Affairs Journal shortly after the policy was announced, "dual containment does not mean duplicate containment." Our policies toward Iraq and Iran are not and have never been the same policies, even though the objective was very similar: to contain the threat that both of them pose, in different ways, to our interests, and the interests of our friends and allies in the region. But the policies that we have adopted and will pursue are policies tailored to meet the specific challenges presented by those two governments. Let me deal with both of those challenges first, and then conclude with some remarks about how all this ties into the peace process.
Iraq
In terms of the latest crisis, Iraq has said it is only seeking to exclude American participation in UNSCOM. But, I think that now it is abundantly clear to all, particularly all members of the Security Council, that Saddam's challenge is a challenge to the UN itself, and to the credibility of the resolutions the Council has adopted, and the regime that the UN has put in place, in order to bring Iraqi behavior into line with international norms.
Saddam is not saying, "I realize I have to cooperate in the destruction of my weapons of mass destruction; I just don't want Americans looking over my shoulder while the UN does it." What he is saying is that he does not accept UNSCOM's mandate, in principle. Just yesterday, for instance, Iraqi Foreign Minister Sahhaf said that the UN Security Council had to be "shocked" into changing its stance. To his mind, the Security Council was the party which was in the wrong, not Iraq.
The U.S. is not seeking confrontation with Iraq. We are seeking Iraqi compliance with its obligations under the UN resolutions. As we speak, the Security Council is voting on a resolution to condemn Iraq's effort to dictate the terms of its compliance with the Council. It is also voting to impose additional travel sanctions. This resolution, which will be a presidential text, in other words a unanimous resolution with the support of all members of the Council, should send a clear signal to Iraq that its behavior is unacceptable to the international community, and that it has no choice but to rescind its decision and allow UNSCOM to get on with its job. Saddam Hussein, I believe, misinterpreted tactical differences among UNSC members on the previous last resolution. He saw that as some king of an opening--to a Council that would not insist that Iraq meet all its obligations under the resolutions. Hopefully, this signal from the Council, in the form of a clear resolution which condemns Iraq's behavior--insists on a reversal, postpones any sanctions reviews, and increases travel sanctions--will send a clear and unmistakable signal, and he will realize that it is time to back down.
The Clinton Administration has made clear, repeatedly, that we do not rule out any option to deal with Iraqi defiance. In particular, any attempt to strike at a U-2 aircraft operating under UN authority would be a serious mistake on Baghdad's part, and would draw an appropriate response. Iraq said it did not attack Monday's flight because the flight was out of range. That technical excuse, however, leaves the Iraqi threat of aggression intact. It is not sufficient that Iraq simply fail to carry out its threat. The threat itself--a threat directed at the UN--must be withdrawn. That's what the Security Council has called upon Iraq to do.
Saddam's decision to flout the will of the UN is somewhat perplexing, not just to us, but to all of the leaders I met with in the region. Far from there being any sympathy for him, there was a simple question: "How could he possibly imagine that he could get away with it?" The answer of the Security Council is clear, he will not get away with it.
The purpose of the sanctions regime, which the UN has imposed on Iraq, is not to punish Iraq. The world has very real concerns about the Iraqi regime's proven unwillingness to live peacefully with its neighbors and indeed with its own people. We cannot forget that Iraq swallowed a country whole, and what it took to force it to give up Kuwait. Through the UNSC resolutions, the world intends to ensure that, whatever Baghdad's intentions, it will no longer have the capability to threaten its neighbors or, indeed, its people.
That is why the UN Special Commission was created, and that is at the heart of the world's current dispute with Baghdad. Two thousand days after the UN called on Iraq to cooperate with UNSCOM, to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, UNSCOM was forced to report recently that Iraq is still hiding weapons of mass destruction or the technology to build them. Iraq has never declared and identified completely the poisonous fruits of its WMD programs.
UNSCOM has made progress in uncovering and destroying long-range missiles and chemical weapons, despite--not because of-Iraq, but UNSCOM has reported that serious concerns remain. Iraq's production of the deadly chemical agent VX is something that UNSCOM has highlighted as a continuing and serious problem. There is much greater concern regarding biological weapons, due initially to Iraq's long denial of the existence of such a program, followed by its obviously disingenuous declarations about the nature of that program.
What the UN is doing through UNSCOM is nothing short of trying to forestall further aggression, and thereby save lives. UNSCOM is not looking for an excuse to avoid giving Iraq a clean bill of health on these deadly weapons. Iraq is the one seeking to avoid complying with UN resolutions. We need to keep that very clear distinction.
Baghdad's latest actions indicate that the Baghdad regime has not changed the attitudes and policies that earned it international condemnation, and the imposition of sanctions. It is the kind of behavior that has led the Security Council to conclude 38 times, since 1990, that no basis exists for the lifting of sanctions. In the process of developing these resolutions, the Council decided on a 60-day review process, in the belief that, if not in the first 60 days, maybe in the second 60 days, Iraq would come into compliance with the demands of the international community. We've gone through this 38 times, and still the Security Council had not judged that Iraq is not in compliance. So, it is not the U.S. that is holding up this process; it is Iraq's refusal to comply that is the source of the problem.
We have said time and time again, but it bears repeating: This is not an attempt to harm the Iraqi people. It is the Iraqi regime against which the sanctions are targeted. That is why the sanctions never precluded the shipment of food and humanitarian goods to Iraq. The U.S. and the international community went beyond that, assuming, unfortunately correctly, that Saddam would react to sanctions by focusing on his own material interests and those of the people around him in his regime, and disregard the humanitarian concerns of the Iraqi people.
Precisely because of that phenomena, to make up for the Iraqi regime's lack of concern, the Security Council adopted Resolution 706, the first proposal to allow Iraq to sell oil in order to import more food, just months after Iraq was expelled from Kuwait. But Iraq refused to accept the terms of 706. Because of our concern for the Iraqi people, we sponsored UNSC Resolution 986 in April 1995. The entire 986 process was designed to ensure that all Iraqis benefited from this program, and to limit abuse by the regime.
It was Baghdad that delayed implementation of Resolution 986 for one year. It was Baghdad that held up crucial UN shipments in customs for extended periods. It is Baghdad which, we believe, still has access to hundreds of millions of dollars which it is apparently not prepared to spend on humanitarian goods. And, most callously, it is Baghdad that deliberately refused to pump oil for two months under this program earlier this year. The U.S. and the international community sought to make up for any suffering caused by these delaying tactics by Baghdad, by adjusting the program so that Iraq could still meet its full quota. We did not do this for the Iraqi regime; we did this for the Iraqi people. And if there are other things that can be done to speed humanitarian supplies to the Iraqi people in a reliable and effective way that ensures that the Iraqi people benefit, not the regime, I believe that the international community, and the U.S., would certainly be prepared to support that.
However, in the face of the regime's conduct, it is essential that, until Saddam Hussein complies with all of the obligations under the UN resolutions, the international community must maintain the sanctions on Iraq, and support UNSCOM's efforts to root out all vestiges of Iraq's WMD programs.
Iran
Confronting the challenge from Iran is very different because, despite very troubling aspects of the Iranian Government's behavior, there is not the same degree of international consensus on how to respond, as there exists in the case of Iraq.
By history and geography, Iran is a major regional power. What is at issue here is how it chooses to use its power. It was clear during my trip, that Iran presents a very real concern to the Gulf states, especially dues to its growing military power. That is something very much on their minds, particularly those in close proximity to Iran. And, it was a concern which the Secretary of State also heard very keenly on her recent trip to the Gulf. Iran has been able to rebuild an effective army since its war with Iraq, and now is acting with much more self-confidence in the military realm. It is the most populous state in the Middle East, and contains 9 percent of the world's proven oil reserves, and 15 percent of the world's gas reserves. Tehran is on its version of a regional charm offensive at the present time. FM Kharazi is touring the Middle East, and Iran is offering itself up to the states of both the Middle East and Central Asia as an island of stability in an otherwise troubled region.
Ironically, one of the reported goals of FM Kharazi's trip is to consult with Gulf countries on "solving problems" and to discuss the "foreign presence" in the region. It is ironic because the potential Iranian threat to trade routes, and its efforts to subvert its neighbors, raise concerns among the very states Tehran is now trying to reassure.
The Gulf states' responses to Iran's presence have differed, depending to a large degree on their strategic location in relation to Iran. The states located closest to Iran struck me as the most interested in obtaining urgent protection from potential threats posed by Iran's growing power. Those located further away and closer to Iraq, felt they had greater flexibility to engage Tehran, and were more focused on the threat from Iraq. But, all the Gulf states appreciate and want our military presence in the region as the indispensable balancer of the threats that they see continuing, either from Iraq, or emerging, from a more powerful Iran. On that point, there are no differences. In fact, the welcoming of our presence in the region is striking today, compared with, say, ten years ago. The Gulf states recognize how dangerous their neighborhood is; and how high the stakes are. They are very aware of the way in which Iran, in the past, has engaged in regional meddling by supporting extremists in the neighborhood.
What we are seeking is a change in behavior, not a change in the regime. That behavior includes Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. And, now, we have a very real concern about its long-range missile program, which is moving very rapidly, unfortunately, with Russian assistance. We are concerned about Iran's active support for and sponsorship of terrorism, its violent opposition to the peace process, and its efforts to undermine friendly governments in the region.
Secretary Albright has said that the election of President Khatami is an intriguing development. Clearly, the people of Iran made a choice. They spoke with an overwhelming voice, giving President Khatami an overwhelming mandate for change. If that change results in changes in the behavior in these four categories of principal concern to us, then we are interested in encouraging that change. But, we are adopting a wait-and-see approach. What matters to us is deeds, not words, although we have noticed some toning down of the rhetoric from Iran. We, too, are not interested in a war of words with Tehran, and we have no hostile intent. But, we are looking for changes in these specific policies, not just changes of personalities. And, until we see that change, we believe that altering our efforts to stem those challenges and to maintain our military presence in the region, to maintain our determination to counter-terrorist acts that Iran has sponsored, to change our efforts to slow down acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, to change our opposition to its efforts to undermine friendly governments, and to maintain economic pressure on Iran to encourage change, is not appropriate. But, when we see changes on their part, we will welcome them, and we will be prepared to respond appropriately.
In the economic sphere, we are trying to raise the cost to Iran of its own actions, and to make it clear to Iran it cannot have it both ways--it cannot enjoy the benefits of international commerce, and the incentives to international commerce that countries are prepared to provide at the same time as it threatens the interests of those countries. It has to choose between the economic aspirations of its people, and the pursuit of WMD, and the promotion of terrorism that destabilizes the region; and that thereby comes at the expense of the peace and prosperity of its neighbors. So far, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act has helped deter foreign investment in Iran's petroleum sector, the primary source of Iranian Government revenues. Our continued efforts to implement the law places us at odds with some of our allies.
We are working further with our European allies to develop greater convergence between our approaches toward Iran, in the belief that only through a more united front will Tehran be left with fewer options, and therefore be encouraged to change.
We all agree on the fundamental problems and on the strategic objective. Our differences are tactical ones. Our problem with the EU's efforts at engagement with Iran is that this approach--the so-called "critical dialogue"--has not produced the change that they wanted to see. In our view, the chance that the new Government in Tehran may portend changes mean that now is the time for the leading states of the world to make clear that countries that want to benefit from participation in the international system need to play by the rules.
Our own willingness to have an official dialogue with the Government of Iran remains on the table, as it has been for many years. We would like it to be open, with an authoritative representative of the Iranian Government. Of course, we would use that dialogue to raise our concerns in an effort to try to convince the Iranians to change their behavior.
We do not view our problems with Iran as a "clash of civilizations." I was interested that, in his remarks at Columbia University, Iran's Foreign Minister Kharazi said that his government does not seek a clash of civilizations either. Nor is there any reason for our current problems to be permanent. But, we have not chosen artificial issues to justify our philosophical differences with the Government in Tehran. What we are confronting are real, substantial, issues that are of concern throughout the region. Our friends are not asking us to countenance terrorism or the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. They do not associate themselves with violent opposition to the Middle East peace process. It is up to the Government of Iran, therefore, to make a choice to alter those policies in the interests of regional security, and stability which the Government of Iran says it wants.
The Gulf
I have said that we will stand by our friends in the region. Nothing is more important to a great power than the credibility of its commitments to allies and friends. But our policy in the Gulf cannot be concerned solely with the most recent crisis or threat. It is designed also to maximize the long-term prospects for security and stability in the region. In other words, we are as concerned about ensuring lasting peace and security in the Gulf, as we are about securing lasting peace and security for Arabs and Israelis.
We will continue to defend our interests, and help our friends defend themselves. In this vein, I was pleased to see reports yesterday that the GCC leaders may approve a plan to integrate command-and-control defense systems. We feel that it is past time for the GCC to get its act together in terms of working together for their common defense. We are keen to support their efforts in this regard.
Interest in the long term security of the region also means recognizing much less publicized, but still important, potential challenges to that security. Border disputes between states, population growth and unemployment pressures, and environmental deterioration, are just a few issues facing Gulf leaders and societies as they look to the future.
Stability and security have a domestic component. The Gulf has benefited from steady economic growth. But, in some states that growth is having difficulty keeping pace with population growth, the increased demands for employment, and political participation that population increases inevitably bring. Insufficient economic, educational, and political opportunities, and a sense of injustice give extremists their constituency. We have no intention of imposing Western models of government on the Gulf. But, we believe that governments everywhere must respond to the aspirations of their people to ensure long-term stability. How they respond is bound to reflect their history and culture, and we are sensitive to that.
And, they are beginning to respond to these developments. Kuwait has expanded political participation through its very active National Assembly and less formal institutions. Yemen's generally free and fair parliamentary elections this year represent a promising foundation for continued democratic development. Saudi Arabia's Consultative Council--its "Majlis al-Shura"--is an important step toward the goal of greater popular political participation. And, Oman has begun a measured opening directed by the Sultan which we welcome and support.
As a friend, the U.S. supports emerging measures toward broader political participation and economic reform in the interests of the countries involved, and the entire Gulf region. We support these measures as a matter of principle, but we also believe they hold very tangible benefits for the countries that implement them. At the same time, we are sensitive to the destabilizing potential of too rapid change.
It is in this context of wanting to see economic development in the region, that I will be departing tomorrow with Secretary Albright to attend the fourth Middle East and North Africa Economic Conference, being held in Doha, Qatar. The Secretary's commitment to going to that conference is part and parcel of her commitment, and the Clinton Administration's commitment, to the peace process.
This MENA conference, which will be the fourth, is an institution of the peace process. We want to see all the tracks of the peace process resumed forthwith. We are trying very hard to get the Palestinian track moving again. The Secretary will be meeting separately with Prime Minister Netanyahu on Friday, and with Chairman Arafat on Saturday. She will be talking to them about the sense of urgency we feel on the need to get the process back on track, and about the concern we have that, not only is the whole peace process at stake here, but ,also, that our own interests in the region are being affected by the stalling of the peace process.
But, we also want to see the process resume on the other tracks as well: on the Syria and Lebanon tracks, and on the multilateral track. The MENA conference that will take place in Doha is part of that multilateral process. We are disappointed that some of our friends, some of those who have a particular interest in the peace process, will not be joining us there. We feel that we cannot afford to allow the institutions of the peace process to collapse, because it will be that much more difficult to get the process moving again. That is why the Secretary will be going to Doha: as a manifestation that, no matter how tough the going may be, the U.S. stands by those who take risks for peace. Were we to adopt a different stance, I believe the American people would think less of us.
The conference is not just about the peace process itself. It is also about the economic development of the region. That's why over 700 businesspeople will be represented at Doha. That's why the international community is still going and is still interested in investing in the region. And, we believe it is very important that we not allow the region to slip back into its old ways, the old ways represented by Saddam Hussein. We have seen the potential that peace and security hold for the region. We hope we will be able to depend on our friends in the region, who think in the same way about the need to maintain the peace process, to give us the support that makes it possible to move the process forward.
Conclusion
Whether it be pursuing peace, or working with the Security Council to get Saddam Hussein to reverse himself, or seeking to bring about change in the objectionable aspects of Iran's behavior, the U.S. is committed to an energetic, creative, pro-active, integrated strategy designed to protect and promote our interests, and to make the Middle East a more peaceful, more secure, more stable, and more prosperous region.
Thank you very much.
[end document]
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