THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO

Why Adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO Strengthens American National Security

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEBRUARY 1998
"The bottom line is clear: Expanding NATO will enhance our security. It is the right thing to do."

"We must not fail history's challenge at this moment to build a Europe peaceful, democratic, and undivided, allied with us to face new security threats of the new century—a Europe that will avoid repeating the darkest moments of the 20th century and fulfill the brilliant possibilities of the 21st."

President Clinton
May 31, 1997

"A larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in Europe where wars simply do not happen."

Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright
October 7, 1997
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Why Is NATO Enlargement Good For the United States?

**NATO enlargement will make America safer.** Europe remains vital to American interests, and NATO is the most effective institution for protecting the security of the transatlantic area. Adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the Alliance will extend NATO’s stabilizing influence to more of Europe and reduce the chances of aggression or conflict in Central Europe—a region that helped spawn both of this century's World Wars and the Cold War.

**NATO enlargement will make NATO stronger.** The three new members will add approximately 200,000 troops to NATO’s ranks that can help NATO carry out its missions; indeed, these three states already are contributing over 1,000 troops to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia. NATO has added new members three times since its founding in 1949; now, as then, enlargement will make NATO stronger.

**NATO enlargement will help consolidate democracy and stability in Central Europe.** To join NATO, states must be solid market democracies and have good relations with their neighbors. Just the prospect of NATO enlargement has encouraged states in the region to conclude nearly a dozen major agreements to settle border and ethnic disputes; Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have settled all border issues with their neighbors.

**Enlargement will help erase the Cold War dividing line.** It would be wrong to exclude qualified Central European democracies from Western institutions simply because they were held behind the Iron Curtain against their will. By admitting these three states, and holding the door open to other new members in the future, NATO enlargement will help to erase the outdated and illegitimate Cold War dividing line.
The Enlargement of NATO

Why Adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO Strengthens American National Security

Preface

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most successful alliance in history. For almost 50 years, it has been the primary shield for protecting peace in Europe and the principal institution uniting America and Europe in defense of our common interests. Now, in order to make Europe even more stable and our own country more secure, the United States and its NATO allies have decided to invite three additional states to join the Alliance—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

This proposal requires ratification by the United States, including a two-thirds vote in the U.S. Senate, which is expected to vote on the measure in early 1998. The decision is one of great consequence and demands careful and bipartisan consideration by the Congress and the American public. The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, upon which NATO is based, involves solemn security guarantees. The inclusion of additional states will entail additional costs to all of the Alliance’s members—current and new. The enlargement of NATO will benefit American security in a number of ways but has a range of implications for many aspects of U.S. foreign policy that merit attention.

This pamphlet is designed to explain what NATO is, how it plans to add these new members, and why this step, combined with other current policies, will advance the security interests of the United States and all of Europe.
Introduction: Changes in Europe; Challenges for NATO

The end of the Cold War transformed Europe and the context in which NATO operates. The Berlin Wall has fallen. New democracies with thriving market economies have emerged across Central Europe. Germany has been reunited. The Soviet Union has dissolved; a democratic Russia and more than a dozen other independent states have taken its place. Such changes in Europe were unimaginable less than a decade ago.

These changes hold great promise for the United States. The dangerous nuclear-armed superpower standoff of the Cold War is over. The imminent threat of massive land invasion in Europe is gone. The subjugation of European states has ended. The end of bloc-to-bloc confrontation creates opportunities for nuclear and conventional arms control, as well as for improved cooperation on a host of common challenges from trade, to international crime, to the environment.

The rise of free market democracies in the place of the former Soviet bloc also serves our interests. Democratic countries are less likely to attack us and other democracies, and the blossoming of free market economies creates opportunities for U.S. businesses and workers. The interest of the United States lies in consolidating these trends and helping to build an undivided, democratic, peaceful Europe for the first time in its history. Both the current and preceding administrations have relied on a variety of means—bilateral relations, arms control accords, and a number of multilateral institutions—to work toward that goal.

Even with the end of the Cold War, NATO remains the vital link in our security relations across the Atlantic. The 16-member Alliance is helping to build a new Europe. It has streamlined its command structure and reduced its force levels, with U.S. troop strength in Europe down from more than 300,000 during the Cold War to about 100,000 today. NATO has taken on new missions, such as the one in Bosnia, where troops from the U.S. and other NATO countries are working side by side with those from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and other non-NATO countries. They have succeeded in stopping the killing in Europe’s worst conflict since World War II.

NATO also has reached out to other nations. In 1994 NATO launched the Partnership for Peace. This program, which now includes 27 non-NATO states, is open to all the countries of Europe and the former Soviet Union and
enables peaceful military-to-military cooperation, such as joint training exercises and the exchange of information. In May 1997, President Clinton and the other NATO leaders signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act, reflecting the desire to build a new and constructive relationship with a democratic, peaceful Russia. NATO also has established a charter with Ukraine and formed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to enhance political discussion between NATO and its partner states.

The most important change NATO has undertaken is the addition of new members. At the Madrid summit in July 1997, President Clinton and the other NATO leaders unanimously decided to invite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to begin the process of joining NATO. NATO also declared that the Alliance would keep its door open to other candidate states as well.

Meeting in Brussels on December 16, 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and her NATO counterparts signed the documents to add the three new members to the Alliance. This addition of new members requires ratification by all 16 current NATO

President Clinton with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana at the Madrid summit, July 1997. (NATO photo)
members, including the approval of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. The Senate is expected to vote on the addition of these first three states in the coming months. Members of both parties and both chambers in Congress already have examined questions regarding NATO enlargement in great depth. The Senate alone held 10 hearings on this issue before four different committees in 1997, and more hearings are anticipated in early 1998. NATO’s goal is that all member nations ratify the Alliance’s enlargement by April 1999, the date of the next NATO summit.

Why Is Europe Important To the United States?

Why should we consider Europe’s security to be “vital” to the United States? What interests do we have there? These are fundamental questions. In the early days of our nation, George Washington warned against entangling alliances, and as a relatively new and weak state we steered clear of being tied to an alliance with any of Europe’s quarreling powers.

But with the rise of the United States as a major economic, political, and military power in this century, it became clear that standing aloof from Europe’s problems was neither possible nor desirable. After being drawn into World War I, the U.S. tried to retreat into isolation, rejecting the League of Nations and undermining the Treaty of Versailles. But bitter experience demonstrated that Europe’s problems soon become our own. Adolf Hitler proved that an aggressor bent on European domination also would threaten U.S. interests and shores. American involvement in World War II produced combat losses of nearly 300,000 of our own people and tens of millions more worldwide.

After World War II, the United States took a better course. The U.S. made a decision to remain engaged in Europe’s security. In 1947 President Truman launched the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe and prevent its postwar poverty from becoming a breeding ground for new instability. The U.S. and European states also launched a series of economic, political, and security institutions—including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—designed to help pull

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Europe, taken as a whole, is America’s largest economic partner, accounting for $250 billion in annual two-way trade, and another $250 billion in investment. Our commerce with Europe accounts for millions of American jobs.

Similarly, Europe’s states have worked with us in worldwide security efforts, from the Gulf war, to the sanctions that helped end apartheid in South Africa, to today’s NATO-led mission in Bosnia, where almost three-quarters of the troops are European. It is inconceivable for the U.S. to approach the security challenges or commercial opportunities of the next century without European states as our core partners and allies.

What Is NATO?

One of the boldest international steps taken by the United States after World War II was the signing in 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty and its creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This step represented an acknowledgment on both sides of the Atlantic that it was essential for the United States to stay engaged in European security, and that a military alliance represented an indispensable way of doing so. NATO, originally formed with 12 states, has become the most successful alliance in history. Subsequent expansions have brought the Alliance to 16 members.

Secretary Albright addresses an informal meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the ministerial level, Brussels, Belgium, February 1997. (NATO photo)

European countries closer together, to remove the sources of conflict, and to deter future aggression.

The establishment of these institutions and America’s new commitments to Europe reflected the unique nature of our transatlantic bonds—bonds of history, heritage, culture, commerce, shared security interests, and shared values. A half-century later, these bonds remain strong. Europe, taken as a whole, is
The security obligations of NATO members to one another are described by the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 (sometimes called the “Washington Treaty”). NATO provides a mechanism for its members to discuss common security concerns, coordinate their security policies in mutually beneficial ways, and prepare for common security challenges through participation in an integrated military command structure. Each NATO country retains sovereignty over its own troops, yet works with the other allies to designate which of its forces are available to cooperate with allied counterparts, and then to coordinate necessary planning and training. Although NATO’s existence and operations are consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, it is not a part of the United Nations organization.

NATO makes all of its decisions by consensus. All 16 members must agree on any action before it is taken. This requirement gives each of its members, including the U.S., a veto over any NATO decision. Thus, NATO never deploys forces or enters into an operation without American approval, and American forces are never deployed as part of a NATO operation without American approval.

"NATO enlargement is critical to protecting and promoting our vital national security interests in Europe. If we fail to seize this historic opportunity to help integrate, consolidate, and stabilize Central and Eastern Europe, we would risk paying a much higher price later."

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen
April 23, 1997
In an April 4, 1949, ceremony, Secretary of State Acheson signs the North Atlantic Treaty—the first peacetime alliance in American history. President Truman stands behind the Secretary. (State Department photo)

"[NATO] will create a shield against aggression and fear of aggression—a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all citizens. . . ."

President Harry S. Truman
April 4, 1949

of a NATO operation without the review, approval, and direct orders of the President and his military chain of command. The Alliance’s top military officer in Europe—the Supreme Allied Commander Europe—has always been an American general, reflecting America’s substantial military contribution.

The heart of NATO is its mission of collective defense of the soil of NATO’s members. This commitment is embodied in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (for the full text of the treaty, see page 22) which states in part:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

This is the strongest security commitment in the Treaty and has been a primary basis for the mutual confidence that has evolved among NATO allies over the past half-century. While Article 5 is a solemn political and military commitment, it does not specify any particular response by the United States to a specific situation, and does nothing to diminish the role of Congress in the use of force abroad. Indeed, under Article 11, all provisions of the Treaty, including Article 5, are subject to the “constitutional processes” of its member states—a phrase specifically requested by the U.S. Senate to ensure that the Treaty did not undermine Congress’s constitutional role in such decisions.

NATO, headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, is at its core a military alliance, but it always has served broad political functions. It is the key forum for maintaining consensus among its members as they pursue common interests. It also has helped to deepen cooperation among its members, promote common values, and temper tensions and disputes, such as those that have existed between Turkey and Greece.

Although NATO’s security challenges have changed with the end of the Cold War, enlargement will do nothing to dilute NATO’s focus or drag it into more disputes.

- The Alliance’s core mission will remain the collective defense of NATO soil, and the addition of new members will improve its ability to carry out this mission.
- Enlargement reduces the chances of conflicts like the one in Bosnia; the prospect of joining NATO has encouraged Central European countries to settle border and ethnic disputes. The three new members have settled all outstanding border disputes with their neighbors.
- Once these states have joined the Alliance, the likelihood of conflict diminishes even further; no NATO state has ever come under major attack.
- If a minor or internal dispute were to break out, the North Atlantic Treaty would not automatically require U.S. military involvement. The North Atlantic Treaty’s core security guarantee is triggered by “armed attack” on a state, and under the treaty the U.S. still makes its own decisions about how best to respond.
Why Is NATO Enlargement Good for U.S. Security?

As the U.S. considers ratifying the addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO, the most fundamental question is: Why is this in our own national security interest? There are four principal reasons.

First, NATO enlargement will make America safer by helping to prevent future conflicts in Europe. Both World Wars and the Cold War had their roots, in part, in Central Europe. It is in our own interest to prevent and deter conflicts in the region that ultimately could draw in American forces. Even though Europe is now relatively peaceful, all danger has not disappeared, as Bosnia proved. A larger NATO can bring more states into the cooperative process of security planning that has built confidence and stability among NATO members. It also can help deter a variety of real and potential threats, including regional conflicts, threats from rogue regimes, such as those with weapons of mass destruction, and the unlikely possibility that Russia’s democratic transition might falter and give way to the patterns of behavior demonstrated during the Soviet period.

While enlarging NATO requires that we extend security commitments to the region, doing so actually reduces the chances that our forces will ever have to fight again in Europe. As Secretary of State Albright has noted: “This is the productive paradox at NATO’s heart—by imposing a price on aggression, the Alliance deters aggression.”

Second, NATO enlargement will make the Alliance stronger and better able to address future security challenges. The inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO will add approximately 200,000 troops to the Alliance, along with a proven commitment to European security. The three countries already are contributing more than 1,000 troops to the NATO-led operation in Bosnia, and Hungary has provided the military base at Taszar that has enabled U.S. forces to deploy safely and effectively. Similarly, the Czechs and Poles served with us in the Gulf war, and all three states have been active participants in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program.

Having so recently regained their own freedom, these three democracies are likely to be energetic allies in helping us to defend freedom in the future. All three states also have made clear commitments concerning their willingness to bear the costs of modernizing their own military forces, so that they can be “security producers” and not simply “security consumers.” NATO has enlarged three times in the past—adding Greece and Turkey in 1952, Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982—and there is
no reason to believe that adding these three states will diminish the ability of the Alliance to continue reaching consensus on its plans and actions.

Third, NATO enlargement will help consolidate democracy and stability in Central Europe. NATO established in 1995 that states wishing to join the Alliance would need to be stable market democracies, and would need to have resolved outstanding disputes with their neighbors. These requirements were essential to ensure that enlargement strengthens the Alliance rather than weakening it. Because many Central European states are eager to join the Alliance—12 in all have indicated such an interest—just the prospect of the Alliance’s enlargement has encouraged many to strengthen their recent reforms and conclude agreements with neighboring states. For example, in recent years states such as Poland have deepened civilian control over the military, while states such as Romania have increased protections for ethnic minorities. Similarly, there have been 10 major agreements among states in the region

“A larger NATO will make America safer, NATO stronger, and Europe more peaceful and united. That is the strategic rationale. But... I see a moral imperative as well. For this is a policy that should appeal to our hearts as well as our heads. . . .”

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
October 7, 1997
during this decade settling border and ethnic disputes; the prospect of NATO’s enlargement helped encourage negotiations on many of these agreements. All these actions removed seeds of possible future conflicts that might otherwise have affected U.S. security and economic interests.

**Fourth, NATO enlargement will help erase the Cold War dividing line.** With the Cold War over, there is no justifiable reason for permanently excluding from Western institutions the countries that were held behind the Iron Curtain against their will. One reason the U.S. waged the Cold War was the belief that Central European states should be free to choose their own governments and security arrangements. Now that these states have regained their freedom and established market democracies, we should welcome the opportunity to reintegrate them into the transatlantic community. One way we can continue to erase the outdated and illegitimate Cold War dividing line is to bring states from Central Europe into the Alliance, as they prove their readiness to assume the burdens of NATO membership and to contribute to the security of the transatlantic area. The Alliance’s commitment to keep an “open door” for other states interested in joining NATO membership and prepared to shoulder the responsibilities of membership, and its range of efforts to reach out to non-NATO states, will help ensure that the process of enlargement does not create a new dividing line in Europe.

“In our committee hearings, the vitally important issues of cost and NATO’s relations with Russia were examined in great detail. We are persuaded that the overwhelming weight of testimony on these points reinforces the argument for NATO enlargement. . . . We believe that NATO enlargement, arguably the most important foreign policy initiative for our country in many years, is an issue that transcends partisan politics. Both of us are firmly convinced that enlargement is squarely in the American national interest.”

Senator Jesse Helms (R, NC), Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Joseph R. Biden (D, DE), Ranking Minority Member
Letter to their colleagues, November 10, 1997
What Will Enlargement Cost?

Security is not free, and NATO enlargement, like every other aspect of America’s security, will carry costs. Adding members to NATO will require the United States and its allies to extend solemn security commitments to additional nations, and NATO members must provide the capability to back them up. The President and his advisers are confident, however, that the costs of NATO enlargement will be affordable, equitably shared with our current and new allies, and well worth the investment.

The cost to the United States will be modest. In February 1997, the Pentagon estimated that the total costs of the first round of enlargement—costs for the U.S., for other current allies, and for the first group of new allies—would be about $27 to $35 billion over 13 years, with the U.S. share totaling about $1.5 to $2 billion, spread over a period of about 10 years. (The addition of other members in the future would likely carry additional costs, but these could not be estimated without knowing which states might be invited to join.) In the fall of 1997, NATO authorities examined the military requirements and the impact of enlargement on the common-funded budgets of NATO in greater detail, including on-site visits to military facilities in the three invited states. Partly because these facilities were in better condition than previously assumed, they concluded that at least one portion of the estimated costs—those funded directly by NATO through its common-funded budgets—would be less than the Pentagon’s earlier estimates. The United States concurs with NATO’s assessment of $1.5 billion and now expects the U.S. share of the costs of enlargement to be about $400 million over the coming decade.

Our current and new allies will pay their fair share. At the Madrid summit in July 1997, the NATO allies agreed that the costs of enlargement would be manageable. At the North Atlantic Council Defense Minister’s meeting in December 1997, all 16 allies reaffirmed this view, stating that

“Has it not been established beyond doubt that even the most costly preventive security is cheaper than the cheapest war? Well, such an investment will hardly generate any return in the next elections, but it will be more appreciated by generations to come.”

Vaclav Havel
President of the Czech Republic
October 3, 1997
Costs associated with the accession of the three invitees will be manageable, and that the resources necessary to meet these costs will be provided in accordance with our agreed procedures under which each ally bears its fair share.

Moreover, both our current allies and the three proposed new allies are investing in the modernization of their militaries, at their own expense, in ways that will better enable them to contribute to NATO’s missions.

There would be greater costs and risks to not enlarging NATO. If the U.S. and its allies fail to help integrate and stabilize Central and Eastern Europe, it could lead to far higher costs later. Polish, Hungarian, and Czech officials have all stressed that it would cost more to pay for their defense outside NATO than inside. Not only would they feel more insecure and thus want to spend more on their own defense outside the Alliance, they would not have the benefit of being able to pool their defense resources with those of other like-minded states. The United States also benefits from having Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the Alliance. Bringing new states into NATO will help prevent conflicts that could cost the U.S. more in the future, and will add new allies that are ready and willing to share the costs of security.

Some estimates produced by both public and private sector organizations have projected higher costs than those produced by the
Department of Defense. Those estimates, however, are based on a much higher threat level, and a much higher level of readiness than political conditions in Europe warrant now and are likely to warrant for the foreseeable future. The U.S. General Accounting Office in a report from August 1997 stated,

Our analysis of DoD’s cost estimate to enlarge NATO indicates that its key assumptions were generally reasonable and were largely consistent with the views of U.S., NATO, and foreign government officials.

Are Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic Ready to Become NATO Members?

When President Clinton made the decision to favor the admission into NATO of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, he did so because he believed those three nations represent the very strongest candidates among the 12 states in the region that had expressed interest in becoming part of the Alliance. At the July 1997 Madrid summit, there was unanimous agreement to invite those three because, of all potential members, they were strongest politically, economically, militarily, and in their foreign policy outlooks.

Political readiness. All three countries have had seven years of solid records as stable democracies. Since 1989, Poland and the Czech Republic have each held three free parliamentary elections and Hungary, two. Just this past September, Poland held free elections that led to another peaceful change in government and once again demonstrated the vitality of that country’s democracy.

All three candidates for membership have taken numerous steps to underscore their political maturity, pluralism, tolerance, and
respect for human rights. The groundwork laid by bold leaders such as Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa has become the foundation for strong and stable democracies. As these countries have emerged from the yoke of communism, they have made tremendous progress in fostering tolerance for Jewish and other religious minorities and ethnic groups. Property restitution laws have been passed to restore to their rightful owners assets stolen by communist regimes. The people of these countries are ready to embrace the Atlantic community, and polling in all three states shows strong support for NATO membership. In November, Hungary held a national referendum on whether to join NATO; more than 85% of those voting said “yes.”

**Economic readiness.** During the 1990s, Central and East European countries have had the fastest economic growth rate in Europe, and the economies of the three NATO candidate states led the way. In eight years, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have undertaken sweeping privatization programs. Currently, over two-thirds of Poland’s and more than 70% of Hungary’s and the Czech Republic’s economies are held by the private sector. Business is expanding steadily in these countries, which have become growing markets for American goods and services. Major U.S. companies have invested billions of dollars in the region.

**Military readiness.** The three new NATO members will add approximately 200,000 troops and a range of airfields, ports, and lines of communication to the Alliance’s collective defense capabilities. Together, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are already contributing more than 1,000 troops to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia. These countries’ contributions to our security are nothing new. As far back as the 1700s, General Kosciuszko of Poland was one of the heroes of the American Revolutionary War and played a key role in the victory at Saratoga. Free Polish and

“If we wish to ensure that we build a stable Europe, a stable and undivided Europe, it’s right to enlarge NATO and offer the Central and East European countries the same opportunity that Western Europe has, while at the same time building a special relationship with Russia.”

Gen. John Shalikashvili
Then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
June 16, 1997
Czech soldiers fought alongside our troops in World War II, and all three states joined forces with us in the Gulf war. The three countries also have established firm civilian control of their militaries and have solid records of reliability in handling sensitive information, both important factors in their readiness to join NATO.

**Foreign policy readiness.**

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have signed agreements to settle all major ethnic and border disputes with their neighbors and are deepening cooperation with these states on a range of common challenges. These countries are playing an important role as models for other countries in Central and Eastern Europe that seek to join NATO of the types of political reforms needed to become members of the Atlantic Alliance. They also have contributed peacekeeping forces to operations in Asia and the Middle East and stood with us in efforts to combat weapons proliferation. In these and other ways, their behavior suggests they will be good allies.

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**What Will Be the Impact Of Enlargement on Relations With Russia?**

The goal that motivates NATO enlargement is the creation of an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe. That goal cannot be fully realized unless our efforts also include Russia. The continued development of a democratic Russia, satisfied within its borders and at peace with its neighbors, offers one of the most important improvements in the security environment of the entire transatlantic area, and especially for the states of Central Europe.

The United States and its allies have taken a wide range of steps to encourage the continuation of democratic developments in Russia. The extent of our bilateral efforts with Russia ranges from cooperation in space, to the involvement of Russian troops with our mission in Bosnia, to working together to eliminate the means of delivery for strategic nuclear weapons, and to clean up the environment. We also work with Russia in multilateral settings such as the 1997 Denver “Summit of the Eight,” which brought Russia together with the top seven

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“NATO expansion means peace and stability, not a drive at confrontation with anybody. This is not a question of aggravating Russia. It is a question of peace in the world.”

Lech Walesa
Former President of Poland
March 11, 1997
industrial countries to discuss a range of economic and political issues. In the past five years, more than 20,000 Russians have visited the United States through official exchange programs.

In order to further such constructive ties with Russia, the Alliance crafted and signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997, which institutionalizes a broad and constructive relationship between the Alliance and Russia. One of the key features of the Act is the establishment of the Permanent Joint Council which provides a forum for senior NATO and Russian leaders to discuss security issues. This council has already held several productive ministerial meetings in which Secretary Albright or Secretary Cohen met with NATO and Russian counterparts.

Of course, Russia's future is not certain, and it is possible Russia's democratic and economic transition could falter. One of the contingencies the Alliance must prepare for is the unlikely possibility that the Russian transition might fail and that Russia might return to the threatening behavior of the Soviet period. But U.S. policy, including NATO enlargement, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the Permanent Joint Council, is designed to create the greatest possible likelihood that Russia will be able to play a full and constructive role in Europe's future.
Despite this record of intensifying cooperation between Russia with both the U.S. and NATO, many in Russia oppose NATO enlargement. President Yeltsin, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and others have criticized it. Some in Russia’s parliament, the Duma, have cited it as a reason for delaying ratification of the START II nuclear arms reduction treaty. Some observers have expressed concern that ultranationalists could use the issue to fan popular resentment in Russia and thereby strengthen the hand of hard-line political leaders.

However, partly because of the cooperative efforts initiated with Russia by the U.S. and NATO, there are strong reasons to believe that NATO enlargement is not undermining Russian reform or strengthening hardliners. Many recent developments argue to the contrary, including the re-election of Boris Yeltsin and the presence of reformers in positions of power, the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and Russian participation in NATO programs such as the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

Nor is there significant evidence that NATO enlargement has been successfully used as a rallying cry by hardliners.

The reasons are straightforward. NATO, a purely defensive alliance, does not threaten Russia. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, NATO greatly reduced troop levels and declared that it does not view Russia as an adversary. NATO also has stated

Former Senator Dole talks to Task Force Eagle soldiers at the Eagle Base, Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina, December 22, 1997. Dole and his wife Elizabeth (left) accompanied President Clinton and First Lady Hillary Clinton and their daughter Chelsea for a holiday visit with the troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (DoD photo)
that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. NATO also has stated that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.

U.S. interests are served by both NATO enlargement and a more cooperative relationship with Russia, and there are strong signs that the U.S. and its European partners can successfully pursue both. Even so, there are some in the United States who worry that the new arrangements with Russia—the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council—might weaken NATO by giving Russia too much influence in the Alliance or relegate the new members to second-class status. Yet the Founding Act and Permanent Joint Council were carefully designed to enable a constructive relationship with Russia without undermining NATO’s strength or effectiveness.

Although the NATO-Russian relationship is growing deeper, there are important provisions built into the NATO-Russia founding Act.

- It gives Russia a voice, but not a veto, in European security issues.
- Russia will not be part of the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance’s supreme decision-making body, and will have no control over its deliberations or actions. Nor will Russia be part of the committee that sets NATO’s nuclear policy, its defense planning process, or other internal Alliance decisionmaking bodies.
- Because the Permanent Joint Council can only act on the basis of consensus, each NATO member, including the U.S., retains an effective veto over its decisions.
- The statements in the NATO-Russia Founding Act concerning NATO’s nuclear and conventional posture policies were unilateral NATO statements of policy, explicitly premised on the current and foreseeable security environment, and based on NATO members’ own self-interest, not extended as a favor to Russia.
- The Permanent Joint Council is not something that only benefits Russia; NATO can use this forum to raise its own concerns with Russia.

What Does Enlargement Mean For States Not Initially Invited Into the Alliance?

Given its motivating goal of an undivided, democratic, peaceful Europe, NATO enlargement is intended to benefit all of Europe, not just the three states that initially have been invited to join. NATO has undertaken a number of steps
to ensure that the process of enlargement helps increase security throughout the region.

- At the Madrid summit, NATO's leaders adopted an “open door” policy that ensures other countries wishing to enter the Alliance and prepared to share its burdens will be considered in the future. President Clinton has stressed that NATO's invitations to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary will not be the last.
- NATO and its partners have established the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council which provides a forum for intensified political and security consultations for countries on both sides of the Atlantic.
- NATO signed a charter with Ukraine as well as its Founding Act with Russia.
- The U.S. is taking bilateral steps to enhance the security and advance the integration of the Baltic states. In the Charter of Partnership with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, recently signed by President Clinton and the Baltic leaders, the U.S. welcomes the aspirations and supports the efforts of these states to join NATO.

Still, there are some who worry that NATO enlargement will draw a new dividing line in Europe that will cause new tensions and reduce the security of those states not invited in. Again, this is an important concern. Yet there is strong evidence to suggest that NATO enlargement is not having this effect.

Worries that those countries not initially invited to join, such as Romania and Slovenia, would feel isolated or be destabilized by the enlargement process have not materialized. In fact, President Clinton received a clamorous welcome when he traveled to Romania two days after the Madrid summit. Leaders throughout the region have expressed support for the decisions taken at Madrid—even if their own states were not invited—and support for the broader process these decisions represent. Nor have states not invited at Madrid become more vulnerable. During this period, Russia has increased its cooperation with Estonia and Ukraine and has signed a border agreement with Lithuania, the first of its kind with a former Soviet republic. Meanwhile, Poland is strengthening its ties to the Baltic states and Ukraine.

Why Not Rely on the European Union or Other Existing Programs?

NATO enlargement is just one aspect of Europe's post-Cold War adaptation. Economic challenges remain pivotal for Central European states. Most of these states need to advance and deepen aspects of reform—from privatization, to improved regula-
tory regimes, to efforts against corruption. This is one reason we support the enlargement of the European Union (EU) to include Central European states.

While the role of the EU is crucial, there is no reason to insist on a choice between EU enlargement and NATO enlargement. Both are important. Each contributes to European prosperity and security. Moreover, EU enlargement alone is not sufficient to secure our nation’s security interests in post-Cold War Europe. The EU lacks the kind of advanced, integrated military capability which remains the heart of NATO’s strength, and which continues to be needed to preserve European security. Moreover, the U.S. is not a member of the European Union, which is one reason why NATO remains our nation’s most important and effective link to transatlantic security.

Similarly, there are other existing programs that focus on Central Europe that will complement NATO’s enlargement but cannot by themselves accomplish the same objectives. NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, for example, has provided an excellent means for Europe’s NATO and non-NATO states to develop deeper ties through military-to-military cooperation and to enable states that aspire to NATO membership to improve their readiness. Partnership for Peace, however, does not entail mutual security commitments as does actual NATO membership, nor does it provide the same incentives and benefits of integration as NATO’s enlargement.

Conclusion: Building Another Half-Century of Security and Peace

The 20th century has been the bloodiest in history, and much of the conflict and warfare it produced was on the European continent. The United States paid a heavy price in those conflicts, measured in both financial and human cost. One of the great challenges of this time is to find ways of preserving and strengthening the relatively peaceful security environment that we now enjoy in Europe after the end of the Cold War.

The enlargement of NATO is a key part of the strategy to meet that challenge, and it builds on the central lessons that have emerged from this century’s experiences.

- Europe’s security is vital to our own, and NATO enlargement will help make Europe more stable and secure.
- The period between the two World Wars revealed the futility of American retreat from European security challenges, and NATO enlargement will help our nation continue to play a leading role in European security—for our sake as well as Europe’s.
- The two World Wars and the Cold War point to the key role Central Europe plays in Europe’s
conflicts, and adding new members to the Alliance will enable NATO to do for Europe’s east what it has done for Europe’s west.

- The success of NATO in deterring Soviet aggression and deepening European integration during the Cold War—and its success more recently in stopping the fighting in Bosnia—testifies to the effectiveness of this Alliance; adding new members will make the Alliance stronger and better able to carry out its mission.

- Our experiences across this century—from the World Wars to the Gulf War—highlight the value of reliable allies that are willing to help shoulder the burdens of security; NATO enlargement will give us three new allies that are ready to share those burdens and have done so in the past.

In all these ways, the enlargement of NATO will advance American interests, prevent future conflicts, deter future threats, and help consolidate the gains of democracy and stability that have come with the end of the Cold War. It will help build a Europe that is undivided, democratic, and at peace—and by doing so, create a more secure foundation for the United States in the 21st century.
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

**Article 1**

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

**Article 2**

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

**Article 3**

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

**Article 4**

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

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**Appendix:**

The North Atlantic Treaty

Washington, D.C.

April 4, 1949
Article 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

—on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9
The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish
immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

**Article 10**

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

**Article 11**

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

**Article 12**

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

**Article 13**

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

**Article 14**

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatories.