

Vice President Gore

Meeting the Challenge of Global Warming

December 8, 1997

Remarks at the UN Committee on Climate Change Conference of the Parties, Kyoto, Japan.

Thank you. Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Figueres, President Kinza Clodumar, other distinguished heads of state, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen: It is an honor to be here at this historic gathering, in this ancient capital of such beauty and grace. On behalf of President Clinton and the American people and our U.S. negotiator, Amb. Stu Eizenstat, I salute our Japanese hosts for their gracious hospitality and offer a special thank you to Prime Minister Hashimoto and to our chairs—Minister Ohki and Ambassador Estrada—for their hard work and leadership.

Since we gathered at the Rio Conference in 1992, both scientific consensus and political will have come a long way. If we pause for a moment and look around us, we can see how extraordinary this gathering really is.

We have reached a fundamentally new stage in the development of human civilization in which it is necessary to take responsibility for a recent but profound alteration in the relationship between our species and our planet. Because of our new technological power and our growing numbers, we now must pay careful attention to the consequences of what we are doing to the Earth—especially to the atmosphere.

There are other parts of the Earth's ecological system that are also threatened by the increasingly harsh impact of thoughtless behavior:

- The poisoning of too many places where people, especially poor people, live and the deaths of too many children, especially poor children, from polluted water and dirty air;
- The dangerous and unsustainable depletion of ocean fisheries; and
- The rapid destruction of critical habitats—rainforests, temperate forests, boreal forests, wetlands, coral reefs, and other precious wellsprings of genetic variety upon which the future of humankind depends.

But the most vulnerable part of the Earth's environment is the very thin layer of air clinging near the surface of the planet that we

are now so carelessly filling with gaseous wastes that are actually altering the relationship between the Earth and the Sun by trapping more solar radiation under this growing blanket of pollution that envelops the entire world. The extra heat, which cannot escape, is beginning to change the global patterns of climate to which we are accustomed—and to which we have adapted over the last 10,000 years.

Last week we learned from scientists that this year—1997, with only three weeks remaining—will be the hottest year since records have been kept. Indeed, 9 of the 10 hottest years since the measurements began have come in the last 10 years. The trend is clear. The human consequences—and the economic costs—of failing to act are unthinkable: more record floods and droughts; diseases and pests spreading to new areas; crop failures and famines; melting glaciers; stronger storms; and rising seas.

Our fundamental challenge now is to find out whether and how we can change the behaviors that are causing the problem. To do so requires humility, because the spiritual roots of our crisis are pridefulness and a failure to understand and respect our connections to God's Earth and to each other.

Each of the 160 nations here has brought unique perspectives to the table, but we all understand that our work in Kyoto is only a beginning. None of the proposals being debated here will solve the problem completely by itself. But if we get off to the right start here, we can quickly build momentum as we learn together how to meet this challenge.

Our first step should be to set realistic and achievable, binding emissions limits, which will create new markets for new technologies and new ideas that will, in turn, expand the boundaries of the possible and create new hope. Other steps will then follow. And then, ultimately, we will achieve a safe overall concentration level for greenhouse gases in the Earth's atmosphere. This is the step-by-step approach we took in Montreal 10 years ago to address the problem of ozone depletion, and it is working.

This time, success will require first and foremost that we heal the divisions among us. The first and most important task for developed countries is to hear the immediate needs of the developing world. And let me say, the United States has listened, and we have learned. We understand that your first priority is to lift your citizens from the poverty so many endure and build strong economies that will assure a better future. This is your right; it will not be denied.

And let me be clear in our answer to you: We do not want to founder on a false divide. Reducing poverty and protecting the Earth's environment are both critical components of truly sustainable development. We want to forge a lasting partnership to achieve a better future. One key is mobilizing new investment in your countries to ensure that you have higher standards of living, with modern, clean, and efficient technologies.

That is what our proposals for emissions trading and joint implementation strive to do. To our partners in the developed world, let me say that we have listened and learned from you as well. We understand that while we share a common goal, each of us faces unique challenges.

You have shown leadership here, and for that we are grateful. We came to Kyoto to find new ways to bridge our differences. In doing so, however, we must not waiver in our resolve. For our part, the United States remains firmly committed to a strong, binding target that will reduce our own emissions by nearly 30% from what they would otherwise be—a commitment as strong, or stronger, than any we have heard here from any country. The imperative here is to do what we promise, rather than to promise what we cannot do.

All of us, of course, must reject the advice of those who ask us to believe there really is no problem at all. We know their arguments; we have heard others like them throughout history. For example, in my country, we remember the tobacco company spokesmen who insisted for so long that smoking did no harm. To those who seek to obfuscate and obstruct, we say: We will not allow you to put narrow special interests above the interests of all humankind. So what does the United States propose that we do?

The first measure of any proposal must be its environmental merit, and ours is environmentally solid and sound. It is strong and comprehensive, covering all six significant greenhouse gases. It recognizes the link between the air and the land, including both sources and sinks. It provides the tools to ensure that targets can be met—offering emissions trading, joint implementation, and

research as powerful engines of technology development and transfer. It further reduces emissions—below 1990 levels—in the years 2012 and beyond. It provides the means to ensure that all nations can join us on their own terms in meeting this common challenge. It is also economically sound. And, with strict monitoring and accountability, it ensures that we will keep our bond with one another.

Whether or not agreement is reached here, we will take concrete steps to help meet this challenge. President Clinton and I understand that our first obligation is to address this issue at home. I commit to you today that the United States is prepared to act—and will act.

For my part, I have come here to Kyoto because I am both determined and optimistic that we can succeed. I believe that by our coming together in Kyoto, we have already achieved a major victory—one both of substance and of spirit. I have no doubt that the process we have started here inevitably will lead to a solution in the days or years ahead.

Some of you here have, perhaps, heard from your home capitals that President Clinton and I have been burning up the phone lines, consulting and sharing new ideas. Today let me add this: After talking with our negotiators this morning and after speaking on the telephone from here a short time ago with President Clinton, I am instructing our delegation right now to show increased negotiating flexibility if a comprehensive plan can be put in place—one with realistic targets and timetables, market mechanisms, and the meaningful participation of key developing countries.

Earlier this century, the Scottish mountain climber W.H. Murray wrote:

Until one is committed there is hesitancy, the chance to draw back, always ineffectiveness. Concerning all acts of initiative. . .there is one elementary truth, the ignorance of which kills countless ideas and splendid plans: that the moment one definitely commits oneself, providence moves, too.

So let us press forward. Let us resolve to conduct ourselves in such a way that our children's children will read about the "Spirit of Kyoto," and remember well the place and the time where humankind first chose to embark together on a long-term sustainable relationship between our civilization and the Earth's environment.

In that spirit, let us transcend our differences and commit to secure our common destiny: a planet whole and healthy; whose nations are at peace, prosperous, and free; and whose people everywhere are able to reach for their God-given potential. Thank you. ■

Secretary Albright

APEC: Facing the Challenge

November 24, 1997

Remarks at the CEO Summit, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, Vancouver, British Columbia.

Thank you, Mr. D'Aquino, for that introduction and for the opportunity to address this very important gathering at this very critical time. I want to begin by thanking our Canadian hosts for the fantastic job they have done in organizing and making arrangements for this summit. I also applaud Paul O'Donoghue and the Pacific Basin Economic Council and Thomas D'Aquino and the Business Council for convening this CEO summit.

During the past three days, you have heard from a galaxy of this region's economic and political leaders. The extraordinary level of participation and interest reflects the paramount role the private sector plays in the economy of the Asia-Pacific. It is fitting, therefore, that partnership between the public and private sectors is at the heart of APEC, and that partnership's purpose is to create a vibrant and growing regional economy that will raise living standards from Sydney to Santiago and from the Yukon to the Yangtze.

From the beginning, the United States has been a leader in APEC. The reason is that our citizens have an enormous stake here.

We are a Pacific nation, just as we are an Atlantic and a Caribbean nation. We are major buyers and sellers in Asia-Pacific markets. We are investors and partners. We are travelers and teachers and students. We have allies and friends in every part of the region. And having fought three wars in the Pacific during the past six decades, we are committed to the region's security and dedicated to its stability. United States' policies in the Asia-Pacific reflect our principles, our values, and our experience.

We believe that democratic institutions, including free economies and respect for human rights, provide the best environment for individual initiative. And that initiative leads, in turn, to productive enterprise, which breeds prosperity, which spawns stability, which is a parent to security and peace.

And let me say at the outset that Congress's failure to renew the President's fast-track trade negotiating authority has not altered our determination to lead. We view that failure as a setback we intend to overcome. Next year, we

will return to Congress. And we are hopeful that the President will be given the flexibility he needs to go forward with our trade agenda in the Asia-Pacific—on time and in full.

Over the past quarter-century, we have watched with admiration as the people of the Asia-Pacific transformed their economies through hard work, innovation, and steady movement in the direction of open markets and reform. The result was an explosion in trade, reduced poverty, and record growth.

In earlier APEC meetings, we have celebrated these trends and focused our attention on how to sustain them. In such a climate, the spirit of partnership has been relatively easy to nourish. This year, however, is different. We meet amidst predictions that the Asia miracle will be succeeded by an Asia meltdown. We have witnessed five months of turbulence in capital markets. The specters of debt and deflation hover over the region. Emergency help has been required, and growth rates have slowed.

As a result, governments and businesspeople are being tested to a far greater degree than in recent years. And the world is asking: Will our partnerships fall apart, or will we pull together? Will we squander our energies on finger-pointing and blame-pinning, or will we focus on how to get back on track? Will we put our faith in alleged panaceas that are quick, easy, and wrong, or will we renew our commitment to the basic principles that underlay past accomplishments and are essential to our future hopes?

As leaders, we who are assembled here in Vancouver this week—whether from the public sector or private—have a responsibility to work together to see that these questions are answered in the right way and that the necessary steps are taken to restore stability, rebuild confidence, and restart growth.

To find the way forward, the United States is emphasizing two core points. First, each country in the region must take responsibility for implementing sound economic policies. This is true no matter how difficult or painful the choices may be. There is simply no other way

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to ensure long-term economic expansion. Second, the international community—with the IMF at its center—must be prepared to help those nations that need assistance and that are doing their best to help themselves.

Accordingly, the United States strongly supports the decisions made last week in Manila to improve regional cooperation in promoting financial stability, and to strengthen the IMF’s capacity to respond to financial crises.

The fact that the region’s economic leaders were able to agree on the Manila framework is encouraging. And it validates the underlying premise of APEC, which is that we will all do

better when we each do better. Stability, like turbulence, is contagious.

In the months ahead, the region’s economies must combine the energy of the tiger with the wisdom of the owl. We must embrace, not retreat from, the concepts that have been the foundation of past economic growth, including sound macroeconomic management, high rates of savings, free markets and liberal trade, and capital flows. We must also learn from the recent disruptions by reforming banking systems, curbing cor-

ruption, and promoting the kind of reliable investments that yield sustained growth.

During this decade, APEC has evolved into a dynamic catalyst in the movement toward a more open regional and global economy. We saw that in 1993 with the Uruguay Round, and last year with the Information Technology Agreement.

This year, APEC is once again playing a catalytic role. The support expressed at Saturday’s ministerial for completion of a strong global financial services agreement should be a neon sign to investors that this region is determined to restore the conditions that make impressive growth possible. The sectoral liberalization package approved by the ministers, covering nine sectors and more than \$700 million in trade, is further dramatic evidence of this determination.

These are solid accomplishments. But if APEC is to continue to progress in reaching its potential, the public and private sectors must strive together to forge more and more specific agreements.

Consider, for example, the agreements reached this year to eliminate duplicative testing of telecommunications equipment and to speed the processing of express packages. These agreements will save both money and time. And they are happening because the industries affected got informed, got involved, and got specific. That is the model for translating the promise of APEC into the reality of a more efficient economy and a healthier bottom line.

Looking ahead, the United States sees an opportunity for APEC to make progress on infrastructure by making government purchasing more transparent, and by working through the private sector to develop a regional network for the delivery of natural gas. We see a chance to open further the new frontier of cyberspace through an accelerated work plan to identify ways to enhance the benefits of electronic commerce.

We believe APEC can be a leader in promoting innovative green technologies and environmentally sensitive development. We would like to see APEC committed not only to more trade and freer trade, but also cleaner trade. Several APEC economies agreed a few days ago to the OECD Convention criminalizing foreign commercial bribery. But several is not enough; we hope every APEC economy will join.

We believe that the APEC community can do more, in conjunction with other international organizations, to prepare for and prevent environmental and weather-related disasters. In Southeast Asia, in recent months, forest and peat fires and a drought brought on by *El Nino* have caused severe damage to crops, reduced water supplies, and exacted other large social and economic costs. It should be a top priority for APEC, and for us all, to do everything we can to see that such disasters are not repeated.

Finally, it is also vital that the nations of the Asia-Pacific work together in Kyoto early next month to achieve a consensus for strong, realistic, and equitable action to combat global climate change. The accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is real, and the harmful ecological and environmental impacts that result will grow steadily more serious over time. As businesspeople, you know that the longer a problem is ignored or denied, the more painful the eventual remedy will be.

President Clinton has proposed a plan of action that sets tough, but realistic, targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The plan also includes innovative strategies such as emissions trading and joint implementation arrangements that are designed to reduce emissions at the lowest possible cost. This has

the added benefit of creating strong incentives for investment in environmental services and clean technologies.

The United States believes it is right for the industrialized nations to act first in the effort to control climate change. But we also believe that larger and relatively well-off developing nations must do their fair share over the long term. Otherwise, the exponential increase in emissions by the developing economies will overwhelm any reductions the industrialized world is able to achieve. In this fight, all must participate, albeit in different ways.

The Kyoto Conference provides an opportunity for the world to answer a threat that, if left unattended, will endanger us all. But through joint efforts, based on shared values, in the service of a profound mutual interest, we can achieve a consensus for action that will benefit us all. I hope the international business community will join with us, both to get an agreement that is truly global and that will truly work, and to help the public understand that we cannot afford not to act.

During the past quarter-century, Asia-Pacific economies have achieved miracles of expansion, job creation, poverty reduction, and rising living standards. Today, they are undergoing a severe test. And so are we all.

To meet that test, we must join forces—as governments, as businesspeople, and as citizens—from all around the Pacific Rim.

We must act with patience, persistence, and principle to stabilize economies, promote good governance, bring down barriers to trade, and engender a broad public conviction that open markets will open the door to prosperity not just for the lucky few, but for the hard-working many.

As Thomas D'Aquino has said, it should be an Asia-Pacific hallmark that businesses and governments work together to see "that trade and investment liberalization and economic growth provide the widest possible benefits to citizens and societies."

The United States has a deep faith in the genius and productivity of the people of the Asia-Pacific; in the resilience and fundamental strength of their economies; and in their capacity to absorb setbacks, regroup, and come back strong.

It was this faith that prompted President Clinton to invite APEC leaders to come together four years ago, setting in motion a process of cooperation and partnership that deepens with each passing year. And it is this faith that allows us—even as we struggle with current problems—to look to the future not only with determination, but with confidence. Thank you very much. ■

Secretary Albright

U.S. Efforts To Increase Regional Economic Cooperation

November 16, 1997

Remarks at the fourth annual Middle East/North Africa Economic Conference, Doha, Qatar.

Thank you very much. Your Highness, Excellencies, and distinguished guests: I am pleased to address this fourth Middle East/North Africa Economic Conference.

I want to apologize at the outset, however, for my inability to remain through your entire program. For reasons I hope you understand, I have some diplomatic work to do that requires me to travel to other countries in the region later today. This conference is, however, too important to miss. Others in the U.S. delegation will remain, and I look forward to a full report on all that is said.

Let me begin my remarks by thanking our remarkable hosts. On behalf of President Clinton, I extend our deepest respect for the efforts that the Emir, the Foreign Minister, and all our Qatari friends have made to encourage broad participation in this conference.

Through your courage and understanding of the long-term best interest of this region, you have earned the world's deep respect, and you have carried forward the vision of a Middle East overcoming past differences and creating increased prosperity, security, and peace for all its people.

I also want to thank each of you whether from the public or the private sector for coming to Doha to bear witness to your own faith in that vision. Your willingness to explore opportunities for investment and cooperation in this region is evidence that the prophets of division and hate are false prophets, and that those willing to travel the path toward peace will have many friends along the way.

The effort to increase regional economic cooperation is not, as some seem to feel, a favor to any particular nation. Shared prosperity will create a more broadly felt stake in peace and deny nourishment to the violent extremists who feed on deprivation.

Increased commerce and investment will diminish the mistrust that has long divided governments and prevented private sectors

from working together for their mutual benefit and that of their societies. But as we strive to shape a prosperous future through economic cooperation, we must also build a safe future through our continued diplomatic and security cooperation.

When the Gulf war ended six years ago, the world spelled out in United Nations Security Council resolutions what Iraq had to do to return to the family of nations. Unfortunately, for the Iraqi people, instead of meeting these requirements, for six years Saddam Hussein has lied, delayed, obstructed, and tried to deceive.

In recent days, tensions have increased as a result of Iraq's effort to exercise a veto over who may serve on UN inspection teams. In addition, Iraq has tampered with UN cameras and illegally moved equipment which could be used in the production of prohibited missiles or biological warfare agents.

The UN Security Council has responded firmly and unanimously by condemning Iraqi threats and demanding Iraqi compliance. The Council action shows once again that this is a dispute not between Iraq and the United States, but between Iraq and the law, Iraq and the world.

Let us not forget that Iraq's obligations were set not by the United States, but by the Security Council. UN inspections are carried out not by an organ of the United States, but by UNSCOM, in which almost three dozen countries currently participate. Iraq's failure to meet its obligations is not the fault of the UN or the United States. It is the fault of Iraq. And the suffering of Iraqi civilians is a direct consequence of this failure.

The United States and the world community want to help the innocent people of Iraq, but the way to do that is for all nations to insist that UN resolutions be met, and that UN inspections be carried out without conditions. That is also the way to protect regional security and ensure peace.

Our resolve on this issue must be unwavering. Hundreds of thousands of coalition soldiers put their lives on the line in the Gulf war. Together, we must and we are doing all we can to achieve a diplomatic solution to the current situation. But we are determined that Iraq not be allowed to regain by stonewalling UN inspectors what is forfeited through its aggression on the battlefield.

And we must and we will ensure that Iraq never again threatens its neighbors or the world with weapons of mass destruction. The importance of standing together whether in support of stability or to build prosperity in this region reflects the nature of our era. In the aftermath of the Cold War and with the advent of the global economy, international relations is not a zero-sum game. Nations will do better and be safer when they find ways to work with each other, and when they heed the eloquent warnings of Anwar Sadat that there can be "no happiness based on the detriment of others."

The annual MENA conferences were initiated with this premise in mind: the premise that we will all benefit when those inside and outside the region are consulting with each other; when public and private sectors are working in partnership; and when the old ways of protectionism, state control, and high barriers to investment and trade are reexamined in light of new economic realities.

Partly as a result of these conferences and of the premise that supports them, this region is at last undertaking concrete economic reforms that may transform its future. For example, the Doha securities market began trading this past May, and our host government has already developed plans to sell shares in state companies to the private sector.

Qatar is also negotiating with foreign firms in the chemical and petroleum sector and has ambitious plans to move forward with a new generation of export-oriented natural gas projects. In Oman, telecommunications are being privatized; new companies may now have up to 49% foreign ownership, and the Muscat securities market is now among the most dynamic in the region.

In Yemen, improved economic policies and enhanced cooperation with the international banks have produced remarkable progress. Tunisia continues to grow at a robust clip, in part because of a well-conceived privatization effort and a new phased-in free trade agreement with the EU.

In addition, more than 100 Israeli firms are now listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Jordan has removed all remaining foreign exchange controls, lifted restrictions on foreign investment, and announced the partial

privatization of the phone company. And Kuwait has sold equity shares in more than 20 state-owned firms since 1994.

Overall, regional economic growth is up for the second consecutive year. Inflation is under control, fiscal policies are sound, and debt loads are manageable. All this is encouraging, but this region remains far from what it could be. Due to high tariff and non-tariff barriers, only about 7% of all trade in the Middle East is between countries within the region. This compares to 20% intraregional trade in the Americas, 30% in Asia, and 60% in Europe.

Overall growth continues to be held back by a combination of rapid population growth, lack of diversification, continued state ownership, and lingering protectionism. The journey to reform has begun, but there are many, many kilometers still to go.

In the West Bank and Gaza, the economy faces a different obstacle, and its condition is dire. Due largely to the impact of security-related closures, economic trends have turned sharply negative.

To counter this trend, the United States continues to participate in, and support, the effort of international donors to assist the West Bank and Gaza. We are working to strengthen security cooperation so that future closures will be less likely. We are encouraging Israel to undertake economic confidence-building measures for the Palestinians. And we are helping to develop initiatives such as the Gaza Industrial Estate to promote economic opportunity and growth.

The economic difficulties now faced by the Palestinian Authority are symptomatic of a broader problem which makes this fourth MENA conference different from its predecessors. At the center of the conferences in Casablanca, Amman, and Cairo, there was a sense of progress toward peace in the Middle East that was greater than we feel today; a sense of possibility that was expanding; and a sense of partnership that seemed more durable and genuine.

Today the peace process is in danger, not because of the people of the region or because they do not desire peace, but because leaders have failed to take the actions required to realize the possibilities of peace. In September, I came to the Middle East to encourage regional leaders to take significant, concrete steps to end the crisis of confidence in the partnership between Israelis and Palestinians and to restore momentum to the peace process. Subsequent meetings have been held in the region—in New York, in Washington, and during the past two days, I have met in London with Prime Minister Netanyahu and in Bern with Chairman Arafat.

These meetings have helped bring the parties back to the negotiating table. We have held serious discussions on the four-part agenda of security, further redeployments, a "timeout" on settlement activity and other unilateral actions, and accelerated negotiation of permanent status issues. There is still much work to be done, but we were able to identify some openings through which further progress could be made.

Unfortunately, time is not on our side. Every week that goes by without a renewal of serious momentum toward peace creates new opportunities for the enemies of peace and

adds to the discouragement of those on all sides who urgently desire peace.

The United States will continue to play the role of honest broker. Our objective is clear: a comprehensive peace based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, including the principle of land for peace.

There was a time two decades ago when skeptics said that Israel would never make peace with Egypt, but it did. They said Israel would never return land, but in the Sinai, it did. More recently, the doubters said that Israel would never accept the Palestinians as a partner in peace, but it did. And they said Israel would never withdraw forces

from Gaza or redeploy forces in the West Bank, but it did. Today, too, there are skeptics. But with effort, determination, and goodwill, those who believe in the promise of peace can once again prove those skeptics wrong.

The Middle East peace process is built on the notion of partnership, and it is not a passive process. Let me say bluntly that there will be no peace if the leaders of this region sit on the sidelines and wait for others to take the risks and summon the requisite courage to bring peace about.

Partners have obligations to make their partners stronger, not weaker; to act in the spirit of peace; to take into account the needs and views of others; to focus not on creating,

but on removing, obstacles to peace; and to contribute to an atmosphere in which the violent extremes are marginalized and the roots of trust may grow.

Is this difficult? Does it entail risk? Does it require fresh thinking? Yes, yes, and yes. But if Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin could achieve peace at Camp David, if Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat could shake hands on the White House lawn, if King Hussein can demonstrate courage in the cause of reconciliation on a daily basis, and if those here at this conference could come together on behalf of this region's future, the time has come for all those with a stake in the Middle East to meet their responsibilities.

I am here in Doha, and others from the United States are here, because America keeps its word. It would be very helpful to the peace process if all the leaders of the region would keep the commitments they have made. And there is not a moment to waste. Israelis and Palestinians must be prepared to make decisions soon that will enable us to move forward and reach agreements.

Palestinian leaders must intensify cooperation on security issues and speak more consistently the language of peace. Israeli leaders must meet their responsibilities by taking steps to restore Palestinian and Arab confidence in their commitment to implementing Oslo. Both sides must work to reestablish their partnership, refrain from steps that make peace more difficult, and look ahead with urgency to what a mutually acceptable outcome of the negotiating process might be.

At the same time, Arab states must meet their responsibility to help the friends and oppose the enemies of peace. They must scrap the barriers that exist between their countries and Israel, the Palestinians' partner in peace. And they must join those represented here in sustaining the trend toward regional integration, economic reform, and mutual growth.

The new tragedies experienced this past summer in Jerusalem and in southern Lebanon were part of a cycle of violence as barren as the driest desert sand. The path of violence is fertile only in the production of more hate, more death, more sorrow, and more parents burying their children. This is not the future the people of this region deserve nor—I am convinced—a future they will accept.

I believe that the alternative vision of a future characterized by peace, open borders, open minds, and open markets is a vision widely shared. It is not restricted to the Israelis or Palestinians or the Arabs of any particular state or group of states. And it is not restricted to those represented here in Doha.

"The Middle East peace process is built on the notion of partnership, and it is not a passive process. Let me say bluntly that there will be no peace if the leaders of this region sit on the sidelines and wait for others to take the risks and summon the requisite courage to bring peace about."

The Middle East peace process has survived multiple traumas and setbacks. Still, it has survived. The reason is that the majority of the people of the region—Israelis, Arabs and Palestinians—have come to believe that the status quo is unacceptable, that the costs of conflict are too high, and that the effort to achieve peace holds at least the promise of a better future.

They understand that, without peace, their societies will remain shackled by the preoccupations of the past; their region will fall further behind in the global marketplace; and their children will grow up in an environment of uncertainty, danger, and fear.

The American diplomat Ralph Bunche, who was involved in Arab-Israeli negotiations decades ago, once said:

I have a bias against war; a bias for peace. I have a bias which leads me to believe in the essential goodness of my fellow man; which leads me to believe no problem in human relations is ever insoluble. I have a bias in favor of Arabs and Jews in the sense that I believe both are good, honorable and essentially peace-loving peoples and are therefore as capable of making peace as of waging war.

These are the words with which I want to leave you, because they capture my feelings exactly. That we must still repeat them long

after they were spoken is an unhappy fact. That we still do repeat them, that they still ring true today, is a more important fact.

As we approach the new century, there are no longer Cold War divisions fueling rivalry in the Middle East. The road to prosperity has been identified through the spirit of cooperation that has characterized these MENA conferences. And the way to peace once obscure has been laid out first at Madrid, then more clearly at Oslo, and in the agreements since.

The United States cannot choose the future for the people of this region: That is their choice and their challenge. We do not underestimate the difficulties. We recognize the dangers. But America was built on optimism and on faith that the future can be made better than the past.

That faith will not be vindicated by any single event or any single conference, but through the actions and choices made day by day, year by year, by government officials and business people, educators and religious leaders, parents and young people in cities and villages across the region.

For your attendance at this conference, I salute you. For your faith in our shared vision of the future, I admire you. And for your support in the weeks and months to come, which we will need, I thank you very much. ■

Secretary Albright

Preserving Peace and Stability With Force and Diplomacy

November 12, 1997

*Remarks at the Joint Service Officers' Wives Luncheon,
Washington, DC.*

Thank you very much. Thank you, Sue, for that really wonderful introduction. I have to say, I do love to hear all that. It is a tremendous pleasure for me to be here with all of you today and to see so many of you here and to know that you are here because you want to hear what we have to say about American foreign policy today.

Before I begin my speech, though, I would like to offer condolences to the families of those Americans who were gunned down in Pakistan overnight—and to tell all of you and them that we are working very hard to be able to figure out what happened. We have talked to the Government of Pakistan, who are also very helpful in this. And we will leave no stone unturned until we find the perpetrators of this horrible crime.

During the past few years, I had the pleasure of getting to know your speaker at last year's event, General Shalikashvili, quite well. He was a brilliant leader and remains a wonderful person. And if there is one principle he stressed over and over again, it is the importance of working together as a team. And as only Shali could do, he called me last night from Seattle to, I think, remind me that I had—but he put it much more delicately by thanking me for honoring a request that he had made.

I think that the idea of working as a team is the same lesson that is reflected in this joint services' lunch; although I gather it wasn't General Shali but Gen. Art Buchwald who deserves the credit for bringing you together.

I have been Secretary of State now for almost 10 months. After the first day, I was asked what it felt like to be a woman Secretary of State. At the time, I had to divide the question. I said that I had been a woman—or a female—for almost 60 years, and that it felt fine. But that I had only been Secretary of State for a few hours, and so we would just have to figure out how it all goes together.

Of course, a few weeks later, when I met with a first-grade class, the kids all wanted to know how it felt to be Bill Clinton's secretary.

I have also been asked what the differences are between a male and female Secretary of State. My quickest answer is, make-up—because you either can have a tired old man or you can have a tired old woman, but with make-up.

I can tell you that I have been very grateful for the encouragement and support I have received from people all over the United States. And nowhere has that support been stronger or more meaningful than from the five Armed Services of the United States.

As I travel around the world from Korea to Saudi Arabia to the Balkans to Haiti and back to Japan, America's Armed Services are there—not as occupiers, but as invited guests; not as instruments of war, but as preventers of war.

Among these overseas posts, there are vast differences of mission, risk, geography, and degree of hardship. But in each there is a tremendous pride in defending our freedom and values and in being part of a tradition of honor that dates back to Valley Forge. And I know that pride is shared—as it should be—by the entire Armed Services community, including children and spouses.

Whenever I speak to the American people about our armed forces, I try to get across three main points.

First, we have the most powerful and respected military in the world, and we have a responsibility to the future to maintain that high standard.

Second, even as we deal with present emergencies, we must bear in mind future contingencies. We need to be sure that the operational tempo we establish for our military is the right one, so that readiness is maintained and capabilities are not worn down.

Third, we have a solemn obligation to ensure that whenever and wherever we deploy our military, the mission is clear; important American interests are at stake; and our forces have the training, equipment, and backing they need to protect themselves and get the job done.

Deciding whether or not to send American military forces overseas is the hardest decision any President can make. And it is doubly complicated in this new era. For we live in an unsettled time, beset by unresolved disputes and unsatisfied ambitions. Although we face no single galvanizing threat, still there are dangers—some as old as ethnic conflict, some as new as letter bombs, and some as deadly as weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands.

That is why our armed forces must remain the best in the world. And as President Clinton has pledged, and our military leaders ensure, they will. It is also why we need first-class diplomacy. Force, and the credible possibility of its use, are essential to defend our vital interests and to keep America safe. But force alone can be a blunt instrument, and there are many problems it cannot solve.

To be effective, force and diplomacy must complement each other. There will be many occasions, in many places, where we will rely first on diplomacy to protect our interests, knowing that our diplomacy is stronger because it is backed by the muscle our armed forces provide.

Today, I would like briefly to discuss three situations around the globe where we are seeking to mix these tools of power and persuasion. But before I do, I would also like to refer to a very damaging situation that has developed on Capitol Hill.

While I sit in my office on a morning like this, trying to figure out what is going on in Saddam Hussein's mind; dealing with the problem of the shooting of our people in Pakistan; wondering about my meetings with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat; getting ready to go to the Middle East, I am concerned about the fact that there is a very real possibility that Congress will adjourn this week without approving legislation we need to fund important aspects of our foreign policy—including programs we need to reorganize the Department of State, contribute to international financial institutions, and pay our arrears at the UN. Can you imagine that while we're asking the UN to be the first line in our discussions about how to make the Iraqis comply, we are actually debating whether we should pay back our dues at the UN?

The reason is that Congress has been unable to agree on funding for international family planning programs. Now, this is a very important issue, and I know it's an important issue to all the people in this room. While we might not agree on how we feel about pro-choice versus pro-life, we do all agree that this is an important issue, and it deserves full and fair debate. But the stalemate it has caused now

threatens seriously to undermine our ability to conduct foreign policy at a very critical time. No matter how important we think that issue is, we cannot let it, at this stage, harm America.

The Administration has proposed that these issues be "de-linked," so that the family planning issue receives full and fair consideration on its own merits, with an up or down vote. Meanwhile, the rest of the legislation, which we need to support our diplomacy and American leadership abroad, should be allowed to go forward.

As members of the armed services community, I hope you agree that as America strives to shape events in what remains a very dangerous world, we should have available every possible foreign policy tool. This is certainly the case, for example, with respect to Iraq, whose leader Saddam Hussein remains either unwilling or unable to learn from his past mistakes.

When the Gulf war ended six years ago, the world made clear through United Nations Security Council resolutions what Iraq had to do to return to the family of nations. Under those resolutions, Iraq was required to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programs and to cooperate with a UN inspection and monitoring regime. And it was required to return stolen property, account for POW/MIAs, end support for terrorism, and stop running roughshod over human rights.

Unfortunately, for the Iraqi people, instead of meeting these requirements, for six years Saddam Hussein has lied, delayed, obstructed, and tried to deceive. In recent days, tensions have increased as a result of Iraq's outrageous effort to bar U.S. nationals from serving on UN inspection teams and because of its threat to try to shoot down unarmed U-2 aircraft.

In addition, Iraq has reportedly tampered with UN cameras and illegally moved equipment which could be used in the production of prohibited missiles or biological warfare agents. Finally, the UN delegation sent to Iraq this past week to insist that Baghdad end its defiance ran into a brick wall.

"To be effective, force and diplomacy must complement each other. There will be many occasions, in many places, where we will rely first on diplomacy to protect our interests, knowing that our diplomacy is stronger because it is backed by the muscle our armed forces provide."

Without ruling any options out, we have responded by encouraging the Security Council to approve a tough new resolution, demanding compliance from Iraq and imposing new travel sanctions against senior Iraqi officials. That resolution is being debated, as we speak, in New York. If approved, the resolution will make it clear once again that the present dispute is not between Iraq and the United States, but between Iraq and the law, Iraq and the Security Council, Iraq and the world.

The United States position is clear: Iraq must meet its obligations. Our resolve on this issue is unwavering. Hundreds of thousands of American soldiers put their lives on the line in the Gulf war. We will not allow Iraq to regain by stonewalling UN inspectors what it forfeited by aggression on the battlefield.

Since the beginning of Operation Desert Storm, American policy toward Iraq has been consistent, principled, and grounded in a hard-won understanding of the nature of the Iraqi regime. And that policy has achieved a great deal. Iraq's military threat to its neighbors is greatly diminished. The area in which Iraqi military forces may operate freely has shrunk. And more Iraqi weapons of mass destruction potential have been destroyed since the war than were destroyed during the war.

But despite all this, it is clear that the nature of the regime in Baghdad has not changed. It continues to disregard its obligations and remains a potential threat to the peace and stability of the region. So this is not, to borrow Margaret Thatcher's phrase, "the time to go wobbling toward Iraq."

We must—and will—continue to work closely with our allies and friends to ensure that UN inspections resume and that Iraq does not wriggle out of its obligations. We must—and will—retain in the region the military capability required to deter Iraqi aggression and to enforce the no-fly and no-drive zones. And we must—and will—maintain a firm commitment to the territorial sovereignty of Kuwait and to our other friends in the region.

To those who ask how long our determination will last, how long we will oppose Iraqi arrogance, how long we will insist that the international community's standards be met, our answer is, as long as it takes. We do not seek trouble, but we will never, never run away from it.

A second test of our military and diplomatic leadership is ongoing in the Balkans, where the worst European violence of the past half-century occurred in this decade. That violence was brought to an end through a combination of vigorous diplomatic efforts led by President Clinton and decisive military action by NATO, led by the United States.

Our goal now is to ensure that the fighting does not resume and that steady progress is made toward stability and democracy in the region. To these ends, we have reinvigorated our commitment to implementation of the Dayton accords. And although many serious obstacles remain, we have made significant progress.

Since Dayton was signed, the warring parties have been separated, arms control targets are being met, and public security has improved. The recent municipal elections have given evidence that many Bosnians are unwilling to accept a future in which the consequences of ethnic cleansing are made permanent. There has also been a substantial increase in independent broadcasting, and a new leader of the Bosnian Serbs has emerged who appears to understand that implementing Dayton is the key to a decent future for her people.

Building peace in Bosnia is a multinational, multifaceted enterprise—with military and numerous civilian elements. All are contributing, but much of the recent progress is attributable to the robust support provided by SFOR, the NATO-led peace implementation force, and to its close cooperation with civilian leaders.

Now there are those who say that Bosnia is Europe's problem and that America has no stake. But history teaches us that there is no natural political or geographic endpoint to violence in the Balkans. World War I began in Sarajevo, and the region was a major battleground throughout the Second World War. The ethnic rivalries that are at the heart of the conflict there need not produce violence, but when they do, they light a fuse of potential conflict throughout southern Europe.

America neither can, nor should, bear the burden of building peace in Bosnia alone; nor are we. We have more than two dozen partners. But as NATO's leader, we cannot walk away from a challenge NATO has accepted. We have made a commitment, which we should keep, to assist and persist in the healing process.

One way our SFOR troops have done that is by providing a secure environment so that victims of ethnic cleansing can return home in safety, as they have done recently in and around the strategic city of Brcko. *The New York Times* quoted one of our officers as saying that "I didn't want to come to Bosnia in the first place, but this is fantastic. You can't feel bad about helping people move back into their homes."

A third part of the world where our civilian and military leaders are working together to preserve peace and build stability is the Korean Peninsula. It is alleged by some that America has a short attention span. Well, let them come to Korea. Here, for more than four decades,

American armed forces have maintained their vigilance, prevented renewed war, and kept open the door to reconciliation.

Earlier in this decade, the Clinton Administration negotiated an Agreed Framework to halt and roll back North Korea's dangerous production of nuclear materials, and to bring that country into compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. More recently, President Clinton and President Kim of the Republic of Korea proposed talks involving the two Koreas, China, and the United States. Although these talks have been slow to get off the ground, a series of preliminary meetings have set the stage for plenary discussions which we hope will begin next month. These so-called four-party talks are important, not because we expect dramatic early results, but because the dangers of miscalculation in that part of the world are extremely serious.

Last February, I visited U.S. troops in the DMZ—the only place in the world where Americans still patrol against a potentially hostile communist army. The men and women on duty there are all the proof anyone could ask that America keeps its commitments. But as I talked with these young people and thanked them, I also felt again how important it is that America succeed in its key foreign policy objectives—not only because of what that success means to us, but because of what it means to the people of decency and good will in every corner of the globe.

For almost as many years as I have been alive, the United States has played the leading role within the international system—not as sole arbiter of right and wrong, for that is a responsibility widely shared, but as pathfinder—as the nation able to show the way when others cannot. Now, we have reached a point in history when no nation need be left out of the global system, and every nation that seeks to participate and is willing to do all it can to aid itself will have America's help in finding the right path.

I learned the importance of American leadership early in my own life. As most of you probably know, I was not born in this country. In fact, yesterday was the 49th anniversary of my arrival. More than half a century ago, when Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia and World War

II began, my family sought and found refuge in England. The whole world, as I knew it, depended on the outcome of that war. So when my family was not in a bomb shelter, we were glued to the radio.

Through the darkness, we were sustained by the inspiring words of Roosevelt and Eisenhower, and by the courage of Allied soldiers. I was just a little girl, but in my heart, even then, I developed an abiding respect for those willing to fight for freedom, and I fell in love with Americans in uniform—something I think I share with all of you.

Now, thanks to President Clinton, I have an opportunity I never believed possible—to serve as Secretary of State. And I am determined to do everything I can to pay back this country for its generosity and for all it has done for the millions throughout this century who have been saved by American soldiers, empowered by American assistance, or inspired by American ideals.

I am a woman, 60 years old. A few months ago, another 60-year-old woman was interviewed by the newspapers. Her name is Ferida Osmic. She is Bosnian, and she is among those able to live now in their own homes because of the climate of security our troops have helped to create in her country. She said simply, . . . the Americans—God bless them and may He give them and their children everything they wish for.

Let us never forget that we are the beneficiaries of a world made free by those who paid the ultimate price for us. We are the inheritors of a country made strong by those who did not back down in the face of the most deadly evil ever to trample this earth. We are the successors of a tradition of human freedom based on principle and law that remains, after more than 200 years, the most powerful force for human progress in the world. We must do, in our time, what our predecessors did in theirs—defend freedom, uphold law, protect our citizens, be vigilant in pursuing our rights, and tireless in fulfilling our responsibilities.

Toward these ends, I pledge my own best efforts and express my gratitude to you and the entire armed services community of the United States. Thank you very much. ■

Secretary Albright

The United States and Assistance To Post-Conflict Societies

October 31, 1997

Remarks at the U.S. Agency for International Development Conference on Promoting Democracy, Human Rights, and Reintegration in Post-Conflict Societies, Washington, DC.

Thank you. This platform I'm standing on was not for Brian, but for me—because I'm not only the first woman Secretary of State, but the shortest.

It is wonderful to be introduced by a real friend. Brian and I have been friends for a long time, and I think that we all owe a great debt of gratitude to him, because he did make transition governments the business of the day at the National Democratic Institute and has now taken his expertise to USAID and, therefore, into the center of our government. I'm very, very pleased to have the possibilities of continuing our friendship through the good work. So Brian, thank you very much for your introduction but, mostly, for what you do.

I think that it is very timely for USAID to be hosting this important conference. To all of you, I'm very glad to be here, and Happy Halloween. I'm wearing an appropriate pin today; that is now my moniker—read my pin.

I get quite a number of invitations to speak these days, but I confess I really jumped at this one. Ever since I became Secretary of State, I have been appearing on TV shows where they spend two minutes asking you a question and then expect a fully comprehensive response in 15 seconds or less. So you can imagine my delight, as a former university professor, when I was told that I could come here and speak for as long as I want. So sit back, relax—you're about to get it.

There is some question in my mind, however, about who should be speaking to whom. For if there is a manual for responding to post-conflict situations, the people in this audience collectively have written it and, in many cases, have lived it. You are the experts, and your efforts are helping to shape the history of our era.

For that, I congratulate you. And I take heart in the knowledge that even if you disagree with some of what I say, as experts, you probably disagree even more with each other.

Of course, because of your expertise, I am sure that any disagreements we do have can rapidly be deconflicted.

The subject of this conference is not new, because conflict is not new. People have been striving to ensure that wars, once ended, stay ended since the dawn of human history. But in our era, the stakes are higher, because the weapons are more destructive and the connections between what happens over there and back here are more direct. And as we know, the end of the Cold War was accompanied by violence on a massive scale from the Caucasus and the Balkans and to Central Africa. Much of this was intrastate violence, and most of the victims were civilian.

Some of these conflicts resulted from the pursuit of power or its abuse; others from extreme nationalism or the resurfacing of long-submerged ethnic grievances. Some were caused by a breakdown in authority aggravated by unrestrained population growth, unplanned urbanization, unchecked environmental degradation, or the ready supply of cheap and deadly arms. And some were caused by a combination of these and other factors.

From 1993 until 1996, as America's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, I had a close-up view of international efforts to respond to these conflicts. Today, I will draw on those years at the UN, but also I want to speak from a broader perspective as Secretary of State.

In my view, it is possible now to divide the world very generally into four categories of countries: those that participate as full members of the international system; those that are in transition and seek to participate more fully; those that reject the rules upon which the system is based; and, finally, the states that are unable—for reasons of underdevelopment, catastrophe, or conflict—to enjoy the benefits and meet the responsibilities that full membership in the system entails.

I am convinced, moreover, that the United States has a vital strategic interest in seizing the opportunity that now exists to strengthen the international system by bringing nations closer together around basic principles of democracy, open markets, law, and a commitment to peace.

This conference deals with an important part of that effort: the restoration, reform, and rebirth of societies devastated by conflict or war. Obviously, providing assistance in post-conflict situations is not the responsibility of the United States alone; it is a multinational enterprise. It requires active involvement of the UN system and other international organizations, and it benefits from the contributions of a vast network of private voluntary organizations. But the United States is not just another player.

Looking back, we know that America would not be as strong now if we had not helped the nations of Europe and East Asia to rebuild after World War II. Looking ahead, we know that we cannot maintain our position of world leadership without doing our fair share to fix the places within the international community that have split apart or broken down. We do, after all, have a security interest in preventing conflicts from reigniting, spreading across international borders, drawing in regional powers, and creating a risk that our armed forces will have to respond to.

We have an economic interest in opening new opportunities for American commerce and in preventing new demands on the resources we have available for emergency relief and refugees. We have a budgetary and social interest in helping the people of other countries to build a future for themselves at home, instead of being forced—out of fear or desperation—to flee to our shores. We have a political interest in helping post-conflict societies to embrace democracy and to become part of the solution to global threats such as proliferation, pollution, illegal narcotics, and transnational crime. Finally, we have a humanitarian interest in helping those who have survived the cauldron of war or—in a case such as Haiti, the cruelty of repression—to revitalize their societies.

To advance our interests, we will benefit from the opportunities for cooperation created by the Cold War's passing from the worldwide trend toward democracy and from the incentives for reintegration caused by our increasingly global economy. As we proceed, we must be selective. We cannot want peace or reintegration more than those we seek to help. The leaders and factions in post-conflict nations must meet their commitments and play by the rules. If they do not, the efforts we make will

likely be in vain. We must also bear in mind, even as we discuss past lessons learned, that we cannot shape our peace-building efforts with a cookie cutter.

What works in one place may well fail in another. Assumptions based upon our expectations and our culture need to be examined in light of local history, attitudes, and economic and social conditions. We must maintain a balance among security, political, economic, and social objectives. And we must have the right tools.

When Brian Atwood arrived at USAID 4^{1/2} years ago, the United States lacked the ability to respond quickly, flexibly, and comprehensively to the crises and opportunities spawned by the Cold War's end. So in early 1994, with the support of Congress USAID launched its Office of Transition Initiatives, or OTI, to provide such a capability. And I am pleased to say that, in cooperation with other donors and organizations, this three-year-old has already contributed much.

This past May, for example, I visited Guatemala where OTI had built the demobilization camps that enabled former guerrilla fighters to rejoin civil society. Earlier this month, I visited Haiti, where OTI has helped consolidate democracy by working to restore community and economic life in every region of the country. In Angola, OTI has helped create the climate of greater security needed to encourage compliance with the Lusaka Accords. And in Bosnia, OTI has been at the forefront of efforts to establish an independent and objective press.

Although OTI highlights the need to act flexibly when a conflict ends, one of the most important lessons learned in recent years is the parallel need for patience. Peace agreements are not panaceas. The imperative during a negotiation is to persuade the parties to stop the killing. If that goal is achieved, other important issues may be left unresolved. Nor will an agreement by itself provide the security, mend

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the infrastructure, rebuild the hospitals, restore the croplands, or create the other conditions needed for a return to normal life.

These tasks may take years, even if political and security developments are favorable. If they are not, the risk is that reconstruction will never occur and that those dissatisfied with the constraints of peace will slip their harnesses and return to war.

Unfortunately, patience is not a quality for which the 1990s are known. It is relatively easy to summon a sense of urgency and commitment at the moment a conflict ends—handshakes are exchanged and photographs are taken. But it requires a healthy dose of political will to maintain that commitment later, when the ambitious plans designed at the outset face their severest tests.

There is, moreover, never enough money in a post-conflict situation to finance all the good ideas. We live in an era of tight budgets and diminishing enthusiasm for international assistance. It is essential, therefore, that participation in relief efforts be broad, priorities be set with discipline, expectations be realistic, and resources be efficiently used. All this requires sound planning. And one of the key lessons we have learned in recent years is that the more and earlier the planning, the better.

In Cambodia, the peace agreement called for electing a government that would then determine the nation's reconstruction needs. As a result, efforts to repair infrastructure and build institutions were delayed. In Haiti, the United States had time to organize a comprehensive plan that became operational as soon as the elected leaders of that country were restored. More recently, following the peace accords in Guatemala, donors were well-prepared to begin reintegrating former combatants into society.

This is crucial because once a peace agreement is signed, momentum counts. Speed is essential to show the parties that peace pays. We can't spend years deciding where to put a demobilization camp or how to turn on the lights in the nation's capital. We have to create from the outset a sense that the decision to lay down arms is irreversible and that the parties must either join the peace-building effort or run the risk of being left permanently behind.

The immediate challenge after a peace agreement is signed is to create a climate of security so that the fighting can stop and reconstruction can begin. This is often the job of an outside military force assembled by the United Nations, a regional organization, or a coalition. A dilemma in many post-conflict situations is how and when to move from dependency on this outside force to reliance on a local force or forces. Preparing to take this

step is not simply a question of rebuilding a prewar capability; wholesale reform is often required.

This may entail establishing a clear separation between the responsibilities of soldiers and police; underlining the primacy of civilians over the military; restructuring and purging security forces; disbanding paramilitary units; and creating what may be entirely new standards for evaluating performance within both the military and police. That is some list.

As we have seen, most prominently, in Latin America in recent years, democracy may demand of the military nothing less than a 100% reassessment of its purpose and place in the country. But the foundation of true democracy cannot rest on the concessions made by the armed forces alone; civilian leaders must capably perform the tasks they have told the military it can no longer do. And they must demonstrate their own commitment to the rule of law.

International aid to domestic law enforcement has been a growth industry throughout this decade. The specific challenges may vary from teaching the ABCs of police investigation to human rights education to overcoming ethnic rivalry, but the overall goal is the same: to create a force that serves and protects the people, instead of repressing them. In some societies, this idea of police as friend and ally will be novel to citizens and police alike. As a result, years may elapse between the signing of a peace accord and the development of a satisfactory police force. Training takes time, and success depends not only on the arrest of criminals but on their just prosecution and punishment.

However difficult, military, police, and judicial reform are indispensable to lasting peace. If ex-combatants do not feel equal under the law and protected by it, they will take measures to protect their own security and begin the cycle of violence anew.

This leads to what is perhaps the most controversial and difficult question facing those of us involved in peace-building. When do we know that the international military force sent to a post-conflict country can leave without inviting renewed war? Obviously, there is no scientific answer to this question. Ordinarily, however, the level of force required to maintain security will decrease as combatants are demobilized, local security forces are stood up, and economic rebuilding gets underway.

As we have seen in El Salvador, Haiti, and Mozambique—and as we are now seeing in Eastern Slavonia and as we hope to see in Bosnia—it is possible to move down a continuum from a relatively large military force, to a smaller force, to a predominately civilian

mission oriented toward police and judicial training and monitoring human rights. Such a transition can only be achieved with steady support from international donors and with the commitment of the host government to embrace the rule of law.

The need for an exit strategy for military deployments in post-conflict situations has been the subject of much discussion in recent years. I believe that an exit strategy is essential. It requires policymakers to give the armed forces a clear sense of mission and mandate. And a target date for completion puts pressure on local leaders to meet their responsibilities. But an exit strategy cannot be an end in itself, and in peace-building, best-case scenarios rarely play out. To be effective, our strategy must be flexible enough to accommodate setbacks and stretch-outs but firm enough to keep the parties moving in the right direction. In our efforts to help post-conflict societies, we should always bear in mind that democracy provides the best route to long-term reconciliation.

In a democracy, former combatants can continue fighting at the ballot box for the principles they once defended on the battlefield. Moreover, the need to win votes, build coalitions, and propose concrete programs can have a moderating influence on the extremes. And once the mindset of democratic competition sets in, even threatening return to past mayhem can become impolitic and, thus, unthinkable.

Clearly, elections are necessary to provide legitimate and representative government, maintain stability, and promote progress. But although elections must be part of a post-conflict strategy, they are not a sufficient strategy.

Nations come to democracy at their own speed. In the early stages of a transition, an interim coalition government may work better and do more for the cause of reconciliation than a weak elected one. But whether elections are held sooner or later, the international community should strive from day one to help assemble the core ingredients of democracy: free press, political parties, equal rights for women and minorities—and even a new constitution if one is needed.

Nothing provides a more visible symbol of healing after a conflict than the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their prewar homes. Through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the international community has developed a system for protecting refugees that has saved countless lives. Today, however, that system faces some significant challenges.

For example, the recent events in Central Africa underline the need to ensure that the refugees who seek shelter from the conflict are not used as cover by the initiators of conflict. Countries of asylum have primary responsibility for the protection of refugees and for separating armed elements from the refugee population. Unfortunately, the government of former Zaire had neither the will nor the ability to perform these functions with respect to the refugees who flooded across its borders in the wake of the Rwandan genocide three years ago. Ultimately, the camps were broken up forcefully at a high cost in lives and principle. If such episodes are not to be repeated, the international community must devise effective and realistic strategies for ensuring that refugee camps are not misused as military bases or as hideouts for war criminals.

Second, the problem of sexual abuse against displaced and refugee women needs to be addressed further. This is a problem both for women on the road and in camps. The challenge is not simply to care for the victims of such violence, but to prevent the violence and exploitation in the first place.

And, third, for economic and social reasons, female ex-combatants and war-affected families—often headed by women—have particular difficulty reestablishing themselves in society after conflict. Their problems should be incorporated in a broader strategy for community reintegration. Two projects in this category are the UNHCR's Rwandan Women's Initiative and the Bosnian Women's Initiative, which strive to create economic opportunity for returning women refugees.

Finally, one of the cruelest legacies of conflict in our era is ground made deadly by the presence of land mines. Today, an estimated 100 million mines lay scattered around more than five dozen countries: each mine a threat to life and limb; each an obstacle to economic recovery and the return of refugees; each a reminder that the costs of war continue long after the guns of war are silent.

During the past several years, I have met with mining victims on four continents. I have watched little children without legs propel themselves on wagons through the streets, seen old men fitted with prosthetic limbs, and watched mothers tether their children to trees to prevent them from straying into nearby mine-infested fields.

Like other Americans, I have been heartened by the recent dramatic increase in support for protecting civilians from the danger of land mines. I am appreciative of the contributions made to this cause by leaders such as Senators Patrick Leahy and Chuck Hagel, and by the Nobel Prize-winning International Campaign to Ban Land Mines. And I am proud that today, America is the leader in humanitarian demining.

Since 1993, we have devoted \$153 million to this purpose. Our experts are helping to remove mines in 14 nations. They have trained and equipped about one-quarter of those engaged in demining around the world, and we are continuing to increase our commitment. But still, there is much more that we, and others in the international community, can and must do.

Accordingly, I am pleased that later today I will join Secretary of Defense William Cohen in announcing a major new Presidential initiative. The purpose of that initiative will be to ensure that civilians in every country on every continent are secure from the threat of land mines by

the end of the next decade.

Our premise is that the best way to protect civilians from land mines in the ground is to pull them out like the noxious weeds that they are. But given the scale and urgency of the problem, we need a massive increase in global resources devoted to identifying and clearing mines. We need to intensify research into better methods of demining, for in this era of technological miracles, the most common tool we have for detecting land mines is still a stick attached to a person's arm. And we need to expand efforts to heighten awareness among vulnerable popula-

tions, so that when we achieve our goal of eliminating land mines that threaten civilian populations, the children of the world will be there to witness it.

The initiative we are announcing today is intended to increase public and private resources devoted to demining worldwide by approximately five-fold to \$1 billion a year. The initiative will be coordinated by Assistant Secretary of State Karl F. "Rick" Inderfurth, who, because of his dedication to this case and cause has agreed, in addition to his duties as Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia—a region that has Afghanistan in it, with a lot of land mines in it—has today been asked to serve

as the U.S. Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State for Global Humanitarian Demining.

Thirty-six years ago, President Kennedy set for our nation the goal of enabling a man to walk on the moon. Today, President Clinton is reaffirming the goal of enabling people everywhere to walk safely on the Earth.

This conference is about rebuilding post-conflict societies. I can think of no better contribution to that cause than to mobilize public and private resources from around the world to see that land mines are removed forever from the ground on which our children tread.

The issues I have discussed so far relate to the creation within a post-conflict society of what I would call the nuts and bolts of normalcy—the ability of people to go about their daily business free from violence—in hopes of increased prosperity—in communities where the trains are running and basic services are being provided. This is how the physical scars of war are healed, and it is important and necessary to the rebuilding process. But it is not enough, for many of the wounds that war inflicts are not against land or body but mind and spirit.

During the past five years, I have met with victims of war from the Caucasus to Cambodia to Kigali to Quiche. I have talked to people no different from you or I whose lives have been turned wrongside out by ethnic cleansing and murder. I have spoken to grandparents in Georgia who have been driven from the homes in which they had lived their entire lives and to women in Rwanda now raising children conceived in rape by the murderers of their husbands. And I have met with the widows of Vukovar and Srebrenica who will not believe their loved ones are dead, because they have seen no bodies, because they have no faith in what anyone tells them, and because even steel would lose a test of strength compared to human hope. I suspect many of you have had similar conversations.

No international program, no matter how generous or well-planned, can erase the bitterness created by war; that is beyond mortal power. But we do have tools available to provide a degree of help, and this matters—not only for humanitarian reasons but because it is hard to build a democratic community on a foundation of unresolved anger and grief.

The tools include such programs as the International Voluntary Fund for the Victims of Torture, counseling programs run by private voluntary groups, and self-help projects organized by survivors themselves. Donors can also help to locate and identify the remains of

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the missing, search out and care for unaccompanied children, and aid in the reuniting of families. And we have a particular responsibility to support reconciliation through the prosecution of war crimes, a truth commission, or other appropriate means. These are imperfect instruments, but they can provide at least a measure of closure and accountability to past outrages, so that their repetition is less likely, and so that the families of victims don't feel that their suffering has been ignored.

Fifty years ago tomorrow, President Truman summoned Congress to a special session for the purpose of approving post-conflict aid to the people of war-torn Europe. Later, on the first day of that session, the President told the American people that he saw

an opportunity, unmatched in history, to help men and women all over the world to move out of the shadows of fear and war into the light of freedom and peace.

We have learned,

said Truman,

through the costly lessons of two world wars that what happens beyond our shores determines how we live our own lives. . . The best way to prevent future wars is to work for the independence and well-being of all nations.

Much has changed over the past five decades, but the relevance of those words to our future and to the future of American leadership has not. For almost as many years as I have been alive, the United States has played the leading role within the international system,

not as sole arbiter of right and wrong—for that responsibility is widely shared—but as pathfinder; as the nation able to show the way when others cannot.

Now we have reached a point in history when no nation need be left out of the global system, and every nation that seeks to participate and is willing to do all it can to aid itself will have America's help in finding the right path. Like the leaders of a half century ago, we are present at the creation of a new era full of opportunity but imperiled, as well, by new dangers.

The good news, in which our own nation has always believed, is that human security and prosperity and freedom are dynamic, not finite. If we plant the seeds and till the soil, they will grow. This view is not based on any illusions. Relief and development professionals, especially, have seen far too much of poverty and suffering to indulge in sentimentalism. But we live in a nation and a world that has been enriched immeasurably by the survivors, by those who have emerged from the ravages of war to rebuild their lives, recreate their communities, and renew the progress of their nations.

It has been said that all work that is worth anything is done in faith. Let us all keep the faith that each child saved, each refugee returned, each institution reformed, each barrier to justice brought down, and each land mine removed will build our confidence in each other and expand outward the limits of what is possible on this Earth. Thank you very much for your attention. ■

David J. Scheffer

U.S. Policy and the Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court

November 13, 1997

Address by the U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues at the Carter Center, Atlanta, Georgia.

I am honored to address such a distinguished audience on a subject of great importance to the United States and to the international community. President Carter's personal interest in the establishment of a permanent international criminal court is yet another testament to his vision for the global protection of human rights. We are grateful, once again, for his activism and for his assistance in addressing the major challenges of our times.

Let me start by drawing your attention to President Clinton's speech on September 22 at the UN General Assembly. President Clinton said, "before the century ends, we should establish a permanent international criminal court to prosecute the most serious violations of humanitarian law." The President's vision reflects our long-standing fundamental position of support for a fair, effective, and efficient court, and now emphasizes a rapid timetable for its establishment. As we approach the 21st century, individuals—of whatever rank in society—who participate in serious and widespread violations of international humanitarian law must no longer act with impunity. The time has come to move with determination toward the establishment of an international court that serves as a deterrent—and as a mechanism of accountability in the years to come.

The United States will continue to play a major role in the negotiations and in Rome next summer. The participation of the United States in an established permanent court will be essential to its effectiveness. History has shown that when new international institutions are started without full United States participation—like the League of Nations—they can fail. When they start with United States leadership—like the United Nations, the war crimes tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the new Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons—they can

succeed. There are no shortcuts to getting to "yes" in this process. Creating a fair, effective, and efficient permanent court is within reach, but all governments and all NGO's engaged in this historic endeavor will need to proceed with realistic expectations about the functions and structure of the court. We look forward in the coming weeks to working very closely with other delegations on issues of state cooperation, definitions of war crimes, rules of procedure, and applicable general principles of criminal law.

I wish to use my brief intervention this morning to discuss some elements of the U.S. position which most concern nongovernmental organizations and other governments. There are many provisions of the draft statute for the permanent court which are being negotiated in a very collaborative and productive manner, and considerable progress is being made. The U.S. delegation has been a leading influence in drafting the general principles of criminal law and the procedures of the court. This is no small task, as we try to resolve differences between common law and civil law systems.

There also has been much progress on the definitions of the crimes which will constitute the jurisdiction of the court. Those definitions must reflect well-accepted principles of criminal law as it applies to individuals. There is a tendency in the negotiations, occasionally, to seek to transform human rights principles and prohibitions on state practice into new criminal law principles. But this treaty-making exercise cannot become a law-making exercise. The treaty must reflect what is currently international criminal law, not what we hope or even confidently predict may one day become criminal law. Our national legislatures will have to be convinced that individuals prosecuted by the permanent court are being prosecuted for well-established crimes, not for

violations of principles which, as well-intentioned and important as they are, are prohibitions rather than crimes.

The permanent court should not take the place of national courts in handling everyday cases. Rather, the permanent court should be a significant and powerful international mechanism to deal with whole situations of exceptional seriousness and magnitude. It is reasonable, therefore, to consider that there should be some overall threshold of seriousness and magnitude to meet before one sets in motion the considerable and expensive machinery of the court. This is not a court that can or should realistically be called upon to deal with every crime that goes unpunished, however desirable in the abstract that might be.

The trigger mechanism, or how cases are initiated by the permanent court, remains controversial. While the "like-minded" group of governments and many NGO's argue for an independent prosecutor with the unfettered authority to investigate and prosecute any individual anywhere in the world, another important group of governments argues just as strongly that multiple state consents must be required before the prosecutor can act against any individual. There needs to be a middle ground. A third viewpoint, advanced by the United States and a number of others, is that the Security Council should have an essential role to play in a trigger mechanism where the prosecutor would exercise considerable independence.

Unfortunately, the U.S. position is sometimes misunderstood and misrepresented. So, I want to lay it out very clearly before this expert audience: The United States Government believes that the prosecutor should initiate investigations and prosecutions of individuals provided the court is seized with an overall situation or matter (meaning conflict or atrocity) for adjudication. We have emphasized, in this regard, that the state party should have to refer a situation or matter; the state party would not lodge a complaint against one or more named individuals as is currently envisioned in the International Law Commission draft statute, and as seems often to be taken for granted in the debate. An individual state should not be able to pick and choose whom to investigate and then dictate this to the prosecutor by filing a selective complaint. Individual complaints by state parties can only lead to highly politicized behavior by governments as they target individual suspects following cursory investigations or no investigations at all. Our proposed procedure for state parties would be similar to the referral procedure for the Security Council, which is acceptable to a wide range of governments.

However, if the situation referred by the state party to the court concerns a dispute or situation pertaining to international peace and security that is being dealt with by the Security Council, then the Security Council should approve the referral of the entire situation to the court. This procedure would recognize the Charter responsibilities of the Security Council. In most cases, the Council's decision likely would affect the timing of the referral and not permanently deny the referral. Once such a referral of a situation goes forward to the court, individual cases brought by the prosecutor would not be reviewed by the Security Council.

Our proposal mirrors the practice of the international war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia. The prosecutor would have wide discretion within the parameters of the situation or matter he or she is charged to investigate by either the Security Council or a state party, just as Justice Arbour now exercises with respect to the Former Yugoslav and Rwanda war crimes tribunals established by the Security Council. Many have pointed to these as a model for the kind of independent functioning prosecutor which we want to see for the permanent court.

The United States has reserved on the issue of state consent for individual cases until we see how the debate on the role of the Security Council and on complementarity settles. Complementarity, or appropriate deferral to national jurisdiction, is of great importance to our government. The negotiations on complementarity are proceeding well. But if the U.S. position on the role of the Security Council does not attract more support, then it will be only logical to assume that our government will need to look more seriously at other procedures to provide appropriate safeguards for U.S. interests. What are those interests?

First, we want to make sure that anyone who would commit war crimes against the U.S. military is investigated and prosecuted. We want to make sure the protections of an international criminal court also protect our forces. The benefit of a properly structured permanent

"The permanent court should not take the place of national courts in handling everyday cases. . . . the permanent court should be a significant and powerful international mechanism to deal with whole situations of exceptional seriousness and magnitude."

international criminal court will be its potential for helping to protect our own military from war crimes by deterrence and enforcement of the law.

Second, the permanent court must be effective and credible. The argument that somehow the court would be ineffective, if the Security Council has an important role in the court's work, is extremely shortsighted and oblivious to what the court will require to function effectively.

Third, the court must not become a political weapon, used perhaps with the best of intentions, to interfere with important efforts by the Security Council to strengthen international peace and security.

Fourth, the United States has an important international responsibility as a permanent member of the Security Council to engage in efforts to maintain or restore international peace and security. In the post-Cold War world, the U.S. military is called upon to undertake missions under UN authority to carry out mandates from the Security Council; to fulfill our commitments to NATO; to help defend our allies and friends; to achieve humanitarian objectives, including the protection of human rights; to combat international terrorism; to rescue Americans and others in danger; and to prevent the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction. No other government shoulders the burden of international security as does the United States.

Fifth, many other governments do participate in our military alliances, such as NATO, and a much larger number of governments participate in UN and other multinational peacekeeping operations, such as SFOR in Bosnia. It is in the interests of all of these governments that the personnel of their militaries and civilian commands be able to fulfill their many legitimate responsibilities without unjustified exposure to criminal legal proceedings. There is legitimate concern that a completely independent prosecutor would have free rein to probe into any and all decision-making processes and military actions anywhere, anytime, under any circumstances. It would be profoundly mistaken to assume that such concern should inhibit the establishment of a permanent court. Rather, it needs to be an essential factor in determining the jurisdiction and functioning of such a court.

In sum, the Security Council and a permanent international criminal court are both mechanisms for helping to establish and maintain international peace and security. Just as the United States has an interest in an effective and credible international criminal court, the United States also has an interest in an effective and credible Security Council. We see both as essential as we move into the 21st century.

Two final points: The interest of some governments and NGO's to include a crime of aggression in the jurisdiction of the permanent court is understandable, particularly in light of the Nuremberg precedent. But it is not realistic at this time. There is no broadly acceptable definition of a crime of aggression for purposes of individual criminal culpability. Advocates for the inclusion of this undefined crime also should consider seriously whether its inclusion will impose unnecessary risks on, and thus inhibit the use of, those military forces that the international community calls upon to undertake tough assignments. The establishment of the court will only be delayed if efforts continue to include this crime, and the number of countries joining the treaty will only decrease.

Finally, we cannot lose sight of the considerable assets that the Security Council can bring to the work of the permanent international criminal court. Not only has the Security Council already shown its willingness to delegate to an independent prosecutor wholesale conflicts and atrocities to investigate and prosecute, the Council doubtless will be looked to by the permanent court to enforce its orders in some circumstances. There will be times when the court will want the power of the Security Council to enforce the court's orders. If the world is seeking to establish a truly effective, busy, and permanent international criminal court, then the Security Council's role is vital.

This is not "Mission: Impossible." Nor is it simply a matter of ignoring reality and creating a theoretically independent court. We are confident that, with an acceptable outcome to the negotiations and ultimately with the support of the U.S. Senate, we will see a permanent international criminal court with strong U.S. participation by the end of this century. Thank you. ■



TREATY ACTIONS

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Protocol among the United States, Japan, and Korea amending the agreement on the establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy (KEDO) Development Organization. Done at Washington Sept. 19, 1997. Entered into force Sept. 19, 1997.

Agreement among the United States, Japan, and Korea on cooperation among the original members of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. Signed at Washington Sept. 19, 1997. Entered into force Sept. 19, 1997.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. Signed at The Hague Nov. 15, 1965. Entered into force Feb. 10, 1969.

Accession: Bahamas, June 17, 1997.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Agreement among the states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and other states participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces. Done at Brussels June 19, 1995. Entered into force Jan. 13, 1996.

Additional protocol to the agreement among the states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other states participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces. Done at Brussels June 19, 1995. Entered into force June 1, 1996.¹

Ratifications: Belgium, Oct. 10, 1997; Kazakhstan, Nov. 6, 1997; Moldova, Oct. 1, 1997.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement replacing Annexes I and II to the air transport agreement of Mar. 21, 1989, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia Sept. 2, 1997. Entered into force Sept. 2, 1997; effective Apr. 1, 1996.

Canada

Agreement amending Annex B of the treaty on Pacific coast albacore tuna vessels and port privileges of May 26, 1981. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 3 and 9, 1997. Entered into force Oct. 9, 1997.

Ecuador

Agreement continuing air transport services in accordance with the terms of the agreement of Sept. 26, 1986, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Quito Aug. 18 and Sept. 22, 1997. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1997, effective July 1, 1997.

Egypt

Results package grant agreement for the Health Policy Support Program, with annex.

Guinea

Agreement regarding the consolidation, reduction, and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Conakry Oct. 29, 1997. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Guinea of written notice from the U.S. that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.

Israel

Agreement regarding mutual assistance in customs matters. Signed at Washington May 16, 1996. Entered into force Sept. 24, 1997.

Moldova

Agreement regarding grants under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the furnishing of defense articles, related training, and other defense services from the United States to Moldova. Effected by exchange of notes at Chisinau Oct. 9 and 10, 1997. Entered into force Oct. 10, 1997.

Namibia

Arrangement for cooperation in the Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) Program, with appendices. Signed at Windhoek Oct. 8, 1997. Entered into force Oct. 8, 1997.

Netherlands

Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in [nuclear] safety matters, with addenda. Signed at Vienna Sept. 30, 1997. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1997.

Russia

Agreement concerning cooperation regarding plutonium production reactor, with annexes. Signed at Moscow Sept. 23, 1997. Entered into force Sept. 23, 1997.

Agreement concerning the modification of the operating Seversk (Tomsk Region) and Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk Region) plutonium production reactors, with related letter. Signed at Moscow Sept. 23, 1997. Entered into force Sept. 23, 1997.

Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperation regarding plutonium production reactors. Signed at Moscow Sept. 23, 1997. Entered into force Sept. 23, 1997.

South Africa

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at Cape Town Feb. 17, 1997. Entered into force Dec. 28, 1997.

Switzerland

Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters, with addenda. Signed at Vienna Sept. 30, 1997. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1997.

United Kingdom

Memorandum of understanding concerning the Trimaran Demonstrator Project, with annexes. Signed at Abbey Wood and Pyestock Sept. 2 and 3, 1997. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1997.

United Nations

Agreement extending the cooperation service agreement of Oct. 18, 1994, as extended, for the contribution of personnel to the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Effected by exchange of letters at New York Sept. 30, 1997. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1997; effective Sept. 17, 1997.

Uruguay

Agreement concerning assistance in developing and modernizing Uruguay's civil aviation infrastructure. Signed at Washington and Montevideo Sept. 25 and 30, 1997. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1997.

World Intellectual Property Organization

Agreement regarding the functioning of the United States Patent and Trademark Office as an international searching authority and international preliminary examining authority under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, with annexes. Signed at Geneva Oct. 1, 1997. Enters into force Jan. 1, 1998.

¹ Not in force for the U.S. ■