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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Geneva, Switzerland, August 14, 1996
NICHOLAS BURNS: I've asked General Joulwan to speak to you for a couple of minutes. He wants to talk to you about the incident on Saturday at the Bosnian Serb military headquarters. He'll have a few thoughts on that, and then he'll have time for just a couple of questions because he has to run to the airport.
GENERAL JOULWAN: Thank you very much. Let me tell you what I know about the incident. I assume everyone has read the press release that we're talking about. As I mentioned to one of you as I was coming out of the car this afternoon, I had just heard about and I asked Admiral Lopez to look into it. We're still at that point. Admiral Lopez is conducting a review and he'll make that available to you very shortly. But he's conducting the review of exactly what occurred.
Let me give you what I know at this point from initial reports, and based on some telephone calls that I've made. Again, I would defer to the IFOR commander who will have a more detailed report probably sometime tomorrow. You have to remember that I was in Sarajevo and Pale on Monday, and I think this event took place on Saturday. I went in with the Secretary General Solana on Monday, and so I do have a feel for what was really going on. I'd like to put all that in perspective, if I could, with what I have pieced together with some initial phone calls.
First, a small group, I think a six- or seven-man inspection team, went up to the Hans Pijesak bunker on Saturday. This was the result of weeks of negotiations. It was to do an inspection of that bunker. That's what they went there to do, and it was a small force in order to carry out the inspection. We have carried out inspections in other contonment areas and storage sites, in declared sites, to be precise, in other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. When the team got there, as I understand it, they were met by a guard that was guarding the bunker at the time. From what I understand, he said they could not be admitted unless -- as I heard when I took some telephone calls this afternoon -- General Mladic escorted them. I don't know if that was done in jest or not. But the comment that got back to me was that this was taken very seriously by our team that was there. There were about 200 or 300 troops guarding the bunker at the time on the Bosnian Serb side. This six- or seven-man crew pulled back, said that "we accept no conditions." Again, they waited there for several hours, nothing happened, and they were then called back.
Then, it's very important what occurred. This is what I do know. IFOR then went through a very deliberate planning process. I received a call on Saturday that they had been denied access, and that they would brief me on Monday when I went down there, which they did. I was with the Secretary General, and I recommended, and the Secretary-General approved, what they call "Fear Naught" procedures, which is to start protecting people from agencies as well as from IFOR. There was a deliberate plan for forced entry into that bunker by what would have been a very substantial force if inspection was not granted, and if any indicted war criminal, including Mladic, was inside that bunker he would be detained, and turned over to proper authorities. That's the mission, and that would have occurred. There was no attempt to mislead anyone. It seems to be portrayed that way, but there was no attempt to do it. We were about ready to conduct a forced entry into this bunker. The Secretary General and I met with Madam Plavsic, and Mr. Krajisnic in Pale, I told them of the seriousness of this, and again said that we need to inspect that bunker. That bunker was inspected yesterday. It was very clear: We were not ducking anything, we were carrying out our instructions. We would have conducted a very deliberate forced-entry operation to take that facility and conduct the inspection. That's what I know of the facts. I'm sure that Admiral Lopez, when he completes his review, will give you more information from Sarajevo.
QUESTION: What has the higher priority in your view -- apprehending the military leader of the Bosnian Serbs, who probably has the blood of tens of thousands of people on his hands, or taking a look at a bunker? Secondly, could Mladic have slipped away without IFOR knowing about it by the time you got back to the bunker? Third, could you have taken measures to make sure he didn't slip away? Fourth, couldn't you have summoned a full force if indeed apprehending had the higher priority with IFOR?
GENERAL JOULWAN: They were in the process of conducting a very deliberate operation into Mladic's bunker. That's what they were in the process of doing. We place a very high premium on indicted war criminals, I've said that in the past. We will, within the mission that I've been given, carry out that mission. I think justice needs to be done. I think the Secretary General of NATO has said it very clearly that these individuals belong in The Hague. Let there be no misunderstandings; that is a high priority for IFOR, and we will carry out that mission.
QUESTION: But why couldn't that little force blow a whistle and say, "Send up more peacekeepers. We think Mladic is in there, and we'd like to grab him while we can." Why wait two days and go back when he's probably slipped away?
GENERAL JOULWAN: You can't really mean it as simply as you say, "by blowing a whistle." We were going back and planning a deliberate operation to go into that bunker.
QUESTION: But by then he's gone.
GENERAL JOULWAN: It doesn't happen that quickly, that if they were confronted with the situation, 30 minutes later you have the sufficient force to do a forced entry into that sort of facility. That is not in the guidance that we're given, in terms of "as the tactical situation permits." I think that needs to be clearly understood.
QUESTION: General, if you understood that this was Mladic's bunker, as I understood you to say, why was a six- or seven-man force dispatched, rather than a larger group?
GENERAL JOULWAN: They were there to do an inspection. That is what there were sent there to do. If, in the course of that inspection, they would have run into Mladic, they would have had to make a decision, but they were there to do an inspection of a bunker.
QUESTION: But you didn't expect to see 200 to 300 Serb soldiers on hand at such a bunker?
GENERAL JOULWAN: They had worked this for weeks to go in and do this inspection. They had every reason to believe that they could conduct the inspection.
NICHOLAS BURNS: I've been with the General in the last couple of hours, and we've tried to at least get some initial reports from Sarajevo. What is striking to us, and we've been asking this question: It's not at all clear that the soldiers in question knew for a fact that he was inside the bunker. That's one of the issues that Admiral Lopez is going to be dealing with. We need to know the answer to that.
QUESTION: But it was Mladic's bunker.
NICHOLAS BURNS: Yes, it was. But that's not all clear, Steve, and that's a very important point.
GENERAL JOULWAN: It wasn't even clear exactly where the bunker was located, to be very honest. All of that needs to be understood as they were going to carry out their duty.
QUESTION: Why does IFOR feel it necessary to negotiate to conduct an inspection? Is it not in IFOR's writ that you go where and when you want? Especially given the fact that it is known that Hans Pijesak is Mladic's headquarters. There seems to be something slightly out of focus here, with all due respect. Why is it that (a) IFOR negotiated, feels it necessary to negotiate; and (b) why send such a small force once you had negotiated? Mladic, after all, did the same thing five weeks ago. I know that for a fact.
GENERAL JOULWAN: Part of this was a continuation of that discussion five weeks ago. This was an attempt to -- I wouldn't call it negotiations; we had asked to go in there.
QUESTION: But that's what you called it.
GENERAL JOULWAN: Then a poor choice of words. They were attempting to inspect this facility, like they have several hundred facilities. This was another declared site that they were trying to inspect, like they have others in the past. But I think the other part of this was there was a planned operation that was ongoing, that they were going to have the force necessary to enter this very heavily armed facility, and they were going through that process. It's not as if they didn't think about it, they did have this contingency plan to do it. They pulled back, and they were in the process of doing that. They would have conducted a forced entry, and General Walkman --
QUESTION: How many people were going to be brought up to go in?
GENERAL JOULWAN: I'd rather not get into operational details, but a sufficient force in order to be able to do it.
QUESTION: And where were they on Sunday?
GENERAL JOULWAN: They were in the vicinity, but it takes a planned effort to go in there. It's not going to happen when you've got seven people. You have to pull the people out, and then you conduct the operation. I think that's very wise to do, and they were in the process of doing that. QUESTION: Might it not have been possible to send a larger force to begin with? Because there had been trouble with the Bosnian Serbs there.
GENERAL JOULWAN: Let's let Admiral Lopez his review. I think it's important to let the field answer those sort of questions on the tactical side, the planning process and what they went through.
QUESTION: During the weeks of talks in preparing for this inspection, it wasn't discussed whether Mladic would be there? You didn't say, "Make he's not there?"
GENERAL JOULWAN: Again, I think the best answer to that is in the field. To my understanding, no, there were no conditions at all. It was very clear there would be no conditions at all, this would be an inspection like any other inspection done at any other site. No conditions.
QUESTION: I guess there's really a broader question here. These two people who've been indicted as war criminals are pretty well known -- Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic. Do you intend to apprehend them for war crimes, or are you basically trying to stay away from running into them? Do you know where they are? Why don't you have the intelligence to know where they are, and why don't you go get them if you were going to do this?
GENERAL JOULWAN: I won't comment too much on operational details. Let's me make it clear: Absolutely not. Our mission is to detain them, and if we come in contact with them, we will do exactly that, that is part of the IFOR mission.
QUESTION: With all due respect, you said apprehending war criminals was a high priority. If it's a high priority, sir, why don't you go and apprehend them? I'm sure your intelligence is good enough that you know where they are. Certainly you have a pretty good idea now where they hang out. Or is your intelligence not good enough to know where they are? Or do you just not want to do it before the elections? Or not at all? In other words, is this really not a top priority?
GENERAL JOULWAN: It is a top priority, and within the instructions that I've been given we will conduct the mission, within the instructions we've been given. That's what I can say. But please don't take from that that this is not a high priority. We have a clear set of rules that we're operating under. I think you understand those. But if we come in contact with him, I assure you we'll detain him. Now let me be clear: Two guys out on a patrol somewhere, coming in contact with an indicted war criminal in a convoy of several hundred people, I think you have to use some judgment here. We've asked our troops to use judgment if they would come in contact with him. In this case, there was a very well planned operation, a forced-entry operation, that was being planned to go into this facility. If Mladic was in that facility, he would be detained and turned over to proper authorities, by IFOR. Period.
QUESTION: Did they announce they would be sending only seven people to the bunker when they were talking to the Bosnian Serbs?
GENERAL JOULWAN: You'll have to ask that when you get down to IFOR and ask the commander who's doing a review of that now.
NICHOLAS BURNS: Last question.
QUESTION: Did the Bosnian Serbs at any point offer to produce Mladic to accompany your people?
GENERAL JOULWAN: Again, I would ask you to ask that of the IFOR commander who's making a review now.
QUESTION: When you were there on Monday, were you briefed about this?
GENERAL JOULWAN: No, as I said, I just heard about it when you asked me the question.
QUESTION: Isn't that curious?
GENERAL JOULWAN: I don't know. Conjecture on my part is that they were there to do an inspection. This idea of Mladic -- and again that's why I'm conjecturing here, I won't take it in jest, but it was sort of like "he'd have to take you in," words to that effect. But that's what Admiral Lopez is going to look into. They were there to do inspections. No conditions on the inspections. They were denied access. They were pulling back. A full-scale operation was being planned, that was approved. If, in the course of that operation, they would have come in contact with General Mladic, they would have detained him and turned him over to proper authorities.
QUESTION: I find it a little curious you weren't briefed on what happened two days before.
GENERAL JOULWAN: That's part of the review that I've asked them to conduct.
QUESTION: Have all of the inspections required two weeks prior notice?
GENERAL JOULWAN: Again, ask that of those in Sarajevo. I'm not really sure. They'll be able to answer that for you.
[end of document]
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