

Secretary Albright

A Diplomatic Framework Guiding U.S. Efforts on Non-proliferation

June 10, 1998

Remarks at the Stimson Center, Washington, DC.

Thank you, Michael, for that introduction and thank you all for being here. I especially want to recognize my friend Barry Blechman, my old colleague Ambassador Bob Gallucci, and Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, who earned the world's gratitude during his years at UNSCOM; Professor Goldemberg; members of the Nuclear Roundtable; excellencies from the diplomatic community; friends from Capitol Hill; NGOs; and the press: There is such a wealth of experience, expertise, and wisdom in this room. It would take a cynic to ask why, if we're all so smart, the world seems to be in such shaky condition. Fortunately, none of us are cynics, but I think we all know we have some hard issues with which to grapple. It is to that end that I want to address my remarks today, and there could not be a more appropriate occasion on which to do so.

The Stimson Center is dedicated to the rigorous and nonpartisan pursuit of knowledge. It focuses on the tough problems and the difficult questions. It does so in the spirit of Henry Stimson, who served in the Cabinet under four Presidents—two Republican and two Democrat.

What I like most about Mr. Stimson's career is the precedent he set. After serving as Secretary of War from 1911 to 1913, he returned to the same job in 1940. So I figure that when I leave this great job as Secretary of State, after 27 years I can come back.

I have a special place in my heart for Henry Stimson and all those who led the Allies to victory in World War II. Their heroism altered my life and brought me to live in this nation, whose leadership carried the world through its darkest trials. Today, I am proud to say that American leadership continues to shape events in every region on every continent around the globe.

We exercise this leadership not out of sentiment, but out of necessity. For we Americans want to live, and we want our children to live in peace, prosperity, and freedom. But as

we look ahead to the 21st century, we know we cannot guarantee these blessings for ourselves if others do not have them as well.

In recent weeks, at commencement speeches at the University of Maryland and the Coast Guard Academy, I have discussed steps we are taking to sustain our prosperity and to help keep Americans safe from international terror and crime. During a commencement speech, you do wonder whether the audience is with you as you go through a very long speech. My speech today is fairly long, and if there ever was an audience that deserves it, it is this one. So I will sit back and relax and [inaudible].

Today, I want to set out the diplomatic framework guiding our efforts to prevent the spread and limit the dangers of the world's deadliest weapons. In fulfilling this mission, diplomacy is an important, but not our only, tool. When we negotiate arms control and non-proliferation agreements, we hope others will act in good faith. But we never count on this; we insist, instead, on the most thorough possible verification measures. We exercise our treaty rights to the full. And we maintain the world's strongest, best-prepared and best-equipped armed forces.

We pursue arms control because our citizens and military will be more secure if certain weapons are eliminated—or, at least, kept out of the wrong hands. Consider, for example, that millions of Americans and Europeans sleep safer every night because the START and INF treaties have eliminated thousands of Russian nuclear weapons. Consider that Saddam Hussein has been kept in a strategic box because UNSCOM has ferreted out and destroyed more weapons of mass destruction capacity than was destroyed in the entire Gulf war. Consider that 37,000 American troops in Korea are safer and Asia is more stable because the Agreed Framework has frozen North Korea's dangerous nuclear program. And consider what the modern world would be like if poison gas and deadly viruses were viewed as legitimate weapons.

"More nations in more parts of the world have been signing up and following through. Increasingly, countries that had been contributing to the proliferation problem are becoming part of its solution."

Former Secretary of Defense William Perry had it right when he said that effective arms control is "defense by other means." Through the decades, we have served this goal through formal treaties, such as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. We have pursued agreements to limit the transfer of dangerous technologies, while maintaining rigorous controls on our own exports. We have developed early warning and detection capabilities, which we are always striving to improve. We have backed fully the inspection activities of the IAEA and the UN Special Commission. We have worked steadily

to expand the circle of nations that abide by the rules of non-proliferation, while not hesitating to expose and confront those who cheat.

Especially in recent years, we have made great progress. More nations in more parts of the world have been signing up and following through. Increasingly, countries that had been contributing to the proliferation problem are becoming part of its solution. More and more, the understanding has spread that a world in which the most dangerous weapons are under, not out of, control, will be more secure for all.

Unfortunately, that understanding has not taken sufficient hold in South Asia. The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests dealt a blow to the non-proliferation regime. But let me be clear: Those senseless blasts beneath the ground do not, as some suggest, discredit that regime. To the contrary, they illustrate its logic and its necessity.

Indian leaders, especially, predicted that the decision to test would make their country more respected, more secure, and more firmly in control of events in South Asia. Those leaders were wrong. A month ago, India and Pakistan could look forward to improved relations with the United States and other major powers, to steadily increasing outside investment and beneficial trade, and to serious consideration of their membership on the UN Security Council. Today, those prospects have been demolished.

A month ago, the people of India and Pakistan were living—as they had lived for decades—with bitter tensions over Kashmir. But those tensions did not pose a clear and present danger to most of either nation's population. Today, both Indians and Pakistanis are less safe.

In 1993, a devastating earthquake claimed 20,000 lives in central India; it was an unforgettable tragedy. But a nuclear exchange of even a limited nature would kill not thousands, but millions. Depending on the winds, even a unilateral attack could destroy untold lives on both sides of the border.

For both nations, the strategic environment is now far more complicated and grave. Both face the prospect of an arms race neither can afford. Each faces the risk of nuclear missiles being pointed at their cities. Neither can be confident it will have early warning of what the other will do. And the risk of misinformation leading to miscalculation leading to disaster is high.

For both India and Pakistan, then, this is the payoff for exploding a nuclear device—mutual insecurity, decreased prosperity, a harvest of fear at home, and condemnation abroad. They really hit the jackpot, didn't they?

Obviously, the nuclear tests cannot be undone. But the resulting risks and disruptions can be minimized if cooler heads and clearer thinking now prevail. We hope that this is beginning to occur. The rhetoric in New Delhi and Islamabad seems to be quieting, calls for renewing their bilateral dialogue are increasing, and both sides say they have no present plans for further nuclear tests. But these steps are nowhere near enough.

The world community is urging leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad to forswear any future tests and to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons or from testing missiles capable of delivering them. Further, we have called upon both countries to join the CTBT, without conditions, to stop producing fissile material and join in negotiating a worldwide pact, to refrain from deploying missiles, and to formalize their pledges not to export any materials or technology that could be used to build nuclear weapons or their delivery systems.

India and Pakistan should take such measures not as a favor to the world community, but because it is in the security interests of each to do so. In considering their next steps, they should realize that the NPT will not be amended to include them as nuclear weapon states. That is fundamental; for the NPT is fundamental to nuclear non-proliferation.

A generation ago it was predicted the world would have 20-30 nuclear states. No measure has done more than the NPT to prevent that. If we were to allow India and Pakistan to test their way to nuclear status under that agreement, we would create an incentive for others to follow their misguided example. Moreover, we would break faith with those countries—such as South Africa, Brazil,

Argentina, South Korea, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—that have understood the importance to their own interests of foregoing the nuclear option.

The nuclear tests in South Asia present us with a fateful choice. Some now say that nuclear non-proliferation is doomed, and the sooner we accept that, the better off we'll be. Because a standard has been violated, they would have us accept a world with no standards at all.

I say that is dangerous nonsense. Efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons do not come with a guarantee. But to abandon them because they have been dealt a setback would be a felony against the future. And there are steps we can take to regain the momentum we have lost.

Step one is to gain Senate approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. For despite the South Asia tests, the CTBT remains essential to our strategy to reduce the nuclear danger. This treaty has been a goal of U.S. Presidents since Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy. If approved and enforced, it will arrest both the development and the spread of new and more dangerous weapons. It has been widely endorsed by our military and scientific leaders, and it has consistently commanded the support of no less than 70% of the American people.

Now more than ever, the CTBT is relevant to American security and world peace. And now more than ever, we need to get the treaty's monitoring and detection system up and running. Now more than ever, we need to declare that testing is not smart, not safe, not right, and not legal. Now more than ever, we need to demonstrate that the world has entered a new era in which the greatness of nations is measured not by how much they can destroy, but how much they can build.

So I ask the Senate—as the President has asked the Senate: Do not stall; do not delay; approve the CTBT. On this critical measure, at this perilous time, American leadership should be unambiguous, decisive, and strong. In particular, I urge my friend, Senator Helms to bring the CTBT before his committee; examine it on the merits. And if the Chairman wants me to testify, all he has to do is say the word and I'll be there.

Of course, our strategy for reducing the nuclear danger involves far more than the test ban. We are working across the board to ensure that the American people never again have to bear the costs and risks of a nuclear arms race.

Many Americans assume our arms control relationship with Russia no longer matters. But it does matter; it matters a lot. For until we bring our nuclear arsenals and postures into line with post-Cold War realities, each of us

will be forced to maintain larger arsenals at higher states of alert than would be ideal. And though we are slicing apart weapons as fast as we can—with START I eliminations running two years ahead of schedule—we cannot move beyond START II until that treaty is ratified. All we can do is prepare the ground for START III negotiations with preliminary experts' meetings to frame issues. That kind of planning has begun, but planning is not enough.

Unfortunately, I must report that the Duma today voted to postpone consideration of START II. I deeply regret that action, and I hope that the majority of the Russian legislature will come to understand what its clearest thinkers already have—which is that, in light of the South Asia tests, START II ratification is now more urgent than ever.

As President Yeltsin has said, START II is manifestly in Russia's interest, as well as our own. It will eliminate the deadliest weapons ever pointed our way, and it will set the stage for START III cuts in strategic arsenals to 80% below Cold War peaks.

That would be a remarkable achievement in its own right. It would also provide further evidence that we are serious about meeting our NPT commitment to move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. That is a worthy goal, embraced by Presidents of both parties, including President Clinton. But we cannot build that kind of world alone, and sadly, it seems more distant today than only a month ago.

START III will be more than a sequel to START II. It will mark a major qualitative as well as quantitative step forward. For the first time, it will address destruction of warheads and bombs, not just the missiles and planes that deliver them.

This past September, we completed the ABM Treaty succession and demarcation agreements. The Senate will have every opportunity to examine them closely when they are presented as a package with the START II extension protocol. Meanwhile, these accords would not impede our efforts to develop the capable theater missile defenses we need. And we know that for Russian strategic reductions to continue, the ABM Treaty must remain in place.

"Some now say that nuclear non-proliferation is doomed, and the sooner we accept that, the better off we'll be. Because a standard has been violated, they would have us accept a world with no standards at all. I say that is dangerous nonsense."

START III is a vital goal. As we pursue it, we will bear in mind the need for strict verification, improved intelligence, and greater transparency. These advances, in turn, will give us a leg up on the "loose nukes" problem that rightly worries us all.

We are working hard to keep the critical ingredients of nuclear weapons—plutonium and highly enriched uranium—out of the wrong hands. It is this fissile material, not the basic design information for a nuclear device, that is the biggest hurdle facing those who seek to build nuclear weapons. That is why we are insisting that North Korea adhere to its commitments under the Agreed Framework, and why we are working so hard with the Congress to ensure that we live up to ours. That is why our strategy includes working with the New Independent States to secure nuclear materials—as we did in transporting HEU out of Kazakhstan and Georgia to safe storage. That is why it includes efforts, through the G-8 nuclear smuggling program, to deal with excess plutonium and make cuts in nuclear arsenals irreversible. And that is why the Administration seeks more funding for Nunn-Lugar-Domenici programs—to keep Russian weapons and nuclear materials secure, and atomic scientists engaged in their home countries, not in business with rogue regimes.

We are pressing every country in the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating a fissile material cutoff treaty. We are pleased that India has now said it is willing to participate in these negotiations. We believe Pakistan should follow suit. I am also directing U.S. negotiators to conclude agreements by the year 2000 to make "excess" U.S. and Russian plutonium permanently unusable for weapons. Finally, we should convene a conference this year to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material—to increase accountability, enhance protections, and complement our efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguards.

The nuclear menace has long been familiar to Americans. But other dangers, no less real, confront us in the form of chemical, biological, and destabilizing conventional weapons. Against these threats, as well, our strategy is to employ a full-court press.

Last year, with bipartisan support from the Senate, America joined the Chemical Weapons Convention as an original party. Other key countries, such as Russia, Iran, and Pakistan, have since joined, as well. This year, we are asking Congress to approve legislation to implement that Convention and thereby make it harder for terrorists to concoct, conceal, or conspire to use poison gas in our own country.

This measure is supported by U.S. industry and would bring us into full compliance with the Convention. While moving forward with it, Congress should not at the same time move backward by adding provisions that are not consistent with the Convention and would diminish its effectiveness.

The Biological Weapons Convention, or BWC, has stigmatized the use of dread diseases as instruments of war. And its implementing legislation has helped our law enforcement officials block attempts to acquire or produce biological weapons. But the BWC needs enforcement teeth if we are to have confidence it is being respected around the world. Under President Clinton's leadership, we have redoubled our efforts to negotiate a compliance protocol in Geneva this year.

Ideological opponents of arms control say treaties lull us into a false sense of security. But look at the facts: This Administration has increased funding for defense against chemical weapons, and the President has announced a plan to inoculate our troops against biological threats.

Global Conventions are not silver bullets that can stop terrorists in their tracks, but they are a valuable tool—and we would be foolish not to use them, for they make the terrorist's task harder and the law enforcement job easier. They also heighten police and public awareness, which can lead to tips that foil plots and save lives. This same problem-solving perspective informs the President's initiative to enhance our readiness against unconventional threats. No President has done more than Bill Clinton to recognize and rectify potential U.S. vulnerabilities in this area.

Finally, let me address a subject whose inherent difficulties make it more, not less, worthy of attention—and that is conventional arms control.

Legitimate exports of conventional arms can support our interests and our foreign policy goals. But in the wrong hands, such exports can endanger our people and empower our adversaries. A prime example is the growing threat to civil aviation posed by shoulder-fired missiles. Today, I am calling for negotiation of an international agreement to place tighter controls on the export of these portable, easily concealed weapons.

I welcome the European Union's recent decision to adopt a code of conduct for arms transfers and will work to ensure better coordination of our respective policies. I also want to strengthen the Wassenaar Arrangement, which has not yet reached its potential. We want that arrangement to be recognized as the institution where responsible nations take

practical steps to prevent and address the dangers arising from irresponsible arms exports.

Lastly, I am proposing that we broaden our efforts to crack down on illicit firearms trafficking. Through the OAS, we have negotiated a landmark agreement to combat such trafficking in our own hemisphere. We are now pursuing a global agreement, which we aim to conclude by 1999.

One export control issue much in the news lately has been our policy of sometimes allowing U.S. satellites to be launched by Chinese rockets. This issue has been belabored elsewhere, so I will only touch on it here. As Secretary of State, I agree with my predecessors from both parties that such launches can serve American interests. They create incentives for China to help us stop the spread of missile and other technology, bolster U.S. competitiveness, and help broadcast Western ideas and values into China.

To those who see this policy as a threat to U.S. security, I would point out that the practice was initiated by President Reagan at a time when China's record on proliferation was a good deal worse than it is today. These launches involve strictly commercial communications satellites. All are subject to DoD safeguards to prevent the transfer of technology that would improve China's missile capabilities, and all are subject to full review and comment by the Department of State.

In closing, I want to say a word about how we forge arms control and non-proliferation policies in the executive branch and in Congress. Clearly, there is room for differences of opinion and debate about the specifics of those policies. But it does seem to me that certain truths are self-evident.

First, America is stronger and more effective when the executive and legislative branches are working cooperatively, rather than at cross purposes.

Second, the Administration and Congress need to reach a better consensus on when, how, and for what purpose to employ the tool of sanctions. For if sanctions are to work, they must be part of an overall strategy, and they must provide sufficient flexibility for the executive so that we are able to do good, not just feel good.

Third, we only have one President and Secretary of State at a time. If they are to do their jobs for America, they need adequate resources, tools, and authority from Congress. But if Congress is to do its job, it needs information and respect from the executive.

This morning, I met with almost half the Senate to discuss South Asia. Before leaving for the Beijing Summit, I plan to meet with congressional leaders at the Department. I and other Administration officials will consult regularly.

Let me say that in the meeting this morning, we had a very good session about the sanctions issue, and I think are finding points of convergence on how we make sanctions work less as a blunt instrument and are able to find some flexibility.

I suggested that we have an executive/legislative working group working on this subject, and the Majority Leader was very interested in that proposition. So I do think that as far as working together on this very important subject, we are moving forward.

Our purpose is to develop a stronger partnership on arms control with our friends on Capitol Hill. This issue is critical to our security and credibility around the world. We need to be speaking with one voice and acting with America's interests—not partisan interests—firmly in mind.

Thirty-five years ago, in this city, on this day, John F. Kennedy spoke memorably of the new face of war created by nuclear weapons and of America's commitment both to the defense of freedom and to the cause of peace. In so doing, he rejected explicitly both the despair of those who believed the nuclear danger could never be controlled and the hopes of those who placed their faith in an infinite concept of universal peace and good will.

He focused, instead, on the hard and practical job of building an attainable peace based not on a sudden revolution in human nature, but on a gradual evolution in human institutions. He predicted there would be no single, simple key to this peace, but rather, it must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts; dynamic, not static; changing to meet the challenges of each new generation.

Kennedy's words that day led to a partial ban on nuclear tests—a measure quickly negotiated and quickly ratified, but only a down payment on the comprehensive treaty whose approval we now seek.

"Our purpose is to develop a stronger partnership on arms control with our friends on Capitol Hill. This issue is critical to our security and credibility around the world. We need to be speaking with one voice and acting with America's interests—not partisan interests—firmly in mind."

Since that day, 3¹/₂ decades ago, we have learned again and again that the pursuit of peace and security is a race never won, a quest never over, a journey always underway. Today, that journey is our responsibility. And like Kennedy's generation, we must proceed stride by stride. We must encourage the constructive involvement of nations from around the world, including past adversaries.

We must use every tool of diplomacy and law we have available, while maintaining both the capacity and the resolve to defend freedom.

We must have the vision to explore new avenues when familiar ones seem closed. And we must go forward—with a will as great as our goal—to build a practical peace that will endure through the remaining years of this century and far into the next. To that mission, I pledge my own full energy and commitment and respectfully solicit both your counsel and your support.

Thank you all very much. ■

Secretary Albright

The NATO Summit: Defining Purpose And Direction for the 21st Century

May 28, 1998

*Statement before the North Atlantic Council Ministerial,
Luxembourg City, Luxembourg.*

Mr. Secretary general, Mr. President d'Honneur, fellow ministers, distinguished colleagues: I am very pleased to speak with you here this morning on behalf of the United States.

In 11 months, our leaders will gather in Washington to celebrate NATO's 50th anniversary and to welcome the first new democracies from central Europe as full members of our alliance. President Clinton is looking forward to hosting your heads of state and government for this historic event.

Two weeks ago in Berlin, the President laid out his thinking on a new Euro-Atlantic partnership for the 21st century. He reminded us that the destinies of America and Europe are joined today and in the future no less than they were 50 years ago when NATO was founded. His speech was an invitation to start a conversation on how we can shape that partnership together.

The history of the 20th century has taught us that we need a partnership in which you can count on us and we can count on you. Our goals are enduring—providing security, ensuring prosperity, and defending democracy. The institutions that unite us in pursuit of these goals are well established. They include not only NATO but the OSCE and the relationship between the United States and the European Union.

The immediate challenges we face together are ambitious. They include completing the integration of Europe, including Russia and Ukraine; deepening the ties between the U.S. and Europe; and establishing more effective mechanisms for America and Europe to pursue common interests in Europe and beyond.

In 1999, our leaders will come together to address these challenges at the NATO summit, at two U.S.-EU summits as well as the OSCE summit. This is the right time to start a discussion about how we can use these events to set the purpose and direction of our partnership for the 21st century. The need for that kind of

discussion was brought home to me when our Senate was debating NATO enlargement last month.

As you know, an overwhelming majority of Senators from both political parties voted to ratify the admission of new members. This means that almost a decade after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the American people have decided not just to preserve our commitment to the security of Europe, but to extend it.

At the same time, the debate that preceded this decision raised many serious questions. Americans are as interested in the future mission of NATO as they are about its makeup. They are happy to see the flags of capable new allies flying outside our headquarters. But they also want to see Americans and Europeans act together to solve the most pressing real world threats to our security.

For the last several years, our leaders have been meeting to adapt our alliance to these challenges and to a transformed Europe. They set the specific goals at summits in 1991, 1994, and 1997. And we have largely met those goals. We have streamlined NATO's command structure and increased European responsibilities; we have undertaken new missions; we have created the Partnership for Peace and the EAPC; we have redefined NATO's relations with Russia and Ukraine; and later today, we will meet with the first of our future allies from central Europe.

This adapted NATO is not just an instrument through which Americans help Europeans secure Europe; its purpose is to defend our common interest in transatlantic security. As President Clinton said in Berlin:

Yesterday's NATO guarded our borders against direct military invasion. Tomorrow's NATO must continue to defend enlarged borders and defend against threats to our security from beyond them—the spread of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic violence, and regional conflict.

It must do so in part because the very nature of potential Article V threats is changing. But it must also do so because non-Article V threats can become Article V threats if they are not addressed early.

I know that some people have suggested that our intent is to alter the original intent of the Washington Treaty, or to create some kind of new “global NATO.” If I could use a polite American diplomatic term: That is just hogwash. All we are talking about is continuing the adaptation of NATO to the realities of the post-Cold War era.

Let me say that I am a conservative and a hawk when it comes to protecting the sanctity of the Washington Treaty. I have made it clear to the U.S. Senate, and I want to be clear today that NATO’s primary mission must remain collective defense against aggression. This is the heart of our commitment under the Washington Treaty.

But we have also always had the option to use NATO’s strength beyond its borders to protect our security interests. NATO’s founders recognized this. In fact, 50 years ago my predecessor Dean Acheson pointed out that while the Washington Treaty involves commitments to collective defense, it also allows us to come together to meet common threats that might emanate from beyond the North Atlantic area. That was a wise approach in 1949, and it should help frame our discussions in 1999.

If joint military action is ever needed to protect vital alliance interests, NATO should be our institution of choice. After all, in such a crisis, it would be foolish not to use the unified command that we have already built; it would be strange not to rely on the habits of cooperation that we have already developed after 50 years in this alliance.

As in the past, we should approach these issues in a manner that is evolutionary, not revolutionary. We should move forward step by step and recognize that we have already taken many important steps—from the 1991 revision in NATO’s strategic concept, which emphasized outreach to new democracies, to our decision to deploy NATO forces to defend common interests in Bosnia. Such missions have become part of what NATO is all about, as is our commitment to undertake them with our Partners whenever possible. What does all this mean for our work together over the next 11 months?

First, at the Washington summit I hope our nations will issue a political declaration on NATO’s rationale and purpose for the 21st century that reflects these considerations.

Second, we should agree on a revised strategic concept that reflects that rationale and which gives our military planners the guidance they need to address the full spectrum of military contingencies NATO forces are likely to face in the future.

Third, we must ensure that NATO can do what it says. We must expand our efforts to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to address the interoperability challenges across the Atlantic, and to promote greater defense industrial cooperation in an age of shrinking defense budgets. Those efforts should culminate in a set of concrete initiatives to which our heads of state can agree next April.

The point is to ensure our alliance has the means to accomplish its task: to protect security and thus to allow freedom and prosperity to flourish. But of course, for this formula to work, our nations must have the resolve to act together as well.

The recent nuclear tests in India are an example of a problem that requires our joint action and resolve. Only by acting together to impose a price on this kind of behavior can we deter others from pursuing the nuclear option. Only by rewarding restraint with tangible support can we encourage nations with the capacity to go nuclear to join the overwhelming majority that have chosen not to do so.

Last week’s North Atlantic Council statement on South Asia was a good beginning. We must keep working together to show we understand the gravity of this threat and to shore up the global non-proliferation regime we built together.

In all these ways, I believe we can continue constructing an inclusive, outward looking Euro-Atlantic community that builds stability in Europe and that projects a sense of security more broadly around the globe. But we also have unfinished business closer to home that demands our attention.

We still have work to do to strengthen and modernize the partnership between Europe and North America. This is partly an economic challenge; it requires moving step by step toward truly free and open trade across the Atlantic. But it is a political challenge as well. It requires an effort to work through our occasional differences and to find effective ways to advance together the countless interests we share.

Another vital goal remains to complete the integration of Europe. By this I do not just mean fitting the right countries into the right bureaucratic arrangements under the right acronyms. I

am talking about the need to build in all of Europe what we have built together in western Europe in the last 50 years. I mean extending as far as possible a community that upholds and enforces common standards of human rights—a community where borders are open to travel and trade, a community where nations cooperate to make war unthinkable. I mean defining Europe in the broadest and most inclusive way and overcoming the barriers that old conflicts and past prejudice have etched in our minds and on our maps.

The addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to our alliance is a huge step in the right direction. We are erasing the last vestiges of the Iron Curtain, and we have established once and for all that this alliance and the community it represents will be open to those nations able to help advance its goals.

This means that the first new members of NATO shall not be the last. If a European country is important to our security, and if it demonstrates that it is ready—politically, economically, and militarily—to contribute to our security, it will be in our interest to welcome it through the open door. This is central to the logic of a larger NATO. It also means that our approach to future rounds should be as pragmatic as our approach to the first. Our timetable should be driven not by political calculations but by the performance of aspiring countries. There should be no artificial deadlines or premature promises. A country's place on the European map should neither rule it in nor rule it out.

Nor can we assume that our parliaments will always agree. The U.S. Senate rejected an arbitrary pause in the process of enlargement, but I can tell you there is zero chance it will ratify the admission of future candidates unless they meet the high standards we set for Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Success in future rounds depends on protecting NATO's reputation—as an alliance of nations willing and able to share military and financial burdens. It will also require working actively with candidate nations to help them reach the finish line, instead of moving the line closer and waiting for them to cross. We have to operationalize the commitment we made in Madrid—to give aspiring countries not promises but a process that helps them understand what they must do to make membership a real possibility.

NATO is not the only organization that has begun to welcome new members. We fully support the expansion of the European Union. We welcome the start of EU accession talks with the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia and trust this

process will eventually embrace others in central Europe as well as Turkey. We hope the EU will move forward as rapidly as possible, for NATO cannot guarantee military security where there is not economic security as well.

America has supported every European effort toward deeper economic integration from the coal and steel community to the single market. We support the creation of a single currency today. We do so with confidence that the EU will expand on the basis of openness of outlook and access. And we are hopeful that as the EU lowers its barriers to the more prosperous countries in central Europe, it does not oblige these countries to raise barriers to other nations.

As our institutions expand eastward, we must avoid creating a new dividing line, a new gray zone, a new strategic and economic limbo further to the east. That is why NATO's Partnership for Peace has never been more vital.

It is why when NATO takes action, we should strive whenever possible to do so with our partners in the EAPC—and why the United States will welcome each of the EAPC's member countries to the Washington summit. The new NATO has to be better equipped to cooperate with partners, an interest that must be reflected in our new strategic concept.

It is why we have long recognized our interest in a stable and free Ukraine. We can be proud of our success in cementing cooperation between NATO and Ukraine. But we must also keep in mind that Ukraine is facing a major economic challenge in the weeks ahead. The greatest threat to its security comes from within; it can only be overcome through reform and recovery.

To complete our vision, we have also been working hard to encourage Russia's integration with Europe as a nation that upholds and defends the rules of the international system. We want Russia to be part of this new partnership. Taking the next steps in NATO's transformation will further underscore that NATO has an enduring purpose, that its mission is directed not at or against Russia but one we can foresee pursuing with Russia. A new

"... the first new members of NATO shall not be the last. If a European country is important to our security, and if it demonstrates that it is ready—politically, economically, and militarily—to contribute to our security, it will be in our interest to welcome it through the open door."

strategic concept will demonstrate that our military planning is no longer preoccupied with a real or imagined Russian threat.

Of course, it is up to Russia to choose how it will engage with NATO and the world. But Russia is far more likely to make the right choices about its future if we continue to make clear that its future lies with us. Each of us and Russia as well should be working to give the OSCE a more substantial role, to make it more operational than conversational, to give it the money and the mandate not only to establish democratic standards but to defend them on the ground. NATO cannot do this. The EU cannot do this. None of us can do it alone. But the OSCE has already begun to play this role in Bosnia, Albania, Croatia, Armenia, and the Baltics. As President Clinton proposed in Berlin, we should strive to expand its presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

No less a challenge will be to preserve and strengthen military stability and openness in Europe by updating the CFE Treaty. Progress in the CFE adaptation negotiations should be a priority for the alliance during the remainder of the year. Having made an excellent start last year, the alliance now needs to follow through in filling out our negotiating proposal in Vienna. We must do so in a way that reinforces NATO's role in European security. I recently wrote Foreign Minister Primakov to reaffirm

our readiness to move forward with Russia to reach a CFE agreement that takes fully into account the interests of all parties involved. This will require creative thinking and tough decisions from all of us.

In short, we have a big agenda ahead of us. But it is not too ambitious for a partnership that defended freedom in Europe for half a century, a partnership that is unifying this continent, a partnership that against the expectations of so many people has survived and even flourished through a time of breathtaking change.

The Washington summit is just 11 months away. The new millennium will follow just 8 months later.

My goals for the NATO summit are simple. We will be meeting not just to celebrate past achievements or to have just another ceremony welcoming the admission of new allies; this is not just going to be the last successful summit of the 20th century: It is going to be the summit that defines the NATO of the 21st century.

Our task is to make clear what our alliance will do and what our partnership will mean in a Europe truly whole and free and in a world that looks to us for principled and purposeful leadership for peace, for prosperity, and for freedom. In this spirit, I look forward to our discussion today and to our work together in the months and years to come. ■

Secretary Albright

U.S. Efforts To Preserve America's Security

May 20, 1998

Commencement address to the United States Coast Guard Academy, New London, Connecticut.

Thank you, Admiral, and my thanks to the entire Coast Guard Academy community for the invitation to participate in your commencement ceremony this year. I'd like to say a special word of welcome to the parents and to the faculty and the entire community to be here on this great day.

As a former professor, I love academic surroundings. And as a mother of three, I know the deep sense of pride that parents feel on graduation day—and the almost equally deep sense of relief. As someone who will always be grateful to the United States for allowing my family to live in freedom, I have an abiding respect for those who choose military service, and I long ago fell in love with Americans in uniform.

So at the outset, let me pay tribute to the American in uniform who just introduced me, for the career of Adm. Robert Kramek—who is soon to retire after more than 40 years of duty—is the very embodiment of the Coast Guard's tradition. As Commandant, the Admiral has taken the Coast Guard around the world, protecting America's strategic interests and setting a standard for excellence that I hope will inspire all those graduating today. Admiral, on behalf of the President and the Department of State and, I am sure, everyone here, let me thank you, congratulate you, and wish you the very best in years to come.

Let me tell you that I feel a special bond with the Admiral because of his Czech background. And I also feel a special bond with the Coast Guard—not only because I see so many female cadets among your ranks today but also because since my time as Ambassador to the United Nations, I have had so many opportunities to witness firsthand the splendid humanitarian work the Coast Guard is performing around the world.

To the class of '98, I also say congratulations. On other occasions, I have seen the Eagle and its towering masts, and I know that most of

you have climbed its rigging. That suggests two possibilities: One, you are all out of your minds or two, you are truly ready to serve.

Of course, there may be a few people in our country who don't feel they are served by the Coast Guard; who do not live on or near the coast; who don't travel our waterways; who don't benefit from maritime commerce; and who do not care whether our fishing grounds are raided by poachers, our beaches contaminated by oil spills, our ports imperiled by terrorists, or our neighborhoods flooded by drugs. There may be a few people like that in America, but if so, they are, shall we say, "factually challenged," because the vast majority of us understand that the Coast Guard provides the best value of any institution in our government.

The Coast Guard is our nation's oldest seagoing service, yet you are focused on the future. As I have seen personally as Secretary of State and before as Ambassador to the UN during visits to Governor's Island, you perform multiple missions requiring an awesome variety of skills. You are active both in time of war and peace. You uphold the law. And because you are so good at what you do, every year thousands of people who would have died, live.

Because the Coast Guard makes a difference every day in the lives of our people, the class of '98 is the inheritor of a grand tradition. And that gives us something in common because, as Secretary of State, I, too, am the inheritor of a grand tradition. For American leadership is evident today, as it has been for almost as long as I have been alive, in every region on every continent around the globe.

We exercise this leadership not out of sentiment but out of necessity. We Americans want to live, and we want our children to live in peace and prosperity and freedom. But we know, as we look ahead to the 21st century, that we cannot guarantee these blessings for

ourselves if others do not have them as well. That is why, at President Clinton's direction, we are strengthening the ties that bind the world's leading democracies, so that the heart of the international community will beat strong and free.

To enrich our international community, we are giving a hand up to nations that need help creating democratic societies, lifting themselves out of poverty, or recovering from conflict. To protect it, we are standing up to aggressors and criminals so that people everywhere may live in security and justice. To modernize it, we are building new institutions and adapting old ones so that we may master the demands of this dynamic world not as it has been but as it is and will be.

Finally, we are refusing to settle for the status quo. Abroad, as at home, we are pursuing higher standards in the marketplace and workplace, the classroom and courtroom, so that the benefits of growth and the protections of law are shared not only by the lucky few but by the hard working many.

The efforts we make to build security, generate prosperity, and extend freedom are not separate but reinforcing, for progress toward one means progress toward all. This morning, I would like to focus particularly on the steps we are taking to preserve the security of the American people.

In the early days of our country, our citizens felt protected by the vast oceans to our east and west. But as technology advanced and U.S. overseas interests grew, we learned the hard way that we couldn't be safe if friends and allies were in danger. And today, the idea of an ocean as protection is as obsolete as a castle moat. For Americans travel constantly; our borders are increasingly tough to secure, and the dangers we face are as fast-moving as a renegade virus and as unpredictable as a terrorist's bomb.

In such a world, no nation can guarantee its security alone. We must act together, and we must plot our defense not against a single powerful threat, as during the Cold War, but against a viper's nest of perils. Of these, four stand out.

First, although the superpower rivalry between East and West has ended, the danger posed by nuclear weapons plainly has not. Evidence of this was provided last week by India's unjustified and unwise decision to conduct explosive nuclear tests.

Why was this decision so dangerous? Because it could ignite an arms race with no visible finish line between India and Pakistan, who have fought three wars in the last 51 years, and who remain bitterly divided over Kashmir and other issues. India's rash action is sure to

heighten security tensions throughout southern Asia, and other nations may be tempted to follow India's wrongheaded example.

President Clinton has strongly condemned these nuclear tests. Consistent with U.S. law, he has imposed an array of sanctions that will cost India dearly. And he and other world leaders have made it plain to India's Government that exploding nuclear devices is a way to lose—not win—international respect.

India wants to be considered a great nation. But India was already a great nation with which we were actively pursuing a warmer and more wide-ranging relationship. I personally conveyed this message to India's previous government during my visit 6 months ago, while reconfirming our warning that a decision to test nuclear weapons would have serious consequences.

The choice India made last week does not reflect that nation's greatness but rather a reckless disregard for world opinion and for India's own reputation. The leaders in New Delhi have made a grave historical error.

In recent days, the Administration has been consulting intensively with top officials in Pakistan, who, in the wake of India's provocation, face strong public pressure to conduct their own nuclear tests. For Pakistan's Government this is a difficult and defining challenge. But it is also an unprecedented opportunity, for if Pakistan's leaders do not test, they will defy India's expectations and foil India's desire to drag Pakistan's world standing down. They will pull South Asia back from an arms competition that nations there cannot afford and might not survive. They will demonstrate confidence in Pakistan's military, which it merits. They will avoid costly economic sanctions. And they will show a level of maturity and responsibility India's current leaders have not. By so doing, they will earn precisely the kind of international respect that India apparently yearns for and its people deserve but which its leaders have so heedlessly thrown away. Moreover, the Administration will work hard with Congress, whose view of South Asia is already changing, to respond to Pakistan's economic and security concerns.

Even beyond the events in South Asia, our strategy for minimizing the nuclear danger to our citizens is broad, comprehensive, and increasingly ambitious. In the weeks ahead, I will be working with my Administration colleagues and the leaders in Congress to identify new steps and to fully implement our prior initiatives. We are determined to seize the opportunity history has presented to reduce further the roles and risks of nuclear weapons. There could be no greater gift to the future.

Last year, the President submitted to the Senate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to ban nuclear explosive tests of any size, for any purpose, in any place, for all time. Now, more than ever, India should sign that agreement—and Pakistan, too. And it is doubly important for the Senate to act quickly to approve that treaty. American leadership on this issue should be unambiguous, decisive, and strong.

We have proposed to Russia a new round of arms reductions that could bring our arsenals down to 80% below Cold War peaks and, for the first time, to eliminate bombs and warheads, not just the planes and missiles that deliver them. As we demonstrated recently through the purchase and transport of highly enriched uranium from the country of Georgia, we are also working hard to ensure that all nuclear materials are securely guarded and safely handled. Our goal is to see that no nukes become loose nukes. Finally, we have made halting the spread of nuclear weapons a top priority in our bilateral diplomacy with Russia, Ukraine, China, and other key nations.

The **second** step we must take to ensure American security is to reduce the risk posed by regional conflicts, for we know that small wars and unresolved disputes can erupt into violence that endangers allies, creates economic havoc, generates refugees, and embroils our own forces in combat.

American diplomacy backed by military power is the single most effective force for peace in the world today. There are those who say that America has a short attention span and that we grow weary in our commitments. But for almost a half-century, our leadership in NATO has defended freedom in Europe, while our troops in Asia have maintained peace on the Korean Peninsula.

In the Gulf, it was U.S. determination that rolled back Iraqi aggression 7 years ago, and U.S. vigilance that keeps pressure on Saddam Hussein to live up to his commitments today. In the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East, we are standing shoulder to shoulder with the peacemakers against the bombthrowers, in hopes the children of those troubled regions will grow up surrounded not by hate and fear but by tolerance and the quiet miracle of a normal life. We do this because it is right but also because in an era when weapons are more available and destructive than ever before, our citizens will be less at risk if peace spreads and conflicts do not.

That is why, too, the United States has a keen interest in defusing unstable situations in places such as Indonesia, where further unrest could have profoundly negative consequences for peace and prosperity throughout Asia. In

this regard, President Soeharto's statement yesterday that he was willing to launch a democratic political transition in Indonesia was an important development.

President Soeharto has given much to his country over the past 30 years—raising Indonesia's standing in the world and hastening Indonesia's economic growth and integration into the global economy. Now he has the opportunity for a historic act of statesmanship—one that will preserve his legacy as a man who not only led his country but who provided for its democratic transition. In this delicate and difficult time, we strongly urge the Indonesian authorities to use maximum restraint in response to the peaceful demonstrations.

Third, if Americans are to be secure, we must also protect ourselves from the unexpected. Because of our military strength, potential enemies may try to attack us by unconventional means such as sabotage and terror. They may seek to disrupt our government, sow fear within our communities, inhibit our travel, and make it harder for us to keep or deploy our troops overseas. In responding to this danger, our goal is grounded in a Coast Guard doctrine—*semper paratus*—always ready, always prepared.

We maintain an arsenal of tough legal and law enforcement measures to fight terror both at home and overseas. We do all we can diplomatically and militarily to see that poison gas and biological weapons do not fall into the wrong hands. We have tightened border security, and we are engaged in constant efforts—with the Coast Guard's active participation and help—to safeguard transportation so that our people may move about our nation and the world without fear.

Finally, if Americans are to be secure, we must push ahead hard in the war against narcotics trafficking and the hydra-headed evil of international crime. Drug cartels and the criminal empires they finance threaten us every day, whether we are traveling abroad or going about our daily business here at home.

"... if Americans are to be secure, we must also protect ourselves from the unexpected. Because of our military strength, potential enemies may try to attack us by unconventional means such as sabotage and terror. They may seek to disrupt our government, sow fear within our communities, inhibit our travel, and make it harder for us to keep or deploy our troops overseas."

President Clinton spoke to this danger last week when he unveiled a comprehensive strategy to integrate all facets of the federal response to international crime. The Coast Guard and the State Department are both key partners in this effort, which is designed to extend the first line of defense against crime far beyond U.S. borders. To this end, we are working together with other nations as never before to train judges, police, and Coast Guards; to share information about criminals; to seize drug assets; to expose and close front companies; and to halt money laundering.

I saw an example of this cooperation last month when I met with U.S., Haitian, and Dominican Republic law enforcement officials on the Coast Guard cutter *Dallas* near Port-au-Prince. In recent months, we have been engaged in a joint operation that has shut down numerous drug-running efforts, including one by a Colombian vessel under Coast Guard pursuit even while I was on board the *Dallas*. And I don't think they just put it on for my visit.

In each case, we may be satisfied that the drugs involved, whether seized or dumped, will never profit those who sought to peddle them. Those drugs will never incite an attack in which an innocent person might be harmed. And most important, those poisonous drugs will never find their way into the bodies of our children.

Drug law enforcement is a good example of the challenge we face in protecting our citizens today. New technologies are available to both the good guys and the bad. Further, although we are strong, there are many security threats we cannot defeat alone. That is why we moved this past weekend to increase cooperation on crime among the G-8. It is why we are forging international agreements and establishing higher standards on everything from the elimination of chemical weapons to the extradition of drug kingpins. It is why we place a high priority on Senate approval of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. And that is why it is so important that organizations such as the Coast Guard—that are fighting to extend the rule of law—have the fast ships, modern communications gear, and other state-of-the-art tools they need to get the job done. Our purpose is to create an ironclad web of arrangements, laws, inspectors, police, and military power that will deny criminals and aggressors the space they need to operate and without which they cannot survive.

A half-century ago, President Harry Truman addressed the students of this Academy during a visit by the Eagle to our nation's capital. He said then that

the responsibility of our nation in the world is the greatest that has ever come to any nation.

He said also that

this responsibility did not apply to our government alone, for in America there can be no meaningful separation between the government and the people. Every American, from the digger of ditches to the Commander-in-Chief has a duty to contribute to our nation's larger purpose—to reflect the values of decency and law; to build and spread prosperity; and to stand as a beacon on behalf of human freedom, even when other lights have flickered and gone out.

Individuals, like nations, face a choice. We can live our lives timidly and narrowly, or we can act with boldness and courage. We can shrink from responsibility, or we can embrace it and thereby shape the course of our own lives and of history itself.

In 2 years and 2 months' time here in New London, the Eagle will lead the tall ships of the world into New London harbor. OPSAIL 2000 is expected to be the largest gathering of tall ships in history. No one can prophesy the future, but from the crow's nest of a tall ship, the lookout can see a little bit further ahead than the others.

This morning, as we gather here to celebrate the accomplishments of the class of '98, our eyes, too, are focused on the far horizon. We, too, are looking ahead as far as we can. And although we cannot foretell what is to come, we are guided by the faith that if we are true to the best traditions of our service and of our country; if we have high standards for ourselves and reach out to others around the world, we can build a global network of purpose and law that will protect our citizens, defend our interests, preserve our values, and bequeath to future generations a legacy as proud as the one inherited by your generation and mine. To that mission I pledge my own best efforts, and now, I summon yours.

Coast Guard Class of 1998, the 21st century is yours to shape on shore, at sea, and in the air. You have met every test of excellence this superb academy has set before you. Today, the real test begins. Go forward with proud hearts, free minds, and the full backing of your country to get the job done. Thank you all very much. ■

Karl F. Inderfurth

India-Pakistan Nuclear Tests

June 3, 1998

Statement by the Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs before the Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC.

Mr. Chairman, since I last testified before this committee only 21 days ago, events in South Asia have continued to proceed in a dangerous direction. In addition to the series of nuclear tests conducted by India, Pakistan tested nuclear devices on May 28 and 30. India and Pakistan have declared themselves nuclear powers and made statements—from which they have since backed away—that they intend to fit their ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Indian leaders have expressed their intention to conduct a national security review to include plans for the development and possible deployment of nuclear weapons, a threshold that if crossed could cock the nuclear trigger.

In Kashmir, there has been continuing worrisome activity along the line of control, including exchanges of fire and troop movements. Such events have been common in the past, and it is difficult to determine the level of threat these most recent incidents pose. Neither side appear intent on provoking a military confrontation, though we cannot rule out the possibility for further provocative steps by either side and remain concerned about the potential for miscalculation and escalation. We have informed both New Delhi and Islamabad about our concerns in this regard in the strongest possible terms.

U.S. Response

As you know, Mr. Chairman, Pakistan's decision to test was not entirely unexpected, and the Administration and, in particular, the President worked diligently to try to persuade the Pakistani Government to capture the political and moral highground. The President said it best. Pakistan missed a "priceless opportunity" to gain the world's support, appreciation, and assistance. I am very grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for all that you did in the 2-week period after India tested, including your introduction of legislation to repeal the Pressler Amendment. While we did not succeed in our ultimate objective, I believe we did the right thing and in the process established a bench-

mark for how the executive branch and Congress can and should cooperate when important national interests are at stake.

The back-to-back tests by India and Pakistan unquestionably represent a setback for the search for peace and stability in the South Asian subcontinent and, indeed, for the cause of global non-proliferation and moving toward a world where fewer states are relying on nuclear weapons for their greatness or for their defense. But that cause, if anything, is even more important today than it was a few short weeks ago, before the Indian tests. The United States is going to stay at it, and we are working very hard to come up with the most promising and appropriate next steps.

Just as we responded to the Indian tests, the United States has moved swiftly to invoke sanctions and to condemn Pakistan's reciprocal tests. This type of behavior, Mr. Chairman, we find especially troubling as it threatens to spiral out of control. Both India and Pakistan have taken pains to assure us that they do not wish to start a conflict; yet, when each has found itself the object of international outrage, it has acted provocatively in an effort to get the other to respond, thereby shifting blame. We can only hope that the two countries realize where such behavior can lead and that they cease and desist immediately lest the tit-for-tat cycle lead to military confrontation, with potentially devastating consequences.

In the short term, Mr. Chairman, we are focusing our efforts on ways to prevent further provocative acts, to get both sides to end further tests, and to prevent related escalation such as missile testing and deployment. We are encouraging the immediate resumption of direct dialogue between India and Pakistan and are working to shore up the international non-proliferation regime. In the end, Mr. Chairman, no effort to restore regional stability or resolve Indo-Pakistani tensions can be effective unless the brunt of the work is borne by India and Pakistan themselves. Now is the time for them to demonstrate to the world that

they are responsible nations, capable of talking to one another, and willing to address seriously the issues between them. These are sovereign nations, democracies both, and they must find ways to communicate as they have in the past—particularly in view of the gravity of the current state of affairs. We and the rest of the international community urge them to do so.

Looking Ahead

Now and for the foreseeable future, we will enforce sanctions firmly, correctly, and promptly in full compliance with the Glenn

Amendment and other legislative authorities. We will continue working to ensure the widest possible multilateral support for the steps we have taken. A vigorous enforcement regime will be necessary for India and Pakistan—to perceive that their actions have seriously eroded their status in the international arena, that this will have a substantial negative impact on their economies, and that they have compromised, rather than enhanced, their security. We will firmly reject any proposal for India or Pakistan to join the NPT as a nuclear weapon state. We do not believe that nations should be rewarded for behavior that flies in the face of internationally accepted norms.

At the same time, we do not wish to make international pariahs out of either India or Pakistan. We believe the purpose of these sanctions should be to influence behavior, not

to punish simply for the sake of punishment. They should not be used to cause the economic collapse of either state or prevent the meeting of basic humanitarian needs. Wherever possible, and as the law permits, we should work to reduce adverse effects on the competitiveness or operations of U.S. businesses.

In the longer term, Mr. Chairman, we will seek international support for our goals, including the need to secure active and responsible adherence to international

non-proliferation norms and a qualitative improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations. We will be looking for both parties to take such steps as:

- Sign and ratify CTBT without delay or conditions;
- Halt production of fissile material and participate constructively in FMCT negotiations;
- Accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities;
- Agree not to deploy or test missile systems;
- Maintain existing restraints against sharing nuclear and missile technology or equipment with others; and
- Agree upon a framework to reduce bilateral tensions, including on Kashmir.

In order to do this, we will need to work cooperatively with the international community and will seek to establish a common approach. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we are in the process of organizing a meeting of the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council tomorrow, which will bring the full force of the P-5 behind the search for effective ways to ensure no more tests or escalation in the region. The meeting will also allow the P-5 to reaffirm its commitment to global non-proliferation through such mechanisms as the NPT, CTBT, and negotiations toward a fissile material cut-off treaty. We will urge signing and ratification of CTBT by India and Pakistan under the terms I just mentioned and explore ways to de-escalate tensions between India and Pakistan and provide them the means to air their legitimate concerns. We will work to keep the international community engaged and will follow up with a meeting of the G-8 in London next week.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, we believe that the approach we have laid out is sound and that the P-5 conference will help us achieve, over time, the objectives we have established. We will work very hard to see that these significant steps will be taken and that they will result in a more stable region and help to repair the damage done to the international non-proliferation regime. That said, Mr. Chairman, I regret that I must conclude on a somber note. Even if we succeed in meeting these difficult challenges, it will be some time before the world looks at India and Pakistan through the same eyes as it did before May 11 when India tested. Then, we were making serious progress in establishing that the United States wanted to enhance its relationship with both countries, on a full range of issues, as together we approached the 21st century. We saw great promise in a region where democracy had a solid foundation; where U.S. trade and commercial interests were firmly established and beginning to flourish;

"We believe the purpose of these sanctions should be to influence behavior, not to punish simply for the sake of punishment. They should not be used to cause the economic collapse of either state or prevent the meeting of basic humanitarian needs."

where significant opportunities existed for expanding cooperation on such matters as health, education, and the environment; and finally, where we were working with the two main protagonists on establishing areas of restraint on our key concerns about non-proliferation.

Today, that view of the region has been dealt an enormous setback. In the past 3 weeks, India and Pakistan have conjured up all of the old and regrettable images of two nations hostage to 50 years of bitter enmity and of the region as a place where only one issue—non-proliferation—matters. I would not want to leave you with the impression that we have foregone our desire to resume productive, cooperative, indeed, warm relations with either India or Pakistan or that we have lost faith in

either government to do the right thing—we have not. But one of the legacies of recent events will be the resurrection in world opinion of the old, narrow view of the subcontinent: India vs. Pakistan, the zero-sum game. That legacy will probably endure for a long time. Speaking as one who has worked to change attitudes, perceptions, and old prejudices about the region, I am both saddened and deeply concerned by the recent turn of events.

Recently, one alarmed Indian politician asked a very simple question: “Where does all this lead?” The leaders of India and Pakistan have the immediate responsibility to answer that question—for the people of their countries and for the international community. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ■

Robert S. Gelbard

U.S. Progress Toward Fulfillment Of the Dayton Accords

June 4, 1998

Statement by the Special Representative of the President and the Secretary of State for Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss our progress toward fulfillment of the Dayton peace accords.

I would like to offer a brief, prepared statement, which I will submit for the record, allowing plenty of time to address your questions. I understand that your primary interest today is Bosnia, but I also would like to update you on the deteriorating situation in Kosovo—a situation which has the potential to threaten broader security in the region and our substantial investment in a stable Bosnian peace.

When I assumed this position in April of last year, my first task was to conduct a serious review of our policy and programs and to develop with all other relevant elements of the executive branch a comprehensive plan for accelerating the pace of implementation. That review, approved by the President in mid-May last year, served as the foundation for a reinvigorated focus on all aspects of implementation, with a strong emphasis on improved collaboration between military forces and civilian implementation agencies in the field. It also served as the basis for a strategy designed to marginalize hard-line extremists who were systematically blocking all efforts to implement Dayton, particularly in the Bosnian Serb entity, and to shore up more moderate, pro-Dayton leaders from all three ethnic groups so they might offer a credible alternative to Bosnia's entrenched wartime leadership.

Support for democratization, the rule of law, and greater pluralism is at the core of Dayton and has remained a fundamental priority as we advance implementation. Not only are we helping Bosnia recover from the devastation of 4 years of war, we are working with its leaders, as we have in other east European countries, to overcome 40 years of centralized, communist political and economic

control. This is a long-term process, but recent progress on the economic front illustrates just how far we have come: The IMF approved a standby arrangement for Bosnia last week; the World Bank approved a major structural adjustment credit just this morning; and Bosnia's new national currency, being printed as we speak, will be introduced into circulation June 15. Bosnia should soon be ready for Paris Club debt rescheduling, and it has adopted a privatization regime which should go a long way toward attracting foreign investment—the long-term engine of growth for the Bosnian economy.

Let me be clear. I do not mean that U.S. troops in Bosnia are nation-building. That is my job, with the cooperation and support of the international community. But the peace process remains fragile, and without the security and confidence SFOR's presence provides, especially in light of conflict in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia could well lose ground or worse, slip back into war. And that would mean endless instability in a region central to U.S. national interests.

The implementation plan has provided the framework—essentially a roadmap—for implementing all of the various aspects of Dayton. Once we determined precisely what had to be done and where the obstacles to progress were, we began to use with the parties, including Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—FRY, every bit of leverage we could identify to press them to meet their obligations under the agreement. While we have brought tremendous political and economic pressure to bear on each of them over the course of the last 14 months, the best leverage we had with those hard-line Bosnians seeking to block arms control or police reform, refugee returns, or free elections was clearly the SFOR presence.

Our policy review produced agreement that SFOR's robust support for civil implementation efforts would be essential to overall success. General Clark—coming to the post of SACEUR with both expertise and clear enthusiasm for the task—has helped ensure that the civilian-military partnership in Bosnia is a reality. This partnership, along with invigorated U.S. leadership in pressing for political change and strengthened civilian leadership on the ground, has produced tremendous results.

The pace of implementation has increased since the election of a moderate government in Republika Srpska—RS—probably the most important breakthrough we have made to date. Last summer, RS President Plavsic realized that the Serb entity was falling further and further behind the Federation as a result of the intransigence of its corrupt leaders. Our sustained pressure on hard-line Bosnian Serb extremists created the space for her to make a break from Radovan Karadzic and his clique and to forge a coalition with more moderate political leaders long silenced by the extremists.

This shift in power—hard won in assembly elections last November—has resulted in an almost paradoxical situation: Right now, there is greater pluralism in the Republika Srpska, and, on a number of fronts, better cooperation from that entity government, including on the sensitive issue of surrender of indicted war criminals.

We also increased the pressure in recent months on Federation leaders—Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats alike—to stop fighting among themselves and follow through on a whole range of commitments. For example, we suspended assistance to Bosniak-controlled parts of Sarajevo in the face of their unwillingness to enable major refugee returns to Sarajevo which would begin to restore it as a vibrant, multi-ethnic, cultural center. They have since passed property laws that make that possible, and we will continue to press to ensure they are fully implemented.

The Bosnian Croats, still largely controlled by a group of extremists, have been blocking implementation on a variety of fronts. The most blatant has been the refusal of the Bosnian Croat military leadership, as well as the police in a number of cantons, to adopt official Federation insignia and symbols, choosing instead to display the flags and insignia of the wartime "Republic of Herzeg Bosna." In response to their continued intransigence, we have suspended activities associated with the Train and Equip Program, which is designed to support a unified Federation army, not two ethnic armies, and we expect the problems to be addressed quickly.

Even given the obstacles we face—and are bound to continue to confront—we have made tremendous progress.

- The political and economic influence of indicted war criminals in the RS has been significantly reduced since the inauguration of the Plavsic/Dodik government last fall. The capital has been moved from Pale to Banja Luka, state-run media has been wrested from SDS control and restructured, and the civilian police, under a new minister of interior, are cooperating with the International Police Task Force restructuring and reform program. Moreover, rapid reform of the RS budget and fiscal controls as well as its privatization laws and the restructuring of the Customs Service have substantially reduced the control of Karadzic and cronies over entity resources.

- Freedom of movement and security have dramatically improved; individual Bosnians can and do routinely travel between the entities. New common license plates were a tremendous help, but this trend is largely a result of the restructuring, training, and ethnic integration of local police forces. The ethnic integration of police forces also has proven to be a critical factor for refugees when deciding when and if to return home.

- Almost all of the Federation police forces have been restructured, and we now are making good headway in down-sizing and restructuring the RS police forces. In addition, RS special police—paramilitary forces—have been disbanded by SFOR. Republika Srpska and Federation Interior and Justice Ministries have signed mutual cooperation agreements and are exchanging information on war crimes issues.

- The Bosnian economy continues to recover and grow, especially in the Federation. Given the political changes in the Republika Srpska, it too has begun to receive desperately needed assistance. Industrial production almost doubled in the Federation in 1996 and grew by an average of about 25% nationwide in 1997. Power has been restored to all major Bosnian cities and water to most, nationwide railroads are running again, regional airports have opened to civilian and commercial traffic, and, in July, Bosnia will have a unified telecommunications system with a single country code.

- Over 400,000 refugees and displaced persons have returned home since the war ended—170,000 of those in 1997. We and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees have focused tremendous energy on accelerating the return process for the remaining refugees and DPs, most of whom would return to areas where they are in the ethnic minority. Under the best of circumstances, the process of

"The U.S.—like all of our NATO allies—not only wants these troops out of Bosnia and home, we want them to be able to point with pride to their enduring contribution to peace, stability, and ultimately, the process of democratization in eastern Europe."

reintroducing families to their towns and homes is slow and complex. But even in areas where returns have been explosive—for example, in Drvar—minority returns can and are succeeding. In fact, in Drvar, despite some initial violent incidents, 1,000 Serb families have returned and stayed.

- Thirty-four of 79 publicly indicted war criminals have been brought to justice. Twenty-eight are still in the custody of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague, 3 have been released, four more are confirmed deceased, and the Tribunal has dropped 13 indictments. Thirty-one publicly

indicted war criminals remain at large, and their transfer to The Hague remains a top priority for this Administration and our allies.

These advances are concrete, measurable progress—meeting many of the benchmarks we established last December—which, if continued apace, will ensure that the peace process becomes self-sustaining and irreversible. Our next big challenge will be to help ensure that the September national elections are an engine for further progress, greater pluralism, and the empowerment of a new generation of leaders focused on Bosnia's future rather than its tragic wartime past.

Last year's municipal elections and the Republika Srpska assembly elections provided a powerful precedent for change. Councils

have been seated in 133 of 136 communities. Only one—Srebrenica—remains completely intransigent. Extremists were voted out in a number of key cities in both entities, and the moderate Plavsic-Dodik coalition made important gains in former Karadzic strongholds including Bijeljina, Bratunac, Visegrad, and Zvornik.

We are working actively now—through support for independent media, opposition parties, and grassroots NGOs—to advance that trend and, hopefully, to replicate it to some greater extent in the Federation. A major split has just developed in the hard-line Bosnian Croat party. We hope to help turn that split into an opportunity by nurturing more moderate

leaders and supporting those willing to embrace and implement Dayton. Similarly, we intend to keep the pressure on the monolithic Bosniak leadership and media to share power and begin to democratize.

While much progress has been made, there is still a great deal of work ahead of us to ensure the gains are consolidated. The international community, in the form of the Peace Implementation Council—PIC—and NATO, are effectively setting the agenda for the next year during their meetings in May and next week. NATO has agreed not only to extend the SFOR mandate; the allies have adopted our benchmarks for measuring progress. The PIC Steering Board Ministers will meet June 9 to review implementation progress this year and establish goals for the remainder of 1998. This agenda, too, will reflect the priorities and benchmarks we have outlined—benchmarks which will be achieved in close coordination with SFOR and NATO.

While the situation has evolved tremendously, SFOR's presence and active role in ensuring a secure environment remain critical. No local force could have provided President Plavsic with a sufficient sense of security to stand up and publicly condemn her old mentor Karadzic for corruption or to install a coalition government against tremendous opposition. Nor would thousands of refugees have traveled across the IEBL to vote in their old home towns in an effort to secure a future there for themselves and their children. Yet today, Bosniak members of municipal councils in RS towns are regularly crossing the IEBL to attend meetings and help administer these governments.

SFOR has provided critical support to all of these implementation efforts and a precipitous withdrawal could well threaten this positive momentum. The United States is determined to ensure that this progress accelerates and that gains made become irreversible. The U.S.—like all of our NATO allies—not only wants these troops out of Bosnia and home, we want them to be able to point with pride to their enduring contribution to peace, stability, and, ultimately, the process of democratization in eastern Europe.

Kosovo

While this hearing is focused on Bosnia, the escalating violence in Kosovo is of enormous concern given the massive violations of human rights as well as the obvious threat the crisis poses for regional stability. We have been adamant in all our dealings with the Dayton signatories, especially President Milosevic, that

the gains of the peace agreement must not be put at risk by developments in Kosovo or attempts at political manipulation by Belgrade.

The United States has led international efforts to get Belgrade to deal with the legitimate concerns of the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo through political means and insisted, since Dayton, on maintaining “outer wall” sanctions conditioned on progress in Kosovo. After Belgrade provoked the current crisis with a brutal crackdown by police paramilitary forces in February, we persuaded our allies to adopt a number of new sanctions keyed to the opening of a substantive dialogue with the Kosovo Albanians.

We used that leverage and active United States diplomacy to persuade Milosevic, finally, last month, to start negotiations on Kosovo’s future status. Talks are continuing in Pristina—the next round is set for tomorrow, but the process, initiated by Kosovo Albanian leader Dr. Rugova in a May 15 meeting with President Milosevic is extremely fragile. It is seriously jeopardized by Belgrade’s disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force in response to violence from Albanian extremists.

The United States deplores the use of indiscriminate and overwhelming force by police and military against civilian populations. Reports of atrocities, wanton destruction of homes and property by Serbian forces, and actions to prevent delivery of humanitarian aid are abhorrent and only perpetuate and increase the level of violence by further radicalizing the Kosovo Albanian majority.

The dialogue will only succeed if Belgrade cooperates in taking immediate and concrete steps to stop violence, to reduce tensions, and at the same time acts to intensify the pace and seriousness of the talks. Belgrade is on notice that we will not accept a sham dialogue. Secretary Albright has made clear that if the dialogue fails to produce results and violence continues, suspended sanctions—the investment ban—can be quickly reinstated and that we will work with the allies to develop additional measures if necessary.

We cannot allow the situation to unravel further or to threaten what we have accomplished in Bosnia. We have succeeded in getting dialogue started and will continue to up the pressure if Belgrade refuses to cease the violence. Thank you. ■



TREATY ACTIONS

MULTILATERAL

Children

Convention on protection of children and cooperation in respect of intercountry adoption. Done at the Hague May 29, 1993. Entered into force May 5, 1995.¹

Accession: Moldova, Apr. 10, 1998.

Territorial Application: Canada extended to the Yukon Territory, Apr. 24, 1998.

Prisoners

Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983. Entered into force July 1, 1985.

Accession: Costa Rica, Apr. 14, 1998.

BILATERAL

Cuba

Agreement extending the provisional application of the maritime boundary agreement of Dec. 16, 1977. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Dec. 30, 1997 and Mar. 30, 1998. Entered into force Mar. 30, 1998; effective Jan. 1, 1998.

Ecuador

Agreement concerning assistance in developing and modernizing Ecuador's civil aviation infrastructure. Signed at Washington and Quito Mar. 5 and 23, 1998. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1998.

Ghana

Agreement for cooperation in the Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) Program, with appendices. Signed at Accra Mar. 20, 1998. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1998.

Guinea-Bissau

Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Bissau July 23, 1997 and Feb. 16, 1998. Entered into force Feb. 16, 1998.

Japan

Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 29, 1988, as amended, concerning the acquisition and production of the EP-3, UP-3C, and UP-3D aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Mar. 27, 1998. Entered into force Mar. 27, 1998.

Agreement concerning a cooperative modification program for the ACES II Ejection Seat. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Mar. 27, 1998. Entered into force Mar. 27, 1998.

Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 31, 1989, as amended, concerning the acquisition and production in Japan of the SH-60, UH-60J, and UH-60JA aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Mar. 27, 1998. Entered into force Mar. 27, 1998.

Latvia

Acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, with annexes. Signed at Riga and Patch Barracks Mar. 28 and 30, 1998. Entered into force Mar. 30, 1998.

Russia

Agreement extending the agreement of June 17, 1992, as amended and extended, concerning the safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear weapons through provisional emergency response equipment and related training. Signed at Washington and Moscow Feb. 6 and Apr. 1, 1998. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1998; effective Aug. 28, 1997.

Agreement extending the agreement of Aug. 28, 1992, as amended and extended, concerning the safe and secure transportation of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons material through the provision of cargo and guard railcar conversion kits. Signed at Washington and Moscow Feb. 6 and Apr. 1, 1998. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1998; effective Aug. 28, 1997.

Senegal

Protocol to amend the air transport services agreement of Mar. 28, 1979. Signed at Dakar Apr. 1, 1998. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1998.

¹ Not in force for the U.S.

