

Secretary Albright

American Leadership for the 21st Century: Doing What's Right And Smart for America's Future

March 25, 1997

Prepared statement for the Jesse Helms Lecture Series, Wingate University, Wingate, North Carolina.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for that introduction and for your hospitality. I was born abroad, came of age in Denver, and work in Washington. But after today, I feel almost like a native Tarheel. Thank you all for making me feel at home.

Dr. McGee, Dr. Prevost, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Baldwin, students, faculty, distinguished guests: It is an honor to participate in the Jesse Helms Lecture Series. I know of the role that Wingate University has played in the life of Senator Helms and the reputation that Wingate has achieved in a state richly blessed with quality educational institutions.

As a former professor, I love academic surroundings—and old habits die hard. When I testify before Senator Helms' committee, he is always reminding me that not every question requires a 50-minute response.

Despite that, the chairman and I get along very well, which some people find puzzling. They wonder what we have in common. After all, the Senator is from rural North Carolina; I was born in the capital city of Czechoslovakia. He can square dance; I've done the macarena—and, unlike Vice President Gore, I actually move. He's a Republican, and before I became a diplomat and had all my partisan instincts surgically removed, I was a Democrat.

So, what gives? I think the answer can be found on the very first page of Senator Helms' book. I have "no doubt," writes the Senator, "that being an American in the 20th century is the greatest fortune that can befall a human being." Chairman Helms and I do not always agree, but we are both grateful for the privilege of living in this country.

We both understand that our ability to debate differences freely and without fear can never be taken for granted. Millions have died

for that right. And hundreds of millions are still denied it. We both believe that the concept of individual liberty set out in the American Constitution remains—after more than 200 years—the world's most powerful and positive force for change. And we both agree that if our freedoms are to survive through the next American century, we cannot turn our backs on the world.

At Wingate University, you also recognize that. As your brochure says, "here. . . world awareness studies are required." Members of the university community are encouraged and helped to travel. It is an important part of your preparation for the future.

When you who are students graduate, you will compete in a global marketplace. Your jobs may depend on the vigor of overseas trade.

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The security of your families will be influenced by whether we are able to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; whether we can stop small wars from growing into large ones; and whether we can win the fight against international terror, crime, drugs, and disease.

An important part of my job as Secretary of State is to spread the word that the success or failure of American foreign policy will be one of the determining factors in your lives—as it has been in mine. And I suggest to you, as you think about your own futures, that you consider how you might contribute to America's success. To me, there is no goal more meaningful or

exciting and no field more interesting than international affairs.

Who knows: One day one of you may become Secretary of State, or chairman—or chairwoman—of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I hope you do. I also hope that the world you will inherit will be in as good or better shape than the world we have today.

To that end, American foreign policy is dedicated to three central goals:

First, we strive to keep our people safe by defending against threats to our security and that of our allies and friends;

Second, we work to keep our people prosperous by creating an ever-expanding global economy in which American genius and productivity receive their due; and

Third, we are determined to keep our people free by promoting the principles and values upon which America's democracy and identity are based.

Today, as a result of American diplomatic and military leadership from administrations of both parties, our citizens are safer than at any time in memory. Russian warheads no longer target our homes, and nuclear weapons have been removed from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan. North Korea's nuclear weapons program has been frozen and will be dismantled. Iraq's Saddam Hussein remains trapped in a strategic box, unable to threaten Iraq's neighbors—or us. In Asia, we are building with allies and friends a community of nations based on common interests and a shared commitment to peace. In Europe, where

America has fought two hot wars and one Cold War this century, we are making progress toward a continent that is wholly united, peaceful, and free. And we are working with our NATO allies to adapt our great alliance to new missions and to include new members.

These efforts reflect not altruism on our part but realism. They are both right and smart. But we know that preparedness does not come without a price tag. It costs money to inspect a nuclear facility in North Korea or Iraq or to dismantle and dispose of nuclear materials safely from the former Soviet Union. It takes money to help our partners build peace and democracy and to defeat transnational crime.

Under the Clinton Administration, we insist that other countries pay a fair share of the costs of what we do together. America is a champ, not a chump. But we cannot lead without tools.

I have urged Chairman Helms, as I urge you, to support the President's request to fund our international affairs programs. The amount for everything from aid to Israel to building peace in Bosnia to buying pencils for our embassy in Tokyo equals about 1% of our total budget. But that 1% may determine 50% of the history that is written about our era. And it will affect the lives of 100% of the American people.

One of the President's top early priorities, which will certainly affect our lives, is a treaty to ban chemical weapons from the face of the earth. That agreement, known as the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC, will enter into force on April 29. Our goal is to ratify the agreement before then so that America will be an original party.

Chemical weapons are inhumane. They kill horribly, massively and, once deployed, are no more controllable than the wind. That is why we decided long ago to eliminate our stockpiles of these weapons. We will not use them against others; the CWC would help ensure that others never use them against us.

The CWC sets the standard that it is wrong for any nation to build or possess a chemical weapon and gives us strong and effective tools for enforcing that standard. This will make it harder for terrorists or outlaw states to build, buy, or conceal these horrible weapons.

Not everyone agrees. There are thoughtful critics of the treaty who say it is flawed, because we cannot assume early ratification and full compliance by the outlaw states. This argument is sincerely made, but to me, it is not convincing. It's like saying that because some people smuggle drugs, there is no point in passing a law against drug smuggling. We can't let the bad guys write the rules. We and the other law-abiding nations have to establish the rules by which all must be judged.

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As Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf recently observed, if the Senate rejects the CWC, the United States would end up on the opposite side from our allies and on the same side as countries such as Libya and Iraq. That's not all. If we fail to ratify the Convention by the end of April, we will lose the right to help draft the rules by which the Convention will be enforced. We will lose the right to help administer and conduct inspections. And we will risk serious economic loss.

According to a letter signed by the CEOs of more than a dozen companies that have facilities here in North Carolina, the American chemical industry's "status as the world's preferred supplier. . . may be jeopardized if. . . the Senate does not vote in favor of the CWC." According to those executives "we stand to lose hundreds of millions of dollars in overseas sales, putting at risk thousands of good-paying American jobs." Ratifying the CWC is right and smart for America. In fact, the Convention has "made in America" written all over it. It was endorsed by President Reagan, negotiated under President Bush, and is strongly supported by our military leaders. In the weeks ahead, the President and I will be working to persuade Senators to give this important treaty their timely approval.

A second major goal of American foreign policy is to create American jobs. Here, the Clinton Administration has had extraordinary success. Since 1993, more than 200 trade agreements have been negotiated, causing exports to soar and creating an estimated 1.6 million new jobs nationwide.

This matters to States, such as North Carolina, that rely a great deal on exports. Senator Helms recognized that when he invited the Ambassadors from seven Southeast Asian nations here last year.

He knows what our business-people also know: Competition for the world's markets is fierce. Often, our firms go head-to-head with foreign competitors who receive active help from their own governments.

Our goal is to see that American companies, workers, and farmers have a level playing field on which to compete. And we continue to make progress toward that objective.

Last December, we achieved an International Technology Agreement that will open up new markets for North Carolina's many high-tech firms. And earlier this year, we signed a global telecommunications agreement that will

dramatically increase sales and investment opportunities for companies from this region and elsewhere across America.

As long as I am Secretary of State, our diplomacy will strive for a global economic system that is increasingly open and fair. Our embassies will provide all appropriate help to American firms. Our negotiators will seek trade agreements that help create new American jobs. And I will personally make the point—as I did during my recent visit to South Korea, Japan, and China—that if countries want to sell in our backyard, they had better allow America to do business in theirs.

Force, strong alliances, economic leadership, and active diplomacy all contribute to our security and well-being. But to build the kind of future we want for our children, we must also remain true to American values.

Some suggest that it is soft-headed for the United States to take the morality of things into account when conducting foreign policy. I believe a foreign policy devoid of moral considerations can never fairly represent the American people. It is because we have kept faith with our principles that, in most parts of the world, American leadership remains not only necessary, but welcome.

That is why we must fight and win the war against international crime and put those who traffic in illegal drugs permanently out of business. It is why we must stand up to the forces of international terror. It is why we should speak out against those who violate human rights, whether those violations occur in Baghdad, Burma, Burundi, or Beijing. It is why we should keep our word and pay our debts to the international organizations we rely on to help fight hunger, control epidemic disease, care for refugees, and ensure the survival of infants and children. It is why we should ratify properly drafted international conventions on human rights, including—almost 20 years after it was signed—the Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women.

When it comes to the rights of more than half the people on earth, America should be leading the way. Today, around the world, appalling abuses are being committed against women—from domestic violence to dowry murders to forcing young girls into prostitution. Some say all this is cultural, and there's nothing we can do about it. I say it's criminal, and we each have a responsibility to stop it. Finally, if we are to be true to American values, we must do all we can to see that government "of the people, by the people, and for the people" continues to make progress around the earth.

One of the great lessons of this century is that democracy is a parent to peace. Free nations make good neighbors. Compared to dictatorships, they are far less likely to commit acts of aggression, support terrorists, spawn international crime, or generate waves of refugees.

In Haiti, America was right to restore democratically elected leaders and smart to remove the source of terror that was causing thousands of migrants to flee to our shores. In Cuba, America is right to push for democratic change and smart to work with Latin and European leaders so that pressure builds from every direction.

Today, in our hemisphere, only Cuba remains unfree. And as Senator Helms has often pointed out, its regime does not have time on its side. How could it? Communism was created to solve the problems of the 19th century and failed. It rose to prominence in the 20th century and killed and jailed tens of millions of people. Now, on the threshold of the 21st century, it is a relic—a sinking ship that will soon disappear beneath the waves of history. It could not compete with the idea of freedom.

A half-century ago, a generation of American leaders—including Secretary of State George Marshall and Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—helped to forge a bipartisan consensus to defend freedom against the threats faced in their day. They did this, not because it was good politics, but because it was best for America. They understood that when Americans stand together and act across party lines, we are more likely to succeed.

They knew that, when we are together, our commitments will inspire greater trust. And those tempted to oppose us will think twice—or

today, if they see Senator Helms and me ganging up on them—maybe more than twice. Above all, our predecessors understood that the ties that bind America are far stronger than disagreements over any particular policy and far more durable and profound than any party affiliation.

I am reminded of a story in the Bible about the prophet Elijah, upset by the waywardness of his people, seeking guidance from above. As Elijah crouches in a cave, a great wind arises that splits mountains and breaks rocks. But Elijah does not find God in the wind. After the wind comes an earthquake, but God is not in the earthquake; then comes a fire, but God is not in the fire. Finally, after the fire, there comes a still, small voice; it is in that voice that Elijah hears God.

I believe that those searching for the secret of America's strength will not find it in our missiles, though our missiles, too, may split mountains and break rocks; they will not find it in the tall buildings on Wall Street or in the largest shopping centers or the most luxurious private homes. I think they will find it instead, in the still, small voice that helps us not only as Americans, but as people, to separate right from wrong, to judge others as we would be judged, and to believe in our hearts in the birthright of every human being to be free.

Let us all—Republican and Democrat, old and young, rich and poor—heed that voice. Let us respond to the threats we face in our day by building a future based on what is smart and what is right; a future that will bind our people together, secure our freedoms, and protect our citizens through the remaining years of this century and into the next.

Toward that end, I pledge my own best efforts and ask your help.

Thank you very much. ■

Secretary Albright

Preserving Principle and Safeguarding Stability: U.S. Policy Toward Iraq

March 26, 1997

Prepared statement at Georgetown University, Washington, DC.

Father O'Donovan, Dean Goodman, distinguished panelists, and friends: I am pleased to be here to participate in your day of discussions regarding United States policy toward Iraq. I am especially pleased because Georgetown University was long my professional home, and it is the first chance I have had to return since becoming Secretary of State.

I must confess that, as I look around the room and see so many former colleagues, I feel a certain amount of envy. I am having a wonderful time in my new job, but as I recall my previous life, it occurs to me that there are certain advantages to teaching, as opposed to practicing, diplomacy.

For one thing, you don't have to be as diplomatic. For another, instead of spending your time with grizzled old foreign ministers, you are surrounded by fresh-faced, quick-witted students who keep you young.

Instead of reciting talking points that have been compressed into little bullets, you get to lecture 50 minutes at a chop. And instead of going up to Congress to get grilled, you can invite others to seminars and grill them.

So I remember my years here fondly. And I am constantly bumping into former Georgetown students who are now running large chunks of foreign governments. So have faith. Despite our early exit from the basketball tournament, the master plan is still on track—Georgetown may yet rule the world.

I also want to thank Ambassador Suddarth and Dr. Stowasser. As today's event illustrates, the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies and the Middle East Institute are rich contributors to our public policy debate. It is in the interests of advancing and clarifying that debate that I was pleased to accept your invitation to speak here today.

My fundamental purpose is to reaffirm United States policy toward Iraq. That policy is part of a broad commitment to protect the security and territory of our friends and allies in the Gulf. We have a vital national interest in

the security of the region's oil supplies, and we have forged strong friendships with countries in the area that agree with us that nations should respect international law, refrain from aggression, and oppose those who commit or sponsor terror.

Here, as elsewhere, we recognize that stability is not an import; it must be home-grown. But we also know that circumstances may arise in which active American leadership and power are required.

A compelling example was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait 6½ years ago. The results of that event remain with us now. So before discussing where we go from here in our policy toward Iraq, let me review how we got to where we are.

When President Bush launched Operation Desert Storm, he said that America had two objectives. First, to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. Second, to cause Iraq once again to "live as a peaceful and cooperative member of the family of nations." Because of the bravery and brilliance of the U.S.-led military coalition, the first objective was quickly achieved. But despite the lessons of war, continuing international pressure, the impact of tough UN sanctions, and the best interests of the Iraqi people, Iraq's Government has continued to defy the will of the international community.

Under resolutions approved by the UN Security Council, Iraq is required to demonstrate its peaceful intentions by meeting a series of obligations. It must end its weapons of mass destruction programs and destroy any such weapons produced. It must cooperate with the inspection and monitoring regime established by the UN Special Commission, or UNSCOM. And it must recognize its border with Kuwait, return stolen property, account for POW/MIAs, end support for terrorism, and stop brutalizing its people. Had Iraq complied with these obligations early on, its economy would have recovered, the oil trade would have resumed, debts would have been paid, the suffering of its

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people would have been avoided, and it could have resumed its rightful place among the responsible nations of the world.

Instead, from the outset, Iraqi leaders chose denial, delay, and deceit. Or to put it even more bluntly—they lied. They have blocked inspections, concealed documents, falsified evidence, and challenged UNSCOM's clear and legitimate authority. They have refused to account satisfactorily for Kuwaiti missing and prisoners of war. They have failed to return stolen property and weapons. They have virtually demolished the marsh Arab commu-

nity in southern Iraq, waged war on the minorities in the north, and accelerated repression in the center to stay in power. And their agents have crossed borders to gun down or poison Iraqi dissidents.

Throughout, their leader, Saddam Hussein, has bemoaned the unfairness of sanctions and the indignity of inspections. His complaints remind me of the story about the schoolboy who returned home with his nose bloodied and his shirt torn. When his mother asked him how the fight started, he said, "it started when the other guy hit me back."

Since 1991, the task of looking behind Iraqi deceptions to find the truth has fallen to the IAEA and to UNSCOM Chairman Rolf Ekeus and his staff. For years, they have struggled to discover and destroy Iraq's once-extensive arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.

Although they have been harassed and threatened by Iraqi officials, they have made steady—and at times stunning—progress.

The defection in 1995 of Hussein Kamil, the official who directed many of Iraq's efforts at deception, marked a turning point. It led to major revelations regarding biological weapons and appeared, for a time, as if it would cause Iraq finally to accept the need for full disclosure. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. The refusal to cooperate fully continued throughout 1996 and to the present time.

This tactic has not and will not work. Our resolve on this point is unwavering. Hundreds of thousands of American soldiers put their lives on the line in the Gulf war. We will not allow Iraq to regain by stonewalling the Security Council what it forfeited by aggression on the battlefield.

We know from experience that firmness is the only language the Iraqi Government understands. In 1993, when Iraq plotted the assassination of former President Bush, the United States struck back hard.

In 1994, when Iraqi troops again threatened Kuwait, President Clinton's firm military and diplomatic response caused Baghdad not only to pull back its troops but to recognize—at long last—its legal border with Kuwait. Moreover, a new Security Council resolution restricted military activity in southern Iraq.

Last August, Iraqi forces took advantage of intra-Kurdish tensions and attacked the city of Irbil, in northern Iraq. President Clinton responded by expanding the no-fly zone to the southern suburbs of Baghdad. This reduced further the strategic threat posed by Iraq and demonstrated our intention to respond to Iraqi transgressions in a manner of our choosing.

Contrary to some expectations, the attack on Irbil has not restored Saddam Hussein's authority in the north. Iraqi troops have withdrawn from Irbil, and the region's inhabitants, conscious of Baghdad's past repression against them, have resisted efforts by the regime to re-establish control.

The Kurdish parties have been working with us to limit their differences and seek common ground. Although old rivalries remain difficult, we are firmly engaged alongside Turkey and the United Kingdom in helping the inhabitants of the region find stability and work toward a unified and pluralistic Iraq.

Although we oppose the lawless policies of the Iraqi regime, we have never had a quarrel with the Iraqi people. UN sanctions do not prohibit food and medical supplies. But because Saddam Hussein did not use his resources to meet the basic needs of his people, we supported efforts for additional relief.

For five years, Baghdad refused to accept such an arrangement. It was not until late last year that Iraq finally caved in to international pressure and agreed.

The food for oil deal now in place is designed to ease the suffering of civilians throughout Iraq. It is not related to the larger question of when and if the overall sanctions regime will be lifted. Nor is the continuation of this arrangement automatic, however strongly we support its purpose. If we see evidence that the Government of Iraq is not living up to its promises with respect to implementation, the experiment will cease.

All this brings us to the present day. From the beginning of Operation Desert Storm until now, American policy toward Iraq has been consistent, principled, and grounded in a

realistic and hard-won understanding of the nature of the Iraqi regime. It has been bolstered by bipartisan support at home and general approval in the region. And it has achieved a great deal.

Iraq's military threat to its neighbors is greatly diminished. Most of its missiles have been destroyed. Its biological and chemical warfare production facilities have been dismantled. Nuclear materials have been removed, and an international monitoring regime to prevent the construction of nuclear weapons is in place.

Iraq has been barred from importing weapons and weapons-related materials and technology. And the area in which Iraqi military forces may operate freely has contracted. To guard against further miscalculations on Baghdad's part, U.S. forces have been deployed to the region, and we have demonstrated our ability to reinforce those troops rapidly if required.

Diplomatically, we have sustained an international consensus that Iraq should not be allowed again to threaten international peace. In statement after statement, and in 36 successive reviews, the Security Council has maintained its support for sanctions and its insistence on compliance.

Meanwhile, six years of sanctions and isolation have taken their toll on the regime in Baghdad. Saddam Hussein has become by far the most divisive force in Iraq, and several coup attempts have been made. Members of his own somewhat dysfunctional family have turned against him. His inner circle of advisers has been purged repeatedly. Today, his power rests on an increasingly narrow foundation of intimidation and terror.

So while Iraq's lawless policies are failing, our policies of law and firmness are working. As long as the apparatus of sanctions, enforcement, inspections, and monitoring are in place, Iraq will remain trapped within a strategic box, unable to successfully threaten its neighbors and unable to realize the grandiose ambitions of its ignoble leader.

It is essential, however, that international resolve not weaken. Containment has worked, but—despite Iraq's present weakness—the future threat has not been erased. Iraq's behavior and intentions must change before our policies can change. Otherwise, we will allow the scorpion that bit us once to bite us again. That would be a folly impossible to explain to our children or to the veterans of Desert Storm.

Consider that, under Saddam Hussein, Iraq has started two major wars, used poison gas, and committed gross violations of international

humanitarian law. Consider that Iraq admitted producing chemical and biological warfare agents before the Gulf war that were sufficiently lethal to kill every man, woman, and child on earth. Consider that Iraq has yet to provide convincing evidence that it has destroyed all of these weapons. Consider that Iraq admitted loading many of those agents into missile warheads before the war. Consider that Iraq retains more than 7,500 nuclear scientists and technicians, as well as technical documents related to the production of nuclear weapons. Consider that Iraq has been caught trying to smuggle in missile guidance instruments. And consider that, according to Ambassador Ekeus, UNSCOM has not been able to account for all the missiles Iraq acquired over the years. In fact, Ekeus believes it is highly likely that Iraq retains an operational SCUD missile force, probably with chemical or biological weapons to go with it.

If past is prologue, under the current government, an Iraq released from sanctions and scrutiny would pick up where it left off a half-dozen years ago—before the mother of all coalitions stopped it dead in its tracks. For these reasons, our policy will not change. It is the right policy. To those who ask how long our determination will last; how long we will oppose Iraqi intransigence; how long we will insist that the international community's standards be met: Our answer is—as long as it takes.

We do not agree with the nations that argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted. Our view, which is unshakable, is that Iraq must prove its peaceful intentions. It can only do that by complying with all of the Security Council resolutions to which it is subject.

Is it possible to conceive of such a government under Saddam Hussein? When I was a professor, I taught that you have to consider all possibilities. As Secretary of State, I have to deal in the realm of reality and probability. And the evidence is overwhelming that Saddam Hussein's intentions will never be peaceful.

The United States looks forward, nevertheless, to the day when Iraq rejoins the family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding member. This is in our interests and in the interests of our allies and partners within the region.

Clearly, a change in Iraq's Government could lead to a change in U.S. policy. Should that occur, we would stand ready, in coordination with our allies and friends, to enter rapidly into a dialogue with the successor regime.

That dialogue would have two principal goals. First, because we are firmly committed to Iraq's territorial integrity, we would want to verify that the new Iraq would be independent, unified, and free from undue external influence; for example, from Iran. Second, we would require improvements in behavior. Is there cooperation with UNSCOM and compliance with UN resolutions? Is there respect for human rights, including the rights of minorities? Is there a convincing repudiation of terrorism? Are its military ambitions limited to those of reasonable defense?

If our concerns were addressed satisfactorily, Iraq would no longer threaten regional security. Its isolation could end.

The international community, including the United States, would look for ways to ease Iraq's reintegration. A whole range of economic and security matters would be open for discussion in a climate of cooperation and mutual respect. Iraq could begin to reclaim its potential as a nation rich in resources and blessed by a talented and industrious people. And Iraq could become a pillar of peace and stability in the region.

But until that day comes, we must—and will—maintain our watch. We will

- Continue to work closely with our allies and friends to ensure that Iraq does not again attack its neighbors or put them at risk;
- Retain in the region the military capability required to deter Iraqi aggression and to enforce the no-fly and no-drive zones;
- Maintain a firm commitment to the territorial sovereignty of Kuwait and our other friends in the region;
- Lend our full diplomatic support to the work of the UN Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency;

- Insist, with all of the diplomatic tools at our command, that UN sanctions remain in place. Within that context, we will do what we responsibly can to minimize the suffering of Iraqi citizens;

- Continue to support the establishment of a coherent and united Iraqi opposition which represents the country's ethnic and confessional diversity; and

- Continue helping the people of northern Iraq to meet their practical needs, resolve internal tensions, and reject the influence of terrorists.

The Baghdad of 1,200 years ago was described as the center of "a properly regulated and well ordered state, where schools and colleges abound, [to which] philosophers, students, doctors and priests. . .flock. . .[and where] the governors and ministers [are] honest."

Clearly, Saddam Hussein has not been an agent of progress. And clearly, what is now need not always be.

The rip in the fabric of Gulf stability that was created by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has not fully mended. But the aggression has been rolled back. Iraq's military is contained. And the path for Iraq's re-entry into the community of nations is clearly laid out.

This is not, to borrow Margaret Thatcher's phrase, the time to go wobbling toward Iraq. The United States is committed—as are our friends—to the victory of principle over expediency—and to the evolution in Iraq of a society based on law, exemplified by pluralism and content to live at peace.

These goals may be achieved soon. They may be achieved not-so-soon. But they are right; they are necessary; and they will be achieved.

Thank you very much. ■

Secretary Albright

Maintaining America's Strategic Interests

March 5, 1997

Opening statement before the Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: It is a pleasure to appear before you for the first time in my new capacity. As Ambassador to the United Nations, I benefited greatly from our constructive dialogue over the past four years. I look forward now to continuing our relationship with the same candor and commitment—and to working with you on an even broader array of challenges facing our nation and the world.

In his State of the Union address last month, the President said that “to prepare America for the 21st century, we must master the forces of change and keep American leadership strong and sure for an uncharted time.” Thanks to the President’s personal engagement, the hard work of Secretary Christopher, and the bipartisan support of Members of Congress, we undertake this challenge with the wind at our backs. Today, our nation is respected and at peace. Our alliances are vigorous; our economy is robust. And the ideals enshrined in the American Constitution more than 200 years ago still inspire those who have won, and those who seek, a place in the constantly expanding domain of freedom.

All this is no accident, and its continuation is by no means inevitable. The preservation of peace, the growth of prosperity, and the spread of democracy must be sustained as they were created—by American leadership. That imposes a responsibility upon all of us, for the accounts under the jurisdiction of this subcommittee provide many of the resources by which American interests are protected and American leadership is maintained.

This matters because, in our era, we are all deeply affected by events overseas. Our workers and businesspeople compete in a global marketplace. Our citizens travel. Our students are measured against those from around the world. Our borders are vulnerable to illegal immigrants, drugs, pollution, and disease. And our children will do better and be

safer in a world where nations are working together to set high standards, contain conflict, and enforce the rule of law. It was with these considerations in mind, Mr. Chairman, that I embarked last month on my first overseas trip as Secretary of State.

In Europe, my discussions focused on preparations for the summit that President Clinton and the leaders of NATO will attend this July in Madrid. That summit will mark another milestone in the post-Cold War transformation of NATO by inviting a number of Europe’s new democracies to begin talks about joining our alliance. Our goal is to help NATO do for Europe’s east what NATO did 50 years ago for Europe’s west: to integrate new democracies, eliminate old hatreds, provide confidence in economic recovery, and deter conflict.

As my visits to Rome, Bonn, Paris, London, and NATO Headquarters in Brussels gave evidence, the alliance is united. NATO will continue its process of internal adaptation. We will accept new members and keep open the door to future membership. We will operate in partnership with all of Europe’s democracies. We will develop an enhanced relationship with Ukraine. We will strive to forge a long-term strategic partnership with Russia. And we will coordinate with other regional institutions, including a strengthened OSCE, the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the Western European Union. In this way, we will ensure NATO’s continued role as a mighty instrument for peace, stability, and freedom throughout Europe.

Such an outcome would serve the interests of every country, including Russia. In Moscow, I emphasized to Russian leaders that, just as they have created a new Russia, we have created a new NATO. The new NATO is not arrayed against any country; it is a force for democracy and for integration. Russia’s own security will be enhanced in a Europe without walls, with a transformed NATO as its partner.

"We have an obligation to ourselves and to our children to do all we can to sustain progress toward security cooperation; economic integration; political reform; and victory over the forces of terrorism, corruption, and crime."

During my talks with President Yeltsin and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, I was able to outline the concrete possibilities of such a partnership. I very much welcome President Yeltsin's subsequent statement that he will seek to make progress during his summit meetings with President Clinton in Helsinki later this month.

The issue of NATO adaptation reminds us of the broader interests we share not only with our traditional allies in the west, but with a democratic Russia, Ukraine, the other New Independent States, the Baltics, and the new

democracies of Central Europe. The continued strengthening of democratic institutions and values throughout this region is vital to our future and must be a defining characteristic of our age.

We should never forget that European divisions engulfed our people in two world wars and one Cold War this century. We have an obligation to ourselves and to our children to do all we can to sustain progress toward security cooperation; economic integration; political reform; and victory over the forces of terrorism, corruption, and crime.

In Europe, the central question we face is whether we have learned the right lessons from history. To secure the future, old adversaries must become partners, and old grievances must be settled peacefully.

The same is true in Asia, where much depends on whether choices are based on past suspicion or current hope. The message I conveyed during my trip is that America will do its part to help those focused on building a secure and peaceful future for Asia and the Pacific. Accordingly, I reaffirmed our strong security relationships with our key allies—Japan and the Republic of Korea.

In both Tokyo and Seoul, I emphasized the importance of proceeding with the Agreed Framework that has frozen—and will ultimately dismantle—North Korea's nuclear weapons program. I announced the scheduling of a joint briefing on the proposal for four-party peace talks concerning the future of the Korean Peninsula. And I discussed our decision to join the Republic of Korea in contributing emergency food relief for the starving people of North Korea—a policy that reflects our values and our belief that food should not be used as a political weapon.

Economic issues were also on the agenda in Japan and Korea. In both cases, my focus was on the implementation of agreements designed to assure fair access for American goods and services to local markets.

During my meetings with Chinese leaders, we agreed that expert-level discussions would be held later this month between our countries on a range of non-proliferation issues. I raised America's strong concerns about Chinese practices on internationally recognized human rights, including the right to free expression of political and religious beliefs. I noted the progress that has been made on bilateral trade issues, including textiles and the enforcement of intellectual property rights, and pressed for greater market access for American goods.

We also had an important discussion of Hong Kong, where the United States has substantial interests. I made it clear we expect China to ensure a smooth transition under the 1984 Joint Declaration with the United Kingdom and to assure Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy and way of life. Finally, we discussed Taiwan, where American policies have not changed.

My visit, and China's willingness to receive me despite the death several days earlier of Deng Xiaoping, reflects a mutual determination to maintain our strategic dialogue. This dialogue is designed to identify and build on areas of cooperation, while seeking through candid discussion to narrow differences. By so doing, we hope to develop more extensive areas of common ground, thereby serving the interests of both our countries and the world.

Although I was only in Asia for a few days, I was impressed by the depth of the commitment to strong and stable relations with the United States. This is a region characterized by dynamic economic expansion. But it is also a region threatened by potential turbulence. American engagement is an essential source of stability and, as such, is welcomed on all sides.

Although our interests demand that we direct our attention frequently to Europe and Asia, we cannot—and are not—neglecting our friends elsewhere. In regard to the Arab-Israeli peace process, we are working closely with the Government of Israel, the Palestinians, and others in the region to sustain the progress generated by the Hebron Agreement. The Israeli-Palestinian negotiating process is critical to the structure of peace we hope to build in the region, and we must keep it moving forward. We are encouraging the parties to take steps to build the confidence and trust so vital to sustaining this process.

The recent visits of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat, and the upcoming visits of President Mubarak and King Hussein, reflect the vital role that America plays in this effort. In that role, we will continue to back those who believe in peace and continue to oppose vigorously those who seek to disrupt peace through violence or terror.

Closer to home, we are proud to be among the community of democracies that has come to exist in our own hemisphere. Last week's visit of Chilean President Eduardo Frei was a reminder of the economic and political dynamism of our southern neighbors.

The 1994 Summit of the Americas provides a valuable framework for progress toward durable democratic institutions, ensuring the rule of law, and promoting higher standards of living through free trade and economic integration. The Administration will continue working with all of our democratic partners to implement this framework—and to build strong relationships based on shared interests and mutual respect.

One example is our effort—together with Argentina and Brazil—to encourage a peaceful resolution of the border dispute between Peru and Ecuador. Another is our wide-ranging relationship with Mexico, with whom we share a 2000-mile-long border and a need to respond cooperatively to challenges that include trade, the environment, immigration, corruption, and—most particularly—the war against illegal drugs.

Last week, the President certified Mexico's cooperation in that war but with firm expectations of further progress. Along with Attorney General Reno and Director McCaffrey, I will be monitoring developments continuously. I recognize that there are those who disagree with the President's decision, but it was the right one. Corruption is deeply rooted in Mexico and has undermined the anti-narcotics effort. But President Zedillo is aware of this and is fighting back. Our focus now must be not on unproductive efforts to allocate blame but on strategies to overcome problems. In this effort, we will be pleased to consult with Congress, and we welcome Congressional support.

Mr. Chairman, Africa, too, is a continent of importance to the United States. Throughout the region, there are examples of nations taking the right steps to enlarge private enterprise, invest in education, expand opportunities for women, and solidify democracy.

Despite daunting problems, the overall economic outlook in Africa is improving. And progress has been made in resolving ethnic and civil strife. The UN peacekeeping mission in Mozambique succeeded, and the mission in

Angola remains on the right track. Fighting has subsided in Liberia. In Zaire, we are deeply engaged with South African President Mandela, other regional leaders, and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in efforts to find a political solution and to prevent further humanitarian disaster.

In South Asia, we have a strong interest in encouraging cordial and peaceful relations between India and Pakistan, two long-time friends of the United States. This is the 50th anniversary year of independence for both countries, and we would like to do what we can in cooperation with both to reduce tensions, curb the regional arms race, and prevent nuclear proliferation.

The United States has important economic, security, political, and humanitarian interests on every continent. We need to stay engaged. And if we are to have the resources required to do that, we will need the help of this subcommittee.

Over the past few weeks, as I visited U.S. missions abroad, I could see first hand the connections that exist between the resources we provide here in Washington and what our diplomats are able to do for America overseas. For example, Embassy Moscow is charged with reporting on the complex evolution of a nation whose democratic development is critical to our future. Embassy Seoul has played a vital role in defusing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, while also processing more visa requests than any other mission. Embassy Tokyo manages one of our warmest relationships but also helps to level the economic playing field for American companies. Our diplomatic team in Brussels is on the front lines of the construction of a new Europe and plays host to a huge array of officials attending NATO and European Union meetings. And our mission in Beijing—cramped and handicapped by grossly sub-standard facilities—is striving to defend our interests, report on developments, and carry out a range of vital diplomatic functions in a nation of 1.2 billion people.

Mr. Chairman, I said in my confirmation hearing that America requires not only a first-class military, which we have, but also first-class diplomacy—which is threatened by the steady erosion of our international affairs accounts.

The goals I have outlined today of a more stable world in which America's interests are protected cannot be achieved without diplomacy that is flexible in responding to crises, firm in pursuing our strategic priorities, and vigilant in protecting our security. If we want our actions to be felt globally, we must have a global presence, global reach, and global expertise.

Accordingly, I am here to ask your support for the President's requests for funding for Fiscal Year 1998 for the accounts that are under your jurisdiction, beginning with State Department Operations.

Tools to Maintain our Diplomatic Readiness

Here, our overall request is \$2.175 billion, roughly a 4% increase from the 1997 level. As members of this subcommittee know, funds have been very tight in recent years. Although our workload in priority areas and in the processing of passports and visas has increased, funding for the two accounts that fund our embassies and consulates has been flat during the past five years—and our buying power has been eroded by years of overseas inflation and exchange rate fluctuations.

We have done our best to manage this squeeze by streamlining operations, cutting almost 2,500 positions, postponing needed repairs, and closing more than 30 overseas posts. We have also recognized that, if we are going to work smaller, we have got to work smarter. To this end, we have reduced dramatically the time required for an American to obtain a passport.

We have developed an overseas staffing model that relates personnel requirements to workload and our foreign policy priorities. We have made travel advisories and other consular information available over the Internet. We are redesigning our worldwide logistics operations to provide materials and services faster, better, and cheaper. We have significantly enhanced our information management capabilities. We will actively pursue our part in a government-wide proposal for the retention of fees. And in part, thanks to your efforts, Mr. Chairman, we have put in place a system to provide incentives for more efficient operations and promote equitable sharing among federal agencies of overseas costs.

But sound management requires investment and modernization, as well as efficiency. We must continue to make much-needed infrastructure repairs and install the modern information technology our diplomats need to stay ahead of the game in an era when, from Singapore to Slovenia, the fast devour the slow. And with 50% of our computers and 75% of our phone systems already obsolete, Mr. Chairman, we do not operate as rapidly as we should.

The small increase requested by the President this year will help us keep pace with inflation, modernize our information technology, integrate environmental concerns into the

mainstream of our foreign policy, and make a small downpayment on repairs to our dilapidated facilities in China.

Even so, we will not have the resources we need to improve other sub-standard facilities. The General Accounting Office has identified more than \$260 million in deferred maintenance.

Mr. Chairman, as I have told State Department employees, helping to design and implement American foreign policy is not just another career choice. It is a service to America as important and often as risky as service within our armed forces. It requires a commitment to American interests and ideals. And it needs to be done with excellence and spine.

Let us not forget that we depend on our diplomats to negotiate and verify the agreements that keep us safe from the spread of nuclear weapons. We

- Rely on them to maintain day-to-day support for the peacemakers over the bomb-throwers in strategic areas of the world;
- Turn to them to build relationships with other nations that will enable us to protect our citizens from the scourge of drugs, the plague of crime, and the threat of terror;
- Ask them to help open new markets and assure fair treatment for American goods and services in a fiercely competitive global marketplace, thereby creating good new jobs for our people here at home;
- Expect them to look behind the claims of dictators and despots and to report the truth about abuses of civil liberties and violations of human rights;
- Count on them to help Americans who are hurt, or fall seriously ill, or who are otherwise in need of a friendly voice in faraway lands; and
- Require them to provide support to other federal agencies, from Defense to Agriculture to Commerce to the FBI, that are also involved in promoting American interests around the world.

So there is no more important a part of my message to you today than that the people who do America's work abroad need and deserve the support of Congress—the representatives of our people here at home.

Tools for Leadership Through International Organizations

I also ask your support for the President's request for our participation in international organizations. In my previous capacity, Mr. Chairman, we had a number of opportunities to discuss the Contributions to International Organizations account. That account serves a wide range of American interests.

For example, the UN Security Council is helping to ensure that Saddam Hussein never again threatens Iraq's neighbors whether conventionally or through weapons of mass destruction. UN peacekeeping has helped end wars and build democracy in countries as diverse as Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique. UN mediation brought a halt to the decades-old civil war in Guatemala. The UN War Crimes Tribunals are striving to hold accountable the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing and mass rape.

The International Atomic Energy Agency helps to ensure that nuclear weapons do not fall into the wrong hands. The World Health Organization helps to protect Americans from the spread of infectious disease. The Food and Agriculture Organization sets quality and safety standards that are essential to protect American consumers and that serve the interests of our multi-billion dollar food industry. The International Labor Organization promotes respect for human rights in the workplace, and minimizes unfair international competition from firms and countries that do not observe core labor standards.

Other UN-related agencies help to keep air travel safe, facilitate international communications, and provide early warning of hurricanes. In our daily lives, we take these services for granted. As public officials, we cannot.

The question for us is not whether the UN and its many agencies work for us but whether we can make them work better. That is why we have repeatedly stressed, here on Capitol Hill, at the State Department, and the White House, the importance of reform.

Mr. Chairman, on this subject, we have come a long way in our dialogue over the past four years. There is common ground in our approach, and that approach has yielded dividends. We are far from satisfied, but I think it is fair to say that there has been more reform at the UN during the past four years than in the previous 40.

In 1993, the UN had no Inspector General and no cap on a steadily increasing budget paying for a gradually increasing staff. UN peacekeeping operations were expanding rapidly without adequate discipline or financial controls. A series of expensive global mega-conferences had been scheduled. And both leadership and membership within many international organizations had become complacent.

Since then, much has changed. Despite limited resources, the Inspector General has demonstrated independence and determination in exposing inefficiency and waste. The UN has lived within a no-growth budget, and we believe it will continue to do so. UN staffing

has declined significantly. New peacekeeping operations are far less frequent, better planned, and more successful. An informal moratorium on UN global conferences is being observed. And our reform mantra of consolidation, accountability, prioritization, and fiscal discipline has been echoed by a number of member states—including the G-7/P-8 and the European Union—supported by a promising new Secretary General—and is having an impact throughout the UN system.

This progress did not come easy. Our position on the UN budget for the past year, for example, has been to support more money for the Inspector General and more for priority peace initiatives in Central America, while calling for dramatic reductions elsewhere. This did not go down well with those whose priorities differ from our own. Moreover, our policy of paying our UN assessments late, coupled with our arrears, has alienated both supporters and opponents of reform.

Last year, we proposed a five-year plan for paying arrears, with the understanding that the payments would be tied to specific reforms. I think, in retrospect, that proposal was flawed. It did not provide much leverage with UN members. And despite the efforts of this subcommittee, we did not do very well with Congress. The \$50 million we received in arrears for UN peacekeeping, while welcome, was more than offset by an \$85.6 million shortfall in appropriations for FY 1997 assessments in the overall CIO account. Clearly, if we are going to make progress, rather than lose ground, we need a different approach.

The President's proposal for arrears payments in this year's request is for \$100 million in FY 1998 funds and a \$921-million advance appropriation—that would fully clear our payable arrears and would be made available in FY 1999.

If this request is approved, we would have far greater leverage in negotiating the budgets of the international organizations to which we belong. And we would have a far better chance of success than we do now in negotiating reductions in our share of these budgets and in gaining approval for proposals on reform.

The result would be to reduce the future costs to the United States of participating in these organizations. By paying our arrears, we would get America out of debt. By reducing future assessments, we would keep America out of debt. By providing incentives for reform, we would enable these organizations to do more with less. This is a "win-win-win" proposition. The organizations would operate more efficiently on a sounder fiscal footing, American leadership would be maintained, and long-term costs to our taxpayers would go down.

"If we are to protect our own interests and maintain our credibility, we have to weigh our commitments carefully and be selective and disciplined in what we agree to do."

In the days ahead, I want to work with you and other leaders in Congress to find a way to implement the President's plan. Our continued leadership at the UN and within other international organizations depends upon it. Our principles require it. Our interests demand it. And our budget allows it. The alternative is a climate in which our influence goes down as our arrears grow even higher, and our debts are used as an excuse to delay reform. Timing is important, because 1997 is the year when budgets for the next biennium are approved and when the UN scale of assessments may be

revised. If we squander the opportunity now, we will live with that mistake for at least two more years.

One additional point: Negotiating a reduction in our share of UN costs is not a simple matter. We make the argument, which I believe is valid, that the UN would be better off if it were not as dependent on the United States for funding. We can make the case that the overall contribution that America makes to international security and peace far exceeds that of any other nation, and should be taken into account. Nevertheless, it is also true that Europeans currently pay a larger amount per capita to the UN than we do. If contributions to the UN were based solely on percentage share of world income, our share of UN

costs would go up, not down. I believe we can win this argument, nevertheless, if we have the leverage that arrears repayment would provide. Without that leverage, quite frankly, we do not have a chance.

Our request this year also includes \$969 million for our scheduled payments to international organizations. Our request for contributions for international peacekeeping activities, at \$240 million, includes full funding for U.S.-assessed contributions to critical UN operations along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, on the Golan Heights, and in Angola, to name just a few.

Because the United States has unique capabilities and unmatched power, it is natural that others turn to us in time of emergency. We have an unlimited number of opportunities to act. But we do not have unlimited resources, nor unlimited responsibilities. If we are to protect our own interests and maintain our credibility, we have to weigh our commitments

carefully and be selective and disciplined in what we agree to do.

Recognizing this, we have good reason to strengthen other instruments for responding to conflicts, particularly the United Nations. We know from history and our own experience that small wars can grow into big ones; that unrest provides targets of opportunity for aggressors, criminals, and terrorists; and that unresolved conflicts can spark the migration of millions, draining the world's economic and humanitarian resources. UN peacekeeping is not the answer in all cases, but well-designed UN operations allow us to share the risks and costs of peacekeeping with others. They make it less likely that American military forces will face danger overseas. And they afford a valuable alternative when other options are either unacceptable, more expensive, or less likely to succeed.

As we have discussed before, I appreciate your desire to be consulted about prospective peacekeeping operations. In fact, we incorporated your language on advance notification of new or expanded peacekeeping missions in our FY 1998 budget request. We need your understanding and support so that operations will be effective and so that we can pay our assessments. In that spirit, let me mention a couple of situations where new developments are possible.

Although progress has been made in Bosnia, we now face a critical need to implement the recent decision putting the strategic city of Brcko under international supervision for one year. Police monitoring will be a key element, and we expect to be talking with you soon about a proposed expansion of the UN civilian police mission in Bosnia to handle that task.

On the other hand, the situation in Africa has become less clear. An early mission to Sierra Leone now seems less likely. We have and will continue to consult closely with you on this.

USIA and ACDA

Let me also say a few words about the USIA and ACDA budgets covered by your subcommittee, although I know you will hear later from those agencies directly.

As you know, USIA has undergone rigorous downsizing—cutting staff by 29% and its budget by 33% in constant dollars over the last four years. The consolidation of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has produced a 25% drop in its budget requirements since 1994.

USIA's programs continue to play a critical role in our diplomacy—whether beaming news to China and Cuba; providing frequencies for threatened independent radio stations in Serbia; or sending American students, teachers, and professionals on exchange programs. After four years of cuts, we are requesting a small increase, to \$1.078 billion, covering improvements in broadcasting, exchange programs, and technology. This will allow USIA to be a streamlined but strong partner in our public diplomacy. Let me also mention here the National Endowment for Democracy, which receives funding from USIA for its important role in supporting democracy and free elections around the world.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has also faced four years of declining budgets. But its monitoring and implementation responsibilities have increased, in no small part due to its own success in helping us to gain extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We can scarcely afford not to follow up on our successes with vigilance, even as we pursue U.S. interests such as a ban on antipersonnel land-mines and a fissile materials cut-off agreement. ACDA has requested \$46.2 million for its operations. This is an increase of \$558,000—less than half the rate of inflation—to make sure that our objectives are met.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, in the coming months and years, the President and I will be working closely with you and the members of this subcommittee. Fortunately, the foundations of a bipartisan foreign policy are already strong.

I think it is fair to say that we agree on the need to build a Europe that is whole and free and an Asia-Pacific community based on shared interests and a common commitment to peace. We agree on the need to engage with Russia

and China at a time of uncertain transition in both these great nations. We agree on the need to create an ever-expanding global economy in which American genius and productivity receive their due. We agree on the need to fight back hard against terrorism, illegal drugs, and the spread of nuclear weapons—and to seize opportunities for peace. We agree that freedom is a parent to peace and prosperity and that our leadership is essential to preserve and extend it. And if we agree on a principled and purposeful American role in the world, then surely, we must agree on the need to provide the resources required to sustain it.

Like military readiness, Mr. Chairman, our diplomatic readiness depends upon having the right people in the right places with the right support.

- That is why we need the funds to maintain universal coverage—posts in almost all of the nations of the world;
- That is why we need funds to train our diplomatic personnel;
- That is why we need up-to-date communications equipment and information technology;
- That is why we need to maintain facilities in which our staff can live and work safely and productively; and
- That is why we need to maintain our influence in institutions such as the United Nations—by meeting our commitments and paying what we owe.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, as we near the end of this century, we share a great responsibility: to maintain America's influence, power, and prestige around the world. And by so doing, to lay the foundation for the next American century.

Toward that end, I pledge my own best efforts, and solicit your wise counsel and support.

Thank you very much. ■

Secretary Albright

The Transatlantic Community: Peaceful, Democratic, and Undivided

April 23, 1997

*Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Washington, DC.*

Thank you Secretary Cohen. Mr. Chairman, I very much welcome this chance to testify on what is among the most significant foreign and defense policy issues of our time. With our appearance here today, the Administration really begins in earnest our effort to work in partnership with you to bring this historic effort in Europe to fruition.

By definition, my comments on NATO enlargement today will be preliminary. We have not yet chosen the first candidates for new membership. NATO's discussions with Russia and other nations are not complete, but the outlines and direction of our policy are clear. There is growing, bipartisan interest in the Senate, of which Senator Lott's NATO Observers Group is but further demonstration. It is time to take our own dialogue to the next level, because if our policy is to succeed, it must have your support.

As I thought about what to say here today, I must say I was tempted to follow the advice James Reston, the legendary *New York Times* reporter and columnist, offered after watching Secretary of State Dean Acheson bring the NATO Treaty to the Senate in 1949: "There are many ways," Reston wrote, "in which a Secretary of State can present a treaty to the Senate, but the best way is to tell the Senators everything. This astonishes them, then bores them stiff, and eventually minimizes the ordeal." That advice notwithstanding, Mr. Chairman, I will summarize.

Let me begin by explaining the fundamental goal of our policy. It is to build—for the very first time—a peaceful, democratic, and undivided transatlantic community. It is to extend eastward the peace and prosperity that western Europe has enjoyed for the last 50 years. In this way, America will gain strong, new partners in security and trade. And we will gain confidence that our armed forces will not again be called upon to fight on European soil.

Many organizations are doing their part to assure the prosperity and security of Europe. The European Union is expanding. The OSCE is promoting democracy and helping to resolve conflicts from the Caucasus to the Balkans. Many of the new market democracies are joining the World Trade Organization and the OECD.

But NATO is taking the lead, just as it has for the past half-century. NATO is still the anchor of our engagement in Europe, the only organization in Europe with real military might; the only one capable of providing the confidence and security upon which our other goals depend.

The debate about NATO enlargement is really a debate about NATO itself. It is about the value of maintaining alliances in times of peace and the value of our partnership with Europe.

I am a diplomat, and I know that a diplomat's best friend is effective military force and the credible possibility of its use. That has been the lesson of the Gulf war and Bosnia and all through history. And that is a lesson we must remember in Europe, where we will still face threats that only a collective defense organization can deter.

No alliance has ever been more successful in deterring aggression than NATO. During its first 50 years, NATO also provided the security that shattered European economies needed to rebuild. It helped former adversaries reconcile, making European unity possible. It brought the former fascist nations—first Italy, then Germany, then Spain—back into the family of European democracies. It denationalized European defense. It stabilized relations between Greece and Turkey—all without firing a shot.

NATO defines a community of interest that both preceded and outlasted the Cold War. That is why the United States, a united Germany, and our other allies decided to preserve the alliance after the Berlin Wall fell. It is why

neither we nor any current ally would even think about leaving NATO or settling for a watered-down substitute and why so many others now wish to join.

Why We Are Enlarging NATO

Clearly, if an institution such as NATO did not exist today, we would want to create one. We would want to build the strongest possible partnership with those European nations that share our values and our interests. Just as clearly, if we were creating a new alliance today, we would not make the old Iron Curtain its eastern frontier. We would not leave a democratic country out in the cold because it was once, against the will of its people, part of the Warsaw Pact.

The only question we would consider is this: Which democratic nations in Europe are important to our security and which are willing and able to contribute to our security? In other words, we would not be confined by old thinking or zero-sum calculations from the Cold War. We would begin to think in entirely new terms about what a European continent, whole and free, would look like, and what our relationship with Russia and other key states on such a continent would be. That is exactly what we are doing as we plan the enlargement of NATO; strengthen its Partnership for Peace; build the new Atlantic Partnership Council; and develop NATO's new partnerships with Russia, Ukraine, and other European nations.

As you know, at the Madrid summit in July, NATO will invite several nations to begin accession negotiations. We aim to finish those talks in time to sign accession documents by December. In 1998, the Senate and the parliaments of our allies will be asked to ratify enlargement. With your consent, the first new members will join by 1999.

NATO enlargement involves the most solemn commitments one nation can make to another. Let me explain exactly why it is in our interest to do this.

First is to protect against Europe's next war. Three times in this century, American troops have had to go to Europe—in two hot wars and one cold war—to end conflicts that arose in central Europe. Yet, in the last half-century, America has never been called upon to go to war to defend a treaty ally. We have learned that alliances make the threat of force more credible and therefore the use of force less likely—that by promising to fight if necessary, we can make it less necessary to fight.

The United States has important security interests in central and eastern Europe. If there were a major threat to the peace and security of this region, there is already a high likelihood that we would decide to act, whether NATO enlarges or not. The point of NATO enlargement is to deter such a threat from ever arising.

The **second** reason is to defend Europe's gains toward democracy, peace, and integration. Just the prospect of enlargement has given central and eastern Europe greater stability than it has seen in this century. Old disputes between Poland and Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, Hungary and Romania, Italy and Slovenia, Germany and the Czech Republic are melting away as nations align themselves with NATO. Democratic reforms are advancing. Country after country has made sure soldiers take orders from civilians. These nations are fixing exactly the problems that could have led to future Bosnias.

NATO's prospective members know that they will not have to go it alone if peace and security is threatened in their region. This gives them a reason to avoid destabilizing arms build-ups. It means we can continue to cut conventional arms across Europe. It means confidence within the region will grow, allowing political and economic ties with Russia to improve, too.

The **third** reason, Mr. Chairman, as I suggested, is to right the wrongs of the past. If we don't enlarge NATO, we will be validating the dividing line Stalin imposed in 1945 and that two generations of Americans and Europeans fought to overcome. That's conscionable. With the Cold War over, there is no moral or strategic basis for saying to the American people that we must be allied with Europe's old democracies forever, but with Europe's new democracies never. That would create a permanent injustice, mocking a half-century of sacrifices on both sides of the Iron Curtain. And it would create a permanent source of tension in the heart of Europe.

The **final** reason for enlargement is that it will strengthen NATO by adding capable new allies. Secretary Cohen can speak with greater authority about the military capabilities of NATO's prospective members and their progress in meeting NATO's standards. I want to stress that enlargement will strengthen the political and moral cohesion of the alliance.

The nations we are considering for membership share our most fundamental values and aspirations for Europe and the world. Many

"Clearly, if an institution such as NATO did not exist today, we would want to create one."

shared risks with our soldiers in the Gulf war. Without hesitation, each provided troops to NATO in Bosnia; Hungary provided the bases from which NATO launched its mission and all these nations are with us in SFOR today. They are heeding our call to stop dealing with rogue states such as Iran and Iraq. And they have lent their support to the expansion of democratic principles and respect for human rights around the globe.

The bottom line is that our future allies will bear the cost of defending freedom, because they know the price of losing freedom. Now it falls to us to decide whether the people who knocked the teeth out of totalitarianism in Europe and who helped to liberate us from the Cold War are worthy members of history's greatest democratic alliance. The President and I believe that some are now ready, willing, and able, and we trust the Senate will agree.

Answering the Critics

Still, I know that many thoughtful people remain skeptical. Let me answer their concerns as plainly and directly as I can.

Some people say that enlargement will simply create a new line of division in Europe, leaving the most insecure countries out. But we have taken a range of steps to avoid that outcome. We have made it clear that NATO's first new members will not be the last and that the door to future membership must not be slammed in the face of countries that are not yet ready.

NATO also is launching a number of internal reforms and strengthening its Partnership for Peace, so that whenever the allies act our Partners will be able to act with us. And we are creating an Atlantic Partnership Council, composed of NATO's allies and the members of the Partnership for Peace, so that every new democracy, whether it joins NATO sooner, later, or not at all, will have a say in Europe's future. This approach has the support of our partners, from the Baltic states, to Poland, to Ukraine.

We have made a particular effort to reach out to Ukraine. We are working toward signing a NATO-Ukraine document and seek to strengthen NATO's practical cooperation with Ukraine to support the new Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion, to bolster military reform, to enhance interoperability with NATO, and to encourage Ukraine's cooperation with its neighbors.

There are only two possible alternatives to this overall strategy. We could freeze Europe's Cold War division. Or we could create a lowest common denominator NATO that includes

everyone and imposes obligations on no one. Both of these alternatives are unacceptable. It is far better to invite the strongest candidates to join now, while keeping the door open to every democracy that can shoulder the responsibilities of membership.

We should also remember that when NATO was created in 1949, important countries such as Germany, Greece, and Turkey were not included. Yet NATO left no doubt that it had a direct and material interest in their security—and not coincidentally, just a month after the NATO Treaty was signed, the Berlin blockade was lifted. NATO's area of concern has always been wider than its area of membership, and it always will be.

Others suggest that if we want to integrate Europe's new democracies, then the European Union or NATO's Partnership for Peace can do the job alone. Frankly, I think it is patronizing to assume all these proud nations will just accept partial membership in Western institutions because they happen to sit on the wrong side of an outdated dividing line. Why should they settle for second-class citizenship if they are ready to make a first-class contribution?

EU expansion is vital. But the security NATO provides has always been critical to the prosperity the EU promises. EU expansion will also require new members to make vast adjustments in their regulatory policies. If NATO can proceed now, why wait until, say, tomato farmers in central Europe start using the right kinds of pesticides? And as the EU expands, only NATO can make sure that a united Europe maintains its strongest link to America.

As for the Partnership for Peace, it has indeed been a great success and it will remain critical. But we should remember that many nations have embraced the Partnership both to develop lasting ties with NATO and to prepare for eventual membership. The idea that NATO can remain as it is forever while the central Europeans happily participate in the Partnership for Peace forever, with no prospect of joining the alliance, is a fantasy.

A final criticism we often hear is that we do not need to bother with NATO at all because there is no military threat in Europe. In fact, due largely to Bosnia, more Europeans have died in violent conflict in the last five years than in the previous 45. So I cannot be complacent.

At the same time, with our leadership strong, Bosnia now being stabilized, Russia engaging with NATO, and nuclear arms reductions moving forward, I can understand why some people don't see a threat right now. It is because our policy is working.

Mr. Chairman, if you don't see smoke, that is no reason to stop paying for fire insurance. Like any good insurance policy, NATO enlargement will certainly carry costs. Those costs are outlined in the report we presented to the Congress in February. Secretary Cohen will talk more about the military costs and there will also be a small cost to the NATO civil budget, although it is not possible to estimate the precise amount at this time.

As Secretary of State, I am equally concerned about the costs of a decision not to enlarge. NATO would be stuck in the past, risking irrelevance, even dissolution. Our leadership in Europe will be compromised and relations with our traditional allies would deteriorate.

It might be said, rightly or wrongly, that we blocked the aspirations of NATO's would-be allies solely because Russia objected. Confidence would crumble in central Europe, leading to a search for security by other means, including arms build-ups and increased tensions between neighbors. The worst elements in Russia would be encouraged, secure in their view that Europe can be divided into new spheres of influence and that confrontation with the West pays off. There would be little chance of building a constructive partnership between Russia and NATO.

Russia

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that the debate about NATO should be reduced to a debate about Russia. After all, from the Baltic states to the Balkans, more than 200 million people live in Europe's other new and emerging democracies.

At the same time, every NATO ally and every central European democracy agrees that we cannot build a Europe whole and free until a democratic Russia is a full participant in Europe. This means that we must appreciate the remarkable distance that Russia has traveled since it rejected communism, as well as our own interest in seeing Russia play an important role in Europe—as a great power and no longer an imperial power. We must recognize that Russia has made a choice for democracy and markets and defied the most dire predictions about its evolution.

Some, given the history, object to the very idea of Russian cooperation with the alliance. But we, given the history, understand that Russia's willingness to work with NATO is an opportunity to be seized, not a reason to hide the silverware.

One area where we are cooperating is our effort to adapt the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. NATO's CFE proposal responds

to the remarkable changes in European security since the treaty was signed in 1990. It calls for significant reductions in the number of conventional weapons permitted in the Atlantic to the Urals region, consistent with NATO's continuing security requirements. It can ensure there is no destabilizing concentration of military equipment anywhere in Europe. And it makes clear that the specter of NATO tanks and artillery advancing to Russia's borders is not real.

A critical part of our approach to adapt the CFE is timely Senate approval of the "Flank Document" to which all 30 CFE states agreed on May 31, 1996. This agreement addresses concerns raised by Russia and Ukraine about the impact of the treaty's equipment limits in the CFE "flank" zone, while applying new constraints and special transparency measures as added assurance against excessive force concentrations. The Flank Document is a balanced agreement that serves U.S. interests.

To enter into force, all 30 states' parties must formally approve the Flank Document by May 15, 1997. If it does not enter into force by then, this valuable and sensible agreement will be put at risk, and the prospects for successful CFE adaptation would diminish.

In the past few months, NATO has also been discussing the terms of a charter that will institutionalize its practical cooperation with Russia. At the Helsinki summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin outlined the possibilities of such a partnership.

We will be able to act together with Russia to fight proliferation, to keep nuclear arsenals safe, and to respond to humanitarian crises and threats to peace. We will build on the cooperation our troops forged in Bosnia, making sure it lasts long after the last foreign soldier leaves that country. A joint NATO-Russia Council will give Russia a voice but not a veto—a chance to work in partnership with NATO, not within NATO. Both sides will retain complete freedom of action when we can't agree.

President Clinton has been absolutely clear with President Yeltsin about the lines we will not cross and the barriers we will not build as we construct the NATO-Russia partnership.

First, NATO enlargement will go forward with no delay;

Second, no European nation will be excluded from consideration;

Third, NATO's new members will enjoy the full benefits of membership;

Fourth, the new NATO-Russia Joint Council will be a forum for consultation, cooperation and, where possible, joint action. It will not have the power to dilute, delay, or block NATO decisions nor will it supplant

NATO's North Atlantic Council. It will grow in importance only to the extent Russia uses it constructively; and

Finally, NATO will continue to evolve, but its core function of collective defense will be maintained and enhanced—and the qualities that have made it the most successful alliance in history will be preserved.

As you know, Russia would also like us to make absolute commitments in the charter about the deployment of nuclear and conventional forces on the territory of new members. But we will not compromise on this issue.

All we have done and all we will do is to restate unilaterally existing NATO policy: that in the current and foreseeable security environment, we have no plan, no need, and no intention to station nuclear weapons in the new member countries, nor do we contemplate permanently stationing substantial combat forces. The only binding limits on conventional forces in Europe will be set as we adapt the CFE treaty with central European countries and all the other signatories at the table.

Let me also stress that the point of the NATO-Russia agreement is not to convince Russia to agree to NATO enlargement. We do not need Russia to agree to enlargement. The point is to advance a goal that is worthwhile in its own right: our interest in promoting the integration of a democratic Russia and acting together to meet the challenges of the next century.

I do not expect the Russian Government to change its mind about NATO's plans to take in new members. We must face this fact squarely, but we should also recognize it for what it is: an issue of perception, not of military reality. NATO poses no danger to Russia, just as Russia poses no danger to NATO. We do no favor to Russia's democrats to suggest otherwise.

The fate of Russian democracy is certainly not at stake in NATO's decisions on enlargement. Russia's future as a free and prosperous nation will depend upon the ability of its leaders and people to build an open society, to defeat crime and corruption, to spark economic growth and spread its benefits. The Russian people know that their future will be written in Moscow, in Irkutsk, in Novgorod, and not at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

The truth is, the quest for freedom and security in Europe is not a zero-sum game in which Russia must lose if central Europe gains, and central Europe must lose if Russia gains. Such thinking has imposed enormous human and economic costs during the last 50 years, and we have a responsibility as well as an opportunity to transcend it.

In this new Europe, the United States and western Europe have a chance to gain new allies and partners who can and will contribute to our common security. The people of central Europe have a chance to see the erasure of a Cold War dividing line that has cut them off from the European mainstream. The people of Russia have a chance to achieve the deepest and most genuine integration with the West that their nation has ever enjoyed.

Twice in this century, Mr. Chairman, we have faced the challenge, in the aftermath of war, to bring together that kind of Europe. We had the opportunity after World War I, but too many, in the United States and elsewhere, lacked the vision. After World War II, there was no shortage of vision, but across half of Europe the opportunity was denied.

Today we have the vision and the opportunity to build a Europe in which every nation is free and every free nation is our partner. With continued bipartisan support from the Senate and from the American people, I am confident that this is the Europe our children and grandchildren will know. ■

Secretary Albright

American Principle and Purpose In East Asia

April 15, 1997

*1997 Forrestal Lecture at the United States Naval Academy,
Annapolis, Maryland*

Good evening. Admiral Larson, thank you for your kind introduction. Captain Bogle, Dean Shapiro, Captain Evans, midshipmen: I am delighted to have a chance to address the Naval Academy community and the participants in your annual Foreign Affairs Conference.

I thought I would begin this evening on a fashion note. One of the big differences between an admiral or a general and the Secretary of State is that they get to wear a uniform and, unless I happen to be playing baseball that day, I do not. This is unfortunate, because I think the uniform sends a message of resolve that could be useful, diplomatically. As a substitute, I decided, while I was U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, that I would begin to wear special pins.

It all started when the press in Iraq referred to me as a snake for suggesting that after starting two wars, using chemical weapons against his own people, and murdering some of his closest advisers, Saddam Hussein should perhaps not be trusted. So the next time I met with the Iraqi ambassador in New York, I wore a pin in the shape of a snake.

Since then, I have bought a number of pins, but my favorite, I am wearing today. I got it after Bosnian Serb General Mladic, an indicted war criminal, announced that he had named one of his goats after me. I began to look around for a pin so that I would have one to wear when the general is, at long last, prosecuted for his crimes. When word got around, I heard almost immediately from my friends in the Navy, and I am proud to wear the Naval Academy pin this evening. I am also pleased that the organizers of your Foreign Affairs Conference this year have chosen as your topic the great unfinished cause of our times—the struggle for democracy.

This Academy has been the training ground for many of the heroes of that struggle. Their memory is strong within us and cherished by us. For within the past few years, we have celebrated what seems sometimes as the 50th anniversary of everything. And as we have recalled the bravery of sailors, aviators, sol-

diers, and marines from Normandy to Leyte Gulf to Tarawa to Iwo Jima, we have been in awe of their sacrifice and inspired by their example.

The lessons they bequeathed to us are many. We must maintain strong alliances, for there is no better way to prevent war. We must be prepared to defend our interests whether in air, on land, or at sea. We must never take freedom for granted. And, as Americans, we must continue to carry aloft the banner of leadership.

Today, we are approaching the threshold of a new century in a new era of possibility and risk. The class that entered this academy last fall will graduate in the year 2000.

You will embark upon your careers of service at a time when America is strong, prosperous, respected, and at peace. You will look across the Caribbean and see a nearly complete hemisphere of democracies and a group of forward-looking leaders with whom we are striving to consolidate the sway of freedom, defeat the plague of drugs, and lay the groundwork for sustainable economic growth.

You will look across the Atlantic and see a NATO strengthened by new members and trained for new missions in a Europe in which every democracy, including Russia, is our partner and every partner is a builder of peace. And you will look across the Pacific, where you will see a region of dynamic economic growth, thriving new democracies, and complex political and security challenges.

It is American policy toward this region—East Asia—that I would like to discuss with you tonight. When the Cold War ended, some Asian leaders feared that we Americans would retreat from our historic presence in the region. If any remnants of that perception persist, let me dispel them now. As President Clinton has repeatedly made clear, and as the U.S. Navy helps ensure, America is and will remain an Asia-Pacific power.

Our role there is vital, from the stabilizing effects of our diplomatic and military presence, to the galvanizing impact of our commercial ties, to the transforming influence of our ideals.

And our commitment is solid because it is solidly based on American interests.

We have an abiding security interest in a region where we have fought three wars in the last half-century and where almost any significant outbreak of international violence would threaten our well-being or that of our friends. We have an abiding economic interest in a region that is characterized by explosive growth and with which we already conducted more than 40% of our trade. We have an abiding political interest in a region whose cooperation we seek in responding to the new global threats of proliferation, terrorism, illegal narcotics, and the degradation of our environment. And we have an abiding interest as Americans in supporting democracy and respect for human rights in this, the most populous region of the world.

These interests cannot be separated into discrete boxes. They are reinforcing. The vitality of the international economic system rests upon international political order. Political order depends, in great measure, on military security. Economic stability reduces the likelihood of dangerous conflict. When each of these pillars is strong, progress on all fronts is possible. If one pillar collapses, stress on the others is multiplied.

For this reason, we are working with our allies and others in the region to build an Asia-Pacific community based on a full range of interests, including economic growth, the rule of law, and a shared commitment to peace. To this end, we are fortifying our core alliances, maintaining our forward deployment of troops, and supporting new multilateral security dialogues, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. We are negotiating agreements to open markets for American goods, services, and capital. And we are actively promoting the trend within the region toward greater political openness. Although many of our initiatives in East Asia are regional in nature, most are grounded in key bilateral relationships. Of these, especially prominent are those with Japan, the Republic of Korea, and China.

Five decades ago, our predecessors made a strategic decision to help rebuild Japan from the destruction of World War II. The resulting alliance of two great peoples, two great democracies, and the two largest economies in the world is not directed against any particular adversary. Rather, U.S.-Japanese cooperation is for peace, for prosperity, for democracy, and for economic and political development around the globe.

Militarily, we are committed to maintaining our presence in Japan, to being good guests there, and to working with our hosts to expand the already high degree of cooperation among our armed forces. Economically, we will

continue to strive for a more balanced relationship. Since 1993, we have negotiated 23 market-access agreements that have narrowed our trade deficit and set the stage for further progress. And politically, we are working with Japan almost everywhere—from peace in Bosnia to development in Africa to reform at the UN to our pathbreaking Common Agenda on global issues.

In 10 days, Prime Minister Hashimoto will be in Washington, and I know that President Clinton is looking forward to reviewing with him ways to further strengthen our alliance. The U.S.-Japan partnership is a cornerstone of our arrangement in the Asia-Pacific region and a vital contributor to Asian security. Central, as well, is our friendship with the Republic of Korea. Since the armistice four decades ago, South Korea has climbed the ladder from poverty and destruction to become an active democracy with a modern economy.

Today, our annual trade with Korea tops \$50 billion, and we work with the government in Seoul on a range of political matters. But most critical is our shared effort, as allies, to preserve stability on the Korean Peninsula. To this end, the Agreed Framework we have negotiated has frozen North Korea's dangerous production of nuclear materials and required it to take the steps necessary to comply with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. U.S. and South Korean diplomacy has thereby preserved the peninsula's stability in the short term, while preparing the way for discussions that may lead to full reconciliation in the long term.

A year ago, Presidents Clinton and Kim proposed talks involving the two Koreas, China, and the United States. We have recently joined with South Korea in briefing the North on the details of these proposed four-party talks. We look forward to what we hope will be a positive response at meetings scheduled this week in New York.

We also are continuing to respond to North Korea's food shortage, the tragedy of which has been documented not only by UN officials but by recent visitors from Congress. Although the threat of famine results largely from failed policies of the North, we view the suffering as a humanitarian, not a political, issue. Earlier this year, the United States contributed \$10 million in response to a World Food Program appeal. Today, I have announced that we will commit an additional \$15 million.

In February, I visited U.S. troops in the DMZ. These men and women are the visible, human evidence of our commitment to South Korea's security. As I talked with these young Americans, shook their hands, and thanked them, I felt again the urgency of the challenge that Korea presents to us all. Our alliance with the Republic of Korea is a source of stability

and vital for the defense of freedom. North Korea has begun to move, ever so slowly, in the direction of greater contact and openness with the outside world. While maintaining our firm policy of deterrence, we will also continue to make clear the benefits of cooperation.

The future of the peninsula is for Koreans to decide. Our role is to support the South in its efforts to assure peace. We are doing that, and we will maintain that commitment for as long as our help is required. No nation will play a larger role in shaping the course of the 21st century Asia than China. With its huge population and vast territory, China's emergence as a modern, growing economic and military power is a major historical event.

In the United States, there are some, alarmed by China's rise, who suggest that our policy should be to contain China. Such a policy assumes and would, in fact, guarantee an outcome contrary to American interests. A policy of containment would divide our Asian allies and encourage China to withdraw into narrow nationalism and militarism. Our interests are served by an Asia that is coming together, not splitting apart—and by a China that is neither threatening nor threatened.

What we see in Asia today is not a clash of civilizations, but a test of civilization. That test is whether we can seize the opportunity for mutually beneficial cooperation that now exists, for we are privileged to live in an era when the protection of security and prosperity is not a zero-sum game.

Much is made in the foreign policy journals of the dialogue that is underway between our government and the Government of China. What those journals sometimes ignore—I know you've been assigned to read them—is that, in addition to what is occurring at the official level, ties between the American and Chinese people are deepening at every level. From the Bay area to Beijing, from New York to Shanghai, we are visiting each other, studying with each other, doing business with each other, philosophizing with each other, and learning from each other. It is our peoples, even more than our governments, that are bringing the old era of mutual isolation and miscommunication to a decisive and irreversible end.

But for America, the strategic benefits of our official dialogue with China are also tangible, clear, and growing. We are not yet where we want to be, nor has China evolved as rapidly or thoroughly as some have hoped. But the direction we must go is clear—greater interaction, based on China's acceptance of international norms. For example, the United States has an interest in China's integration into the global trading system. Accordingly, we support its entry into the World Trade Organization on commercially acceptable terms. We have worked with China to develop a list of concrete steps that would broaden access to its markets and bring its trade practices into line with WTO rules.

In the security arena, when the Clinton Administration took office in 1993, the U.S. and China generally did not see eye-to-eye on nuclear issues, and the Chinese were selling dangerous weapons and technologies with impunity. Through our dialogue, we have built a record of cooperation on agreements to enhance international nuclear safeguards, ban nuclear tests, and make illegal the possession and production of chemical arms.

We also welcome China's commitment not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear activities and its agreement to abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime. We remain concerned, however, about the adequacy of China's export control system. Difficulties have arisen, for example, over Chinese exports of arms as well as sensitive goods and technologies to Iran and Pakistan. Through our dialogue, we are working with China to strengthen export controls and expand cooperation in the development of peaceful nuclear energy and other areas.

More broadly, we have maintained a good working relationship with China at the UN Security Council. We consult regularly on Korea. We are exploring steps to avoid military incidents at sea. We have a shared interest in fighting international terrorism and crime. We have joined forces on specific problems such as the halting of the inhumane and criminal practice of smuggling illegal aliens.

Finally, as the world's top producers of greenhouse gases, the U.S. and China must cooperate in responding to the strategic danger posed by threats to the global environment. Those of you who have traveled in East Asia know that the "Asia miracle" has been accompanied in some places by undrivable streets, unbreathable air, undrinkable water, and unbearable living conditions. We all should care whether the globe's strongest power, and its largest, are able to work together to ensure a future that is not only wealthier—but healthier.

The U.S.-China relationship is guided by principles set out in the 1972 Shanghai and two later communiqués. Pursuant to these documents, we recognize the Government of the P.R.C. as the sole legal government of China. At the same time, under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, we have maintained strong unofficial ties with the people of Taiwan, thereby helping to propel Taiwan's flourishing democracy.

Although leaders in both the P.R.C. and Taiwan recognize the need to resolve differences peacefully, those differences remain a potential source of instability. That is why we have stressed to both Beijing and Taipei that our "one China" policy is firm and that they should do all they can to build mutual confi-

"What we see in Asia today is not a clash of civilizations, but a test of civilization. That test is whether we can seize the opportunity for mutually beneficial cooperation that now exists. . . ."

dence and avoid provocative actions and words. In this regard, our naval presence in the Pacific plays a stabilizing role. When China's military exercises caused tensions in the Strait early last year, our deployment of two aircraft carriers helped lower the risk of miscalculation.

Another important element in the U.S.-China dialogue is our interest in the future of Hong Kong. Two centuries ago, Hong Kong was a treeless, granite island populated by leopards, tigers, mongooses, butterflies, and what has been described as "an unusual variety of newt." Today, it is a vital and astonishing center of global commerce. I am a skeptic about the human ability to predict the future, but I pay homage to the 12th-century Chinese poet who imagined a Hong Kong ablaze with, and I quote, "a host of stars in the deep night and a multitude of ships passing to and fro within the harbor."

On July 1, less than 90 days from now, the world will watch with a mixture of hope and concern as Hong Kong reverts to Chinese sovereignty. The United States supports this reversion under the terms of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, which calls for the preservation of Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy and its way of life and basic freedoms.

As I assured Martin Lee, the leader of Hong Kong's largest democratic party, in a meeting I held with him yesterday, the United States is deeply committed to freedom and democracy in Hong Kong, as elsewhere. In addition, 40,000 Americans live in Hong Kong. Our citizens have \$13 billion in investments there. And we have an interest in law enforcement cooperation and in port access for Navy ships. Advancing these interests depends on the rule of law and protection of civil liberties in Hong Kong.

Accordingly, I have decided to accept the invitation of the British and Chinese Governments to represent the United States at the reversion ceremony in July. By so doing, I will underline American support for the continuation of Hong Kong's current way of life and freedoms. I will emphasize America's continued involvement in protecting our interests and supporting Hong Kong's people as they enter the Chinese nation.

A major area of disagreement between the United States and China is human rights. We recognize that the Chinese people today possess far more options in their daily lives than did their parents. Progress has also been made in revising civil and criminal law and permitting a degree of choice in village elections. China is changing, but the Chinese Government's repression of political dissent has not.

The United States will continue to shine the spotlight on egregious violations of internationally recognized human rights in China, as elsewhere. The world cannot and should not be allowed to forget dissidents such as Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan, both of whom have

been sentenced to long terms in jail for their nonviolent support of democracy.

We have expressed to China particular interest in seeing the release of those imprisoned for the peaceful expression of political, religious, or social views, and as a first step, the release on medical parole of those who are eligible. We have urged that international humanitarian organizations be given access to prisoners. We have stressed the value of resuming negotiations between Beijing and the Dalai Lama for the purpose of preserving Tibet's unique cultural, linguistic, and religious heritage within China.

Earlier today, the UN Human Rights Commission decided not to consider a resolution we had co-sponsored that would have urged China to improve its human rights practices. We regret that decision. We congratulate the Government of Denmark for sponsoring the resolution and the others who co-sponsored it. The Clinton Administration views human rights as an essential part of what our country is all about. We recognize that no nation is perfect and that none has all the answers. But we also believe that human rights are a legitimate subject for discussion among nations. On this, we differ with China, but we also differ with those who believe that the way to improve human rights conditions in China would be to deny to that country the trading status we accord to most others.

For years, the debate in Washington linking trade to human rights in China has raged. And for years, it has failed to advance American interests or to produce progress in China. Instead, this debate has divided us and blurred the focus we should be putting on Chinese practices. The debate has also created the perception that our economic ties to the P.R.C. and our concerns about human rights are in opposition when, in fact, they are two sides of the same coin. Economic openness and political liberalization are not identical, but they do reinforce each other. Both add to China's integration within the world community.

As Americans, we all enjoy a good debate, but we should also realize, in this debate, we all have the same goal. And that goal is a China that is a responsible and deeply engaged participant in the international system and that is meeting international norms, including those that concern the treatment of its own people.

The strategic dialogue between the United States and China is not based on any particular presumptions about the future. On the contrary, it is designed to influence the future in a manner that serves the interests of both countries, the region, and the world. Later this month, we will welcome Vice Premier Qian Qichen to Washington. Later this year, we look forward to a meeting between President Clinton and China's President Jiang Zemin. Throughout, we will continue efforts to narrow differences, expand cooperation, and build understanding. We anticipate that the larger

process of increased ties between the American and Chinese peoples will accelerate with profoundly positive results.

The unifying trends of economic and political modernization that are sweeping East Asia have not erased the region's kaleidoscope diversity. Nations are adapting to growth and change each in their own distinctive ways. But the struggle for democracy in two countries, in particular, deserves mention now and here. In Cambodia, the terror of Khmer past—Pol Pot's genocidal Khmer Rouge—has faded in relevance and power, but the transition to a democratic future has been slowed by corruption, infringement of civil liberties, and political violence.

As Cambodians prepare for elections next year, we call upon all factions to honor the past sacrifices of the Cambodian people and to agree to debate their differences openly and to settle them peacefully, in accordance with the popular will.

In Burma, a military dictatorship continues to repress a democratic movement that enjoys wide and proven popular support. The outcome of this struggle matters to us because Burma's potential can only be realized by a government accountable to its people. It matters because Burma is the largest source of heroin in the world. Our policy is to oppose repression and support a dialogue between the government and the democratic opposition, led by the Nobel Prize-winning Aung San Suu Kyi, and including the leaders of Burma's many ethnic groups.

U.S. officials, myself included, have stressed to Burma's military the opportunity presented by a democratic opening. Unfortunately, the government, known as the SLORC, has responded by placing even greater limits on the right of political expression and by throwing peaceful demonstrators in jail. These decisions continue to have a corrosive effect on the Burmese Government's standing at home and abroad. And Burmese leaders are on notice that unless the clouds of repression are lifted, they will face investment sanctions under U.S. law.

There are some scholars who suggest that democracy and respect for human rights are not well-suited to Asia and that our focus on them is an attempt to impose alien values. But to me, that argument is more rationalization than rational. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights reflects aspirations that are common to all cultures on all continents. Those who stood up to tanks in Tiananmen Square, transformed the Philippines from kleptocracy to democracy, and who are now raising their voices for freedom in Burma are both true democrats and true Asians. They deserve our respect and the world's.

Before I close, I would like to stress again one central point. American policy in Asia has many facets, but those facets are interrelated, not separate and distinct. If you are an Ameri-

can interested in investing in Asia, you will care whether the legal structure in that country respects individual rights and whether the political and security environment is stable. If you are a military planner, you will want to see nations moving ahead with economic and political reform because you know that democracy is a parent to peace. If you are a human rights activist, you will want to encourage outside investment, expanded trade, and a broad dialogue between nations that are democratic and those that are just beginning to experiment with democratic institutions. And if you are Secretary of State, you will be determined to move ahead on all fronts, encouraging the full integration of every country in the region into an international system based on the rule of law.

Fifty years ago this month, President Harry Truman addressed an American people still weary from war and wary of the commitments that loomed in the dawn of the post-war world. He said, and I quote, "The process of adapting ourselves to the new concept of world responsibility is naturally a difficult and painful one. But it is not in our nature to shirk obligations." Truman continued by saying that "we have a heritage that constitutes the greatest resource of this nation. I call it the spirit and character of the American people," said Harry Truman. "We. . .not only cherish freedom and defend it, if we need with our lives, but we also recognize the right of other people and other nations to share it."

It was not enough, after World War II, to say that the enemy had been defeated and that what we were against had failed. The scourge of war had cut too deep. The generation that defeated Hitler and won the war in the Pacific was determined to build a foundation of principle and purpose that would last. Together, they designed the institutions and alliances that would one day defeat communism, promote prosperity, and strengthen the rule of law around the world.

To them and to all those who have fought and sacrificed so that we might be free, we have inherited a duty to history and to ourselves. If we allow the momentum toward democracy to stall, or turn away from our responsibilities, or take for granted the blessings of liberty, we would betray generations past and future and squander all that is truly precious to ourselves.

The dawn of a new century carries with it no guarantees. It will be our shared task as diplomats, sailors, marines, and just plain citizens to shape a future in which our interests are advanced, our values flourish, our goodwill is understood, and our determination and capacity to defend freedom is never in doubt.

Tonight, as I look out at you—the Naval officers and leaders of tomorrow—I have no doubt that in this shared task, we will prevail.

Thank you very much. ■

Secretary Albright

Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

April 9, 1997

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you this afternoon. As evidenced by the bipartisan show of support at the White House last week, timely approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC, is one of the President's top foreign policy priorities. This afternoon, with the help of my colleagues, I would like to explain why.

I begin with the imperative of American leadership. The United States is the only nation with the power, influence, and respect to forge a strong global consensus against the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

- In recent years, we have used our position wisely to gain the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
- We have led in securing the extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- We have frozen North Korea's nuclear program.
- We have maintained sanctions against Iraq.
- We have joined forces with more than two dozen other major countries in controlling the transfer of dangerous conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.

In these and other efforts, we have counted on the strong support and wise counsel of this committee and your Senate colleagues. Your consent to ratification of the START II Treaty made possible the agreement in Helsinki to seek further significant reductions in Cold War nuclear arsenals. And the Nunn-Lugar program set the standard for forward-looking bipartisan action to promote nuclear security.

American leadership on arms control is not something we do as a favor to others. Our goal is to make the world safer for Americans and to protect our allies and friends. We have now another opportunity to exercise leadership for those ends. And once again, we look to this committee for help.

The CWC will enter into force on April 29. Our goal is to ratify the agreement before then so that America will be an original party. By so

doing, as the President said last Friday, we "can help to shield our soldiers from one of the battlefield's deadliest killers . . . and we can bolster our leadership in the fight against terrorism and proliferation around the world."

Chemical weapons are inhumane. They kill horribly, massively, and—once deployed—are no more controllable than the wind. That is why the United States decided, under a law signed by President Reagan in 1985, to destroy the vast majority of our chemical weapons stockpiles by the year 2004. Thus, the CWC will not deprive us of any military option we would ever use against others, but it would help ensure that others never use chemical weapons against us.

In considering the value of this treaty, we must bear in mind that today, keeping and producing chemical weapons are legal. The gas Saddam Hussein used to massacre Kurdish villagers in 1988 was produced legally. In most countries, terrorists can produce or procure chemical agents, such as sarin gas, legally. Regimes such as Iran and Libya can build up their stockpiles of chemical weapons legally.

If we are ever to rid the world of these horrible weapons, we must begin by making not only their use but also their development, production, acquisition, and stockpiling illegal. This is fundamental. This is especially important now when America's comparative military might is so great that an attack by unconventional means may hold for some potential adversaries their only perceived hope of success. And making chemical weapons illegal is the purpose of the CWC.

The CWC sets the standard that it is wrong for any nation to build or possess a chemical weapon and gives us strong and effective tools for enforcing that standard. This is not a magic wand. It will not eliminate all danger. It will not allow us to relax or cease to ensure the full preparedness of our armed forces against the threat of chemical weapons. What it will do is make chemical weapons harder for terrorists or outlaw states to buy, build, or conceal.

Under the treaty, parties will be required to give up the chemical weapons they have and to refrain from developing, producing, or acquiring such weapons in the future. To enforce these requirements, the most comprehensive and intense inspection regime ever negotiated will be put in place. Parties will also be obliged to enact and enforce laws to punish violators within their jurisdictions. Of course, no treaty is 100% verifiable, but this treaty provides us valuable tools for monitoring chemical weapons proliferation worldwide—a task we will have to do with or without the CWC.

CWC inspections and monitoring will help us learn more about chemical weapons programs. It will also enable us to act on the information we obtain. In the future, countries known to possess chemical weapons and who have joined the CWC will be forced to choose between compliance and sanctions. And countries outside the CWC will be subject to trade restrictions whether or not they are known to possess chemical arms.

These penalties would not exist without the treaty. They will make it more costly for any nation to have chemical weapons and more difficult for rogue states or terrorists to acquire materials needed to produce them.

Over time, I believe that—if the United States joins the CWC—most other countries will, too. Consider that there are now 185 members of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and only five outside. Most nations play by the rules and want the respect and benefits the world bestows upon those who do.

But the problem states will never accept a prohibition on chemical weapons if America stays out, keeps them company, and gives them cover. We will not have the standing to mobilize our allies to support strong action against violators if we ourselves have refused to join the treaty being violated.

The core question here is who do we want to set the standards? Critics suggest that the CWC is flawed because we cannot assume early ratification and full compliance by the outlaw states. To me, that is like saying that because some people smuggle drugs, we should enact no law against drug smuggling. When it comes to the protection of Americans, the lowest common denominator is not good enough. Those who abide by the law—not those who break it—must establish the rules by which all should be judged.

Moreover, if we fail to ratify the agreement by the end of April:

- We would forfeit our seat on the treaty's Executive Council for at least one year, thereby costing us the chance to help draft the rules by which the Convention will be enforced;

- We would not be able to participate in the critical first sessions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which monitors compliance;

- We would lose the right to help administer and conduct inspections;

- Because of the trade restrictions imposed on non-member states, our chemical manufacturers are concerned that they would risk serious economic loss.

According to a letter signed by the CEOs of more than 50 chemical manufacturing companies, the American chemical industry's "status as the world's preferred supplier . . . may be jeopardized if . . . the Senate does not vote in favor of the CWC." According to those executives "we stand to lose hundreds of millions of dollars in overseas sales, putting at risk thousands of good-paying American jobs."

Eliminating chemical weapons has long been a bipartisan goal. The Convention itself is the product of years of effort by leaders from both parties. And the treaty has strong backing from our defense and military leaders.

I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that the committee heard this morning from three former Secretaries of Defense who do not favor approval of this Convention. There is no question their arguments are sincerely held and deserve consideration. I would point out, however, that other former Secretaries of Defense from both parties are on record in support of the treaty, and that every former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, going back to the Carter administration, has endorsed it.

Just this past week, we received a letter of support signed by 17 former four-star generals and admirals, including three of the former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and five former service chiefs. In their words:

Each of us can point to decades of military experience in command positions. We have all trained and commanded troops to prepare for the wartime use of chemical weapons and for defenses against them Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations, but instead on its many strengths. The CWC destroys stockpiles that could threaten our troops; it significantly improves our intelligence capabilities; and it creates new international sanctions to punish those states who remain outside of the treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the CWC.

I also note, Mr. Chairman, that the former officials who testified before the committee this morning have not had the benefit of the intensive dialogue we have been conducting

"The CWC sets the standard that it is wrong for any nation to build or possess a chemical weapon and gives us strong and effective tools for enforcing that standard."

with members of the Senate leadership, including yourself, the ranking member, and other key members of this committee. We have attempted, in the course of this dialogue, to address the major issues the opponents of the treaty have raised and to provide appropriate assurances in binding conditions to accompany the resolution of ratification.

For example, critics have asserted that the CWC obliges member states to exchange manufacturing technology that can be used to make chemical agents. This is untrue. The CWC prohibits members from providing any assistance that would contribute to chemical weapons proliferation.

Nothing in the CWC requires any weakening of our export controls. Further, the United States will continue to work through the Australia Group to maintain and make more effective internationally agreed controls on chemical and biological weapons technology. And, as I have said, the CWC establishes tough restrictions on the transfer of precursor chemicals and other materials that might help a nation or terrorist group to acquire chemical weapons.

Opponents also suggest that if we ratify the CWC, we will become complacent about the threat that chemical weapons pose. This, too, is false, and this body can help ensure it remains false. The President has requested an increase of almost \$225 million over five years in our already robust program to equip and train our troops against chemical and biological attack. We are also proceeding with theater missile defense programs and intelligence efforts against the chemical threat.

Some critics of the treaty have expressed the fear that its inspection requirements could raise constitutional problems here in the United States. However, the CWC provides explicitly that inspections will be conducted according to each nation's constitutional processes.

Another issue that arose early in the debate was that the CWC could become a regulatory nightmare for small businesses here in the United States. But after reviewing the facts, the National Federation of Independent Business concluded that its members "will not be affected" by the treaty.

Finally, I have heard the argument that the Senate really need not act before April 29. But as I have said, there are real costs attached to

any such delay. The treaty has already been before the Senate for more than 180 weeks. More than 1,500 pages of testimony and reports have been provided, and hundreds of questions have been answered. The Senate is always the arbiter of its own pace. But from where I sit, a decision prior to April 29 would be very much in the best interests of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, America is the world's leader in building a future of greater security and safety for us and for those who share our commitment to democracy and peace. The path to that future is through the maintenance of American readiness and the expansion of the rule of law. We are the center around which international consensus forms. We are the builder of coalitions, the designer of safeguards, the leader in separating acceptable international behavior from that which cannot be tolerated.

This leadership role for America may be viewed as a burden by some, but I think to most of our citizens, it is a source of great pride. It is also a source of continuing strength, for our influence is essential to protect our interests, which are global and increasing. If we turn our backs on the CWC, after so much effort by leaders from both parties, we will scar America with a grievous and self-inflicted wound. We will shed the cloak of leadership and leave it on the ground for others to pick up.

But if we heed the advice of wise diplomats such as James Baker and Brent Scowcroft; experienced military leaders such as Generals Powell, Mundy, and Schwartzkopf; and thoughtful public officials such as former Senators Nunn, Boren, and Kassebaum-Baker, we will reinforce America's role in the world.

By ratifying the CWC, we will assume the lead in shaping a new and effective legal regime. We will be in a position to challenge those who refuse to give up these poisonous weapons; we will provide an added measure of security for the men and women of our armed forces; we will protect American industry and American jobs; and we will make our citizens safer than they would be in a world where chemical arms remain legal.

This treaty is about other people's weapons, not our own. It reflects existing American practices and advances enduring American interests. It is right and smart for America. It deserves the Senate's timely support. Thank you very much. ■

Jeffrey Davidow

U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean

March 19, 1997

Statement by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Washington, DC.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: It is a pleasure to appear before you today to present the Administration's foreign policy objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean. As we prepare to enter a new century, we have an excellent opportunity to advance our interests in the region.

While relations with each country in Latin America and the Caribbean present their own unique challenges for the United States, the President's policies toward the region seek to achieve four basic objectives:

- Promoting free trade and economic integration in order to enhance economic development and assist American business;
- Strengthening democracy and the rule of law to ensure that the values and principles that have guided our nation thrive throughout the hemisphere;
- Combating drug trafficking, migrant smuggling and environmental degradation to minimize the impact of these transnational problems; and
- Encouraging sustainable development and poverty alleviation programs to improve living standards for all citizens of the region.

These objectives are consistent with our long-standing interests. If achieved, they will help guarantee a 21st century that is more prosperous and secure for all Americans.

The next 12 months will see an intense focus on regional issues by the President. President Clinton has already hosted a state visit by his Chilean counterpart, Eduardo Frei. In April he will travel to Mexico to advance our critically important relations with that country. In May he will visit five countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in March 1998 he will attend the second Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile. This high level of activity is indicative of the importance the Administration gives to relations with the nations of our hemisphere.

A Region of Change

Before turning to look at how we are pursuing our objectives, I'd like to briefly review the transformation that the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have undergone in the past few years.

Only 20 years ago, just four countries in South America had democratically elected civilian governments, and an almost equally small number of countries were following free market economic programs. Indeed, military dictatorships and centrally planned economies were the norm.

Ten years ago, democracy had taken a tentative hold in much of the region, but internal conflicts and guerrilla wars raged in Central America. For most of the region, real economic reforms were just beginning.

Today, the hemisphere is at peace. Former foes sit beside each other and work together peacefully to solve national problems in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. In total, 34 of the 35 countries in the Western Hemisphere are now solidly in the democratic fold. All the region's major economies have implemented substantial economic reforms, and others are racing to catch up. The changes that have occurred in Latin America and the Caribbean have made it possible for the U.S. to develop a very different kind of relationship with its neighbors.

A Shared Vision for the Americas

This new regional consensus in favor of democracy and open economies in the Americas led the Clinton Administration to develop an ambitious policy of regional cooperation. The framework for this policy was established at the Summit of the Americas in Miami in December 1994. At the summit, President Clinton and the 33 other democratically elected heads of state from across the hemisphere agreed to pursue an agenda that complements U.S. regional objectives. The agenda called for

"By 2010, our exports to Latin America and the Caribbean are expected to exceed those to the European Union and Japan combined."

establishment of a Free Trade Area of the Americas—FTAA—by 2005, alleviation of the poverty that still affects an unacceptably large percentage of the population, sustainable growth and respect for the environment, and efforts to address narcotics trafficking and other transnational problems. The basis of this hemispheric cooperation is a shared and earnest commitment to democratic values.

The summit process has already paid dividends. Summit-related activities have resulted in the world's first anti-corruption convention, agreements to fight terrorism and money laundering, and the initiatives on the environment that developed out of the Santa Cruz Summit on Sustainable Development.

FTAA and Regional Integration

While work continues in each of the policy areas agreed to in Miami, the greatest challenge between now and the Santiago summit is to move forward on our free trade agenda. We have made considerable progress on refining the FTAA concept at two successful trade ministerial meetings in Denver and Cartagena, as well as

through the impressive amount of preparatory technical work in the 11 FTAA working groups. We are optimistic that the third trade ministerial in Belo Horizonte, Brazil in May will determine when and how to launch formal FTAA negotiations.

The United States continues to provide intellectual and political leadership for FTAA. We are among the countries advocating the most ambitious objectives and time frame for negotiations. Finally, we are at the forefront of incorporating private sector perspectives into the process.

However, negotiating the FTAA will require authority from Congress. The Administration intends to seek fast track authority this year. While the exact scope and terms are to be worked out, the Administration has made clear that it will ask Congress to approve the same kind of authority that every other president has had since 1974. In the shorter term, the Administration also remains committed to expanding trade opportunities for the Caribbean Basin countries. The Administration has included financing for this purpose in its budget proposal and is in the final stages of developing legislation.

We believe that expanded free trade under the FTAA will be a boon for American businesses and consumers. When fully imple-

mented, it will create the largest free trade arrangement in history, encompassing an area with over 800 million people and overall GDP well in excess of \$9 trillion.

Latin American markets are among the fastest growing in the world, and U.S. exporters and service providers are some of the principal beneficiaries of this growth. U.S. exports to Latin America and the Caribbean exceeded \$100 billion last year. Today, we sell more to Central America than we do to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union combined. We export more to Brazil than we do to China, and we sell more to the 14 million people of Chile than we do to the 900 million people of India. By 2010 our exports to Latin America and the Caribbean are expected to exceed those to the European Union and Japan combined. We cannot afford to sit on the sidelines while other countries move ahead to take advantage of the growing market of Latin America and other regions of the world.

Democracy and Regional Stability

Of course, free trade cannot exist in a vacuum. Progress on the road to the FTAA must occur within a context of democracy and political stability.

For that reason, I am pleased to say that, recently, we have seen significant advances in consolidating peace and democracy in the region. With the signing of the peace accords in Guatemala, Central America is totally at peace for the first time since the 1970s. Democratic elections are now the norm, as witnessed by last Sunday's voting in El Salvador. There has likewise been important progress in the Caribbean. A reformist president has just been elected in the Dominican Republic. National elections in several other countries continued the region's steadfast adherence to democratic electoral procedures.

Nonetheless, challenges to democracy and stability persist. Strong leadership by MERCOSUR countries, the United States, and most importantly by the Paraguayan people, helped to narrowly avert a military coup attempt in that country.

The potential of corruption to place the democratic process at risk was fully revealed in recent events in Ecuador. Last month, a crisis of confidence and an outpouring of public anger led an elected congress to vote out of office an increasingly unpopular, but also legitimately elected president.

Those few brief days in February cannot and must not serve as a precedent for how to deal with problems of corruption in other countries. We can, however, be grateful that the Ecuadorian military did not attempt to interpret

the constitution and that civilian political leaders reached agreements that avoided bloodshed, established an interim agreement, and began the transition toward new elections in 1998.

While democracy is now commonplace in Latin America and the Caribbean, we should not be complacent and assume it always will be. If democratic institutions are weak, dysfunctional, or corrupt, the hard-earned gains of the last decade could be erased. Renewed conflicts between the nations of the region could also cause democracies to fail.

That is one reason why the U.S. is working to foster continued regional stability through increasing cooperation in the areas of defense and security. In November 1995, the Government of Chile hosted the first Organization of American States—OAS—Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures—CSBMs. This successful meeting produced the Santiago Declaration, which lays the foundation for our regional efforts to foster cooperation and mutual understanding in a threat-free environment.

Our commitment to democracy has also caused us to help improve regional institutions. Our efforts include promoting judicial reforms to enhance the fairness of the legal system; supporting non-governmental organizations and regional institutions which advocate for human rights; helping build the capacity to carry out free, fair, and transparent elections; and encouraging broader civic education efforts.

We also are working to enhance regional efforts to combat corruption. Corruption in politics, business, and law enforcement casts a pall over democracy and governance throughout the region. It is a corrosive element that dissolves trust between governments and citizens. Notably, under the auspices of the Organization of American States, 23 nations have now signed the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, which requires governments to criminalize the bribery of foreign officials. This new Convention is the first document of its kind in the world. It represents a significant step forward in efforts to ensure transparency in government, which is essential to a healthy democratic system.

The work of the OAS in putting this Convention together is symbolic of that organization's efforts to "reinvent" itself in order to meet the hemisphere's new priorities. With strong U.S. support and capable leadership from Secretary General Cesar Gaviria, the OAS has adopted a zero-growth budget for 1995-98, and has directed its expenditures to complement U.S. priorities in the hemisphere.

In addition to strengthening democracy and fighting corruption, we are equally concerned with efforts to reduce the grinding poverty that still holds a large portion of the region's population in its grip. Over the past three decades, the region has made major developmental gains. However, wide disparities in income persist. Although estimates vary widely, probably more than one-third of Latin America's people—more than 150 million people—live in dire poverty.

Progress in reducing poverty is therefore critical to sustaining political support for both democratic and market reforms—and to building a broad, modern base of consumers and workers for future growth. To really make a dent in this problem will require sustained growth rates of approximately 6% per year, almost double current figures. While this will be extremely difficult to achieve, it is in our national interest to have the kind of stable, prosperous hemisphere that can only be created through sustained support for efforts to alleviate poverty.

Combating Transnational Threats

Poverty and fragile democratic institutions make the region more vulnerable to a series of transnational ills. For example, the desperate need for economic growth in the region has taken a toll on the environment. Left unchanged, the misuse of the region's environment and natural resource base will reduce future economic growth; raise health costs; and result in an irreplaceable deforestation, land depletion, and loss of biodiversity.

Fortunately, awareness is growing throughout the region that environmental degradation, economic decline, and social and political instability are closely linked. Sound environmental and natural resource management is no longer perceived as a luxury, but as an integral aspect of growth.

Poverty and its consequences also have created pressures leading millions to migrate illegally to the United States in search of a better life. Although Mexico is by far the most important country of origin, illegal immigration from other nations in the region was also very significant. There are more illegal immigrants from Central America, the Caribbean, and South America than from the rest of the world combined. Improvements in governance, respect for human rights, and increased job opportunities at home will significantly reduce the flow of illegal immigrants to the United States.

Perhaps the most serious consequence of poverty and fragile democratic institutions is the threat posed by drug trafficking. The narcotics trade undermines democratic legitimacy and encourages corruption throughout the hemisphere. The tremendous threat that the drug trade poses to our vision of the future of the region cannot be overstated.

Fortunately, over the course of the last year, most regional governments have improved cooperation with the U.S. on narcotics issues. The year 1996 saw significant success against all phases of the international narcotics trade in Latin America and the Caribbean. Coca cultivation in Peru fell 18% as a result of effective law enforcement, aerial interdiction, and targeted alternative development. More than 7,000 hectares of coca were eradicated in an aggressive campaign in Bolivia. In the transit zone, trafficking routes were disrupted, forcing the traffickers to use less-efficient alternative routes. Other important achievements include the passage of money laundering and asset-forfeiture legislation—and the conclusion of agreements to facilitate maritime cooperation in several key countries.

However, despite this progress, cocaine remains in abundant supply, and more Latin American heroin is entering the U.S. Thus, we must continue to improve cooperation with the nations of the region.

Mexico

I realize that the President's decision to certify Mexico this year was a controversial call. But, let me be clear on this point: Full certification is the best means to achieve maximum success against the flow of drugs into our country.

We have worked to expand our counter-narcotics cooperation with Mexico over the past several years and continue to make progress. For the first time, we have secured Mexican agreement to extradite Mexican citizens and are steadily expanding the circumstances under which this is possible. Mexico has made far-reaching commitments on vetting of all counternarcotics officials in the wake of the arrest of Gen. Jesus Gutierrez, while new organized crime legislation gives Mexican authorities powerful new tools to use against traffickers and money launderers. We have obtained appropriate immunities for our law enforcement officers operating in Mexico and are working to ensure their self-defense requirements are met. We have smoother overflight and aircraft- and ship-refueling procedures in place now for our counter-

narcotics assets and have more improvements in prospect, thanks to a relationship we have developed for the first time with the Mexican military.

Clearly, there is strong political will at the senior levels in Mexico to meet the narcotics challenge. I pledge to you that we will work diligently with Mexico, as we will with all the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, to achieve the most effective strategies and programs to combat drug trafficking.

I think it is important that, as the certification decision is debated, we keep the importance of our overall relationship with Mexico in perspective. Our relations with Mexico are as important as those with any country in the world. We share a 1,900-mile border, and Mexico is our third- and soon to be second-largest trading partner. Our economic relations with Mexico have a direct impact on the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Americans.

Any effort to overturn the certification decision will have broad consequences for Mexico—and for us. President Zedillo is leading his country down a path of political reform toward more democracy and more honest elections. He has sustained a sensible macroeconomic course despite strong populist pressures to yield in the face of severe recession. He has pushed his bureaucracy toward a more open and pragmatic relationship with the United States on a variety of multilateral issues of interest to us and more frank and constructive exchanges on our toughest non-drug bilateral issues, such as migration. His stances have not always been popular in Mexico. To ignore this cooperation and to focus solely on the narcotics issues would undermine the policies President Zedillo has championed and play into the hands of those political forces in Mexico that want to drag the country backward, not forward.

Economically, the likely effect of any successful action to overturn the President's decision would be higher Mexican interest rates and lower growth prospects, as the financial markets reacted to our "distancing" from Mexico. It is difficult to quantify this effect, but there is little doubt about its negative character.

Haiti

I think it is important to mention two other countries where the U.S. has special interests and concerns. First, let me discuss our continuing efforts in Haiti. Haiti remains the poorest country in the hemisphere. Poor economic conditions combined in a volatile mix of

political repression and abuses caused a flood of migrants to our shores during the years of political instability and military rule.

However, since the U.S.-led multinational force stepped in to restore Haiti's democratically elected government in 1994, considerable progress has been achieved. Five free and fair elections have taken place since that time, and one popularly elected president peacefully succeeded another for the first time in Haiti's history. With international help, Haiti has also established its first civilian police force to replace the predatory security apparatus of the past. Created in 1995, the 6,000 member Haitian National Police—HNP—is an important guarantor of long-term stability and democratic development.

This progress has produced real benefits for the U.S. In 1994, before the restoration of democracy, the U.S. spent \$400 million dealing with nearly 25,000 interdicted Haitian migrants. In 1996, a mere 733 were interdicted, only 13 in the last six months of the year. The path to a better future or a return to the Haiti of old is now in the hands of the Haitian Government. It must act decisively to consolidate democratic gains, firmly establish the rule of law, and complete badly needed economic reform. However, it will continue to need our help and that of the rest of the international donor community. The Administration will work closely with Congress to continue to address Haiti's problems and help its people build a better future.

Cuba

In addition to advancing reform in Haiti, we face the challenge of continuing to push for change in Cuba, where we have essential and deeply rooted national interests. Our overarching goal is to promote a peaceful transition to democracy on the island.

The fundamental conviction underlying our policy toward Cuba is that the Castro government will not make changes unless it has to—and will endeavor to retain absolute control. For that reason, we have defended the U.S. comprehensive economic embargo on Cuba as the best means for depriving the Cuban Government of the resources it needs to carry out its repressive policies.

Still we believe that tough economic sanctions alone are not enough. Change in Cuba must come from within. Increasing the flow of information in Cuba is essential to fostering peaceful change as is outside support and advice to independent groups trying to carve out space for their activities. For this

reason, President Clinton initiated measures in October 1995 to permit groups in the U.S. to begin developing new kinds of contacts on the island. These steps complemented earlier efforts to encourage private humanitarian donations to NGOs in Cuba.

The Administration has also worked to ensure that controversy over the Libertad Act among our allies does not distract from building international support for change in Cuba. The President's approach to Title III, along with the tireless diplomatic efforts of Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, has created a sharper international focus on the need for a democratic transition in Cuba that is helping to isolate the Castro government even further.

Finally, our Cuban migration policy seeks to deter irregular migration from the island; to save lives that might otherwise be lost at sea; and to prevent the chaotic, uncontrolled arrival of undocumented migrants. Through the September 9, 1994 U.S.-Cuba Migration Agreement and the May 2, 1995 Joint Statement on Migration, we now have in place a system for "safe, legal, and orderly" migration, as an alternative to the dangerous raft voyages that have brought such suffering to families on both sides of the Florida Straits.

When looking to the future of Cuba, I think we need to be sober and realistic about the short run, and optimistic about the longer term. Fidel Castro and his associates operate a massive security apparatus and police state designed to eliminate any threat to their dominance. Over the longer run, however, there is reason to be more hopeful. The more Cubans become aware of what they are missing in the world outside, and of how successful they and their country could be, the harder it will be to contain their desire for real change.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Latin America and the Caribbean have undergone an important and positive transformation in the last decade. This transformation has brought almost the entire hemisphere into the community of free market democracies. This new reality has given us a unique opportunity to work together with our neighbors in the region to build a better, more prosperous future for all 800 million citizens of the hemisphere.

At the Summit of the Americas in Miami in December 1994, we put our nation on a course toward achieving that brighter future. The Miami vision of a hemisphere of free trade;

strong democratic institutions; and fewer problems with drugs, environmental degradation, and poverty is one that we stand by. It is a vision and commitment that the United States, along with the other 33 democratic countries of the Americas, will renew at the Santiago Summit in March 1998.

Although much has been accomplished in the past four years, there is a great deal more work left to do before we can achieve our goals. Disparities in income, inadequate health and education, fragile democracies, and the narcotics trade create conditions of tremendous cost

and risk to U.S. national interests. Funding levels for direct U.S. assistance in the region are sharply lower than a decade ago. Because of this, our ability to have a direct impact in the region is severely limited. I urge you to provide the necessary level of foreign assistance resources to achieve our goals in the region. I look forward to working with the members of the subcommittee in the coming months as we work with the countries of Latin American and the Caribbean to advance the interests of the American people. ■

Secretary Albright presented the first report on environmental diplomacy on Earth Day, April 22, 1997. Following are her remarks upon the release of Environmental Diplomacy: The Environment and U.S. Foreign Policy.

Today, I am pleased to present the State Department's first annual *Report on the Environment and Foreign Policy*. The report reflects the Department's decision, initially reached by Secretary Christopher, to integrate the environment and other global concerns into American foreign policy.

That decision was both a product of Secretary Christopher's vision and our collective experience. In recent years, in region after region, we have found that our diplomacy has been influenced by success or failure in managing the environment. This shouldn't surprise us. After all, competition for scarce resources is an ancient source of human conflict. In our day, it can still elevate tensions among countries or cause ruinous violence within them.

In addition, a lack of environmentally sound development can entrap whole nations within a cycle of deepening poverty, disease, and suffering. There is nothing more destabilizing to a region than to have as a neighbor a society so depleted in resources that its people have lost not only faith, but hope.

By definition, the global environment deeply affects our own people. Our families will be healthier if the rate of emission of greenhouse gases is slowed. Our families will be safer if we have cut back on toxic chemicals used in the cultivation and production of food. Our coastal economies will be stronger if our

bays and beaches are free of pollution and our oceans once again teem with fish. Our employment base will continue to expand if, through environmental good sense, other nations are able to create durable new markets for American services and goods. And our futures will be brighter if we are part of a world that is increasingly able to support life, rather than one that is losing that capacity day by day.

It is said that nine-tenths of wisdom is being wise in time. Current environmental and demographic trends are clear. We are headed for a world in which there will be far more of us, living closer together, consuming more, and demanding more. Inevitably, we will face a competition between the "using up" that results from human presence, and the ability to adapt that sometimes results from human genius.

As policymakers, our job is to contribute to this adaptation process. Our challenge is to forge an international diplomatic response that reflects strong consensus goals and that will lead to positive and measurable results. The report released by the Department today reflects our effort to highlight and describe key parts of that challenge and to identify our environmental priorities for the coming 12 months.


For example, at the December conference on climate change in Kyoto, Japan, we will be

Environmental Diplomacy Report

The entire text of *Environmental Diplomacy: The Environment and U.S. Policy*, along with related materials on environmental and other global issues, is available on the Department of State's Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN), at:

<http://www.state.gov/global/oes>

To obtain hard copies of the full report, contact the Government Printing Office at 202-512-1800. □



pressing for clear, common, and enforceable targets for greenhouse gas emissions—targets that encourage flexibility and innovation on the part of government and industry alike.

We seek an outcome in which the industrialized nations, which emit the largest amount of greenhouse gases today, will accept legally binding targets and in which developing nations, which will soon become the largest emitters, acknowledge their obligations for the future. We will also be moving ahead with plans to negotiate a global agreement to ban or minimize the release of 12 of the most hazardous persistent organic pollutants on Earth.

These are substances that may have been banned long ago for domestic use in the United States but which continue to show up in humans and more often in migratory populations of fish, birds, and marine mammals. These pollutants such as DDT and PCBs are the toxic equivalents of the Energizer Bunny: They keep on killing and poisoning for decades after they have entered our food supply.

In addition to these initiatives, the Department will proceed on a host of fronts and with a host of partners, both in and outside the government, to encourage global progress in maintaining biological diversity, managing forests, restoring valuable fish stocks, and increasing the production of sustainable energy.

We will also continue to work on a regional basis to contribute to the solution of particular problems, such as the health of the Aral Sea, access to water in the Middle East, reversing desertification in East Africa, and cleaning up toxic and waste sites in central Europe and the Baltics.

Finally, we will be placing a steadily increased priority on environmental and related global issues in many of our key bilateral relationships. As our Common Agenda with Japan has demonstrated, cooperation leads to results. We can accomplish a great deal for our own future and for the world by working with nations such as Russia, Ukraine, China, South Africa, and Mexico to identify environmental problems and coordinate strategies for dealing with them.

The report we release today is a reflection of a long-term commitment to incorporate environmental goals into American foreign policy. As Secretary of State, I am determined that this commitment be active, worldwide, and successful.

Now I am pleased to yield the floor to two of the reasons why I am so confident that we will succeed—Under Secretary of State Tim Wirth and Assistant Secretary Eileen Claussen.

Thank you all very much. ■

March 1997

MULTILATERAL

Defense

Amendment I to the memorandum of understanding among the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy concerning cooperation on project definition and validation of a medium extended air defense system, with annex. Signed at Huntsville, Dec. 16, 1996. Entered into force Dec. 16, 1996.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Agreement among the states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and other states participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces. Done at Brussels June 19, 1995. Entered into force Jan. 13, 1996.

Signature: Austria, Jan. 16, 1997; Luxembourg, Feb. 18, 1997.

Ratification: Uzbekistan, Jan. 30, 1997.

Additional protocol to the agreement among the states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other states participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces. Done at Brussels June 19, 1995. Entered into force June 1, 1996.¹

Signature: Luxembourg, Feb. 18, 1997.

Safety at Sea

Amendment to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended. Adopted at London May 16, 1995. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1997.

Scientific Cooperation

Agreement among the United States and Israel, Japan, Korea, and Oman establishing the Middle East Desalination Research Center. Signed at Muscat Dec. 22, 1996. Entered into force Dec. 22, 1996.

BILATERAL

Austria

Supplementary agreement amending the agreement of July 13, 1990, on social security. Signed at Vienna Oct. 5, 1995. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1997.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Sarajevo July 12, 1996. Entered into force Dec. 10, 1996.

China

Agreement extending the memorandum of understanding of Dec. 3, 1993, as extended, on effective cooperation and implementation of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/215 of Dec. 20, 1991. Effected by exchange of notes at Beijing Oct. 22 and Dec. 27, 1996. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1996.

Czech Republic

Acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, with annex. Signed at Prague Nov. 19, 1996. Entered into force Nov. 19, 1996.

Finland

Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Helsinki Mar. 1 and 12, 1996. Entered into force Apr. 11, 1996.

Germany

Memorandum of understanding for the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy Program. Signed at Washington and Bonn Dec. 16 and 20, 1996. Entered into force Dec. 20, 1996.

Hungary

Mutual logistic support agreement Hungary, with annex. Signed at Budapest Dec. 9, 1996. Entered into force Dec. 9, 1996.

Indonesia

Protocol amending the convention of July 11, 1988, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Jakarta July 24, 1996. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 104-32. Entered into force Dec. 23, 1996.

Japan

Agreement concerning a cash contribution by Japan for administrative and related expenses arising from implementation of the mutual defense agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Dec. 17, 1996. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1996.

Panama

Agreement relating to implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty regarding suspension of the prohibition on use of the Albrook Air Force Station airstrip by fixed-wing aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Dec. 27 and 29, 1996. Entered into force Dec. 29, 1996.

Peru

Agreement regarding the rescheduling and reorganization of certain debts owed to or guaranteed by the United States Government and its agencies. Signed at Lima Dec. 31, 1996. Entered into force Feb. 18, 1997.

Poland

Acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, with annexes. Signed at Warsaw Nov. 22, 1996. Entered into force Nov. 22, 1996.

Russia

Agreement extending the agreement of June 1, 1990, as amended and extended, regarding certain maritime matters. Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow Nov. 1 and Dec. 17, 1996. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1996.

Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in high performance scientific computing. Signed at Washington Feb. 7, 1997. Entered into force Feb. 7, 1997.

Memorandum of understanding on basic scientific research cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Washington Feb. 7, 1997. Entered into force Feb. 7, 1997.

Ukraine

Agreement extending the protocol of May 10, 1995 to the air transport agreement of 1990. Effected by exchange of notes at Kiev Dec. 19 and 23, 1996. Entered into force Dec. 23, 1996.

Venezuela

Agreement extending the agreement of Dec. 26, 1984, as amended and extended, to establish a Venezuela-United States Agriculture Commission. Effected by exchange of notes at Caracas Dec. 23, 1996 and Jan. 6, 1997. Entered into force Jan. 6, 1997.

April 1997

MULTILATERAL

Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959;

for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS 6997; 21 UST 2517.

Accession: Mauritania, Jan. 30, 1997.

Chemical Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, with annexes. Done at Paris Jan. 13, 1993. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-21. Enters into force Apr. 29, 1997¹.

Signature: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jan. 16, 1997.

Ratifications: Belgium, Jan. 27, 1997; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Feb. 25, 1997; Laos, Feb. 25, 1997.

Children

Convention on the rights of the child. Done at New York Nov. 20, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 2, 1990¹. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-21. *Ratification:* Switzerland, Feb. 24, 1997.

Convention on the protection of children and cooperation in respect of intercountry adoption. Done at The Hague May 29, 1993. Entered into force May 1, 1995¹.

Signature: Venezuela, Jan. 10, 1997.

Ratification: Canada, Dec. 19, 1996²; Venezuela, Jan. 10, 1997².

Accession: Andorra, Jan. 3, 1997².

Pollution

Adjustments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Adopted at Vienna Dec. 7, 1995. Entered into force Aug. 5, 1996.

BILATERAL

Armenia

Agreement on science and technology cooperation. Signed at Washington Feb. 28, 1997. Entered into force Feb. 28, 1997.

Belarus

Agreement extending the agreement of Oct. 22, 1992, as extended, concerning emergency response and the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Signed at Washington and Minsk Jan. 24 and 29, 1997. Entered into force Jan. 29, 1997.

Brazil

Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical cooperation in the earth sciences. Signed at Reston Jan. 17 and 31, 1997. Entered into force Jan. 31, 1997.

Canada

Agreement regarding allocation of intellectual property rights, interests, and royalties for intellectual property created or furnished under

certain scientific and technological cooperative research activities, with attachment. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa Feb. 4, 1997. Entered into force Feb. 4, 1997.

Memorandum of understanding on the Orbiter Space Vision System. Signed at Washington and St. Hubert Nov. 9, 1995 and Feb. 23, 1996. Entered into force Feb. 23, 1996.

Fiji

Agreement concerning cooperation in the Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) Program, with appendices. Signed at Suva Jan. 28, 1997. Entered into force Jan. 28, 1997.

France

Memorandum of understanding for cooperation in the Jason program. Signed at Washington and Paris Dec. 14 and Dec. 20, 1996. Entered into force Dec. 20, 1996.

Hungary

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Budapest Dec. 1, 1994. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 104-5. Entered into force Mar. 18, 1997.

Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, with attachments. Signed at Budapest Dec. 1, 1994. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 104-20. Entered into force Mar. 18, 1997.

Agreement concerning security measures for the protection of classified military information. Signed at Washington May 16, 1995. Entered into force June 4, 1996.

India

Agreement extending the agreement of Jan. 7, 1987, on educational, cultural, and scientific cooperation, with related letter. Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi Oct. 4 and Dec. 23, 1996. Entered into force Dec. 23, 1996; effective Jan. 7, 1997.

Japan

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 8, 1993, concerning the acquisition and production in Japan of the Multiple Launch Rocket Systems

and related equipment and materials. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Jan. 28, 1997. Entered into force Jan. 28, 1997.

Jordan

Agreement concerning the program of the Peace Corps in Jordan. Signed at Amman Oct. 28, 1996. Entered into force Oct. 28, 1996.

Malta

Agreement on reciprocal exemption from taxes on earnings derived from the operation of ships and aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Dec. 26, 1996 and Mar. 11, 1997. Entered into force Mar. 11, 1997.

Palau

Agreement concerning cooperation in the Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) Program, with appendices. Signed at Koror Jan. 30, 1997. Entered into force Jan. 30, 1997.

South Africa

Agreement concerning the establishment of the South African-United States commission for educational exchange. Signed at Cape Town Feb. 17, 1997. Entered into force Feb. 17, 1997.

Agreement concerning cooperation on defense trade controls. Signed at Pretoria Jan. 24, 1997. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1997.

Suriname

Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Paramaribo May 28, 1993. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1996.

Switzerland


Extradition treaty. Signed at Washington Nov. 14, 1990. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 104-9. Enters into force Sept. 11, 1997.

Ukraine

Agreement regarding certain maritime matters, with annex. Signed at Washington Jan. 23, 1997. Entered into force Jan. 23, 1997.

¹Not in force for the U.S.

²With declaration(s). ■



Earth Day 1997