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| James P. Rubin, Assistant Secretary Daily Press Briefing Excerpt Middle East Peace Process October 27, 1998 |
Q: Another subject? About the Middle East, of course--has there been filed either with Israel or with the CIA an action plan by the Palestinians on arresting terrorists and all? Because an action plan--some even call it a time table--was promised during the talks.MR. RUBIN: Do we have the agreement here? My understanding is that the agreement envisages that being done in the first week--
Q: That's right.
MR. RUBIN: Today is Tuesday. I would not be in a position to answer the question as to whether some discussions hadn't begun or not. But again, the time frame is by Friday.
Secretary Albright has been in touch with Chairman Arafat yesterday; she spoke to Foreign Minister Sharon earlier today. I would expect her to be in touch with the Prime Minister during the course of the day to talk about implementation and how we can be of assistance in facilitating implementation.
It will be hard for me to give you each day an update on what steps have and haven't been taken; other than to tell you that would be required, I believe, in the first seven days.
Q: Maybe it's in the agreement, but is it supposed to go to Israel--the plan, do you know?
MR. RUBIN: Whatever the agreement says on that, I'll have to check for you.
Q: Do you think you could take one more swing at me for--is it a hard deadline, is it a goal? Is it you'd like to see it met but it may not be practical? What's the current--
MR. RUBIN: Well, the goal is to get the permanent status talks started as soon as possible--pursuant to the agreement, they'll start ten days from last Friday--and then to be of assistance, the United States will be of assistance where we can to try to bring them towards agreement on these excruciating issues that will require painstaking negotiations.
The President has committed to bring the parties together at the appropriate time to see if we can be of assistance. I would expect the Secretary to be involved in this; I would expect Ambassador Ross to be involved in this; Aaron Miller, Martin Indyk, the other members of the Middle East peace team. We'll have to see exactly when we play what role.
With respect to the completion, what we are looking for is the parties to make a good faith effort to negotiate. I don't want to speculate on what will happen if they're unable to finish the work, despite such a good faith effort, by May 4.
Q: But I mean, you are willing to say something, are you, about--well, maybe I ought to rephrase the question. You have said something about unilateral declarations of statehood. What if they don't meet the May 4 deadline. I know that's hypothetical; but it's also likely. If they don't make the May 4 deadline, would Arafat then be free to make any kind of declaration he feels like?
MR. RUBIN: As regards the possibility of a unilateral declaration of statehood or other unilateral actions by either party outside the negotiating process that prejudge or predetermine the outcome of those negotiations, the United States opposes and will oppose any such unilateral action.
Q: Irrespective of May 4, or May 5 or May 3?
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
Q: Speaking of assistance, in a more precise sense the President mentioned that the United States would be willing to provide financial assistance to both sides. Has this building or any other part of the government begun putting together an estimate about how much money would be involved eventually?
MR. RUBIN: Work is going on in that area; people are assessing it, talking amongst themselves--perhaps some consultations with Israel and the Palestinians. At the appropriate time, we would want to consult with Congress about any such assistance. Clearly, it will be substantial. But I don't think there is an American number at this point.
Q: The Israelis were quoting a figure of something like $1 billion to finance the further redeployments. Is that in the ball park?
MR. RUBIN: Clearly, this would be substantial, but we don't have an American figure at this time. Clearly, the numbers are going to be substantial, but I don't want to confirm or deny any particular figure until we've developed one.
Q: To go back to unilateral acts, I may have missed this, but I haven't yet seen any clarification of whether you see the ban on unilateral acts as covering Israeli settlement activity. It's really become a point of dispute.
MR. RUBIN: We have made clear that unilateral actions, including in the area you specified, that prejudge the outcome of the negotiations is something the United States will oppose. The memorandum itself recognizes the necessity of a positive atmosphere of the permanent status talks. Both parties are aware of our view on this subject. So we've made quite clear, whether it's a unilateral declaration or a unilateral action, when it prejudges the outcome of what are expected to be very difficult permanent status negotiations, we're opposed to any such measures.
Q: When you say opposed, do you mean opposed beyond merely saying that it's unhelpful as you've said in the past?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we're against them is what I mean.
Q: Does that go further than saying they're unhelpful?
MR. RUBIN: You'll have to make your own judgment about that.
Q: Could that have a--settlements, for example, supposing they decide to risk your displeasure, would that have an impact on the financial aid eventually to be turned over?
MR. RUBIN: Can we come up with a number first and then we'll worry about what--
Q: No, regardless of the number.
MR. RUBIN: I don't intend to make any new policy on that subject.
Q: I understand that the U.S. will oppose any unilateral action. The question is whether the Israelis and the Palestinians promised the United States that they will not do these unilateral actions.
MR. RUBIN: We've provided you a copy of the agreement; we've specified publicly our interpretation of the agreement. Both sides are aware of our views on these subjects. With respect to any private conversations we had with either side, I don't intend to discuss them publicly.
Q: Regarding the offer from a leader of the Taliban, Mr. Muttmayan to have Mr. bin Laden tried or have his case reviewed in the Supreme Court of Afghanistan, I take it is this a satisfactory step that the United States would agree to provide some kind of information or evidence; or is that too risky or what?
MR. RUBIN: We understand that the Taliban issued a decree on October 25 empowering their Supreme Court to accept evidence concerning Osama bin Laden and review it within the framework of Islamic Shari'a law.
As we have stated previously, we prefer not to respond to a hypothetical question, which we regard this to be at this time, regarding a possible trial of Osama bin Laden. We believe that bin Laden should be brought swiftly to justice for his crimes. We have made it clear to the Taliban on several occasions that it must stop harboring terrorists such as Osama bin Laden.
With respect to the U.S. providing evidence, we consider that wildly premature speculation at this point. With respect to any bill of indictment in the United States of Osama bin Laden, that would have to be referred to the Department of Justice.
Q: So basically this Department is panning this offer from Mr. Muttmayan at this point; is that correct? Saying no thanks?
MR. RUBIN: You can draw your own conclusions from what I just said.
Q: Jamie, do you have anything on the VX gas report?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, on the VX let me say - and then I gather we're going back to another subject or clarification with assistance of all those necessary?
According to the report UNSCOM delivered to the UN Security Council after discussion in New York by 21 experts from seven countries on the results of tests of Iraqi missile fragments, all tests in all countries are conclusive and valid. The tests prove the existence of degradation products of the following: VX; VX stabilizer; a nerve agent of either the G or V series of chemical weapons; and an undeclared decontaminant which is most effective against chemical weapons.
The experts agree that there is evidence that Iraq loaded nerve agents--some of the most horrible weapons in the world--including VX into its missile warheads. The experts unanimously concluded that the existence of VX degradation products conflicts with Iraq's declaration. It is time for Iraq to provide a full and accurate account of their weapons of mass destruction--particularly the deadly nerve agent, VX. The onus is on them to reverse course, to fulfill their obligations and to give a true accounting of its weapons of mass destruction programs and to resume cooperation with UNSCOM and to allow inspections to continue.
In short, these findings make clear that Saddam Hussein did produce VX weapons contrary to what he said; that he produce these most horrible weapons, even though he said he didn't. It shows the urgency and necessity of Iraq coming clean on what they built, what they have, so that the international community can confirm disarmament of those provisions, without which sanctions cannot be lifted.
Q: Where do you see this going from here, Jamie?
MR. RUBIN: Well the Council is going to be reviewing these findings. I would expect there to be further discussion on it. This can't but hurt Iraq's case that somehow it's up to the international community not Iraq to take the next step. We have made clear that in the absence of renewed cooperation by Iraq with UNSCOM that we are not going to allow this comprehensive review that they want to go forward; but with renewed cooperation it can go forward.
Q: Jamie, with this evidence that you say is conclusive and valid--or that all tests were conclusive and valid, is it your impression or your view that Saddam Hussein's Iraq poses a greater or same danger to the region or to the world?
MR. RUBIN: We had no doubt that he had produced such weaponry; it was just he was the only one that said it wasn't so. So it's not changed our view of the danger of Saddam Hussein.
Q: And that view is that--
MR. RUBIN: That until Iraq is disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction, until Iraq complies with international Security Council resolutions that demonstrate its peaceful intentions, that sanctions must remain on indefinitely because he is a threat to the region and a threat to the world.
Q: The focus has been on (inaudible) assurances to Israel. The Internet has a letter that Secretary Albright purportedly gave or wrote to Prime Minister Netanyahu. I wondered, are there assurances to the Palestinians in print, too? Are there written assurances to the Palestinians? And will these letters--or letter--be made public and given an official government stamp of veracity?
MR. RUBIN: Certainly I am not going to be in a position of responding to every piece of information that appears on the Internet or any other source. We are providing you the information that we have decided to provide, pursuant to the Wye River negotiation. I will try to answer your questions as best as I can on American positions. If there are private exchanges, they are designed to stay private; and therefore, they wouldn't be provided to the public.
Q: I'll try to break this down. Have there been letters of assurances--
MR. RUBIN: I will try to get an answer for you on what private assurances exist--either topics or a number--for the record. But I don't have any ability to answer your question right now.
Q: If they are private, which is another way of saying secret, that sort of amends the notion that everything transacted at--I almost said Camp David--at the Wye would be made public.
MR. RUBIN: I don't remember anybody ever saying that.
Q: Well, all right, I don't want to get into it. (Inaudible)--Kosovo and time is running. I mean, I thought that what we heard--there will be an agreement, there will be letters, there will be understandings, et cetera, et cetera--all would be a package and sort of implicit in that is that's what we're doing and it's no secret--
MR. RUBIN: --to each other and there may be letters that are exchanged that aren't public. Governments are allowed to have private communications with each other.
Q: Are they part of the agreement?
MR. RUBIN: I don't understand.
Q: Well, are they a part of the agreement complex? In other words, do they support the published part of the Wye agreement?
MR. RUBIN: We certainly wouldn't say anything privately that was inconsistent with the agreement publicly.
Q: Well, it could be irrelevant?
MR. RUBIN: Sorry?
Q: Letters could be irrelevant to the agreement itself. I'm asking a simple question: do they support the agreement?
MR. RUBIN: They're consistent with them; I don't know how to state it any more than that.
Q: Anyhow, if you do hear, at least the fact, if you can tell us whether there are assurances to the Palestinians, because--
MR. RUBIN: I'll try to get an answer. I'm sure that they'll be published all over the place, but that doesn't mean we'll necessary want to comment on them.
Q: Well, they're a little less inclined to find reporters to tell things to than the Israelis are. So the letter from Albright--
MR. RUBIN: I haven't found that.
Q: Well, it's pretty true. By the way, their press office was never occupied throughout all the nine days. It was an interesting situation. But Albright-Netanyahu letter is getting circulated--
MR. RUBIN: I have no comment on it.
Q: I'm not asking you to comment. I'm asking you if you could tell us at least, if not now, is there an assurance to the Palestinians as well?
Q: Jamie, I don't know if you've answered this in the past about--is the CIA determinations on compliance, is that going to be made public during the course of the 12 weeks? Who's done what--
MR. RUBIN: There are no limits to your appetites. No, I would expect not.
Q: Do you have anything on the state of the--
MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry, let me amend the answer in the following way. There has been a misperception that I think Mr. Tenet sought to clarify in today's newspaper. The CIA doesn't make judgments; the CIA provides information and facilitates cooperation--provides the facts and the information and reports to the State Department and other agencies of the government for judgments to be made about compliance with the agreements and making political judgments.
So there's been a slight misperception on that. But the information that's provided by our experts has never been provided publicly before. I wouldn't expect it to be now.
Q: Forget them making it public. The question, which you had to wrestle with yesterday and which Congress is making an issue of--and we both know they've always had a role, so we don't have to go over that again. This agreement is bottomed on the notion that the CIA will have an enlarged verification role. The CIA, hey, Israel, you can do this stuff because the CIA's going to be on the job making sure this stuff is done. Now, whether they make the judgment or provide the information for someone else to make the judgment, you're not disputing the CIA will be far more active than it ever has been in the past.
MR. RUBIN: I would point you to the article and the view of Mr. Tenet, as this is fully consistent with things it's done before. Experts will obviously play a role in fighting terrorism; that's a greater and greater priority for the United States--that is, fighting terrorism and particularly in this region. So I would expect there to be more activity to fight terrorism.
Q: Do you have anything on the state of President Yeltsin's health?
Q: In this discussion of letters that have been sent, some of which are being revealed, you didn't seem to want to exclude the possibility that there are secret assurances contained in letters. Now, I don't suppose you just want to let that impression sit out there, do you?
MR. RUBIN: If I look back at the transcript about the letters, I'll have no clue what you said or what I said. All I'm telling you is, I'm not commenting on any letters.
Q: My question is, are there secret assurances in letters? Can you tell us--
MR. RUBIN: If they were secret, I wouldn't want to comment on them.
Q: So there could be secret assurances in letters?
MR. RUBIN: We can go back and forth and it will end up with me saying, no comment. But if you'd like to continue, that would be fine with me.
Q: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: I don't want to comment on the question of private communications.
Q: No, but in the past, government spokesmen have been able to tell you what they said or they say we can assure you what you see is what there is--there are no secret assurances to the parties.
Q: There were letters of assurances after the Hebron agreement, and we're in the same position today as we were then, which is that the Israeli one leaked within five minutes and the Palestinian one, until this day, is unknown.
MR. RUBIN: Well, some countries or some entities have different approaches to their dealings with the media. I don't know whether that applies in this case or it doesn't apply. What I know is that I am not now in a position to tell you what private assurances were made, what subjects were dealt with, whether there were secret assurances. I'm just not going to address the question in any meaningful way.
Q: Well, you can still pick from a variety of other options. I mean, this didn't begin with Hebron; it began in 1973.
MR. RUBIN: Do you enjoy this?
(Laughter.)
Q: No, I don't enjoy this, but I'm waiting--
MR. RUBIN: Because I don't; I definitely don't.
Q: No, I'm waiting--it's all right, it will be the last from me anyhow. But I'm waiting for the familiar, and if I don't hear it then I know I haven't heard it; so I've got to ask the question.
MR. RUBIN: I'm trying to provide no meaningful information on this question.
Q: You're doing very well so far.
(Laughter.)
But I'm waiting for the familiar statement that nothing was told to one party that wasn't told to the other party. And if you can't say that, that's significant; because if there are secret agreements or if you're not going to reveal whether there are, then the next question is, did one side hear things that the other side didn't?
MR. RUBIN: I will take this elaborate exchange and I will read through it and try to ascertain what questions in it I will approach the authorities with, and try to get you answers best I can.
Q: Fair enough.
MR. RUBIN: But maybe afterwards we can decide more specifically what the questions are that are likely to yield answers--other than what is our secret assurance to one country or another or another entity.
Q: Can you give us any more about the Arab reaction to your appeals that they engage in the peace process?
MR. RUBIN: The Secretary strongly believes that the Arab-Israeli peace process is not a spectator sport. It is important that all those who support the peace process, especially those in the region, do their part for peace and not remain on the sidelines.
The Wye River memorandum marks an important breakthrough in the peace process. Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Netanyahu have taken considerable risks for peace and they need our support. Implementing this memorandum will require the help of all states in the Middle East. We ask that our friends and allies in the region now come forward to support this process and help us in our ongoing efforts to reach a comprehensive peace.
What we are looking for, in the first instance, we expect the Arabs to lend their political and financial support to the Palestinians, who obviously need to see a greater and greater peace dividend if the peace process is to stay strong.
We also believe that Arab re-engagement in the normalization process with Israel would lend vital support to the Israelis and the Palestinians as they carry out this agreement. This is extremely important--that the Israelis see greater and greater engagement with their Arab neighbors as they make the tough decisions for peace.
With respect to various comments that some countries have adopted as skeptical or a wait-and-see attitude, clearly we have concerns in this area. We intend to work closely to promote greater and greater support from Arab countries for the steps that I outlined.
But as we move ahead, we look forward to the cooperation of our friends and allies such as Egypt, in helping to mobilize the political and financial support necessary to make this process a success.
So in short, there's a lot of work to do; a lot of people have a lot of work to do. There are steps the Arabs can take to increase normalization with Israel, increase support for the Palestinians that will redound to the advantage of all the peoples of the Middle East peace. Everyone needs to get off the sidelines, get into the game and do their part.
Q: When you refer to wait-and-see attitude, were you referring to before you started this initiative or since you started this initiative?
MR. RUBIN: We are aware that the current public posture of some of the countries is a wait-and-see posture. We are trying to move quickly to move forward on these steps that I described to you. Secretary Albright will be in touch with her counterparts and other diplomats will be in touch with their counterparts to try to push on this front.
I don't have any new actions--this just started a few hours ago--to report to you.
Q: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:35 P.M.)
[end document]
