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Alina L. Romanowski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Testimony, House International Relations Committee Washington, DC, March 23, 2000 |
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Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, and esteemed colleagues. I am pleased to be here this afternoon to discuss developments on the military side of our Iraq policy. As my colleagues from the State Department have noted, we have three primary objectives in Iraq: containment, humanitarian relief, and regime change. Of these three areas, the Department of Defense contributes primarily to that of containment, by enforcing the no-fly zones (NFZs) in northern and southern Iraq, enforcing the UN economic sanctions through the operations of the Maritime Interception Force (MIF) in the Gulf, and maintaining a credible force in the region, which can be quickly reinforced if necessary, to deter and if necessary respond militarily to Iraqi aggression or provocations. The no-fly zones are a necessary measure to contain Saddam Hussein's aggression against the people of Iraq and the region. They were established to support UN Security Council Resolution 688, which required the Iraqi regime to cease repression of Iraqi civilian populations, repression that the Council determined was a threat to international peace and security. Operations Northern and Southern Watch have ensured that Baghdad is unable to use fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters against the populations of northern and southern Iraq, a limitation that sharply reduces the effectiveness of regime operations. In addition, Operation Southern Watch also ensures that Iraq cannot secretly reinforce or strengthen its military forces in southern Iraq in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 949. For most of the period since the no-fly zones were established, our patrol's were carried out without serious Iraqi attempts to interfere. In the past 15 months, however, Iraqi air and air defense forces have begun regularly challenging the NFZs. Iraq publicly announced its intent to shoot down coalition aircraft, and it violated the no-fly zones over 600 times in 1999, either by sending aircraft into prohibited airspace or firing on coalition aircraft with anti-aircraft artillery or surface-to-air missiles. We have taken prudent steps to ensure the safety of coalition pilots despite these challenges. These steps have included giving operational commanders additional flexibility in responding to Iraqi actions. Coalition pilots may respond to such provocations not only by defending themselves but also by acting to reduce the overall air defense threat, making the area safer for pilots performing future missions. Though Iraq tries to paint the United States as an aggressor, the ongoing conflict in the NFZs is entirely Iraq's doing. We would welcome an end to Saddam's provocations. In fact, we have stated repeatedly that we will stop bombing Iraqi military facilities if Iraq stops threatening coalition aircraft. Our operations in the no-fly zones also provide other operational military benefits. Coalition responses have caused a significant degradation of Iraqi air defense capabilities in the zones, a development which will minimize the threat to our forces if more sustained military conflict in Iraq is ever necessary. Furthermore, our control of over sixty percent of Iraq's airspace permits us to assess Iraqi military movements and other developments that might threaten Kuwait or Iraq's other neighbors. Enforcement of the no-fly zones thus provides us with critical early warning of any Iraqi aggression toward its neighbors to the north or the south. A second element of the military contribution to containment is the conduct of maritime interdiction operations in the Persian Gulf. These operations are conducted by a Maritime Interception Force, or MIF, established in 1990 to support UN Security Council Resolution 665. That resolution grants authority to UN member states to halt all inward and outward maritime traffic to Iraq to ensure compliance with the sanctions regime. Though the MIF cannot possibly intercept all illicit goods that go in and out of Iraq, it inspects oil-for-food shipments into and out of Iraq in a search for contraband, seizes a significant amount of unlawful trade, and serves as an important deterrent to other potential smugglers. Its efforts are even more important now, with oil prices rising, as Saddam only has a greater incentive to try to smuggle illicit oil now that the potential financial returns are higher. The MIF also plays an important role in maintaining international support for the sanctions regime. The MIF's interception of ships smuggling oil and food out of Iraq--including the re-export of food and medicines that could benefit Iraqi civilians--irrefutably demonstrates that Saddam and his regime are manipulating the welfare of the Iraqi people for their own personal gain. The multinational character of the MIF also tangibly demonstrates the international community's resolve to ensure that the sanctions are maintained. Eight countries (Argentina, Australia, Kuwait, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the UAE, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have participated in the MIF with either ships or boarding parties during the past year. Nine other countries have participated in the past, and several additional countries have expressed an interest in participating in the near future. Kuwait, Oman, and the UAE regularly accept vessels diverted by the MIF, sometimes at the cost of public criticism. This international support is critical to our larger efforts to deter and respond to Iraqi aggression. We work closely with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states on a wide range of programs designed to promote regional security, and many of these regional partners host U.S. forces. At any given time, the United States has in the region some 17,000-25,000 personnel (most of those afloat), about 30 naval vessels, and some 175 aircraft. We have also taken a number of steps in the past 10 years, including a substantial prepositioning program, that will permit the rapid flow of additional forces to the Gulf region in a crisis. We maintain such a robust capability for a variety of reasons critical to U.S. national security: --To enforce the limitations--such as the sanctions, the no-fly zones, and the no-reinforcement zone in the south--placed on Iraq pursuant to resolutions of the Security Council. --To deter and defend against Iraqi threats to coalition forces, Iraq's neighbors, or UN personnel. --To be able to respond vigorously if Baghdad takes aggressive action against the civilian populations in northern Iraq or seeks to rebuild its WMD programs. Though Iraqi forces continue to possess the ability to threaten regional security, particularly if U.S. and coalition forces were not involved, Iraq's overall conventional military capabilities have continued to decline since Operation Desert Fox. Desert Fox was conducted in December 1998 after UN Special Commission Chairman Richard Butler reported that Iraq was preventing UNSCOM from carrying out its mandate in violation of Security Council Resolution 687, the resolution that terminated hostilities in 1991. Desert Fox was accordingly intended to degrade Iraq's WMD programs and related delivery systems, as well as its ability to threaten the region and coalition forces. We focused the strikes on military targets related to WMD and on the military forces, including air defenses, that protected WMD facilities. Our assessment is that the operation was a success. We believe we set Iraq's ballistic missile programs back by one to two years, degraded the infrastructure that Saddam used to conceal WMD programs from international exposure, and reduced the regime's ability to exercise effective command and control over its forces. Naturally, in the fifteen months since Desert Fox, Saddam has begun to rebuild some of the facilities damaged in Desert Fox, including facilities that were related to Iraq's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. In addition, we also know that Saddam does try to procure WMD-related equipment and materials through a variety of illicit means, including front companies and sham oil-for-food contracts, but, as far as we know, these efforts have produced little or no fruit. Of course, inspectors on the ground are an important factor in assuring whether Iraq has reconstituted its ability to manufacture or deploy WMD. The establishment of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the resumption of weapons inspections is therefore important, as it will give us a sense--should Baghdad permit them to return--of what Iraq has done during the absence of international monitors. That said, we remain convinced that it is preferable to have no inspections at all than to establish a weak, easily manipulated political organization that provides Iraq with propaganda victories by issuing rubber stamp endorsements of Iraq's misleading assertions. That is why it is so important that UNMOVIC be a tough, professional, and competent organization. We are confident that the newly appointed executive chairman of UNMOVIC, Hans Blix, is committed to developing that kind of UNMOVIC and we look forward to the deployment of UNMOVIC inspectors to Iraq. Containing Saddam Hussein requires the continued commitment of the United States and others in the region. Our efforts to enforce the sanctions regime and no-fly zones, the maintenance of credible military capabilities to act quickly and effectively when necessary, and our cooperation with our regional partners and allies are all key components of this important international effort. We will continue to contain Saddam Hussein until a new regime comes to power in Baghdad that will work with the international community to seek a better future for the people of Iraq. Thank you. [end of document] Near Eastern Affairs | Department of State | Secretary of State |
