

Secretary Albright

Finding the Path to Lasting Peace in Bosnia

May 22, 1997

Address at annual Fleet Week Gala, New York City.

Thank you, General Shali. I am deeply honored to receive the *Intrepid* Freedom Award. I am not sure what I have done that qualifies for the adjective “intrepid,” unless it was throwing out the first pitch of the baseball season, but I am very grateful just the same.

I want to join with our other speakers in welcoming the members of our five armed services who are here, in congratulating those who will be honored as “Military Personnel of the Year,” and in saluting our friends from Canada, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and Brazil.

I am also pleased to add my voice to those paying tribute to Zachary and Elizabeth Fisher for their work on behalf of America’s armed forces. Mr. and Mrs. Fisher, you are the greatest, and all of America is in your debt.

I know it is customary at this event to speak primarily about Fleet Week and about this marvelous piece of history—the *Intrepid*—which has been turned into a living museum. But I have asked for and have been granted permission to discuss not so much the history that has shaped us but the history we are now striving to shape, and to focus not so much on the past exploits of our armed forces but on a region—the Balkans—in which those forces are even now rendering extraordinary service.

Two weeks short of 50 years ago, another Secretary of State, this one truly “intrepid,” announced a plan for the reconstruction of postwar Europe, a plan that Winston Churchill called “the most unsordid act in history.”

The Marshall Plan was inspired by the vision of a peaceful, democratic, and united Europe. It was grounded in the lesson, seared in the minds of that generation, that American security and prosperity could not be assured if Europe were weak, unstable, or divided.

The descent of the Iron Curtain across the European stage prevented the full realization of Marshall’s vision. But the resolve demonstrated by the American commitment to lead united the

west, produced the greatest military alliance in history, and fired an economic recovery that halted communist inroads in Europe.

Today, we have the opportunity Secretary Marshall’s generation was denied—to build a Europe without walls, wholly at peace, and fully free. This vision is at the heart of the Founding Act of the new partnership between NATO and Russia that President Clinton will join in signing in Paris next Tuesday. It is embodied in our plan to invite a number of Central Europe’s new democracies to join NATO, which we will do in Madrid the first week of July. It is central to the Partnership for Peace. And it is reflected in our joint efforts to restore political stability in Albania, to encourage a permanent reduction of tensions in the Aegean, and to nurture democratic transitions from Skopje to Yerevan.

But if we are to succeed and make our vision a reality, we must also complete our mission and fully implement the Dayton Accords for peace in Bosnia.

Like the Marshall Plan, Dayton is a call to cooperative action—in this case, to bring together a nation and mend a region shattered by the worst violence in Europe since Hitler’s final days. And like the earlier initiative, it depends on the military and civilians working together, on support from other democracies, and on the willingness of those eligible for assistance to do all they can on their own behalf.

Dayton is also based, as was the Marshall Plan, on a clear-eyed view of U.S. interests. Fulfillment of these accords would produce a stable, undivided Bosnia that would cease to be a source of instability in southern Europe. We must never forget that there is no natural geographical or political endpoint to violence in this region. Fulfillment of Dayton would ease the nightmare that inter-ethnic fighting could again spread across southern Europe, affecting NATO allies, redividing the continent, and

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creating a crisis that America could not ignore and that U.S. forces could not contain without grave risk.

So the promise of Dayton is that when our forces depart Bosnia, they will be able to do so without the fear that renewed violence threatening U.S. interests might one day require them to return.

The fulfillment of Dayton would also serve America's interest in a unified Europe by making possible the full integration of Bosnia into European institutions, including the Partnership for Peace. It would contribute to regional prosperity in which our own economy has a stake and sustain momentum toward the democratic values that we cherish. It would make Americans safer by helping to prevent the area in and around Bosnia from serving as a base for transnational crime and by dampening the revival of the Balkan route for smuggling drugs. It would contribute to our security by creating a further bar to meddling by Iran. And it would serve our interest in the rule of law by establishing a precedent-setting model for resolving ethnic differ-

ences on the basis of justice and respect for human rights.

To suggest, as some have, that America has no stake in the future of Bosnia is to propose that America abdicate its leadership role in Europe. As Secretary of State—and I know I speak for President Clinton, Secretary Cohen, and General Shali—let me affirm: America will never abdicate that role. To do so would shake the faith of allies, betray our responsibilities, and ignore the lessons—learned at priceless cost in blood and treasure—of this century.

Let us not forget that Dayton is a post-Cold War watershed. Because of President Clinton's decision that America would act to negotiate and enforce peace, U.S. leadership was underlined within a reenergized NATO in a Europe that is coming together.

There is historic importance to this. Today, virtually all of Europe has joined forces to bring stability to a region that has in the past rent Europe asunder. In addition to NATO, each of the participating countries—from Russia to the Baltics to the Central European states to others around the world—will deserve credit for what IFOR and SFOR achieve. Each has gained valuable military experience working shoulder to shoulder with the alliance. And each will depart from the operation with a broader sense of what national interests entail.

Dayton has also put Bosnia on the road to recovery. Eighteen months ago, that nation was in splinters. Three armies were dug in along mine-filled lines of battle. Of the pre-war population, one in 10 had been wounded or killed. Of the survivors, five in 10 had been displaced from their homes, eight in 10 were relying on the UN for food, and nine in 10 were unemployed.

Since then, our initial security goals have been achieved. The fighting has ended, forces have been separated and reduced in size, and confidence-building measures have been implemented. All heavy weapons have been placed in cantonment. And the U.S.-led train-and-equip program is stabilizing the long-term security environment by marginalizing extremist influences, strengthening security relationships, and giving the Federation the means for self-defense.

In addition, SFOR and Special Forces trainers have cooperated through the Bosnia demining program to create a capacity for addressing this urgent and massive problem. Landmines are a terrible and unwanted legacy of war that will remain a challenge for Bosnians well into the next century, but we have at least given them a way to begin meeting that challenge.

All this has made possible the start of a transition in Bosnia from war zone to enterprise zone—especially within the Federation that joins the Bosniac and Bosnian-Croat communities.

Here, the rebuilding of damaged infrastructure is underway. Key roads, rail links, and bridges are being restored. Houses are being repaired. Places of worship are being rebuilt. Basic services such as water and power are being reestablished. The Sarajevo airport is open. More than \$100 million in business loans have been made. Unemployment has been cut in half. Wages are up. Economic growth last year was at 35%. And inflation is being contained. This reflects an extraordinary international effort with the U.S. Agency for International Development playing a lead role and involving contributions from four dozen countries and almost a dozen multilateral and private voluntary organizations.

Politically, the process of democratic integration has begun. Peaceful national elections have been held. Competing political parties have formed. And institutions in which all three communities are represented, including a joint presidency, council of ministers, and legislative assembly, have been formed.

Not surprisingly, given the situation 18 months ago, there remain important areas

where progress has been slow. With a few exceptions, Bosnia's leaders have not embraced true political and social integration.

As a result, freedom of movement within Bosnia has been constrained. The return of refugees and the displaced to areas in which they would be an ethnic minority has been resisted. Cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal has lagged badly. And the tripartite political institutions have barely begun to reach their potential.

Having taken stock of where we are, the question now arises of where we go from here. Some suggest that we abandon the unifying vision of Dayton and acquiesce in the division of Bosnia—like ancient Gaul—into three parts. Closer to home, we face critics who are so impatient with the intransigence of the parties that they are ready to declare the patient dead.

But Dayton prescribes long-term rehabilitation, not an instant cure. To abandon it now would be to rewind the tape of recent history and set the stage for renewed killing of predictable savagery and unpredictable scope and consequences. That is the path for the cynical and the weary, but it is a path that promises even greater dangers and costs than the admittedly difficult road to an enduring peace.

I am reminded of something that Senator Arthur Vandenberg said during Senate debate on the Marshall Plan 49 years ago. He said:

The greatest nation on earth either justifies or surrenders its leadership. We are entirely surrounded by calculated risks. I profoundly believe that the pending program is the best of those risks. I have no quarrel with those who disagree, because we are dealing with imperderables. But I [cannot] . . . say to those who disagree that they have escaped to safety by rejecting or subverting this plan. They have simply fled to other risks, and I fear far greater ones. For myself, I can only say that I prefer my choice of responsibilities.

Tonight, as Secretary of State, I can only say that compared to the risks of failing to lead, the Clinton Administration prefers the risks and responsibilities of leadership in Bosnia.

Today and in days to come, we will be rededicating ourselves to the goal of implementing the Dayton Accords and to a single Bosnian state with two multi-ethnic entities. We affirm that our commitment to Bosnia's future is long term and will continue well after SFOR departs.

As an initial symbol of that commitment, I am announcing today that the United States soon will be opening branch offices in Mostar and Banja Luka, giving us an expanded diplomatic presence throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Next week, in Portugal, I will be meeting with my counterparts to discuss steps we can take together to re-energize the Dayton process. Immediately thereafter, I will travel to Sarajevo, Brcko, Banja Luka, and other locations in the region with the message that President Clinton has approved a series of measures to encourage further and more rapid progress toward the core goals of Dayton. Those goals include:

1. Promoting a stable military situation to minimize prospects for renewed fighting;
2. Improving the ability of local law enforcement authorities to provide public security;
3. Advancing the development of democratic institutions that govern in accordance with the rule of law;
4. Securing the safe return of more refugees and displaced persons to their homes and enabling Bosnians to move freely throughout their country;
5. Bringing to justice more of the persons who have been indicted for war crimes and other atrocities; and
6. Enhancing economic reconstruction and inter-entity commerce.

Overall, our goal is a democratic and united Bosnia within a democratic and united Europe. To build that Bosnia, we will need the continued leadership and help of our allies in Europe and our friends from around the world. We will need to maintain our own cohesion and move ahead on diplomatic, security, and economic fronts simultaneously.

We will need the cooperation of all parties to Dayton, including the governments of Serbia and Croatia. Experience tells us that such cooperation will not come easy or without use of economic and political leverage. The currents of extremism that fueled the Balkans war remain strong both in Belgrade and Zagreb.

To these two governments, the message from the United States is clear: If you build real democracy, respect human and minority rights—those of Albanians in Kosovo as well as Serbs in Croatia—respect international law, and fulfill the obligations of Dayton, including the obligation to comply fully with the War Crimes Tribunal, you will be welcomed into Western economic and political institutions. But if you fail to cooperate with Dayton, you will remain outside the mainstream. No movement will be possible on outer-wall sanctions on Serbia. Zagreb will face increasing opposition to further integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Within Bosnia, we will move ahead with renewed energy to assist those who want our help in enabling their country to have the full attributes of a single national community.

For example, while SFOR will remain principally focused on enforcing the military aspects of the Dayton Accords, it will build on its accomplishments by actively supporting crucial civil implementation tasks, within its mandate and capabilities. These include helping to create a secure environment for managed refugee returns and the installation of elected officials in targeted areas and specific economic reconstruction projects which could include inter-entity telecommunications and restoring civil aviation.

Full implementation must be our goal in all sectors, and the parties cannot pick and choose those elements that they prefer at the expense of others. If they are not complying on key implementation tasks, it will not be business as usual for their politicians or their military leaders. For example, if the parties do not comply with arms control obligations, SFOR will have the option to restrict military movements and training.

Obviously, the international community cannot impose cooperation in Bosnia. We cannot make every city, village, and person embrace the concept of a unified Bosnia. But those who reject that concept will not receive our help. Nor will they see their vision of a separatist future fulfilled. There is no alternative to Dayton. Bosnians should either join the effort to make it work or get out of the way. The only aid we will provide or support for Bosnia is aid that helps build a unified country or that helps people who are helping Dayton succeed. The initiatives for moving forward on the core purposes of Dayton that I will discuss tonight were conceived with precisely this principle in mind.

For example, our new Open Cities Support Project provides assistance to communities—and only to communities—that have demonstrated a willingness to allow persons from ethnic minorities to return safely to their homes. To date, we have identified four municipalities in different parts of Bosnia to participate at a cost of \$3.6 million. We have an additional \$5 million available to help repair buildings, provide agricultural support and business credit, and to train workers in eligible communities.

In the future, we will explore options for providing additional aid to open cities ranging from direct economic help to projects aimed at the preservation of natural resources and the environment. SFOR is looking at how it can assist. And we will urge our allies and the international financial institutions to make a special effort to help. We want every city that chooses to be an “open city” to be a city with a future, a city with friends.

One city where it is especially critical that residents work for unity and peace is Brcko. Because of its strategic location and the terrible ethnic cleansing that occurred there, a peaceful, multi-ethnic Brcko would be a powerful symbol to the rest of Bosnia and a springboard toward success for the entire Dayton process.

Our goal in Brcko, as in Bosnia more generally, is to reconnect what has been disconnected, to restore the flow of transportation, communication, commerce, and social interaction among the various ethnic communities within the country.

Although there are those who resist this surgery, they offer no viable alternative to it. We believe that more and more Bosnians are coming to accept that restoring the natural circulation of things and people within their country will benefit all segments of the population and that this is the only—I repeat the only—means by which they may build a decent future for themselves and for their families.

A nation cannot be a democracy without free expression. And the absence of free expression has made it much harder for Bosnia to be a nation. The virus of intolerance thrives in an environment in which information is controlled and the party line is the only line most people ever hear. Since Dayton—despite Dayton—officially controlled media have spewed forth misinformation designed to fuel hate. Meanwhile, independent journalists have been brutalized and harassed.

This is unacceptable. To help reverse the tide, the U.S. will be expanding broadcasts of RFE and VOA programming in Bosnia through partnership agreements with local stations. And we will continue to support the emergence of independent television and radio facilities. Our goal, which I am announcing today, is to ensure that by the end of this year, every sizable community in every part of Bosnia has access to independent radio or television reporting.

I am also announcing today that the U.S. Information Agency plans to reopen the Fulbright program with Bosnia for the 1998-1999 academic year with an emphasis on journalism and the rule of law.

Finally, the United States will make it clear in every meeting with our partners in the peace implementation process and in every meeting with the parties themselves that the protection of free expression is essential and that the human, civil, and legal rights of all journalists should be protected.

Just as a free press is a necessary component of democracy, so is the rule of law. And establishment of the rule of law is vital to Bosnia's integration as a peaceful and productive society.

Building professional police and judicial institutions in Bosnia is different from attempting the same task in a nation such as Haiti. In Bosnia, the challenge is not so much a matter of education as it is a matter of attitude. For decades in this region, the purpose of the police was to control communities, not to serve them. Our goal, working with UN police monitors, has been to establish a new tradition based on democratic standards not only for police, but for lawyers, judges, and the entire legal system. We have made progress, but much remains to be done. To date, the United States has contributed the lion's share to police and judicial reform efforts. Now we are looking to our partners to contribute an additional \$80 million in equipment, training, and funds to build on this progress. We also are proceeding with plans to establish a police academy in the Federation.

Another important component of the rule of law pertains to war crimes. The International War Crimes Tribunal was created to reinforce the principle that ethnic cleansing, mass murder, mass rape, torture, and brutal and degrading treatment are not mere tactics of war; they are crimes—and, whether inflicted by the winners or losers of armed conflict, those who commit those crimes should be held accountable.

In practice, the Tribunal faces formidable obstacles. Unlike the court a half-century ago at Nuremberg, the accused are not surrendered prisoners. To gain access to the indicted, prosecutors depend on the help, in most cases, of the very entities in whose name the crimes were committed. The Clinton Administration understands that if peace is to endure in Bosnia, there must be justice. The ability of the Tribunal to gain access to additional indictees is vital to the success of Dayton. It would strengthen the rule of law, soften the bitterness of victims' families, and remove an obstacle to cooperation among parties to the Dayton Accords.

Accordingly, as I have said, we have made compliance by all parties with the obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal a prerequisite to our assistance, our support for assistance by others, and our backing for membership in international institutions.

Serbian President Milosevic should ensure that any person indicted by the Tribunal who resides in Serbia or who enters Serbian territory is arrested and turned over to the Tribunal. That principle, enshrined in Dayton, has been violated repeatedly in the past. Whenever and wherever possible, President Tudjman of Croatia should use the full influence of his government to see that indictees are made

available for trial. Authorities in the Federation should uphold the rule of law and turn over to the Tribunal the many indictees within their jurisdiction. The Federation cannot make the progress it needs to without enforcing the law.

Finally, the people of the Bosnian-Serb entity—the Republika Srpska—should understand that we seek the trial of notorious indictees such as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic not because they are Serbs or because we may disagree with them politically or because we may view the lessons of history differently. We want them to stand trial, as we want all indictees of whatever ethnic extraction to stand trial, because these men have been indicted for ordering the mass slaughter of unarmed and defenseless people. If Karadzic or Mladic cared about the future of Republika Srpska, they would stop hiding behind the skirts of its people and defend their actions in open court.

In summary, the Clinton Administration's purpose is to help renew the momentum of the peace process in Bosnia so that it becomes irreversible and so that each of the parties has a clearly understood stake in its success. Working with our partners, we will help create institutions that improve the security of all, permit more displaced persons and refugees to return home, enhance civil liberties, and allow the institutions of a single, multi-ethnic, and democratic state to take root.

In this effort, we will be opposed by some who point to the history of conflicts in the Balkans and say that all our efforts to implement Dayton will be in vain. Of course, we could accept this pessimistic analysis and be imprisoned by it. We could agree that Bosnian hatreds are too deep, the past cruelties too extreme, and the ethnic divisions too wide for any international effort at reconciliation to succeed.

We could shrug our shoulders and turn away from the many in the region who do believe in peace or who do not hate or who are so young and naive as to believe they are entitled to their childhood. We could say, mistakenly, that Bosnia's future is simply God's problem, not our own. But then, if we were the kind of people or the type of society that would embrace that attitude, we would never have acted—under President Clinton's leadership—to bring the war in Bosnia to an end.

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America was founded on the belief that the future could be made better than the past. Just as there was nothing inevitable about fascism or communism or apartheid, so, too, there is nothing inevitable about war in the Balkans. For much of their history, Muslims, Croats, and Serbs have lived side by side in peace. Together, they have raised families, built communities, operated businesses, and served in the armed forces. To suggest that war is inevitable is to deny the human role and relieve from guilt those responsible for initiating the fighting. The mere existence of strong ethnic feelings and identities is no cause for war and will not lead to war if those feelings are not ruthlessly exploited in the future as they have been, at times, in the past. So this is not the time, to use Lady Thatcher's phrase, for us to go "wobbly" on Bosnia.

There is great similarity between the values at the heart of Dayton now and the values defended from the deck of the *Intrepid* many

years ago. We cannot fulfill Dayton ourselves, for only the people of Bosnia—all the people of Bosnia—can do that. But we can understand from our own history the imperative of opposing intolerance, the danger of leaving conflicts in Europe unattended, the power of a democratic alliance working together, and the ability of American leadership—when inspired by a purpose that is right—to prove skeptics and tyrants wrong.

So let us proceed with that understanding in mind. Let us finish the mission of peace in Bosnia and, by so doing, bring closer the day when George Marshall's vision of a fully united and democratic Europe is at hand.

Thank you once again for the invitation to be here and for the wonderful honor of the Freedom Award. And thank you for all you are doing to keep alive the honor and tradition embodied by the world's greatest defenders of human freedom—the armed forces of the United States. ■

Secretary Albright

Sustaining Principled and Purposeful American Leadership

May 22, 1997

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC.*

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify this morning for the first time in my new capacity. I hope very much that we will be able to continue the frank relationship we enjoyed while I served as our Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Together, we have an important job to do, and I look forward to working with you not only this year but in the future.

I want to acknowledge at the outset that this subcommittee and members on it have been leaders in supporting an active and engaged U.S. foreign policy. We have not always agreed on all subjects, but the disagreements have almost always been on tactics, not on goals. We all agree that the United States is, and should remain, vigilant in protecting its interests; careful and reliable in its commitments; and a forceful advocate for freedom, human rights, open markets, and the rule of law.

I am heartened that the agreement on the budget resolution worked out by the Administration and congressional leaders treats international affairs as the priority it is. I know that Senator Lautenberg and others on this subcommittee were important actors in this process, and I want to thank you for your support.

Now the action moves to appropriations. Consistent with the budget resolution, I hope that this subcommittee and the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice and State Appropriations will receive allocations sufficient to fund both our regular international programs and to pay our arrearages to the United Nations and the multilateral development banks. I hope that my testimony this morning will help persuade any who may doubt that such an allocation would serve our nation and our people well.

Mr. Chairman, I am here today to ask your support and that of the subcommittee for the President's request for funds for the foreign operations programs of the United States. Put simply, the goal of those programs is to protect the interests of our citizens in an age when national borders are porous, markets are

global, and many of the threats to our safety and security cannot be dealt with by any one nation acting alone.

The President's request seeks to ensure that we will have the foreign policy tools we need to sustain principled and purposeful American leadership. It includes funds for programs that will help us to promote peace and maintain our security; to safeguard our people from the continuing threat posed by weapons of mass destruction; to build prosperity for Americans at home by opening new markets overseas; to promote democratic values and strengthen democratic institutions; to respond to the global threats of international terrorism, crime, drugs, and pollution; and to care for those who are in desperate need of humanitarian aid. Let me begin my discussion here this morning with our programs for maintaining the security and safety of our people.

Maintaining Security

The Cold War may be over, but the threat posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction has only been reduced, not ended. Our efforts to reduce the number and stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction contribute to what former Defense Secretary Perry called "preventive defense." We pursue these initiatives not as favors to others but because they are a national security bargain for the American people.

With strong U.S. leadership, and bipartisan support from the Congress, much has been accomplished. Achievements range from the removal of nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to recent approval by the Senate—with the help of many members of this subcommittee—of our participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention. But arms control and non-proliferation are works in progress, and we will need your help and that of the Congress, as a whole, to continue that progress.

The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea froze and established a roadmap for dismantling that country's dangerous nuclear weapons program. With our partners, we created the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization—KEDO—to implement key aspects of the agreement. Our earlier commitment helped jump-start KEDO and generated contributions from Japan and South Korea that will ultimately dwarf our own.

KEDO now has 10 members, and we will bring in at least three more this year to share the burden. I appreciate the support this subcommittee has shown in the past for our participation in KEDO, and ask your support for our proposed \$30 million contribution in Fiscal Year 1998. Those funds will leverage the support of others while contributing directly to the safety and security of the American people.

I also ask your support for our proposed \$36 million voluntary contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency—IAEA. These funds will help that agency to verify compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in more than 820 locations in 61 countries.

We are also continuing efforts to fulfill the President's call for negotiations leading to a worldwide ban on the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. Just last week, ACDA Director John Holum was in Geneva to urge the Conference on Disarmament to begin that negotiation in earnest. He also voiced U.S. support for the complementary process now underway in Ottawa. As Director Holum made clear: We don't underestimate the challenges at the Conference on Disarmament. However, that venue does provide the best opportunity to negotiate an APL ban that is truly comprehensive and effective. This issue remains a high foreign policy priority for the United States, and I will continue to consult closely with Senator Leahy, who has been an inspiring and determined leader on this issue, and other Members of Congress concerning it.

Finally, I join President Clinton in his call last Friday for early Senate approval of the pending protocol on landmines. By strengthening the restrictions on landmine use, this protocol will help prevent many casualties and is, in the President's words, "an essential step toward a total ban."

Mr. Chairman, international narcotics trafficking also endangers Americans. The President and law enforcement agencies and educators at all levels are committed to doing the job at home. But we cannot hope to safeguard our citizens unless we also fight this menace abroad, where illicit drugs are produced and ill-gotten gains are hidden away.

Under the President's leadership, we have moved aggressively—and with results. This past year, our support for eradication and interdiction helped knock coca production in Peru to its lowest level in a decade. Cooperation with Paraguay has improved. New law enforcement cooperation agreements with Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia have been signed. And by economically targeting individuals and front companies, we have done much to disrupt the business and decrease the profits of the notorious Cali cartel.

In Mexico, drug seizures and arrests are up. New laws have been enacted to fight money-laundering. Mexico has set a precedent by extraditing its own nationals to the United States to be prosecuted for drug-related crimes. And amidst all the publicity and real problems related to corruption, it is worth remembering that 200 Mexican law enforcement personnel were killed last year in the battle against drug trafficking.

During the meeting of the U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission earlier this month, Presidents Zedillo and Clinton reaffirmed the commitment of our two nations to work together as allies to reduce demand, intercept shipments, arrest traffickers, confiscate profits, and professionalize every aspect of law enforcement response. We will be working hard, in close cooperation with representatives from the White House and other agencies, to translate this commitment into further progress in the war against drugs.

We are asking this subcommittee to support our efforts in Latin America and around the world by approving our request for \$230 million to combat international narcotics and crime. In addition to other anti-crime initiatives, these funds support our source country narcotics eradication and alternative development programs, provide material and logistical support for police and military in strategic areas, and finance our comprehensive heroin control strategy.

America is the world's leader in the fight against international terror, which continues to claim victims despite steady improvements in multinational law enforcement and information-sharing. We are persisting—and making some headway—in encouraging our allies to refrain from business as usual with Iran until that nation ends its support for terrorism. And we remain steadfast in our support for United Nations sanctions against Libya and Iraq.

To supplement our diplomatic initiatives, we have requested \$19 million for our anti-terrorism programs. These funds will be used primarily to enhance the skills of police and

security officials in selected countries so that they may be more effective partners in preventing and punishing terrorist acts.

Promoting Peace

When we support arms control and anti-terrorism efforts in other countries and regions, we advance the long-term interests and safety of Americans. The same is true when we help end conflicts and reduce tensions in regions important to the interests of the United States. Today, I will cite three cases involving past, present, or potential conflicts where our budgetary resources are affected, our interests are engaged, and our participation or leadership is required.

In the Middle East, we face an extremely difficult and complex situation in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Since 1993, the parties have made enormous gains in transforming the political landscape of their historically troubled region and laying the foundation for an enduring peace.

In recent months, however, those gains have been threatened, and the people of the region have once again become the victims of confrontation and acts of violence. The reason is that Arabs and Israelis alike are doubting their faith in the peace process and in one another.

We have, in the past, experienced setbacks to peace in the Middle East, but we have persevered. Despite present problems, we will continue to look for a way forward. That way begins with restoration of the confidence, trust, and sense of shared interests upon which the peace process rests. All parties must recognize and fully accept that there is no room for terrorism or violence as a tool of negotiation. There can be no rationalizations or room for debate on that central point.

Looking ahead, Israelis must see that terror and threats of violence will not be used against them as a means of leveraging their position in negotiations. Palestinians must see that Israelis are not taking unilateral actions which foreclose options on issues that are reserved for permanent negotiations. And both must assume responsibility for reversing the deterioration in the negotiating environment. In that regard, we have encouraged friends of peace in the Arab world not to take actions which could make progress toward peace more difficult.

Arab-Israeli peace remains a high priority for the Administration and for the United States. We have an enormous stake in the future of the region, and we remain in almost continual contact with representatives of all sides. To support our diplomacy, we must maintain appropriate bilateral assistance to Israel,

Jordan, and Egypt, while contributing to economic growth and the creation of democratic institutions within the Palestinian Authority.

It is also essential to American interests and to the future stability of Europe that we finish the job and fully implement the Dayton Agreement for peace in Bosnia. Fulfillment of these accords would produce a stable, undivided Bosnia that would cease to be a source of instability in southern Europe. It would also make possible over time the full integration of the Balkans into European institutions, contribute to regional prosperity, bolster democracy, prevent the area from becoming a base for transnational crime, create a further bar to meddling by Iran, and create a precedent-setting model for resolving ethnic differences on the basis of justice and respect for human rights.

Since Dayton was signed, our initial security goals have been achieved, and economic reconstruction has begun. Unfortunately, there remain important areas where progress has been slow due to the failure of Bosnian leaders, especially in Bosnian Serb entity—the Republika Srpska—to embrace political and social integration.

Today, and in days to come, we will be rededicating ourselves to the goal of full implementation of the Dayton accords and to a single Bosnian state with two multi-ethnic entities. Next week, I will be visiting Sarajevo, Brcko, Banja Luka, and other locations in the region. I will also be making a more detailed statement in New York tonight regarding the Administration's policy toward Bosnia.

The heart of our message is that the international community, including both civilian and military components, must re-energize its commitment to implement Dayton. For example, while SFOR will remain principally focused on enforcing the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement, it will build on its past accomplishments by actively supporting crucial civil implementation tasks within its mandate and capabilities. These include helping to create a secure environment for managed refugee returns and the installation of elected officials in targeted areas and specific economic reconstruction projects which could include inter-entity telecommunications and restoring civil aviation.

“When we support arms control and anti-terrorism efforts in other countries and regions, we advance the long-term interests and safety of Americans.”

Full implementation must be our goal in all sectors, and the parties cannot pick and choose those elements they prefer at the expense of others. If they are not complying on key implementation tasks, it will not be business as usual for their politicians or their military leaders. For example, if the parties do not comply with their arms control obligations, SFOR has the option to restrict military movements and training.

On the civilian side, as well, we will move ahead with fresh energy to help those in Bosnia striving to build a true national community. For example, our Open Cities Support Project provides assistance to communities, and only to communities, that have demonstrated a willingness to allow persons from ethnic minorities to return safely to their homes. To date, we have identified four municipalities in different parts of Bosnia to participate at a cost of \$3.6 million. We have an additional \$5 million available to help repair buildings, provide agricultural support and business credit, and to train workers in eligible communities.

One city where it is especially critical that residents work for unity and peace is Brcko. Because of its strategic location and the terrible ethnic cleansing that occurred there, a peaceful, multi-ethnic Brcko would be a powerful symbol to the rest of Bosnia. Our goal in Brcko, as in Bosnia more generally, is to reconnect what has been disconnected; to restore the flow of transportation, communication, commerce, and social interaction among the various ethnic communities.

There are those who resist this process, and there are many in Bosnia and elsewhere who are skeptical that it will succeed. These are the same people who said that the war could not be ended; that Dayton could not be negotiated; and that the United States and Europe, including Russia, could never come together on behalf of a Balkans peace.

The Administration does not underestimate the obstacles, but neither do we underestimate the stakes. We are determined to press ahead with our partners both in and outside Bosnia to support the work of the International War Crimes Tribunal in every way we can—and to help create institutions that improve security; permit more displaced persons and refugees to return home; enhance civil liberties; and allow the institutions of a unitary, multi-ethnic, and democratic state to take root. In this effort, we pledge regular consultations with this subcommittee and with others in Congress and seek your support.

Mr. Chairman, of the many outbreaks of violence around the world in recent years, the interrelated conflicts in Central Africa have been the most deadly. Today, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire, our goal is to encourage a peaceful and stable transition to a new era based on democratic representation and popular responsibility. We note that the victorious alliance leader, Laurent Kabila, has said he intends to form an interim government that includes representatives from various components of Congolese society.

We welcome that intention and have expressed our willingness to work with others to provide appropriate help to a transitional government that demonstrates a commitment to broad-based political participation, democratic practices, and human rights. We have made it clear that what we would like to see is a transitional government that, in addition to being broadly representative, is also transparent in its activities, so that the Congolese people know that the days of secret looting and secret terror will not return.

We also want to see a government that respects the rights of its people, assures due process to those charged with crimes, and cooperates fully with the international community in caring for refugees and investigating reports of atrocities. Finally, we will look to the new authorities to adopt democratic practices and build democratic institutions, to work actively to prevent Congo's fragmentation, and to foster stable and peaceful relations with its neighbors.

The Congo is a nation rich in both human and natural resources. In the weeks ahead, we will work with officials in that country and elsewhere to improve prospects for a democratic, prosperous, and peaceful future. We will also consult closely with the Congress concerning the evolution of our policy.

The United States supports international peacekeeping activities that serve our interests through payment of our assessments to United Nations peacekeeping operations and through our voluntary peacekeeping account, for which we are seeking \$90 million in FY 1998. Operations expected to be funded by this account include, among others, peacekeeping and observer activities in the Great Lakes region of Africa, the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group, and peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy missions of the OSCE.

As we work with others to resolve problems such as civil conflict and proliferation, we need strong partnerships with other leading nations. These are the bonds that hold together not only our foreign policy, but the entire international system.

By acting together, we are able to elevate standards of international behavior, spur economic and social progress, and strengthen the rule of law. We also leverage resources far beyond our own.

Today, for example, many of the same countries that are working to implement peace in Bosnia are also striving to build lasting stability through NATO's Partnership for Peace. This year, we have requested \$70 million in military assistance for Partner countries. We are also requesting \$20 million for Central European Defense Loans—CEDL—to help recipient countries build defensively oriented, civilian-controlled militaries with strong ties to the United States.

While preserving NATO's traditional purposes and strengths, we are also adapting it to meet new missions and take in new members. At the July summit in Madrid, NATO will invite a number of central European states to begin negotiations to join the alliance. As President Clinton has repeatedly made clear, this is part of a larger strategy, developed with our allies, to build a future for Europe in which every democracy is our partner and every partner is a builder of peace. Also contributing to this goal is the historic "Founding Act" between NATO and Russia that was reached last week and that establishes the basis for long-term cooperation on security matters. In addition, a new Euro-Atlantic Council will provide the framework for consultations involving NATO and Europe's other democratic states.

In this context, Mr. Chairman, I might add that I appreciate the counsel I have received from members of the Senate's NATO Observer Group and from other Senators with an interest in the evolution of Europe's economic and security institutions. This is a process of enormous importance and can only benefit from vigorous and wide-ranging examination of the issues.

Meanwhile, the economic, political, and military evolution of nations in Asia will also have a profound effect on American security and foreign policy. Today, we are working with allies and friends to build an Asia-Pacific community based on shared interests and a common commitment to peace.

Over the last few years, we have reinvigorated our Asian alliances while maintaining our forward deployment of 100,000 American troops in the western Pacific. We are encouraging new efforts to build security and resolve disputes peacefully through bodies such as the ASEAN Regional Forum.

Our core alliances in Asia are as strong, and our cooperation as broad, as they have ever been. Our relationship with our closest Asian ally, Japan, is underpinned by our shared commitment to open and democratic societies. We consult regularly on issues from peace in Asia to development in Africa. We appreciate Japan's generous financial support for the Middle East peace process and for our Common Agenda of environmental initiatives around the world.

We are working closely with the Republic of Korea, another key ally, to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula and to explore possibilities for permanent reconciliation. Our cooperation is growing in numerous other areas as well, as Seoul, anchor of the world's 11th-largest economy, takes on a larger regional and global role.

We are also deeply engaged in managing our complex relationship with China as it emerges as a key Asian and global power. The evolution of our relations with China will depend primarily on how China defines its own national interests during the remainder of this century and into the next. Through our strategic dialogue, we are encouraging the Chinese to accept what we believe is true: that China will be able to find greater security, prosperity, and well-being inside a rule-based international system than outside. Accordingly, the President has decided to renew China's most-favored-nation trading status, equivalent to normal trading relations, for the coming year.

Currently, China is constructively engaged with the international community in some areas; in some, it is not. We have been able to work together well with respect to the North Korea nuclear issue and banning nuclear tests. We have also made progress on a range of specific commercial concerns and laid the basis for cooperation on responding to global threats of terrorism, crime, drugs, and pollution.

We do, however, still have important differences with China, especially on trade, arms-related transfers, and human rights, including Tibet. We do not hesitate to raise these differences privately with China's leaders or to express our beliefs publicly concerning the need for all countries to respect international standards. We will continue to voice strong concern about the need for China to meet its commitments concerning Hong Kong, a message that I will deliver, in person, at the time of the former colony's reversion to Chinese authority on July 1. And, while we will adhere to our "one China" policy, we will also maintain robust unofficial ties with Taiwan.

Promoting Democracy

Mr. Chairman, America's global leadership is derived not only from our economic and military power, but from the power of our ideals. And fundamental to American ideals is our commitment to democracy.

Today, in Burma, as the Chairman has often and eloquently reminded us, a legitimate democratic movement with demonstrated popular support has been brutally repressed. That movement has urged the international community to limit foreign investment. What is more, Burma's government protects and profits from the world's largest heroin trafficking enterprise.

Last month, in response to deepening repression in Burma, President Clinton decided to impose investment sanctions under a law approved last year by Congress. In combination with the earlier actions we and other nations have taken, together with shareholder and consumer pressure, we believe this step will deal a further blow to investor confidence in Burma. It has sent a message to the military regime that it will not attract the capital investment it needs unless it begins a genuine dialogue with its own people.

We also bolster democracy through our economic support and development assistance programs in selected countries around the world. For example, we are requesting \$202 million in economic support funds for democratic development in countries such as Haiti, Angola, and Cambodia and for regional programs that promote respect for civil liberties and the rule of law.

We are also continuing major programs for strengthening democratic transitions in central Europe through the Support for East Europe Democracy—SEED—program and in the New Independent States—NIS.

The transition from communism to democracy is the product of central European courage, energy, and vision. But the United States may be proud of the role the SEED program continues to play in assisting the process of economic and political reform. What was once said about the Marshall Plan may fairly be said about this program: It has served as "the lubricant in an engine—not the fuel—allowing a machine to run that would otherwise buckle and bind."

Through SEED, for which we are requesting \$492 million this year, we have been able to serve as technical adviser on the ways and means of building democratic institutions and processes, developing financial sectors that attract investment, and coping with energy and environmental problems.

Clearly, progress has not been even either over time or among countries in the region. But the overall direction has been steady in the direction of less centralization, increased reliance on private enterprise, more civil liberties, and greater development of the rule of law.

Central and eastern Europe remain as important to American interests today as when the original SEED act was passed. The nations here are proving that democracy and economic prosperity can be built on the ruins of failed communist systems—a valuable example for countries further to the east. Central Europe is a growing market for U.S. goods and services, and a gateway to the vast potential markets in Russia and Ukraine. Finally, a peaceful, democratic central Europe gives the U.S. and the Atlantic alliance greater assurance of security at a relatively low cost.

A democratic Russia is also an essential partner in our efforts to build a secure Europe. Russia's transition has been arduous and uncertain. More difficult times lie ahead. But open markets and democratic institutions have taken hold. If Russia is to become a full and productive partner in a Europe at peace, that progress must continue.

The United States has a profound interest in encouraging Russia to continue its democratic and economic reforms, to respect fully the sovereignty of its neighbors, and to join us in addressing critical regional and global issues. In Helsinki, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin issued a joint statement outlining their commitment to stimulating growth and investment in Russia, advancing Russia's integration into international organizations, and citing President Yeltsin's plan to launch Russia on its next phase of reform.

In recognition of the progress that has been made, and of the magnitude of our stake in the strengthening of market democracies in the region, we have this year revamped our assistance program to Russia and the other NIS. Of the \$900 million we have requested, \$528 million will fund a new Partnership for Freedom. This initiative will concentrate on activities to promote business, trade, and investment, and those that would more fully establish the rule of law. It will support opportunities for U.S. business and help support partnerships with private U.S. organizations. And it will increase professional and academic exchanges.

In the aftermath of the Soviet Union's disintegration, the NIS had to build their government institutions from the ground up. In most cases, media and basic market institutions, such as banks, capital markets, and regulatory institutions, remain at early stages of development.

In several countries, economic reform has advanced faster than democratic reform. We are concerned, for example, by the undermining of parliamentary independence in Belarus, by continued repression in Turkmenistan, and by the disputed nature of elections held last fall in Armenia. We are concerned, as well, that in some sectors of the NIS, weak institutions of government have led to a vacuum of effective authority that has opened the way to a rapid increase in criminal activity. This is hampering fledgling democratic institutions, creating social instability, and discouraging foreign investment.

We have responded by substantially increasing the proportion of our assistance that is designed to strengthen law enforcement and judicial institutions and promote the rule of law. Since 1995, for example, we have provided law enforcement training to nearly 10,000 officials in central Europe and the NIS. We have developed regional criminal justice training programs for more than 1,000 law enforcement officers and prosecutors at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest. And we have greatly increased our formal cooperation with central European and NIS governments through agreements that allow us to share information and coordinate investigatory, prosecutorial, and crime-preventive activities.

Throughout this region and, indeed, the world, the United States represents the potential of democracy. Wherever we are visibly involved and engaged, we give hope to people who believe in freedom and who want democratic institutions to succeed. By building partnerships with other freedom-loving peoples, we sustain the growth of open markets and democracy that has enhanced our own security and prosperity, and which has been the signature element of our age. If, however, we were to abandon or walk away from our partners in these countries, we would heighten the possibility that their societies would retreat into repression or dissolve into the disorder within which terrorists and criminals thrive.

Certainly, assistance to the strategically located and energy-rich democracies of Central Asia and the Caucasus is strongly in our national interest. The purpose of our aid is to help small businesses gain a greater foothold and to assist nascent democratic organizations, such as the independent media, public interest groups, and educational institutions establish active, effective roles. In this connection, I note that the Administration continues strongly to oppose section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which undermines U.S. influence and policy flexibility in the Caucasus region and Azerbaijan.

The Administration continues to support assistance for Ukraine as part of our long-term strategic partnership with that country. Last week's first, full meeting of the U.S.-Ukraine Binational Commission underscored the value we place on a stable, democratic Ukraine that is working cooperatively with us on a range of issues. During those meetings, we were able to express our support for the process of economic and political reform, while also expressing concern about the problem of corruption that has been chilling outside investment in Ukraine.

Promoting Prosperity

Mr. Chairman, peace and security are paramount goals of our international programs, but promoting economic prosperity is another top priority. The Clinton Administration has had extraordinary success in helping our economy grow at home by opening markets abroad. Our exports have grown by 34% since 1993, generating 1.6 million new jobs. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement entered into force three years ago, U.S. exports to Mexico have risen by more than one-third, and overall trade has more than doubled. We have laid the groundwork for free and open trade in our hemisphere by 2005 and in the Asia-Pacific region by 2020. And we have put our full weight behind better enforcement of intellectual property standards, and fuller consideration of core labor rights, at the World Trade Organization.

Looking ahead, we all know that competition for the world's markets is fierce. Often, our firms go head-to-head with foreign competitors who receive active help from their own governments. Our goal is to see that American companies, workers, and farmers have a level playing field on which to compete.

As long as I am Secretary of State, our diplomacy will strive for a global economic system that is increasingly open and fair. Our embassies will provide all appropriate help to American firms. Our negotiators will seek trade agreements that help create new American jobs. And I will personally make the point to other governments that if their countries want to sell in our backyard, they had better allow America to do business in theirs.

Fortunately, our diplomats are doing their jobs. One of the pleasures of my own job is hearing about compliments from American corporations like this one: After executing a contract to build a power generating plant in Yemen, officials from CAE Development of

Lexington, Kentucky wrote that "Every Department of State employee contacted was top notch and eager to help. . . We could not have obtained this contract without their help."

But our diplomats and our businesspeople need your commitment as well and your support for our requests for the Export-Import Bank and the Trade and Development Agency. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation, I am pleased to say, is now self-sustaining. Its commitments have grown by a factor of five over the last five years, and it has shown profits repeatedly, reaching \$209 million in 1996.

Promoting Sustainable Development

Mr. Chairman, many of America's fastest-growing markets are in developing countries, where the transition to an open economic system is underway, but incomplete. Often, these countries are held back by high rates of population growth, lack of access to health care and education, a scarcity of natural resources, or conflict.

When democratic institutions in a developing country are weak, that country will be less likely to grow peacefully, less inclined to confront international terrorists and criminals, and less able to do its part to protect the environment. That is why our sustainable development programs are a sound investment in American security and well-being.

This year, we have given them a new focus on one of the most basic problems that stifles development and sparks conflict—food security. Programs to improve the dependability of crops and distribution of food in Africa can help make sure hunger is no longer a constant threat to the lives of people and the stability of societies.

Our financial support and pressure for reform have helped the United Nations Development Program to become the central coordinating and funding mechanism for UN development assistance. Every dollar we contribute leverages \$8-\$10 from other nations in support of Bosnian reconstruction, Rwandan judicial reform, and Cambodian demining—to name just a few projects. I urge this subcommittee to support the President's full request of \$100 million for UNDP.

We have maintained our request for funding for UNICEF at \$100 million for FY 1998. Like UNDP, UNICEF plays an important role in countries suffering from, or recovering from, the devastation caused by civil or international conflict. UNICEF helps protect children—a society's most vulnerable members and its hope for the future—from the Balkans to Liberia.

We have requested \$795 million for population and health programs. By stabilizing population growth rates, developing nations can devote more of their scarce resources to meet the basic needs of their citizens. Moreover, our voluntary family planning programs serve our broader interests by advancing the status of women, reducing the flow of refugees, protecting the environment, and promoting economic growth.

We are developing forward-looking programs to protect the global environment and promote sound management of natural resources with our request of \$341.5 million. Of this amount, USAID programs totaling \$290 million are used for projects such as helping to reclaim land for agriculture in Mali, cut greenhouse gas emissions in the Philippines, and acquire American "green technology" in Nepal.

Our \$100 million request for the Global Environment Fund—GEF—provides loans for developing country projects to preserve biodiversity, inhibit global warming, protect oceans, and mitigate depletion of the ozone layer. A key U.S. priority in the GEF is to increase support for private sector efforts on behalf of sustainable development, including new tools such as project guarantees and equity investments in promising environmental technology firms.

As Treasury Secretary Rubin testified earlier this week, we have also requested an increase to restore full funding and begin to pay our debts to the multilateral development banks and the IDA, where our support for reform has achieved results. For example, the World Bank has increased accountability and transparency while cutting its administrative budget by 10%, and the African Development Bank has tightened lending rules, cut staff by 20%, and appointed external auditors. The budget resolution provides you with the flexibility to respond favorably to our request, and we hope you will take advantage of the opportunity to maintain U.S. leadership in these institutions.

Providing Humanitarian Assistance

The President's request of \$650 million for Migration and Refugee Assistance would enable the United States to continue contributing to the relief of those victimized by human or natural disaster. We have also requested that our international disaster assistance and Office of Transition Initiatives programs be funded at the same levels as last year.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, I know that supporting foreign assistance is not the easiest vote for a Member of Congress to make. Americans, all of us, are deeply concerned about problems here at home—about the budget, about the quality of our schools, about crime. No one understands better than the President that we cannot hope to lead abroad unless we are first strong at home. That is precisely why he has placed his primary emphasis on building a strong and growing domestic economy.

But the Administration also knows that neither our history, nor our character, nor our self-interest will allow us to withdraw from the center stage of global political and economic life. In today's world, domestic policy and foreign policy are no longer separable things.

There is, after all, no more immediate or local an issue than whether our sons and daughters will someday be called upon to do battle in big wars because we failed to prevent or contain small ones. There are few more significant economic issues than whether we will find ourselves forced into a new arms race because of setbacks in the former Soviet Union or because nuclear weapons have fallen into the

wrong hands. There are few goals more important to our workers than opening new markets for American goods overseas. There are few matters more urgent for our communities than reducing the flow of drugs across our borders. And there are few questions more vital for our children than whether we will bequeath to them a world that is relatively stable and respectful of the law or one that is brutal, anarchic, or violent.

A half-century ago a great American generation, led by President Truman and supported by Members of Congress from both parties, rose above the weariness of war's aftermath and the temptation of isolation to secure the future. Working with our allies, they made the investments and built the institutions that would keep the peace, defend freedom, and create economic progress through five decades.

Members of the subcommittee: It is up to us in our time to do what they did in their time—to support an active role for America on the world stage, to protect American interests, to keep American commitments, and to help where we can those from around the world who share our values. In that effort, I pledge my own best efforts as Secretary of State, and I earnestly solicit your support.

Thank you very much. ■

Secretary Albright

Speaking to Russian Opinion Leaders About NATO Enlargement

May 2, 1997

Opening statement before the Carnegie Roundtable Discussion, Carnegie Center, Moscow, Russia.

I am delighted to speak with such a distinguished group, and I want to thank you each for giving me this opportunity today. As a student of Russian history and society, I appreciate the important role of Russian thinkers and intellectuals. To a large degree, you shape the way Russians view the West. I occasionally look at the Russian press myself and have seen what some of you have written, as well as what has been written about me. I am glad to say that I've been called worse things in the American press than my Russian nickname "*Gaspozha Stal*."

As the Cold War was ending, Georgi Arbatov commented that "we will do a terrible thing to you; we will deprive you of an enemy." He was wrong on one point. It was not a terrible thing. I am delighted that we have rejected any return to the confrontation of the past.

Ever since the Russian tricolor was raised over the Kremlin, our relationship has been strong and getting stronger. Vast numbers of Russians and Americans are being united by the forces of trade and commerce. We continue to reduce and dismantle Cold War arsenals. We have already banned nuclear testing forever. We will be partners at the Summit of the Eight in Denver. In Bosnia, our soldiers are partners in the truest sense of the word, sharing the same risks and the same achievements.

An important part of my message to the American public and Congress is the need for new thinking about Russia, because we are dealing with a fundamentally new Russia. One reason I am here today is to say we need new thinking on all sides, including in Russia, as you think about the United States, Europe, and the new NATO that is evolving. I know that many Russians are troubled by NATO's decision to add new members. I want to speak with you frankly about this issue today, so that you will understand exactly what our motives are and what they are not.

First, I want you to understand that a new and enlarged NATO will not pose an enlarged threat to Russia. On the contrary, Since 1991, NATO members' defense budgets have decreased by 30%. NATO's land forces are down by 25%. U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe have been cut by 90%, and no NATO nuclear forces are on alert today. The building at NATO headquarters where we once planned our response to a Soviet attack on Berlin now houses a Russian general and staff helping to plan our effort in Bosnia.

In the foreseeable security environment NATO has no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of any new state. Our CFE proposals will ensure that each state maintains only those military capabilities needed for its legitimate individual or collective security needs. So no NATO member—old or new—can become a staging ground for potential attack against Russia. That is not just matter of political intention; it is a matter of military capability.

Second, you should recognize that we view NATO enlargement as part of a broader effort to build a peaceful, undivided Europe, in which Russia plays an important role. It is our firm conviction that this effort is not a zero-sum game in which Russia must lose if central Europe gains, and central Europe must lose if Russia gains. Most of all, it is why we want to develop a NATO-Russia Charter—one that embodies our solemn, enduring commitment at the highest political level, to undertake a fundamentally different relationship with Russia.

Our proposals would establish a permanent NATO-Russia Joint Council, which will give Russia a voice in key decisions that affect its security interests in Europe. We would be able to act together to fight proliferation, to keep nuclear arsenals safe, and to respond to humanitarian crises. NATO and Russian officers would work side by side as equals, planning joint military operations from the moment they are approved.

If Russia feels it has reason to fear that NATO is adopting a threatening posture, or taking actions elsewhere in Europe that concern Russia, it would be able to consult with NATO in an open, timely, and cooperative fashion. In other words, the Charter, together with CFE adaptation and our commitment to achieve legally binding strategic parity through START III, provide arrangements that protect Russia's vital interests.

Third, I hope you will understand that to us, enlargement is an essential part of the effort to build a new, post-Cold War NATO. A few years ago, NATO's leaders faced a simple choice: Would our alliance be known forever as an organization of nations that were once arrayed against an empire that no longer exists? Or will it be known as an organization of like-minded democracies united to meet the challenges of the future?

If the second choice is right, then NATO's Cold War membership will not do. Our alliance has to be open to those countries that can contribute to its goals today. It can't lock out a group of countries because they once fell on one side of an arbitrary Cold War dividing line — a line that did as much to isolate Russia from Europe as it did any other nation.

Fourth, I hope you will come to see that NATO enlargement will make a positive contribution to the security of all of Europe. It should go without saying that Russia will benefit from the resolution of ethnic and border disputes in central Europe. This is the effect enlargement is already having.

NATO membership will give these countries the confidence they need to pursue regional arms control and to build closer relations with Russia. In fact, it is precisely because NATO is taking in new members that we can now avert the threat of a major military build-up in central Europe. Central Europeans want to join NATO for the same reasons that current members would never leave it. They want to be part of an integrated Europe that is anchored to the United States.

If you suggest that Russia and NATO should negotiate over the heads of these countries—if you suggest we should somehow agree to derail their aspirations—you will ignite the very fears in central Europe that you are trying to extinguish.

Let me ask you to consider what would happen if NATO, on Russian advice, decided not to enlarge. Old dividing lines would re-emerge in the heart of Europe. Confidence would disintegrate in many of the new democracies. And a new, destabilizing scramble for security would result. Central Europeans would blame Russia; the progress you have made in establishing normal relations with them would crumble. These countries would seek to build up their own armed forces. A meaningful CFE treaty could not be negotiated. There would be little chance of building a closer relationship between NATO and Russia. The cooperation we've already forged—the joint exercises, joint training, and military liaison offices—could well disappear.

I know it will take time for the progress of trust in the NATO-Russia relationship to catch up with the process of change in Europe. But you are among the most influential opinion leaders in your country. Even if you continue to believe that on balance NATO enlargement is unwise, I do hope you will help inform Russia's people and its leaders that they are dealing with a new NATO.

In the meantime, we all need to reflect on how we manage the differences that arise in even the closest relationship. There have been times, as you all know, when the United States has strongly disagreed with Russian policies. In these cases, we have spoken openly and forcefully, but we have also made clear our determination to keep working together. None of us have the luxury of making a list of differences and walking away.

That is why we will continue our effort to work out a relationship between NATO and Russia. It does not have to happen now; the important thing is to get it right. And that is why we must stay focused on the unique responsibility Russia and America share: to keep strengthening our relationship and our cooperation in building a more stable, inclusive, and democratic world. ■

Secretary Albright

The U.S.-Mexico Partnership

May 5, 1997

*Remarks before Binational Commission Opening Plenary,
Mexico City, Mexico.*

Mr. Foreign Minister, distinguished colleagues from Mexico and the United States: I am delighted to be here to participate in the 14th meeting of the Binational Commission. And I am very grateful for the warm hospitality we have received. I note that this is the second consecutive year that the Foreign Minister has hosted this meeting, so I look doubly forward to playing the role of hostess next year.

Fifty years ago, President Harry Truman and President Miguel Aleman jointly declared in this city that it is the common purpose of our two countries to live together in harmony and to work together for prosperity on both sides of the border. We meet today to restate that purpose and to continue the work of this Binational Commission, which was forged in its spirit.

Our agenda is broad because U.S.-Mexican relations are broad. Our border is long; our people visit each other, study with each other, work with each other, conduct business with each other, and influence each other every day.

Although some have sought to characterize our relationship based on one or two issues, neither our interests nor reality allow that. Our friendship has a multitude of branches, and, in tending them, we must never allow the many blossoms to be obscured by the scattered thorns. The U.S. delegation is eager and prepared to work with you to strengthen areas of cooperation and to solve or minimize problems. As we all recognize, the true value of the Binational Commission is found not in the warmth of our rhetoric, but in the substance of our agreements. The bridges we build are real.

For example, this year, we will be opening new markets in agricultural products on both sides of the border, lowering barriers to the communications industry, and—through NAFTA—soliciting new proposals to accelerate tariff reductions. We anticipate progress in environmental cooperation and other matters that directly affect quality of life in border communities. We are optimistic about progress on educational exchanges. We expect progress in our cooperation on science and technology. We will inaugurate joint research on endan-

gered species in the Gulf of California. And we will, in fact, be building a new bridge between Brownsville and Matamoros, while reopening a larger, rebuilt bridge there as well.

These and a host of other issues will be discussed by our working groups. Understandings and cooperative efforts in areas such as the environment, energy, labor, transportation, and commerce strengthen the fabric of our relationship and help to bind our people together in pursuit of goals we share.

But there is a deeper and more profound basis for friendship between the United States and Mexico, and that is democracy. We believe, with Benito Juarez, that "Democracy is the destiny of humanity; (and) freedom its indestructible arm."

Together, we have worked on a regional and global basis to strengthen and integrate the international system around principles of law and respect for the rights of individuals. Together, we helped lead the effort to extend the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely and without conditions. Together, we are striving to strengthen the inter-American system and to implement commitments made at the Miami Summit of the Americas. Together, we have supported the historic movement toward peace, greater social justice, and genuine democracy in Guatemala—as I was inspired yesterday to see—and throughout Central America. And together, we are working, as we must, to strengthen the forces of democracy and law in our own two countries in the battle against the hydra-headed evil of drugs, corruption, money-laundering, illegal arms trafficking, and organized crime.

My government applauds President Zedillo's personal commitment, and that of Mexico's Government, to cooperate with us in this fight. We have seen your courage in denouncing and unmasking corruption. We applaud the steps you have taken to criminalize money-laundering and facilitate extradition in the service of justice. We are conscious of the sacrifice of Mexican law enforcement and judicial officers struck down by these criminals. And we are encouraged by the rise in Mexico,

as in the United States, of a vigorous civil society; of journalists, lawyers, community leaders, and just plain citizens demanding that public institutions serve public interests.

Together, we have taken many forward steps. But we know that in the struggle between law and outlaw, between democratic integrity and corrupt expediency, we are neither winning nor losing, but remain in the hottest stages of battle. Accordingly, we must follow up on last year's high narcotics seizure rates by intensifying joint operations and putting major traffickers behind bars. We must build law enforcement institutions that are fully professional and give our professional law enforcement personnel the resources and backing they deserve. We must continue our work both bilaterally and at the OAS to curb the black market sale of deadly arms. And we must join in emphasizing to all our people, in the words of President Clinton, that "drugs are wrong, drugs are illegal, and drugs will kill you."

Law is the lifeblood of democracy. And I know that, in recent weeks, the United States immigration laws have been subject to criticism here in Mexico. As someone who emigrated to the United States herself, I sympathize with those who have crossed the border in search of opportunity.

But every nation has a right and a need to regulate immigration—to allow legal immigrants to remain and require those who are not legal to leave. That is our right, but our obligation is to see that in enforcing the law, the rights and dignity of every individual—I repeat, every individual—are protected.

This issue is emotional on both sides of the border and complicated by the fact that in our democracies, publicity is available to many

voices on both sides of the border. It is up to us as officials to do all we can to cooperate on the basis of principle and law. That is the commitment we each have made, and it will require ongoing dialogue in the year ahead.

Underlying the U.S.-Mexico partnership, and linked to our ability to make progress on other issues, is our commitment to mutual prosperity. President Clinton has demonstrated his leadership in responding when problems arose here. Mexico has answered by repaying our help early and in full and by creating a climate for expanded commerce and rapid growth.

We must continue to build on this progress and to make our citizens aware that the creation of jobs and higher standards of living is not a zero-sum game. We must grow on both sides of the border, and we must strive to do so in ways that are socially and environmentally sustainable and that benefit the broadest possible segments of our populations.

As we proceed today, and in future months, we must bear in mind that our own efforts are part of an historic process. Modern attention spans are short. But effective institutions, robust economies, durable partnerships, and positive attitudes do not arise overnight; they require constant tending and persistent hard work.

Fortunately, work in the spirit of cooperation and with a focus on results is what the Binational Commission is all about. I am delighted to play a role. And I know I speak for the entire U.S. delegation when I say that we welcome this opportunity and look forward to the meetings ahead. ■

Secretary Albright

Shaping Our Future: The Denver Summit and Beyond

May 13, 1997

Address to the Women's Foundation of Colorado and the Denver Summit Host Committee, Denver, Colorado.

Good afternoon. Governor Romer, Lieutenant Governor Schoetler, Mr. Mayor, members of the summit host committee and the women's foundation, Ambassador Hunt, Under Secretary Tim Wirth, Harold Ickes, and other distinguished guests: I believe it was Dorothy—or perhaps it was Senator Dole—who said it first, about Kansas, but let me say it now about Denver: There's no place like home.

I know President Clinton is looking forward to coming to Denver, and let me offer greetings as well from your former Mayor and my current Cabinet colleague—Federico Pena. It really is a pleasure to be back and to see so many friends, old and new.

Earlier, I had the opportunity to visit my old school, where many years ago I started an international affairs club and named myself president. I knew early on that foreign policy was my game, but I never expected that four decades, three daughters, and two grandchildren later I would become Secretary of State, nor that I would be traveling around the world, as I was just this past week, with the President of the United States.

As you may have read, the President was in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean to reinforce and protect America's interests along our southern border. As a former professor, I found the trip a fascinating example of what I would call bread-and-butter diplomacy. There was no single, grand agreement but, instead, a host of decisions that will improve the quality of life of people on both sides of our southern border.

Examples include improved cooperation in the war against drugs; agreements on aviation and stolen cars; and a variety of understandings on health, labor, the environment, and energy. These measures with these countries are part of a larger process of integration that I would like to discuss with you today.

But before I do, I would also like to raise the question of resources. Thanks to the past efforts of administrations from both parties

and to the courage, energy, and genius of our people, America has reached the threshold of a new century strong, prosperous, respected, and at peace. This is no accident, and its continuation is not inevitable. Democratic progress, rising standards of living, and increased security must be sustained as they were created—through American leadership.

But we cannot lead without tools. Accordingly, I urge you, as I have urged Americans across this country, to support the President's request to fully fund our international affairs programs. That request covers everything from helping refugees to checking visa applications to negotiating arms reductions, and it is equal to only about 1% of our federal budget. But that 1% may determine 50% of the history that is written about our era, and it will affect the lives of 100% of the American people.

With your support and that of Congress, we have an unprecedented opportunity to shape a future in which nations increasingly come together around basic principles of democracy, open markets, and the rule of law.

We are pursuing that goal by adapting key institutions and alliances, building strong relationships with the world's major powers, and drawing a clear line between behavior that should be accepted by the international community and behavior that should not.

That is why we are working with our allies to build a NATO strengthened by new members and trained for new missions. It is why we have worked with friends in Asia to freeze North Korea's nuclear program and prepare the way for lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. It is why we stand with the peacemakers against the bomb-throwers in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and other troubled regions of the world. And it is why we are placing a high priority on the Summit of the Eight to be held here in Denver next month.

Your city can be proud that you will during that summit be playing host to history. For the first time, Russia will be virtually a full partici-

pant in the discussions of what—until now—has been known as the Group of Seven. This reflects the process of inclusion highlighted by President Clinton at the Helsinki Summit in March. And it demonstrates that we are truly building a new future for Europe; a future in which every democracy—including Russia—is our partner and every partner is a builder of peace.

There are many international organizations and arrangements in the world, but the Group of Seven, plus Russia, stands out because of the economic and political clout of its members. When these countries agree to act together, for peace, for economic security, for human rights or on other initiatives, it can make a real difference, elevating standards and influencing policies around the globe.

For example, here in Denver next month, President Clinton and the other heads of state will be looking for ways to enhance cooperation in responding to the threat of international terror. They will be discussing strategies for fighting and defeating organized crime, which has extended its tentacles around the world and is corrupting democracies, fostering violence, and poisoning our children through the deadly flow of drugs.

They will be sharing ideas on how to stop the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and how to end the scourge caused by the indiscriminate use of landmines, which have been killing and maiming too many children in too many countries for far too long.

And they will be exploring ways to further expand the global economy, which is one of the central goals of the foreign policy of the United States. During the past four years, under President Clinton, we have had great success in using our diplomacy to build prosperity. During this time, more than 200 trade agreements have been negotiated, causing exports to soar and creating an estimated 1.6 million new American jobs.

This matters especially to states such as Colorado that rely a great deal on exports. For example, your high-tech sector will benefit from access to new markets opened by the Information Technology Agreement we negotiated earlier this year. And on our trip to Central America last week, we signed "Open Skies" agreements of the type that have allowed Denver International Airport to add non-stop flights to Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Toronto, and elsewhere during the past two years.

As our businesspeople know, competition for the world's markets is fierce. Often, our firms go head to head with foreign competitors who receive active help from their own governments. Our goal is to see that American compa-

nies, workers, and farmers have a level playing field on which to compete, whether they are selling machinery to harvest wheat or technologies designed to detect wind shear, such as the system a Boulder company, supported by our Trade and Development Agency, is building in the Far East.

As long as I am Secretary of State, our diplomacy will strive for a global economic system that is increasingly open and fair. Our embassies will provide all appropriate help to American firms. Our negotiators will seek trade agreements that help create new American jobs. And I will personally stress the point—as I have in visits to many of our principal trading partners around the world—that if countries want to sell in our backyard they had better allow America to do business in theirs.

The argument that we make and that underlies the very concept of the Summit of the Eight is that economic progress is not a zero-sum game. When we help other nations grow, we expand the system of market democracies in which our own nation has the largest stake. We also create opportunities here at home.

In 1995, the U.S. Agency for International Development bought almost \$17 million of Colorado wheat, beans, and lentils to feed the hungry overseas. And Colorado organizations as diverse as Global Steel and Colorado Springs Junior Achievement have participated in our aid programs.

We will devote much attention at the Summit of the Eight to the challenge of building strong economies, opening new markets, and creating jobs. But we also will be careful to draw the connection between those goals and another—and that is the future of our global environment.

The people of Colorado understand as well as any in our country how important it is that when we grow economically we do so in ways that are healthy and sustainable.

Over the past several years, I have traveled to almost every region of the world. I have flown over whole mountain ranges virtually stripped of trees. I have seen farmers in Africa and Haiti struggling to grow crops on hillsides so steep it is impossible to stand, because all the other soil has been exhausted. I have seen areas renowned for their economic vigor where the quality of life has been ruined by unbreathable air, undrinkable water, and immovable traffic. I have talked to people, whose families have been fishermen for generations, in despair because fisheries resources have been destroyed.

And just this past week, I went with the President to a rain forest in Costa Rica, where we underlined America's commitment to

protecting the world's natural resources, and we proceeded to demonstrate that commitment—by getting drenched.

Preserving a healthy and abundant global environment is not simply a foreign policy interest of the United States. It is an obligation to the future which each and every one of us share.

At the Denver Summit, we will be discussing how nations can meet that obligation as a follow-up to the Rio Earth Summit held five years ago. There could hardly be a more appropriate place for such a discussion than Colorado, where the beauty of the environment is a major economic asset and where much of the world's most advanced climate change research is being done.

Colorado is also the home of the State Department's leading expert on the environment, our immensely energetic and accomplished Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Tim Wirth, and home of Dottie Lamm, who was a leading member of the U.S. delegation to the Women's Conference in Beijing a year-and-a-half ago.

Of course Dottie, with Ambassador Swanee Hunt, also co-founded the Women's Foundation of Colorado. The Foundation's efforts to promote women's self-sufficiency here are mirrored by those of other grass-roots organizations around the world. They provide ample evidence that, whether women are bumping against a glass ceiling or standing on a dirt floor, they are eager to be full partners in the development of their societies. And whether or not they have that opportunity will do much to determine our success or failure in promoting sustainable development around the world.

We know from experience, after all, that when women have the knowledge and power to make their own choices, the cycle of poverty, in which too many countries remain ensnared, can be broken. Birth rates stabilize. Environmental awareness increases. The spread of sexually transmitted disease slows. And socially constructive values are more likely to be passed on to the young.

One of the most encouraging developments of our era is the coming together throughout the world of organizations and individuals dedicated to the challenge of advancing the status of women.

This past week in Central America, for example, I participated in a meeting with our First Lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton, and women from each of the countries in that region. It was heartening to learn during this meeting that, thanks to the efforts of concerned NGOs, one country has approved a law requiring new members of its congress to pay

any child support they may owe before they are allowed to serve. In another, the courts have—for the first time—voided laws that explicitly discriminate against women in the punishment of crimes.

The efforts of nongovernmental organizations should be applauded, but governments must do their part, as well. As Secretary of State, I am working with other Administration officials to see that issues related to the status of women receive the attention they deserve. For example, our overseas aid programs support projects that expand the ability of women to participate fully in the economic and political life of their societies. We are emphasizing access for women and girls to education and health care, and designing refugee relief to meet women's needs. We are supporting efforts to provide credit for women engaged in micro-enterprise. We are working to ratify—at long last—the Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women. We are leading a global effort to crack down on illegal trafficking in women and girls, because we believe that if those who traffic in drugs should be punished severely—and they should—so should those who traffic in human beings.

And we are working hard to end violence against women. Today, around the world, appalling abuses are being committed against women, from domestic violence to dowry murders to forcing young girls into prostitution. Some say all this is cultural and there's nothing we can do about it. I say it's criminal and we each have a responsibility to stop it.

When we stand up for basic values of law and respect for the dignity of every human being, we are serving our common future. The American values we share and the world admires are founded in a commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law not just for some but for all people.

Only in liberty can human potential find fulfillment in equal men and women secure in their rights and able to meet their responsibilities. And only if our nation is outward-looking, if we are responsible, and if we are true to our values can we fulfill our potential as leaders and as builders of the next American century.

Almost 50 years ago, my family came here to escape communism and find freedom. The Denver Post had a motto then that read "Tis a privilege to live in Colorado." My father used to repeat that motto on a regular basis, but he would often add a reminder: "Kids," he would say, "never forget that it is also a privilege to live in the United States."

The Americans of that post-World War II era faced the challenge of building a lasting peace. Their goals then were similar to our

goals today. They understood that nations working together as trading partners and partners in peace would be less likely to fall into the abyss of war. They believed that gaining the commitment of nations to high standards of law and human rights would make the world less brutal and unjust. And they believed in human progress—for they had just defeated the greatest enemies of progress ever to walk the earth. Together with our allies, they forged a set of institutions that would defend freedom, rebuild economies, uphold law, and preserve peace.

Today, we face the challenge of strengthening and adapting those institutions to meet the demands of our era. There is now no region on earth that need be excluded from the benefits of the international system or that should be

excluded from its responsibilities. And there is no American who does not stand to benefit from the creation of a world that is increasingly prosperous, secure, and free.

As I have said, the task of shaping the future is not that of governments alone. It requires the steady efforts and firm commitment of cities such as Denver and citizens such as you to play a strong partnership role.

Denver's decision to host the Summit of the Eight and the record of accomplishment of the Women's Foundation of Colorado give evidence that the future is in good hands.

For all you are doing and have done, I admire you. For all you will do, I salute you. And for your attention and hospitality here today, I thank you very, very much. ■

Secretary Albright

U.S. Leadership for a Global Community and China's Emerging Role

May 13, 1997

Luncheon remarks at the Hotel DuPont, Wilmington, Delaware.

Senator Biden, thank you for that characteristically understated introduction. Senator Roth, Governor Carper, Congressman Castle, friends and guests: I am delighted to be here in Wilmington with you today. Although I was born in Prague and came of age in Denver, I have spent most of my adult life in New York and Washington—or in transit between the two. So I am very glad to get off the train, at last, and see the city without a blur. Delaware is a small state, but it has a very large presence in Washington.

I doubt there is a Senator in our era with a greater record of accomplishment than Joe Biden. I am delighted that he has decided to advance the interests of Delaware through his service as the leading minority member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

By his leadership on the Chemical Weapons Convention, his advocacy of a tough stance in the war against drugs, and his support for a foreign economic policy that works for America, Joe Biden is showing every day that strong policies abroad make a real difference for our citizens back home.

Senator Bill Roth is Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. In other words, like Senator Biden, he has clout. In fact, he is also serving, with Senator Biden, as Chair of the Senate's NATO Observer Group, consulting with the Administration on the historic enlargement of that historic alliance. Senator Roth has earned universal respect for his energy, fairness, and achievements during his years of public service.

Representative Mike Castle has not been in Washington as long as his colleagues—which you may or may not consider a good thing—but he has already established a reputation for independence and courage. I thank all of you for taking the time to welcome me here today.

As Secretary of State, I am often asked my view of the world now that the Cold War is receding into memory and a new century is about to dawn.

There are obviously many elements to this and, because I am a former professor, I have the habit of discussing each in sound bites that are 50 minutes long. But in deference to the lulling effects of this wonderful lunch, and to all our schedules, I will give you a highly abridged version.

Largely as the result of strong U.S. leadership from Administrations of both parties, we have in our era an unprecedented opportunity to integrate the world around basic principles of democracy, open markets, law, and a common commitment to peace.

Not every country is yet able to participate fully in this integration. Some are in transition from centralized planning and totalitarian rule to democracy. Some have only begun to dip their toes into economic and political reform. Some are still too weak to participate meaningfully in the international system. And a few have governments that actively oppose the premises upon which that system is based.

It is in America's interests to strengthen the system, to ensure that it is based on high standards and sound principles of law, and to make it more inclusive. We do this by helping transitional states to play a greater role, by giving a boost to the weak states most willing to help themselves, and by making it clear to the outlaw states that they cannot prosper at the expense of the rest; they must either reform or suffer in isolation.

That is why we are working with our allies to build a NATO strengthened by new members and trained for new missions, and why we are pleased the alliance has made a historic breakthrough by enlisting Russia as a co-builder of peace. It is why we have worked with friends in Asia to freeze North Korea's nuclear program. It is why we stand with the peacemakers against the bombthrowers in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and other troubled regions of the world. It is why we have insisted on tough UN sanctions against the outlaw regimes of Libya and Iraq. And it is

why we are engaged in a strategic dialogue with China aimed at encouraging that country to become a fully responsible and active participant within the international system.

Because it is a timely subject, and very important to American interests across the board, let me elaborate a bit on this last goal.

Next month, the annual Congressional debate concerning China's most-favored-nation—or MFN—trading status will begin. I can say today that President Clinton has decided to renew China's MFN status for the coming year. I understand that the White House will be making the announcement shortly.

Some in Congress will not agree with this approach, arguing instead that a confrontational approach is more likely to alter China's policies in areas where we have differences, such as human rights and military exports. The Administration's view is that our long-term interests are best served by a strategic dialogue with Chinese leaders on a full range of issues. Let me explain why.

First, it is important to remember that MFN is a powerful symbol of America's global commitment to open markets. Despite its name, MFN is not a privileged status accorded only to close friends; it is the ordinary tariff treatment we extend to most nations.

More generally, we have to think carefully about what our long-term approach to China should be. There is no questioning the significance of China's emergence as a major, modern economic and military power. And there should be no doubt that China will play a major role in the future of Asia, where the United States has a panoply of vital interests.

The evolution of our relations with China will depend primarily on how China defines its own national interests during the remaining years of this century and into the next. Through our strategic dialogue, we are encouraging the Chinese to accept what we believe is true—that China will be able to find greater security, prosperity, and well-being inside a rule-based international system than outside.

Currently, China is constructively engaged with the international community in some areas; in some, it is not. Given the undemocratic nature of China's government, we can expect that further movement in the direction of inclusion will be gradual. But we also believe continued U.S. engagement is the best way to encourage that movement.

The opponents of maintaining normal trading relations with China have legitimate concerns—which the Administration shares—but the tool they have chosen is less scalpel than wrecking ball. They proceed from the

fragile hope that denying MFN would have a salutary effect on China's human rights or arms export practices.

The Administration, however, proceeds from the realistic conviction that revoking MFN would derail prospects for U.S.-China cooperation both on these and other important issues such as preserving peace on the Korean Peninsula, encouraging dialogue with Taiwan, controlling nuclear proliferation, safeguarding the global environment, cracking down on international terror, fighting the narcotics trade, and further opening China's markets to meet World Trade Organization standards.

In recent weeks, some have advocated using China MFN as leverage to protect democratic rights in Hong Kong following its reversion to Chinese authority on July 1. However, as Senator Roth pointed out in last Friday's *Wall Street Journal*, this idea is strongly opposed by Hong Kong's democratic leaders, because of the damage it would do to Hong Kong's free market economy.

A further objection to ending normal trading relations is that it would do more to isolate the United States than China. We could expect virtually no support from our friends and allies in Europe and Asia, all of whom support our policy of seeking China's integration into regional and global institutions.

Critics say that denying MFN is essential to uphold U.S. principles. The Administration believes our strategic dialogue can both protect American interests and uphold our principles provided we are honest and frank about our differences on human rights and other issues—which we have been and will continue to be. Whether or not we revoke MFN, China will be a rising force in Asian and world affairs.

History teaches us the value of encouraging emerging powers to become part of international arrangements for settling disputes, facilitating shared economic growth, and establishing standards of international behavior.

Here at home, we should not let the MFN debate obscure the fact that those on both sides share common goals. Whether our own particular interests in China are focused on diplomatic, security, commercial, or humanitarian concerns, our overriding objective is to encourage in China full respect for the rule of law.

"The evolution of our relations with China will depend primarily on how China defines its own national interests during the remaining years of this century and into the next."

If you are a businessperson, you will care whether China's legal structure respects individual rights and whether the political and security environment is stable. If you are a military planner, you will want to see China moving ahead with economic and political reform because you know that an open society contributes to peace. If you are a human rights activist, you will welcome the long-term liberalizing effects created by expanded commerce, creation of a strong private sector, and a broad dialogue between China and the world's democracies. And if you are Secretary of State, you will be determined to move ahead on all fronts, encouraging the full integration of China into the international system.

A half-century ago, a generation of American leaders led by President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall offered a plan for

rebuilding a Europe decimated by war. Their goals then were similar to our goals today. They understood that nations working together as trading partners and partners in peace would be less likely to fall into the abyss of war.

They believed that gaining the commitment of nations to high standards of law and human rights would make the world less brutal and less unjust. And they believed in human progress—for they had just defeated the greatest enemies of progress ever to walk the earth. Their task, then, was concentrated on the former battlegrounds of the Second World War.

History enables us now to cast the net more broadly. Today, there is no region—and no nation—that need remain outside the international system.

Broadening and strengthening that system cannot be done by governments alone. It is a joint opportunity in which educators, community leaders, and the private sector—that's you—must play a strong partnership role.

As one whose job it is to protect American interests, I hope and believe that, together, we will seize that opportunity, and by so doing, arrive at the end of this century well-prepared for the next. Thank you very much. ■

Deputy Secretary Talbott

The U.S., the EU, and Our Common Challenges

May 6, 1997

Remarks to the U.S.-EU Conference "Bridging the Atlantic: People-to-People Links," Washington, DC.

Thank you, Ambassador Ruperez, for that kind introduction. As President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Spanish Parliament, as Spain's first Ambassador to NATO, as a negotiator who helped to craft the Helsinki Final Act, you are the personification of the European side of the transatlantic relationship that is the subject of my remarks to this distinguished audience.

The theme of this conference is building bridges across the Atlantic. I work for a President who is building one to the 21st century, so I applaud the metaphor. But it really is the right one. Many of you here are dealing with the nuts-and-bolts issues of strengthening the structures of transatlantic cooperation—student and employee exchange programs, sister-city relationships, economic partnerships, Internet link-ups, and the constant back-and-forth, give-and-take transactions across the Atlantic.

I would like to give special mention to one exchange program in particular because it has served as a model for several others represented here. Five decades ago, a statesman from Arkansas named William Fulbright had an inspired idea: a scholarship that would give Americans and others the opportunity to live and to study in a different country. Since then, thousands have used their Fulbright experience to tie tighter the bonds between the United States and Europe.

I am particularly pleased to see Harriet Fulbright here today. I want to tell you, Harriet, that your late husband's friend, admirer, and one-time Senate aide, President Clinton, will do everything he can to strengthen and extend this remarkable program and others like it, such as the Ron Brown and Edmund Muskie Fellowships, which give students from Europe's young democracies a chance to study in America.

The U.S.-EU Agreement on Higher Education and Vocational Training has already helped launch dozens of educational consortiums. The Fellowship of Hope—proposed by

former Secretary Christopher last September—is up and running, giving officials from the U.S., the EU, and its member states a chance to work in the foreign affairs agencies of our governments. I am also pleased to see that a Transatlantic Labor Dialogue has joined the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, and I know you are already working on a flurry of creative proposals—from a transatlantic AIDSNET to a "telecity" and a digital library projects, from new sister-city arrangements with communities in central and eastern Europe to corporate and workplace exchange programs.

All of us—governments, the private sector, universities, and NGOs—are working together in joint enterprise. Its purpose is not just to strengthen existing structures across the body of water that separates us, but also to build new structures embracing the values that bring us together in a single, transatlantic community.

I'd like to speak to you this morning about several ways in which our community is changing. It is changing basically for the better, but, nonetheless, in ways that present challenges to all of us.

Both here, on this side of the pond in the Western Hemisphere, and on the far side in Europe, the watchword of our era is integration. Secretary of State Albright—who sends her greetings to all of you—is in Mexico. She is with President Clinton and several other members of his Cabinet, working to advance our Administration's vision of hemispheric integration. But the quest for integration is a transatlantic phenomenon as well, and it has been since the birth of our country.

In 1785, before Thomas Jefferson became Secretary of State, he was our Minister in France. That was a time of intense, often literally cut-throat competition in Europe. From his post in Paris, Mr. Jefferson drafted a proposal for freedom of trade between the Old and the New Worlds—and for a covenant on the universal rights for the citizens of all nations.

That same year, when Barbary pirates were menacing the sea lanes of the Mediterranean and Atlantic, Mr. Jefferson proposed that the United States organize a multinational naval force to combat the threat. If you will grant me a little license of creative hindsight, you could say one of our Founding Fathers was proposing a proto-NATO. However, he was shot down by his home office on the grounds, among other things, that we couldn't afford such a thing—a reminder that the occasional difficulty of persuading Congress to provide the resources for America's engagement abroad is nothing new.

One hundred and thirty years later, Americans went "over there"—to Europe—to fight the war that Woodrow Wilson said would end all wars and make the world safe for democracy. But, of course, all that carnage did nothing of the kind—in some measure because its aftermath included a sustained episode of American isolationism. It took another World War before America and Europe would finally build a lasting structure across the Atlantic.

This year, we are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, which, appropriately, came into being at about the same time as the Fulbright Exchange Program—and in furtherance of the same commitment to transatlantic bridge-building.

The enduring legacy of the Marshall Plan is visible today not only in the steel mills and railways and farmlands of Western Europe: It is visible in the institutions that have brought the two continents politically and economically closer together. The OECD and the Bretton Woods institutions—the World Bank and IMF—were catalysts not just for reconstruction of shattered economies, but for reconciliation and integration among former European adversaries. They helped ultimately to solidify the foundation of the European Union itself. Together, 50 years ago, we embarked on a period of unprecedented peace and prosperity, and together, we built the most dynamic trade and investment relationship in the world.

But there is another point that is crucial, both as an aspect of history and as a guide for the future: We—the U.S. and Europe—did not confine our cooperative efforts, or the benefits of those efforts, to ourselves alone. Rather, we reached out—we opened up—to other regions, to other markets. We saw the pattern in the tiles we were assembling as part of a larger mosaic. This was not an abstraction; it could not have been more practical, which is to say it could not have been more economical and commercial. The U.S. and the EU worked together to liberalize world trade. The Uruguay Round of the GATT was the culmination of that effort. In

a word, to our credit, while acting regionally, we grew used to thinking, acting, and trading globally.

But being limited in our prophetic powers, we also grew used to the Cold War; we came to think of it as a permanent part of the human condition and the Iron Curtain as a permanent fixture on the Continent of Europe. Our shortsightedness in this respect calls to mind a remark by an American baseball player, Dan Quisenberry, who used to be a relief pitcher for the Kansas City Royals: "I have seen the future," he once said, "and it is very much like the present—only longer."

Then, suddenly, eight years ago in 1989, the future arrived, and it looked very different. The walls came down, revealing a new landscape in which old thinking and old borders were no longer relevant. Today, the fastest-growing economies in Europe lie east of the Elbe. Soldiers from Russia and Ukraine, Estonia and Poland, Britain and France, America and Canada, and many other countries that were, only a decade ago, members of opposing blocs are today serving together in Bosnia. I spent last week in Moscow with Secretary Albright negotiating a cooperative relationship between Russia and NATO, all of which vindicates the wisdom of another famous philosopher-baseball player—the incomparable Yogi Berra: "The future," he said, "ain't what it used to be."

With the end of the Cold War, the energies that used to go into common defense have increasingly been able to go instead into the strengthening of our core institutions. One of those is the EU itself, about which I would like to say a few words.

But first let me put forward a general principle: Let me establish a context for American support of, and occasional concern about, the EU. We believe that regional integration in Europe and everywhere else should help those countries directly involved transcend traditional boundaries of habit and history, geography and culture. As a corollary, integration should look outward, rather than inward.

That is our best insurance policy against the possibility that the wrong kind of regional cohesion will spawn the worst kind of interregional conflict. That worry has been on the minds of some of our best, most farsighted thinkers for a long time. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, George Orwell wrote his futuristic nightmare *1984*. In the story that the novel tells, the globe is divided into three warring super-regions—Eurasia, Eastasia, and Oceania. Well, we are now 13 years past 1984 and, let's hope, safely past the danger of which Orwell warned.

But we can't be complacent. We must continue to make sure that cooperation within regions reinforces cooperation among regions. That principle guides our own government in its approach to NAFTA, as President Clinton, Secretaries Albright, Rubin, and Daley are telling their hosts in Mexico today. It guides us in our approach to South America and the Far East—and the opportunities for bridge-building between the two. Who would have thought a decade ago that Chile would be one of the most vibrant members of an organization called APEC? The A and the P stand for Asia-Pacific. And this same emphasis on openness, on outwardness—on bridge-building—will guide us in our reaction to, and interaction with, the EU.

Let me borrow the terminology especially familiar to the Europeans here today: When our Administration says we support European integration, we mean both deepening and broadening; we mean both the consolidation of international institutions and the expansion, or enlargement, of those institutions. That means we encourage our friends and allies in Europe to embrace the broadest, most expansive, most outward-looking, most inclusive possible version of integration.

This is not a criticism of past or current EU policy. Quite the contrary, we credit the EU for the farsighted decisions it has already made, such as its assistance programs in central and eastern Europe, its commitment to expand, and its part in the New Transatlantic Agenda.

That said, we also understand that Europe today is embroiled in a debate over an issue that seems, at least to its participants, to be largely internal to Europe. I'm referring to the issue of EMU. A few words—carefully chosen, I might add—about our view on this important and sensitive subject. The record shows that over the past 50 years, the United States has supported every previous initiative to achieve greater political and economic unity among European nations. We have done so for reasons of our own self-interest. A politically united Europe will be a stronger partner to advance common goals. An economically united Europe creates a much more attractive environment for American investment.

As for the EMU, we have been careful not to plunge into the middle of a debate that already has plenty of just the right participants. It is not for us to say how this initiative should evolve or who should join. But we have no doubt—and no hesitancy in saying—that an EMU that cements an open single market and that sparks economic growth in Europe will be good for the American economy. If the EU emerges from this bold initiative able to play an

even more active and constructive role on the world stage, that will be good for America, too.

Let me now turn to another subject that has also generated vigorous debate: the relationship between the EU and the lands to its east. Central and eastern Europe is the region where our century's two hot wars as well as the Cold War began. New dangers still lurk there, as is apparent from a sobering fact: From Bosnia, Croatia, and Albania in the Balkans, to Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh in the Caucasus, more Europeans have died violently in the last five years than in the previous 45. Instability there threatens the peace of Europe as a whole.

Vaclav Havel has reminded us that—and I quote—"Just as it is impossible for one-half of a room to be forever warm and the other half cold, it is equally unthinkable that two different Europe's could forever exist next to each other without detriment to both—and it is the stabler and more prosperous one that would pay the higher price." Havel is one of a number of brave leaders of brave peoples, who have, since 1989, broken the locks, thrown open the gates, torn down the walls. States that were, only a decade ago, captive nations, fortress societies, and command economies are now holding elections, instituting the rule of law, opening their economies, nurturing a free press, and knocking at the doors of the various international associations and institutions that make up our community.

We must respond by opening those doors. In debating whether—and how quickly and on what terms—to do so, we should remember that when George Marshall unveiled the plan that came to bear his name, Germany and France were ruined lands, worse off in many ways than the countries of central and eastern Europe today. Today, they and the rest of the EU represent the triumph of integration over what Marshall depicted in 1947 as the "hunger, poverty, despotism, and chaos" of Western Europe. That is why the enlargement of the structures that undergird the transatlantic community is not some risky new venture, but a logical extension of the strategy of Marshall, Adenauer, and Monnet.

It was with that idea in mind that the leaders of NATO three years ago decided to expand to central and eastern Europe. NATO had another choice. It could have confined itself to its Cold War membership, but that would have implied that Checkpoint Charlie marks the spot where our interests and aspirations end—or, as was once suggested not too long ago—where history itself ends. That would have been a strategic mistake of the most profound proportions and the most lasting consequences.

Let me speak for my own government's motives here. We, the United States, have a variety of mutually reinforcing reasons for enlarging NATO. We believe it is the best way to ensure stability and consolidate democracy in central Europe.

But I will be quite frank: We have an ulterior motive as well. We hope that the enlargement of NATO, of which we are a member, will contribute to the conditions for the enlargement of the EU, of which we are not a member, but in which we have such a profound—I'd even say vital—interest.

This is not just a matter of NATO's setting an example. Rather, it's a matter of NATO's creating an environment which, because it is more stable and peaceful, will be conducive to the EU's expansion eastward. Many of Europe's new democracies are well on their way to meeting the economic conditions for EU membership. But EU governments and Western investors must also be confident about the long-term, deep-seated security of the region, and that's what NATO is all about.

Some have suggested that the opposite is true—that NATO enlargement gives the EU an excuse not to embrace new members. The facts argue otherwise. The clearer we have been about NATO's determination to take in new members, the clearer the EU has been about its own plans to expand. What's more, in all fairness to the EU, it is hard to imagine its process of expansion moving much faster. The EU rightly asks potential members to make many complex changes in their economic and regulatory policies. But as Secretary Albright has said, the security NATO provides should not have to wait until, as she put it, "tomato farmers in central Europe start using the right kinds of pesticides." From our vantage point, NATO enlargement and EU expansion are separate but parallel processes in support of the same overall cause, which is a broader, deeper transatlantic community.

Let me turn now to a third tough, important issue that the EU faces as it looks east and south. I'm referring to the challenge to Europe's sense of itself and its future posed by Turkey's aspiration to join the EU. Here, too, the U.S. doesn't have a vote, but it certainly has interests.

Turkey is undergoing the strains of modernization, including in the crucial area of democracy and human rights. These areas, along with Turkey's relationship with Greece, are all legitimate issues of concern to the EU. But these difficulties do not make Turkey any less European. In fact, many current EU members have overcome far greater traumas in

this century, and that's putting it mildly. And let us not forget that at the beginning of this century, in the wake of World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman empire, Turkey—under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk—made a strategic choice about its nature and its orientation—the right choice, from our point of view and, we believe, from Turkey's own.

Then, in the wake of World War II, Turkey joined NATO. That was, of course, largely because Turkey shared a border with the Soviet Union and was thus literally on the front line of the Cold War. But it is today just as much on the front line of the multiple challenges that face us in the post-Cold War era. Turkey's continuing strategic importance derives from its frontiers with Iraq, Syria, and Iran, and from its proximity—as well as its linguistic affinity—to the Caucasus and central Asia.

Therefore, we have as much an interest as ever in Turkey's development as a strong, prosperous, secular, and democratic state, fully integrated with our community. Only with that kind of Turkey can we prevail together in the struggle that has replaced the Cold War: the struggle between security and insecurity; between prosperity and poverty; in short, between the forces of integration and disintegration.

We recognize how difficult and multi-dimensional the issue of Turkey is, not least for Turkey itself, but also for others. We realize that Turkey's relationship to the EU is not just a foreign policy issue for several major EU states, but one of domestic politics as well, given the connection between EU membership and freedom of movement.

We in the U.S. have some familiarity with such connections, as anyone knows who has followed the debate over NAFTA, or who heard this morning's news reports on the demonstrations that greeted President Clinton upon his arrival in Mexico City. I'd even say that, among the many things that the U.S. and the EU have in common is a dilemma: how to reconcile, on the one hand, the imperatives and benefits of regional integration and open borders with our neighbors and, on the other, the imperatives of a sound and humane policy on migration. In their current visit to Mexico, President Clinton and his Cabinet are stressing that we want to encourage legal migration, which has enriched our culture and our economy and made the United States the fifth-largest Hispanic nation on earth. We want to encourage legal immigrants to become citizens, while at the same time, we want to discourage illegal migration, which only erodes the consensus for deeper ties.

We recognize that the EU and Turkey are working hard to strike their own balances on these complex issues and to stake out as much common ground as possible. The EU has had a Customs Union Agreement with Turkey for over a year, and last week, the EU stated that its door is open to Turkish membership according to the same criteria applied to any other applicant. We also applaud the establishment last week of a group of "Wise Men" to look at the issues that have generated so much tension between Greece and Turkey.

Still, there are those who resist vehemently the idea that any nations to the east of what might be called "traditional Europe" can ever truly be part of a larger, 21st century Europe. We believe that view is quite wrong—and potentially quite dangerous. Over the centuries, Europe at its best—and its most peaceful and most prosperous—has defined itself not in terms of artificial barriers—a river here, a mountain range there, a concrete-and-barbed-wire wall somewhere else. Rather, Europe has become Europe by reaching over such boundaries; by assembling itself into a community of nations that share values, aspirations, and ways of life.

Turkey has been a part of the European system since the 16th century. Of course, it has cultural ties to Central Asia and the Middle East. But so does Russia, which must also be part of the building of an integrated post-Cold War Europe if there is to be such a thing. True, most of Turkey is separated from the rest of Europe by a bit of water, but then so is all of the United Kingdom.

Let me also say a word more about Islam. The current debate over Turkey resonates with references to "culture," or sometimes as "civilization." These words are often euphemisms for religion. There is a theory currently in vogue that the Cold War rivalry between communism and capitalism has been replaced by a global "clash of civilizations," including one between Western and Muslim countries.

That idea gives short shrift both to the great diversity within these supposed civilizations and to what they have in common. It underestimates the ethnic and religious diversity of the United States and, increasingly, of Western Europe as well. And it underestimates the dangers we may face in the future if we today raise artificial barriers against the aspirations of any European nation that is willing to accept the standards and responsibilities of our democratic community, or if we define the "European-ness" of a village on the basis of whether its landmarks are church spires or minarets.

As Warren Christopher put it early last year, our strategy of integration must, and I quote, "not recognize any fundamental divide among the Catholic, Orthodox, and Islamic parts of Europe. That kind of thinking fueled the war in the former Yugoslavia and it must have no place in the Europe we are building." Secretary Albright strongly agrees, and she will use her own tenure here to urge that Europe define itself as inclusively, expansively, and comprehensively as possible.

So, to conclude, with respect to all three issues I have touched on this morning—the EMU, the relationship between the EU and the former communist lands to its east, and the EU's relationship with Turkey—the United States will continue to recommend as guiding principles for statesmanship and public policy precisely those goals and values that motivate all of you in the work that has brought you together for this conference. We will encourage the EU to do in the future what the individuals gathered and the organizations represented here are doing right now—and that is building bridges; deepening and broadening the network of connections and associations; and promoting exchanges within and among the local, national, and regional communities that make up the global community of which we are all a part. Thank you very much. ■



TREATY ACTIONS

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica—Environmental Protection

Protocol on environmental protection to the Antarctic Treaty, with schedules and annexes. Done at Madrid and Bonn Oct. 4, 1991 and Oct. 17, 1997¹. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-22. *Ratification*: United States, Apr. 17, 1997.

Aviation, Civil

Convention on the marking of plastic explosives for the purpose of detection, with technical annex. Done at Montreal Mar. 1, 1991¹. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-8. *Ratification*: United States, Apr. 9, 1997.

Chemical Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, with annexes. Done at Paris Jan. 13, 1993. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-21. *Signature*: Bhutan, Apr. 24, 1997. *Ratifications*: Bahrain, Apr. 28, 1997; Bangladesh, Apr. 25, 1997; China, Apr. 25, 1997; Equatorial Guinea, Apr. 25, 1997; Iceland, Apr. 28, 1997; Kenya, Apr. 25, 1997; Korea, Apr. 28, 1997; Suriname, Apr. 28, 1997; Togo, Apr. 23, 1997; United States, Apr. 25, 1997; Zimbabwe, Apr. 25, 1997. Entered into force Apr. 29, 1997.

Copyright

Berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works of Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979. Entered into force for the U.S. Mar. 1, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-27. *Accession*: Cape Verde, Apr. 7, 1997.

North Atlantic Treaty

Agreement among the states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and other states participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces. Done at Brussels June 19, 1995. Entered into force Jan. 13, 1996. *Signature*: Iceland, Mar. 10, 1997. *Ratification*: Poland, Apr. 4, 1997.

Additional protocol to the agreement among the states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other states participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces. Done at Brussels June 19, 1995.

Entered into force June 1, 1996².

Signature: Austria, Mar. 27, 1997; Iceland, Mar. 10, 1997.

Ratification: Poland, Apr. 4, 1997.

Property

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932; 21 UST 1749.

Accessions: Cape Verde, Apr. 7, 1997; Papua New Guinea, Apr. 10, 1997.

War, Prevention of

Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Signed at The Hague July 29, 1899. Entered into force Sept. 4, 1900. TS 392; 32 Stat. 1779.

Adherence: Slovenia, Sept. 5, 1996.

Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Signed at The Hague Oct. 18, 1907. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1910. TS 536; 36 Stat. 2199.

Accessions: Australia, Dec. 23, 1996; Libya, July 4, 1996.

Ratification: Colombia, Jan. 16, 1997.

Weapons, Conventional

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with annexed protocols. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983; for the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-25.

Protocol on non-detectable fragments (Protocol I) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983; for the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-25.

Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps, and other devices (Protocol II) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983; for the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-25.

Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons (Protocol III) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983².

Accessions: Djibouti, July 29, 1996; Panama, Mar. 26, 1997.

Ratification: Philippines, July 15, 1996.

Protocol on blinding laser weapons (Protocol IV) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Vienna Oct. 13, 1995¹.

Accession: Panama, Mar. 26, 1997.

Acceptances: Finland, Jan. 11, 1996; Sweden, Jan. 15, 1997.

Women

Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1981². [Senate] Ex. R, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.

Ratification: Switzerland, Mar. 27, 1997.

Accessions: Andorra, Jan. 15, 1997; Botswana, Aug. 13, 1997; Kyrgyzstan, Feb. 10, 1997; Lebanon, Apr. 16, 1997; Mozambique, Apr. 21, 1997.

Withdrawal of reservations and declarations made upon ratification: United Kingdom, Mar. 22, 1996³.

Convention on the political rights of woman. Done at New York Mar. 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954; for the U.S. July 7, 1976. TIAS 8289; 27 UST 1909.

Accession: Kyrgyzstan, Feb. 10, 1997.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agreement concerning United States armed forces technical personnel deployments to Bolivia. Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz Feb. 4 and 14, 1997. Entered into force Feb. 14, 1997.

Agreement between the United States and Bolivia regarding the reduction and reorganization of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies. Signed at La Paz Nov. 27, 1996. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1997.

Canada

Agreement concerning the imposition of import restrictions on certain categories of archaeological and ethnological material, with appendix. Signed at Washington Apr. 10, 1997. Entered into force Apr. 10, 1997.

Colombia

Agreement between the United States and Colombia to suppress illicit traffic by sea. Signed at Bogota Feb. 20, 1997. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1997.

Grenada

Agreement regarding the provision of articles, services, and associated military education and training by the United States Government for anti-narcotics purposes. Effected by exchange of notes at St. George's Dec. 23, 1996 and Mar. 14, 1997. Entered into force Mar. 14, 1997.

Guinea

Agreement between the United States and Guinea regarding the consolidation, reduction, and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies. Signed at Conakry Nov. 18, 1996. Entered into force Apr. 9, 1997.

Guyana

Agreement regarding the reduction and reorganization of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Georgetown Mar. 27, 1997. Enters into force upon receipt by Guyana of written notice from the U.S. that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.

Honduras

Agreement between the United States and Honduras regarding the consolidation, reduction, and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies. Signed at Tegucigalpa Dec. 4, 1996. Entered into force Apr. 10, 1997.

Ireland

Agreement for promotion of aviation safety. Signed at Dublin Feb. 5, 1997. Entered into force Feb. 5, 1997.

Italy

Agreement for the transfer of ownership of the long-range radio aid to navigation transmitting and monitoring stations at Lampedusa, Sella

Marina, and Crotone, Italy, with annex. Signed at Rome Nov. 17, 1994. Entered into force Feb. 4, 1997.

Japan

Agreement concerning cooperation on the very long baseline interferometer space observatory program, with memorandum of understanding. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Feb. 7, 1997. Entered into force Feb. 7, 1997.

Maldives

Memorandum of agreement concerning assistance in developing and modernizing Maldives' civil aviation infrastructure, with annex. Signed at Washington and Male Feb. 12 and 17, 1997. Entered into force Feb. 17, 1997.

Mexico

Protocol concerning the use of the 929-930 MHz and 931-932 MHz bands for paging services along the common border, with appendices and letter of understanding. Signed at Washington Feb. 27, 1997. Entered into force Feb. 27, 1997.

Agreement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety and research matters. Signed at Mexico Mar. 5, 1997. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1997.

Russia

Agreement extending the annexes to the air transport agreement of Jan. 14, 1994, as extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow June 14 and Dec. 14, 1996. Entered into force Dec. 14, 1996.

Memorandum of cooperation between the United States and Russia in the field of research on fundamental properties of matter. Signed at Washington Feb. 7, 1997. Entered into force Feb. 7, 1997.

Sierra Leone

Agreement relating to the employment of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Freetown Jan. 17 and Feb. 24, 1997. Entered into force Feb. 24, 1997.

South Africa

Agreement concerning cooperation in the Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) Program, with appendices. Signed at Cape Town Feb. 17, 1997. Entered into force Feb. 17, 1997.

United Kingdom

Agreement amending and extending the memorandum of understanding of June 21, 1994, for the development testing, qualification testing, and unconstrained enclosure development for the intercooled recuperated (ICR) gas turbine engine. Signed at London and Washington Mar. 6 and 11, 1997. Entered into force Mar. 11, 1997.

Vietnam

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and the Agency for International Development, with annexes. Signed at Hanoi Apr. 7, 1997. Enters into force upon an exchange of letters between the U.S. and Vietnam confirming that all domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled and confirming full payment by Vietnam of the first installments of interest.

Yemen

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Sanaa Apr. 8, 1997. Enters into force following receipt by Yemen of written notice from U.S. that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.

¹Not in force.

²Not in force for the U.S.

³The declarations and reservations entered in respect of the dependent territories on behalf of which the convention was also ratified continue to apply. ■