Middle East Peace Process

The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released online from January 1, 1997 to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for current material from the Department of State. Or visit http://2001-2009.state.gov for information from that period. Archive sites are not updated, so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.

U.S. Department of State
Office of the Spokesman

On-the-Record Briefing by Ambassador Dennis Ross on Middle East Peace Process, Department of State, Washington, DC, October 30, 1996.

QUESTION: The other day the Israeli Ambassador told about a dozen of us that you had asked Arafat to please postpone or defer his trip to Europe and stay with this. In fact, they thought there would be an agreement and maybe a day break that day and a summit and all. And I just wondered if, indeed, Arafat had resisted suggestions from you that he stay at the table and wrap this up.

AMBASSADOR ROSS: We obviously did work very intensively. I think six of the last seven nights that we were out there, we worked until at least five in the morning. I had told the Chairman probably three days before Monday morning, when he was scheduled to leave to go to Europe, that I would try to -- I would work through this, but that if he were to leave the region, as I understood he was planning to do, then I would leave at that time, as well, because so much of my effort involved going back and forth between the leaders each day. It was not only working with the negotiators through the night, it was also going back and forth during the day between the leaders.

So I let him know that if we didn't have it finished by the time that he went on his trip that I would also leave. That's all that I said to him.

QUESTION: What was your preference? Did you express a preference that indeed you both stay?

AMBASSADOR ROSS: I did not express a preference that he stay. I simply stated that we were at a point where if, for reasons that related to his having had a long scheduled trip, he were to leave, then I couldn't be in the region at the same time, because it really robbed me of a lot of the focus and purpose of the effort.

QUESTION: Could you define for us the difference between renegotiation and modifications and alterations?

AMBASSADOR ROSS: Well, I wouldn't even -- I wouldn't use either set of terms. What we are doing is, we are taking the interim agreement as it relates to Hebron redeployment and we are pursuing the -- basically a set of what I would call mechanisms, measures and modalities to implement it.

That's divided into two parts when it comes to Hebron. One is the civil affairs which involves the transfer of authority on the civil side, and it means getting into a greater level of detail than was provided for in the agreement itself. Provision of services, what happens with the infrastructure, the numbers of Palestinian inspectors, transportation. All of these issues, in addition to planning and zoning, are the issues that we had to go into on the civil side.

On the security side, it focused very much on questions very much related to how you insure for both sides that there will be a level of security and you avoid possible points of friction. That produced a lot of different issues that have been discussed, most of which have been resolved but not all.

We went, during this three-week period, from a point of having an agreement in principle that all the issues would be pursued within the framework of the agreement, but the issues themselves really hadn't been raised. By the time I left we had developed quite a bit of an understanding on the civil and the security issues, and have developed draft text accordingly.

AMBASSADOR ROSS: Well, you know, these discussions were obviously extremely intensive, and I think we, as you often find when you go through a process of this sort, the closer you come to agreement, the more you find issues begin to emerge that really hadn't been there before. It is often like peeling the layers of an onion. The closer you get to the point of agreement, you find -- you peel off a new layer and suddenly there are new questions or issues that have to be discussed.

You also go through a different process which is a process of, first of all, forging conceptual understanding on certain issues, and then trying to find a way to express it in words. And that two-stage process is not a simple one. First, reaching the conceptual understanding is obviously critical and essential. It is a necessary condition but it is not a sufficient condition because once you have done it, then you have to be able to translate it into words, and that is always a process that proves to be, I think, intensive and arduous.

So we have come a long way from where we started. We obviously didn't -- we weren't able to overcome all the differences. The negotiations have carried on since I left, and they are being carried on at a lower level. The negotiators are pursuing the issues that are highly technical in character, and we will make a judgment as to when to raise the level.

I wouldn't plan to go out again until we are at a point that I have had a chance to talk with both parties, and we have made a judgment as to whether or not it is appropriate to raise the level or keep it at this level. If we choose to raise the level, then, you know, obviously that will be a point at which I would consider returning.

QUESTION: Dennis, give a noun to describe where we are now? Pause, recess, interruption, breakdown, impasse?

AMBASSADOR ROSS: None of the above. The reality is we don't have breakdown and we don't have breakthrough. We have an ongoing process right now that is being conducted by the negotiators. During the three-week period, we worked at several different levels. It wasn't just that I was going back and forth between the leaders.

Clearly, I'm not going back and forth between the leaders right now, because I'm here and Chairman Arafat is in Europe, and the Prime Minister is in Israel. So the ability to go back and forth between them, that's not something that exists at the moment.

Then we have the negotiating level that is carried out by the people who have been charged with being the focal points of negotiation, and we raised the level. We had different Palestinians and Israelis joining the negotiations or creating small groups as ways of trying to -- as a device for trying to find ways to overcome the differences.

You had on the Palestinian side Abu Mazen join the negotiations, and you had on the Israeli side General Shahak join the negotiations. That was part of an effort to not only work at the technical level of the negotiators but also to bring in a somewhat different level on each side as a way of trying to focus the negotiations and move more quickly to making decisions.

What has happened is, there is an intensive set of discussions that have gone on. Draft texts have been developed. Considerable progress has been made, and all the areas have been discussed.

We have basic agreement in the civil area. We have substantial agreement in the security areas but we haven't resolved all the questions yet.

The questions that are being discussed right now are technical in character. They also relate to trying to finalize text and figuring out how you shape the text.

To conclude, I think we may well have to raise the level again, but I think we'll have to make a judgment about where the discussions that have taken place yesterday and today are moving. We'll see where we are by the end of the week, and I'll have a chance to talk to both sides and make a judgment about when it's appropriate, if it's necessary. It's also possible it won't be needed to raise the level. If it's necessary to raise the level, then we'll do so.

QUESTION: Dennis, is it possible if the situation goes n reverse that the longer this drags out with Chairman Arafat in Europe, you here, and talks not going on a higher level, that each side will raise new issues, try to reopen issues that were previously settled?

AMBASSADOR ROSS: I think there's no question that in any negotiation -- and this one is no exception -- you like to close as soon as you can. Because the longer things stretch out, you always put yourself in a position where you may find that new issues begin to emerge.

We're clearly better off closing this as soon as possible. If the negotiators who are doing it right now are able to close, that would be the best of all worlds. If it becomes clear that they're not able to do that, then we'll focus again on how to try to accelerate things so that we can bring it to a very rapid conclusion.

The differences that remain at this point are clearly bridgeable. They can be overcome. I believe, in fact, that reaching an agreement soon is very definitely something that could be done.

AMBASSADOR ROSS: I'm not going to get into the differences because that's what is being negotiated now. Apart from the fact that it tends to violate the character of our role in it, it also makes it more difficult to resolve differences if you publicize them. There's a lot of stuff that's out there right now. But some of what's out there is not particularly accurate, and I don't want to begin to identify what is.

QUESTION: Dennis, do you think that the Secretary might go out there at some point to be there for a signing ceremony, or to help this process along in any way?

AMBASSADOR ROSS: I don't think there are any plans at this point for that. Right now the focus should be on the effort that's being made by the negotiators on each side. We are participating with them -- both Ambassador Indyk and Consul General Ed Abington have taken part in these discussions, and they will continue to do so.

We'll see where things are over the next few days and then we'll make a judgment as to whether or not it makes sense, as I said, to raise the level if that seems to be necessary.

QUESTION: Dennis, can you go into a little bit of flavor, for lack of a better word, as to how the personalities are meshing or learning to mesh, since this is a new team of Israeli negotiators and since the old teams obviously knew each other better?

AMBASSADOR ROSS: I think, on the one hand, the basic atmosphere and environment has been a positive one. In the sense of how they work together in the discussions, it is usually characterized by not only a kind of businesslike approach but, in fact, it's a personable approach. That has been positive.

At the same time, there is no question there is a level of trust that needs to be developed as you move forward, not only now but for the future. The conclusion of the agreement on Hebron redeployment will have a very positive effect on both sides in terms of demonstrating the new team that exists. In fact, it's a new team on both sides.

Certainly some of the Palestinians are people who were negotiating before but not all of them. On the Israeli side, it is a new team. Although, here again, some of the military people are people who were involved in the negotiations before.

Each side now has to see that they can actually come to agreement. The mere fact of coming to an agreement will, I think, be a very useful development in terms of shaping a level of confidence that needs to exist but doesn't yet exist.

I also think that the nature of our role has been really indispensable in helping them come together, in helping them find a way to conduct these negotiations, and in helping them find ways also to bridge differences that come up.

They each have a very high level of trust in us. We want to play this role to help them, but we also want to play the role in a way that doesn't begin to have us substitute for one of them. It is a principle of ours that these have to be bilateral negotiations. These have to be bilateral agreements. Because at the end of the day we're not a party to the conflict. They are the ones who have the differences that have to be settled, and that they have confidence in us is clearly very important; that they develop the kind of confidence in them that produces agreements that they believe in is ultimately the real test.

QUESTION: Why does there have to be a high level of trust -- to complete the agreement, to have it implemented or possibly both? If you say there needs to be a high level of trust, the clear inference is, there isn't that level of trust now. You said there needs to be one. That, indeed, reinforces the notion there isn't one, or one that you think is needed. What is it needed for -- to complete the agreement?

QUESTION: Do you think there will be one if there isn't this high level of trust?

AMBASSADOR ROSS: Let's put it this way. I think the conclusion of the agreement will begin to shape and develop that kind of trust.

AMBASSADOR ROSS: Clearly, there's a relationship between the two. If you ask me, can we conclude this agreement without a higher level of trust at the moment, the answer is yes, because we're close. We're not far now.

Some of the difficulties in this discussion, this negotiation, has been a function that each side has concerns about the other. Each side is looking at a very delicate situation. Each is highly sensitive to trying to ensure that the measures and mechanisms that they're going to agree upon and then implement will hold. Because they both know the sensitivity of Hebron. Hebron is clearly a special case.

QUESTION: The Israeli Ambassador said the other day that there was one issue that was going to be saved for the meeting of the principals to be resolved and there was another one that had gotten reopened during that last night of negotiations. Without addressing just which these are, is that accurate?

AMBASSADOR ROSS: At this point, I'm not sure that's the case. I think there is a potential to close these prior to the time that the leaders meet. I wouldn't say, at the end of the day, that you won't have them come together.

QUESTION: Was that the case on Monday, when you decided to come back, that one issue had gotten reopened during the night but the other one was going to be resolved had there been a meeting --

AMBASSADOR ROSS: There was no understanding at the table that they would save an issue for the leaders. There was no such understanding.

As I was starting to say, Roy, it is possible that you will end up with one or two issues that are saved for the leaders. But there is not, in fact, an understanding that that is the case. So we'll have to see.

I think there was one issue that had been -- that I think was reopened, but we had another issue that we thought previously had been opened, and it was closed in the last evening. So when you go through this kind of a process, that kind of a development is not particularly unusual.

QUESTION: This means you're going to go back before election day and realistically Arafat doesn't come back until Saturday, does he?

AMBASSADOR ROSS: He's back the end of the week, and I'm really not in a position to go back before election day. I have some personal reasons for that. My youngest daughter is having minor surgery on Monday, and I have to be here for that.

QUESTION: Is the presence of the French President and the Russian Foreign Minister in the area a complicating factor in the sense that it might give a -- change the psychological or political mood of the negotiators?

AMBASSADOR ROSS: I don't think so. I didn't see any evidence of that when President Chirac was there. I don't expect that to be the case with Foreign Minister Primakov.

The reality is we have a negotiation that has developed a structure, a basis, and a very high level of detail that has been worked through with both sides. I think it has acquired the kind of standing that I think it will continue until in fact conclusion is reached.

QUESTION: What about the developing of confidence was a key to bridging these differences between the two sides? But what kind of message do you think it sends to Arafat, walking away at your urging to sort of stay in the area? I mean, does that send a message of confidence?

AMBASSADOR ROSS: Maybe you need to listen a little more carefully to what I said. I didn't urge him to stay. He had a long planned trip, and he went ahead and he took that trip. I think the real issue is that confidence to be developed between the two sides is going to emerge, (a) from reaching this agreement and implementing it, and then having things go forward; and (b) -- and it's related to what I just said -- you've got to change the climate on the ground.

People on both sides have to begin to have a sense that this process will go forward and will go forward in a way that responds to their mutual needs. If we can't re-establish a sense of mutual hope, then we're going to find this process constantly facing difficulties. That's really got to be our task; not just to reach agreement but to have the agreements and the results on the ground begin to change the climate of opinion and to recreate a sense of mutual hope.

QUESTION: No, but why do you say "recreate," "re-establish," meaning it existed before?

NB: Sure. There were times, with different periods, when both sides, I think, were much more hopeful than they are now.

QUESTION: Was the new phase the election of a new government in Israel? I mean, there was hope before Netanyahu, and the hope has somehow been lost?

AMBASSADOR ROSS: No, I think there was hope before four bombs went off in nine days in Israel.

QUESTION: But you're telling us hope has to be re-established. We can't write that somebody -- the natural question is, where did the hope go? When did it disappear? I mean, you know, people look at --

AMBASSADOR ROSS: Four weeks ago we had major violence, and it affected both sides, and that violence, where there were victims on both sides --

QUESTION: And just one quickie. What do you mean by -- I understand security. Is civil another way of saying "administrative"?

AMBASSADOR ROSS: Civil relates to the transfer of authority, and it covers the issues that I was mentioning. It covers provision of services. It covers what happens to infrastructure. It covers planning and zoning. it covers transportation. That's civil.

U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman

U.S. Department of State
Office of the Spokesman