

Secretary Christopher

Investing in American Leadership

January 15, 1997

Address at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

I want to thank Joe Nye for that very generous introduction. It was a real privilege for me to serve in government with such an able official and such a distinguished scholar. Joe's contributions, along with those of so many other members of the Kennedy School faculty, are shining examples of the Kennedy School's commitment to public service, and I congratulate you for that today.

This is the third straight year I have had the opportunity to speak with you, and I also want to thank you for welcoming me so warmly again. A few years ago, I promised myself I would keep on coming up to Boston every January until the Patriots made it to the Super Bowl. Now that I've kept my promise, I'm ready to go home. But before I do, I want to reflect on the record of these last four years and to focus on the investments we must make to sustain American leadership and engagement in the world.

When our Administration took office in 1993, we faced an array of challenges that required urgent attention. Russia's democracy was in crisis; its economy was near collapse. The nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union was scattered among four new countries with few safeguards. The war in Bosnia was at the peak of its brutality and threatening to spread. North Korea was developing nuclear weapons. The Middle East peace process was stalemated; negotiations were stymied. Repression in Haiti was pushing refugees to our shores. NAFTA's passage was in serious doubt, threatening our relations with the entire hemisphere.

Not all at once but step by step, over the last four years, we have resolved these pressing questions and built an enduring basis for our engagement in a more secure and prosperous world. Indeed, it was in this period, with our leadership, that the world of the 21st century began to take shape. It is a world where no great power views any other as an immediate military threat, a world where the institutions we built after World War II are being adapted to meet new challenges, a world where open societies

and open markets have a strong competitive advantage, and a world where America remains the indispensable nation.

A new and distinctive element of our strategy has been the priority we have attached to addressing emerging global issues like proliferation, terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, and damage to the environment. These transnational issues cannot be adequately addressed by traditional country-to-country diplomacy or even on a regional basis. Global problems require global solutions.

We began to address these problems in 1993 by appointing an Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs to focus on many of these issues. I believe the progress we have made since will be seen as a principal legacy of the Clinton Presidency and, I hope, of my term as Secretary of State.

A central part of our global strategy has been to ensure that weapons of mass destruction do not threaten the American people. That is why we worked so hard to extend indefinitely the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to secure the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is why we have a program in place to keep nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union from falling in the hands of terrorists or rogue states. It is why we acted to freeze and eventually eliminate the North Korean nuclear program. It is why we have been determined to shut down Iraq's biological weapons program. And it is why, over the next several months, the President and our Administration will press hard for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Just as important, we are confronting the new security threats that have emerged with

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Secretary of State Warren J. Christopher
(State Dept. photo)

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such clarity since the Cold War ended. We have put the fight against terror, drugs, and crime at the top of the agenda of the G-7 and the United Nations. As a result, law enforcement cooperation among nations is stronger than ever, major terrorists have been caught, and many acts of terror have been prevented.

I have also made it a personal priority to integrate environmental issues into every aspect of our diplomacy. In my travels, I have been startled by the massive, bursting, over-crowded cities I have seen in many parts of the world—great cities like Sao Paulo and Mexico City, Jakarta and Manila and Cairo—cities where overpopulation and pollution threaten the health and welfare of nations and regions. In the Middle East, I've seen how the shortage of water is a source of conflict. In the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union, I've been struck by the ruinous impact of pollution on public health, on life expectancy, and on the prospect for economic recovery. A few years ago, these issues were barely on our screen. Now, they are in the mainstream of our diplomacy, and I believe they will become even more central in the next century.

I believe another lasting legacy of the President's first term will be the record we forged in advancing our economic interests. Thanks to the Uruguay Round and NAFTA, tariffs on U.S. exports are lower than ever before. Thanks to over 200 new market opening agreements, we have created 1.6 million American jobs. Thanks to the free trade commitments we forged in our hemisphere and across the Pacific, we have an opportunity to become the hub of a dynamic, open marketplace that stretches from Chile to Canada, from Australia to Korea. We simply must not squander that marvelous chance.

In every region in the world, our leadership has been decisive in advancing our interests and ideals. Across the Atlantic, we are on the verge of building a stable, democratic, and undivided Europe. American leadership ended the war in Bosnia, and it is winning the peace. We have led the reinvigoration and transformation of NATO. All of Europe's new democracies have joined the Partnership for Peace, and this year NATO will invite several to begin negotiations to join the most successful alliance in history. At critical moments, we stood by democracy in Russia, and we have opened the door for its integration, including a new charter with NATO.

Asia, too, is entering the next century prosperous, at peace, and with new structures of cooperation designed to keep it that way. Again, our leadership has been vital. We have provided stability by maintaining our military presence,

strengthening our cornerstone alliance with Japan, and standing with South Korea against provocations from the North. We have provided vision by leading APEC to embrace open trade. We have worked with China to advance the vital interests we share, even as we address our very serious differences on issues like human rights.

In the Middle East, we are closer to realizing our goal of a comprehensive peace. Our diplomacy was vital in helping Israel reach agreements with the Palestinians and a peace treaty with Jordan. We helped open a new dimension of the peace process by galvanizing the economic summits at Casablanca, Amman, and Cairo and encouraging important steps toward normalized relations between Israel and its neighbors in the Middle East. While peace has faced many severe tests in recent months, the achievements are enduring. And we are determined to move forward.

The agreement on Hebron and other issues reached last night is really an extraordinary achievement. It demonstrates that there is a powerful logic to peace—an imperative powerful enough to overcome the setbacks and hesitations of recent months. The protocol on Hebron and the U.S.-drafted Note for the Record are a clear roadmap for the future of the peace negotiations. They set forth commitments and a timeframe for both Israel and the Palestinians to implement the agreements they have already reached. The Note also fixes a time for the commencement of the vital negotiations on the final status issues.

Now that the parties have taken this difficult step, they must not relax or step back in fatigue. They must use this new momentum to move ahead to build the peace that is in the common interest of Israelis and Palestinians alike. And we must remember that we were able to help the parties reach their agreement because of our leadership and engagement—and because we have had the resources to support those who took risks for peace.

In the Western Hemisphere, we have seen a dramatic movement toward open societies and open markets in a region that is the fastest-growing market for U.S. exports in the world. When the hemisphere's democratic trend was threatened by the dictatorship of thugs in Haiti, it was America's decisive action that restored legitimate government. When free markets were threatened by the financial crisis in Mexico, it took our leadership to restore confidence.

In Africa, we have been engaged on a continent that has now reached a crossroads—a point at which sound policies and steady international engagement can make the difference between war and peace, poverty and growth. That is why we have made a vigorous effort to encourage democracy, resolve conflicts, and promote trade and investment.

It is why we are working to create an African Crisis Response Force that would enable

countries in the region to respond to emergencies with their own troops but with financial and logistical support from the United States and our allies.

In all these areas, the record we have forged is itself the best argument for a principled and robust policy of American engagement in the world. Because of our military and economic might, because we are trusted to uphold universal values, there are times when only the United States can lead. We must lead not because the exercise of leadership is an end in itself, but because it is necessary to advance the interests and ideals of our great nation.

I went through this summary of accomplishments deliberately, because I wanted to lay the basis for the case I want to make to you today: that we must sustain our leadership and back it up with sufficient resources. This is really the central lesson of our era. Because the United States led, a century that was never safe for democracy is ending with peace and freedom ascendant. The end of the Cold War has only strengthened the imperative of American leadership. As President Clinton has said: "This is the greatest age of human possibility in history and that gives us special opportunities, but it also imposes special responsibilities."

The need for American leadership is rarely questioned in our country. Yet, today, our ability to lead is open to question. Let me explain: No one in public life will stand up and say we can afford to retreat; we can ignore our commitments; we can build a wall around America. Members of Congress do not call me to say close some embassies, lower the flag, and bring our diplomats home by Christmas. On the contrary, Congress calls to protest whenever we reluctantly decide that we must close a mission because Congress cut back our funding. What is more, while cutting our budget, Congress regularly calls on us to increase our global engagement—by enlarging NATO, supporting the independence of Russia's neighbors, promoting investment in Africa, and protecting workers' rights in Asia, to name just a few examples.

Of course, Congress is absolutely right to say we should do all these things. But our foreign policy will not be sustained by rhetoric or good intentions. Talk is cheap; leadership is not. Leadership in foreign policy requires resources: enough to keep our embassies open and our people trained; enough to maintain constructive relations with the world's great powers; enough to multiply our leverage through international institutions; enough to provide targeted aid to struggling democracies that can one day emerge as allies and export markets; enough to meet threats like terrorism and international crime.

As I said before, we would not have been able to achieve the Hebron agreement without constant

leadership in the Middle East, without constant engagement in the peace process, and without the resources we provided over the years. There is just no free lunch. We simply have to make the investments to sustain our engagement.

The biggest crisis facing our foreign policy today is whether we will spend what we must to have an effective foreign policy. Since 1985, our spending on international affairs has been slashed by 50% in real terms—50%. Our budget for foreign affairs is now just over 1% of the overall federal budget.

The amazing thing is these cuts have not been accompanied by any serious congressional debate. They have not been motivated by any reassessment of our interests in the world. As I said, everyone is for U.S. leadership in principle. Some people just think we can have it without paying the price. As a result, we are endangered by a new form of isolationism that demands American leadership but deprives America of the capacity to lead.

One casualty of inadequate resources will be the principle of universality in our representation abroad—the principle that there should be a U.S. mission in virtually every country. Budget cuts have forced us to close over two dozen consulates and several embassies. If the hemorrhaging continues, we will have no option but to close more facilities.

In an unpredictable world, we need a voice in every nation. In the last few years, we have seen over and over again how vital our presence can be, often at unexpected times in unexpected places. Over 170 nations—from Albania to Zambia—had an equal say in extending the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and approving the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Each had an equal need to be persuaded by on-the-spot American diplomacy, and I can tell you that it happened over and over again. We could not have negotiated the Dayton peace agreement had there not been embassies in each of the former Yugoslav republics. We needed people on the ground in every Balkan capital to gather information, to conduct negotiations, to spotlight atrocities, to prepare the way for our troops, and, not least, to symbolize our commitment to that troubled region.

Likewise, we almost certainly could not have convinced Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine to give up nuclear weapons if we had not opened embassies in each of the New Independent States when the Soviet Union broke up. And yet, if we faced a situation like

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the break-up of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, I doubt if we could afford to open the necessary new facilities.

Budget cuts have also forced the people who serve our country abroad to work under intolerable conditions. Our diplomats in Beijing work with obsolete technology in decaying buildings. At our embassy in Angola, which is a focal point of talks to end that country's civil war, our people work out of a makeshift trailer park. Our embassy in Tajikistan is run out of a Soviet-era hotel; utilities go off for days at a time, and our diplomats have to carry jugs of water up the stairs. These are the people we call on when Americans get into trouble, when our companies need help to crack new markets, when we need to track down terrorists and drug lords.

One of the principal tools of our diplomacy is foreign assistance. These programs give us the leverage our diplomacy needs to be effective. They help us prevent conflict and catastrophe. As crisis after crisis has shown, the cost of prevention is never as great as the price of neglect. We have already spent nearly as much money dealing with the short-term crisis in Rwanda and Burundi alone as we were able to spend last year to promote development and peace in all of Africa.

Our assistance programs have declined by 37% in real dollars in the last 10 years. Half of our bilateral aid now supports the Middle East peace process. These funds advance a vital interest and must be fully preserved. But aid to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan will inevitably come under pressure—possibly irresistible pressure—if our other assistance programs continue to be decimated and this imbalance grows.

Our diplomats also help America compete in the global economy. Indeed, in the last four years, we have achieved a major cultural change in our embassies. They are now aggressively supporting American companies in winning and carrying out contracts abroad. American business leaders have told me how much they have been helped by this aspect of our "America's Desk" effort. But now I am hearing another message. They say that our Ambassadors are striving mightily but that personnel cuts have left them stretched too thin to do what they want to do to be helpful.

Another casualty has been our support for international institutions, including the international financial institutions and the United Nations. For 50 years, the United States has led in the United Nations, because it is a valuable tool for advancing our interests. That is more true today than ever with the emergence of new global issues. But now we face stark alternatives. We can continue to meet global challenges

through the UN, where we share the burden with over 180 nations, or we can meet them alone, forcing our soldiers to take all the risks and our taxpayers to foot all the bills. That is our choice.

In part because of U.S. arrears, the UN is hobbled in doing tasks of great importance to our interests—in peacekeeping, in refugee operations, in human rights, in world health, to take only a few examples. By failing to pay our dues, we also compromise our ability to shape a smaller, leaner, and more effective UN.

But our campaign for reform has begun to make progress. The UN has a new Secretary General, a leader with the ability and conviction to make the UN an effective institution for the next century. The UN must do its part. But now so must the United States. It is time to pay our dues and our debts. It is time to recognize that we cannot reform and retreat at the same time.

More broadly speaking, it is time to recognize that we have a vital national interest in adequately funding our international efforts. Just as we need to preserve our military readiness by maintaining forces and bases around the world, we need to preserve our diplomatic readiness by supporting the people and programs that help keep our soldiers out of war. In a world of real dangers, the failure to maintain diplomatic readiness will inevitably shift the burden of leadership to our military. The cost will be measured in lost opportunities and lost lives.

Our Defense Department has wisely designed a strategy to cope with two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. While our Defense Department has a two-crisis capability, the State Department is in danger of having a no-crisis budget.

We cannot respond to a crisis in one part of the world without taking funds from valuable programs in other regions. To support our deployment in Haiti, for example, we had to cut aid to Turkey. To monitor the cease-fire in Northern Iraq, we had to short-change the peace process in Guatemala. If a new crisis occurred today, we would have to make a painful choice: Which long-term interest—probably an already underfunded long-term interest—should be sacrificed to meet the short-term need?

I urgently and earnestly call on the Congress to reassess the erosion of our diplomatic readiness and to support, on a bipartisan basis, the President's international affairs budget. This is a challenge that must be met if we are to maintain our strength in the next century.

As I leave this wonderful office that I have been privileged to be in for the last four years, I have many reasons to be optimistic about the future. I know that time and again—from Haiti to Bosnia, to Mexico to Russia to China—

President Clinton has made the tough and correct decisions that leadership requires, and I know he will continue to make them. I know that Ambassador Albright, too, will be an eloquent and effective advocate for America's tradition of global engagement. I know that with any reasonable support, the men and women of our Foreign and Civil Service will keep on advancing our interests in every part of the world, despite the hardship and danger they accept and endure.

I am optimistic because I know the American people stand with us. I have seen it as I have traveled around the country: Americans are proud we are the world's leading nation, and they know leadership carries responsibilities; they understand that better than the people in Washington. They see the evidence that isolationists miss: that the security of our nation depends on the readiness of our diplomats as our first line of defense; that the safety of our streets depends on our fight against drugs and terror abroad; that our jobs at home depend on the health of the global economy.

I am optimistic because my own career has spanned a very inspiring period in the history of America's involvement in the world. Unless we're all in for a big surprise, I will be the last Secretary of State who served in World War II. My memories of that time and my experience of the last 50 years teach me to have confidence in the choices Americans will make.

After I left law school in 1949, I went to work for Justice William O. Douglas. As I was ending

my year with him, I asked him for some advice. He responded: "Get out in the stream of history and swim as fast as you can." I got out of it a bit further than I ever imagined I would, but let me tell you what I saw along the way.

I saw a whole generation of leaders of both parties who recognized our interest in helping Germany and Japan rebuild so they could become our strong allies and trading partners. I saw the American people make the investments that paid off in half a century of peace and prosperity and in freedom's victory in the Cold War. Now as Secretary of State, I have seen former political prisoners like Havel and Mandela lead their countries as Presidents. I've seen former adversary states on their way to become our allies. I've seen once-impooverished countries become our leading export markets. All over the world, people credit the United States for helping to achieve this transformation, and they look to us to continue to lead.

Today, as before, alliances mean peace; engagement means greater security; leadership brings friends to our side. And your generation has an even greater opportunity than mine: You have the key that unlocks the door to another American century. But you also have a responsibility to make the investments my generation made; the investments leadership demands; the investments that will make this an even safer, freer, better world. Thank you very much. ■

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(State Dept. photo)

Biography:

U.S. Secretary of State

Madeleine Korbel Albright

Madeleine Korbel Albright was nominated by President Clinton on December 5, 1996, as Secretary of State. After being unanimously confirmed by the U.S. Senate, she was sworn in as the 64th Secretary of State on January 23, 1997. Secretary Albright is the first female Secretary of State and the highest-ranking woman in the U.S. Government.

Prior to her appointment, Secretary Albright served as the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations (presenting her credentials at the UN on February 6, 1993) and as a member of President Clinton's Cabinet and National Security Council. Secretary Albright formerly was the President of the Center for National Policy. The Center is a nonprofit research organization formed in 1981 by representatives from government, industry, labor, and education. Its mandate is to promote the study and discussion of domestic and international issues.

As a Research Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Women in Foreign Service Program at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, she taught undergraduate and graduate courses in international affairs, U.S. foreign policy, Russian foreign policy, and Central and Eastern European politics, and was responsible for developing and implementing programs designed to enhance women's professional opportunities in international affairs.

From 1981 to 1982, Secretary Albright was awarded a fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian following an international competition in which she

wrote about the role of the press in political changes in Poland during the early 1980s.

She also served as a Senior Fellow in Soviet and East European Affairs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, conducting research in developments and trends in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

From 1978 to 1981, Secretary Albright was a staff member on the National Security Council, as well as a White House staff member, where she was responsible for foreign policy legislation. From 1976 to 1978, she served as Chief Legislative Assistant to Senator Edmund S. Muskie.

Awarded a B.A. from Wellesley College with honors in Political Science, she studied at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, received a Certificate from the Russian Institute at Columbia University, and received her Masters and Doctorate from Columbia University's Department of Public Law and Government.

Ambassador Albright is fluent in French and Czech, with good speaking and reading abilities in Russian and Polish.

Selected writings include *Poland, the Role of the Press in Political Change* (New York: Praeger with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 1983); *The Role of the Press in Political Change: Czechoslovakia 1968* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University 1976); and *The Soviet Diplomatic Service: Profile of an Elite* (Master's Thesis, Columbia University, 1968).

Ambassador Albright has three daughters. ■

Confirmation Hearing

January 8, 1997

Prepared statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: It is a great honor and pleasure to be here with you this morning. I want to begin by thanking the President for his trust in nominating me to this high and very challenging position.

I am very grateful to Secretary Christopher both for his kind words of introduction and for the opportunity he has given me these past four years to observe how a steady and determined diplomat conducts business. And I appreciate very much the committee's courtesy in scheduling this hearing so promptly.

Mr. Chairman, we have reached a point more than halfway between the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the start of a new century. Our nation is respected and at peace. Our alliances are vigorous. Our economy is strong. And from the distant corners of Asia to the emerging democracies of central Europe and Africa, to the community of democracies that exists within our own hemisphere, and to the one impermanent exception to that community—Castro's Cuba—American institutions and ideals are a model for those who have, or who aspire to, freedom.

All this is no accident, and its continuation is by no means inevitable. Democratic progress must be sustained as it was built—by American leadership. And our leadership must be sustained if our interests are to be protected around the world.

Do not doubt: Those interests are not geopolitical abstractions; they are real. It matters to our children whether they grow up in a world where the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction have been minimized or allowed to run out of control. It matters to the millions of Americans who work, farm, or invest whether the global economy continues to create good, new jobs and open new markets or whether—through miscalculation or protectionism—it begins to spiral downward. It matters to our families whether illegal drugs continue to pour into our neighborhoods from overseas. It matters to Americans who travel abroad or go

about their daily business at home whether the scourge of international terrorism is reduced. It matters to our workers and businesspeople whether they will be unfairly forced to compete against companies that violate fair labor standards, despoil the environment, or gain contracts not through competition but corruption. And it matters to us all whether through inattention or indifference, we allow small wars to grow into large ones that put our safety and freedom at risk.

To defeat the dangers and seize the opportunities, we must be more than audience, more even than actors; we must be the authors of the history of our age. A half-century ago, after the devastation caused by Depression, holocaust, and war, it was not enough to say that what we were against had failed. Leaders such as Truman, Marshall, and Vandenberg were determined to build a lasting peace. And together with our allies, they forged a set of institutions that would defend freedom, rebuild economies, uphold law, and preserve peace.

Today, it is not enough for us to say that communism has failed. We must continue building a new framework—adapted to the demands of a new century—that will protect our citizens and our friends, reinforce our values, and secure our future.

In so doing, we must direct our energies, not as our predecessors did, against a single virulent ideology. We face a variety of threats, some as old as ethnic conflict; some as new as letter bombs; some as long-term as global warming; some as dangerous as nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands.

To cope with such a variety of threats, we will need a full range of foreign policy tools. That is why our Armed Forces must remain the best-led, best-trained, best-equipped, and most respected in the world. And as President Clinton has pledged, and our military leaders ensure, they will. It is also why we need first-class diplomacy. Force and the credible possibility of its use are essential to defend our vital interests

and to keep America safe. But force alone can be a blunt instrument, and there are many problems it cannot solve.

To be effective, force and diplomacy must complement and reinforce each other. For there will be many occasions, in many places, where we will rely on diplomacy to protect our interests, and we will expect our diplomats to defend those interests with skill, knowledge, and spine.

If confirmed, one of my most important tasks will be to work with Congress to ensure that we have the superb diplomatic representation that our people deserve and our interests demand. We cannot have that on the cheap. We must invest the resources needed to maintain American leadership. Consider the stakes. We are talking here about 1% of our federal budget, but that 1% may well determine 50% of the history that is written about our era.

Unfortunately, as Senator Lugar recently pointed out, currently, "our international operations are underfunded and understaffed." He noted, as well, that not only our interests but our efforts to balance the budget would be damaged if American disengagement were to result in "nuclear terrorism, a trade war, an energy crisis, a major regional conflict . . . or some other preventable disaster." Mr. Chairman, we are the world's richest, strongest, most respected nation. We are also the largest debtor to the United Nations and the international financial institutions. We provide a smaller percentage of our wealth to support democracy and growth in the developing world than any other industrialized nation. And over the past four years, the Department of State has cut more than 2,000 employees, downgraded positions, closed more than 30 embassies or consulates, and deferred badly needed modernization of infrastructure and communications. We have also suffered a 30% reduction in our foreign assistance programs since 1991.

It is said that we have moved from an era where the big devour the small to an era where the fast devour the slow. If that is the case, your State Department—with its obsolete technology, \$300 million in deferred maintenance, and a shrinking base of skilled personnel—is in trouble.

If confirmed, I will strive to fulfill my obligation to manage our foreign policy effectively and efficiently. I will work with this committee and the Congress to ensure that the American public gets full value for each tax dollar spent. But I will also want to ensure that our foreign policy successfully promotes and protects the interests of the American people.

In addition, I will want to work with you to spur continued reform and to pay our bills at the United Nations—an organization that Americans helped create; that reflects ideals that we share;

and that serves goals of stability, law, and international cooperation that are in our interests.

The debate over adequate funding for foreign policy is not new in America. It has been joined repeatedly from the time the Continental Congress sent Ben Franklin to Paris, to the proposals for Lend Lease and the Marshall Plan that bracketed World War II, to the start of the SEED and Nunn-Lugar programs a few years ago. In each case, history has looked more kindly on those who argued for our engagement than on those who said we just could not afford to lead.

Mr. Chairman, any framework for American leadership must include measures to control the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and terror; to seize the opportunities that exist for settling dangerous regional conflicts; to maintain America as the hub of an expanding global economy; and to defend cherished principles of democracy and law. At the center of that framework, however, are our key alliances and relationships. These are the bonds that hold together not only our foreign policy but the entire international system. When we are able to act cooperatively with the other leading nations, we create a dynamic web of principle, power, and purpose that elevates standards and propels progress around the globe. This is our opportunity, for in the post-Cold War era, big power diplomacy is not a zero-sum game.

The Transatlantic Partnership

A foremost example is the Transatlantic Partnership. It is a central lesson of this century that America must remain a European power. We have an interest in European security, because we wish to avoid the instability that drew 5 million Americans across the Atlantic to fight in two world wars. We have an interest in European democracy, because it was the triumph of freedom there that ended the Cold War. We have an interest in European prosperity, because our own prosperity depends on having partners that are open to our exports, investment, and ideas.

Today, thanks to the efforts of President Clinton and Secretary Christopher, American leadership in Europe is on solid ground. European institutions are evolving in directions that are making the continent more free, unified, and peaceful than at any time in history. Our key bilateral relationships, albeit spirited at times, are as strong and resilient as they have ever been. The terrible carnage in Bosnia has ended. The Partnership for Peace has broadened cooperation on security matters. And there is continued progress on political and market reforms within central Europe and the New Independent States.

If confirmed, I will be returning to this committee often to ask your support for our vision of an integrated, stable, and democratic Europe. In July, at the NATO summit in Madrid, the alliance will discuss European security, including NATO adaptation to new missions and structures, a framework for enhanced consultation and cooperation with Russia, and enlargement. The purpose of enlargement is to do for Europe's east what NATO did 50 years ago for Europe's west: to integrate new democracies, defeat old hatreds, provide confidence in economic recovery, and deter conflict.

Those who say NATO enlargement should wait until a military threat appears miss the main point. NATO is not a "Wild West" posse that we mobilize only when grave danger is near. It is a permanent alliance, a linchpin of stability, designed to prevent serious threats from ever arising.

To those who worry about enlargement dividing Europe, I say that NATO cannot and should not preserve the old Iron Curtain as its eastern frontier. That was an artificial division imposed upon proud nations, some of which are now ready to contribute to the continent's security. What NATO must and will do is keep open the door to membership to every European nation that can shoulder alliance responsibilities and contribute to its goals while building a strong and enduring partnership with all of Europe's democracies.

Building a more cooperative and integrated Europe will be one of many issues that President Clinton will be discussing with President Yeltsin during his visit here to the United States in March. A democratic Russia can and must be a strong partner in achieving this shared goal.

We know that Russia remains in the midst of a wrenching transition, but gains made during the past five years are increasingly irreversible. Despite the threats posed by corruption and crime, open markets and democratic institutions have taken hold. And last summer marked the first fully democratic election of national leaders in Russia's long history.

President Yeltsin's challenge in his second term will be to restore the momentum behind internal reforms and accelerate Russia's integration with the West. We have a profound interest in encouraging that great country to remain on a democratic course, to respect fully the sovereignty of its neighbors, and to join with us in addressing a full range of regional and global issues.

Our deepening friendship with a democratic Ukraine is also fundamental to Europe's integration. Ukraine was the first of the New Independent States to transfer power from one democratically elected government to another. And,

under President Kuchma, it has launched ambitious economic reforms that have subdued inflation and prevented economic collapse. In our relations both with Russia and Ukraine, the binational commissions established with Vice President Gore as the lead U.S. representative will serve as a valuable aid for setting the agenda and facilitating cooperation across a broad range of endeavors.

Finally, the future of European stability and democracy depends, as well, on continued implementation of the Dayton accords. Although IFOR completed its military tasks brilliantly in Bosnia, more time is needed for economic reconstruction and political healing. SFOR's goal is to provide the time for peace to become self-sustaining.

Although the full promise of Dayton is not yet fulfilled, much has changed during the past 13 months. The fighting has stopped, peaceful elections have been held, and the framework for national democratic institutions has taken shape.

Much of this is due to American leadership. Our plan now, in cooperation with our many partners, is to consolidate and build on those gains. Our strategy is to continue diminishing the need for an international military presence by establishing a stable military balance, improving judicial and legal institutions, helping more people return safely to their homes, and seeing that more of those indicted as war criminals are arrested and prosecuted.

Given the ongoing challenges, it is encouraging to note the history-making dimension of the process set in motion by the Dayton accords. Today, in Bosnia, virtually every nation in Europe is working together to bring stability to a region where conflict earlier this century tore the continent apart. This reflects a sharp departure from the spheres of influence or balance-of-power diplomacy of the past and an explicit rejection of politics based on ethnic identification. And it validates the premise of the Partnership for Peace by demonstrating the growth of a common understanding within Europe of how a common sense of security may be achieved.

The experience of IFOR and now SFOR in Bosnia heightens the potential for security cooperation among the full range of NATO and non-NATO European states. In Bosnia, soldiers from NATO, Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Romania, and many other nations trust, defend, and depend on each other. Our challenge is to extend that spirit to other joint endeavors and to keep it thriving long after SFOR concludes its work.

European stability depends in large measure on continued American engagement and leadership. And as history attests, European

"The purpose of enlargement is to do for Europe's east what NATO did 50 years ago for Europe's west: to integrate new democracies, defeat old hatreds, provide confidence in economic recovery, and deter conflict."

stability is also vital to our national interests. As a result, we will remain engaged; we will continue to lead; we will strengthen our alliances; and we will continue to build with our democratic partners a Europe in which every nation is free and every free nation is our partner.

Promoting Mutual Security And Prosperity in Asia

Mr. Chairman, America must remain a European power. We must, and will, remain a Pacific power, as well. Asia is a continent undergoing breathtaking economic expansion and measured, but steady, movement in the direction of democracy. Its commercial vigor reinforces our own and contributes to the vital interest we have in its security. This is, after all, an area in which America has fought three wars during the past six decades and in which 100,000 American troops are based.

President Clinton has elevated this dynamic region on our agenda, and I plan to devote much of my attention to its promise and perils. Our priorities here are to maintain the strength of our core alliances while successfully managing our multifaceted relationship with China.

Because of our commitment to regional security, we have maintained our forward-deployed military presence in the western Pacific. We are encouraging regional efforts to settle territorial and other disputes without violence. We are working hard to open markets for American goods and services—both bilaterally and through APEC—which the President lifted to the summit level. We are broadening our diplomatic and security ties in Southeast Asia, home to the world's fastest-growing economies. And we will continue to promote respect for internationally recognized human rights and the spread of freedom.

Our closest and most wide-ranging bilateral relationship in the region is with Japan, with whom we have strongly reaffirmed our alliance. We consult Japan regularly on a broad range of foreign policy questions from security in Asia to development in Africa. We appreciate its generous financial support for peace efforts from Bosnia to the Middle East. And we are working with Japan and another valued ally, the Republic of Korea, to implement the Framework Agreement freezing North Korean development of nuclear arms. In recent weeks, we and Seoul have worked together successfully to reduce tensions, reinforce the nuclear freeze, and improve prospects for dialogue on the peninsula. I look forward, if confirmed, to visiting both Japan and the Republic of Korea at an early date.

I am also looking forward to the visit here

soon of the Chinese Foreign Minister. A strong bilateral relationship between the United States and China is needed to expand areas of cooperation, reduce the potential for misunderstanding, and encourage China's full emergence as a responsible member of the international community.

To make progress, our two countries must act toward each other on the basis of mutual frankness. We have important differences, especially on trade, arms transfers, and human rights, including Tibet. We have concerns about Chinese policy toward the reversion of Hong Kong. While adhering to our one-China policy, we will maintain robust unofficial ties with Taiwan. But we also have many interests in common and have worked together on issues, including the Korean Peninsula, crime, the global environment, and nuclear testing.

U.S. policy toward China has long been an issue of controversy in Congress and among the American people. There are disagreements about the proper balancing of the various elements of that policy. There should be no doubt, however, about the importance of this relationship and about the need to pursue a strategy aimed at Chinese integration, not isolation.

Preventive Defense Through the Control of Deadly Arms

The Cold War may be over, but the threat to our security posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction has only been reduced, not ended. Arms control and non-proliferation remain a vital element in our foreign policy framework.

With our leadership, much has been accomplished. Russian warheads no longer target our homes. Nuclear weapons have been removed from Belarus and Kazakhstan, and in Ukraine, the last missile silos are being planted over with sunflowers. Iraq's nuclear capability has been dismantled and North Korea's frozen. The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been extended, indefinitely, and without conditions. A comprehensive ban on nuclear tests has been approved, and a chemical weapons ban will soon be in effect.

Mr. Chairman, these efforts to reduce the spread and number of weapons of mass destruction contribute to what Defense Secretary Perry has called "preventive defense." They are designed to keep Americans safe. We pursue them not as favors to others but in support of our own national interests. But arms control and non-proliferation are works in progress, and we will need your help and that of this committee and the Senate to continue that progress.

First, we will be asking your consent to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Conven-

tion, or CWC, before it enters into force in late April. As this committee well knows, the CWC was begun under President Reagan and negotiated under President Bush. It is supported by many in both parties, by the business community, and by our military. The CWC is no panacea, but it will make it more difficult for rogue states and others hostile to our interests to develop or obtain chemical weapons. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will be able to work together to get this treaty approved in time for the United States to be an original party.

We will also be seeking your early approval of the CFE Flank Agreement, which is essential to sustain the CFE Treaty which, in turn, contributes mightily to European security. Overseas, we will be working with Russia to secure prompt ratification by the Duma of the START II Treaty and then to pursue further reductions and limits on strategic nuclear arms.

We will also continue efforts to fulfill the President's call for negotiations leading to a worldwide ban on the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. The humanitarian problems created by the misuse of anti-personnel landmines can only be dealt with on a global basis. In September, the President told the UN General Assembly that "our children deserve to walk the Earth in safety." This will be a major arms control objective of the next four years.

Arms control and non-proliferation are closely linked to our policies toward rogue states. We have a major interest in preventing weapons of mass destruction from being obtained by regimes with a proven disrespect for the rule of law. Accordingly, we will continue working to improve the security and prevent the diversion of fissile materials. We will continue to oppose strongly the sale or transfer of advanced weapons or technologies to Iran. And we will insist on maintaining tough UN sanctions against Iraq unless and until that regime complies with relevant Security Council resolutions.

Vigorous Diplomacy in Support of Peace

Mr. Chairman, the appropriate American role in helping to end conflicts and respond to crises overseas has been debated widely, not only in our time, but throughout American history. Because we have unique capabilities and unmatched power, it is natural that others turn to us in time of emergency. We have an unlimited number of opportunities to act around the world, but we do not have unlimited resources nor do we have unlimited responsibilities. If we are to protect our own interests and maintain our credibility, we have to weigh our commitments carefully and be selective and disciplined in what we agree to do.

Recognizing this, we have a strong incentive to strengthen other mechanisms for responding to emergencies and conflicts, including the United Nations and regional organizations. We should work closely with the entire network of public and non-governmental organizations that has evolved to predict, prevent, contain, and minimize the human and other costs of natural and human-caused disaster. And we should insist that other capable nations do their fair share financially, technically, and—if necessary—militarily.

The primary obligation of the United States is to its own citizens. We are not a charity or a fire department. We will defend firmly our own vital interests. But we recognize that our interests and those of our allies may also be affected by regional or civil wars, power vacuums that create targets of opportunity for criminals and terrorists, dire humanitarian emergencies, and threats to democracy. Then, as President Clinton said recently, "The United States cannot and should not try to solve every problem, but where our interests are clear, our values are at stake, [and] where we can make a difference, we must act and we must lead."

During the past four years, under President Clinton and Secretary Christopher, the United States has been steadfast in supporting the peacemakers over the bombthrowers in historically troubled areas of the globe. Our goal has been to build an environment in which threats to our security and that of our allies are diminished and the likelihood of American forces being sent into combat is reduced.

We recognize that, in most of these situations, neither the United States nor any other outside force can impose a solution. But we can make it easier for those inclined toward peace to take the risks required to achieve it.

As this statement is being prepared, sustained U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East has helped to build a renewed dialogue between Israel and its Palestinian partners, producing significant progress on Israeli redeployment in Hebron. While an agreement is not yet in hand, the intensive negotiations which have been conducted over the past three months, including direct discussions between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat, have restored a sense of momentum and greater confidence between the sides. This process began during the Washington summit called by President Clinton last October and has been sustained and advanced through our active diplomatic engagement.

Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman

"The primary obligation of the United States is to its own citizens. . . . We will defend firmly our own vital interests."

Arafat have reaffirmed to President Clinton their determination to continue their joint efforts for peace. The United States will stand by them as they do.

Today, there remain two competing visions in the Middle East: One is focused on the grievances and tragedies of the past; the other, on the possibilities of the future. An agreement on Hebron would serve as a catalyst, strengthening the supporters of peace. Under the President's leadership, we intend to press vigorously on all tracks to realize a secure, comprehensive, and lasting peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Throughout, we will be guided by America's unshakable commitment to Israel's security and by our opposition to those who would disrupt this process through terrorism and violence.

Secretary Christopher leaves office after four years of historic progress in facilitating peace in the Middle East. While his presence will be missed, I will maintain fully the State Department's commitment to an active U.S. role in this long-troubled and strategic part of the globe.

Across the Mediterranean in Cyprus, another long-standing disagreement remains unresolved. In 1996, the parties moved no closer to a final decision on the status of the island. Moreover, disturbing incidents of violence marred the climate for negotiations while underlining their urgency. The dispute here and related differences between our two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece, affect European stability and our vital interests. Accordingly, we are prepared in this new year to play a heightened role in promoting a resolution in Cyprus. But for any initiative to bear fruit, the parties must agree to steps that will reduce tensions and make direct negotiations possible.

In Northern Ireland, we are encouraged that multi-party talks began, but we are disappointed by the lack of progress made and strongly condemn the IRA's return to violence. We will continue to work with the Irish and British Governments and the parties to help promote substantive progress in the talks. And we note that former Senator George Mitchell, who is chairing the multi-party talks, has been crucial to the forward steps that have been taken.

As we enter the 50th anniversary year of independence for both India and Pakistan, we will again consider the prospects for reducing the tensions that have long existed between these two friends of the United States. We have a wealth of equities in this region and a particular concern about the regional arms race and nuclear non-proliferation. India and Pakistan should both know that we will do what we can to strengthen their relations with us and encourage better relations between them—and that we expect both to avoid actions calculated to provoke the

other.

Another dispute tangled by history and geography concerns Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The good news here is that the cease-fire has now held for more than two years. The bad news is that progress under the OSCE's Minsk process has been agonizingly slow. We have very substantial economic, political, and humanitarian interests in this region and are prepared to play a more visible role in helping to arrange a settlement. One step that Congress could take to increase our influence would be to lift restrictions on non-military assistance to Azerbaijan while maintaining support for our generous aid program in Armenia.

Finally, in Central Africa, we are striving with regional leaders and our allies to prevent a still volatile situation from erupting into even greater tragedy. We are encouraging the repatriation of the remaining Rwandan refugees and assisting in their reintegration into Rwandan society. Through the efforts of Special Envoy Howard Wolpe, we are promoting a dialogue between the opposing parties in Burundi. And we support an end to conflict in Zaire based on recognition of Zaire's territorial integrity and full respect for human rights.

Mr. Chairman, I visited Central Africa last year. In Rwanda, in the beautiful region where they filmed "Gorillas in the Mist," there is an old stone church. By its side, American and other volunteers work with little brushes to clean and reassemble the skeletons of people slaughtered there in 1994. Among the hundreds of skeletons there, I happened to notice one in particular that was only two feet long, about the size of my little grandson.

It is said that foreign policy should not be influenced by emotion. That is true. But let us remember that murdered children are not emotions; they are human beings whose potential contributions are forever lost. America has an interest, as do all civilized people, to act where possible to prevent and oppose genocide.

One practical step we can take is to increase the capacity of African countries to engage successfully in peacekeeping efforts within their region. That is the purpose of the African Crisis Response Force proposed by the Administration last fall. This proposal has generated considerable interest both within and outside the region. With congressional support, it will be a priority in the coming year.

Leadership for a Global Economy

The Clinton Administration has had extraordinary success these past four years in creating jobs for Americans at home by opening markets

abroad. The more than 200 trade agreements negotiated have helped our exports grow by 34% since 1993 and created 1.6 million new jobs. By passing NAFTA, concluding the GATT Uruguay Round, and forging the Miami summit commitment to achieve free and open trade in our hemisphere by 2005 and the APEC commitment to do the same in the Asia-Pacific by 2020, the President has positioned the United States to become an even more dynamic hub of the global economy in the 21st century.

As Secretary of State, I would do all I can to see that this momentum continues. Already, I have talked with Treasury Secretary Rubin, Commerce Secretary-designate Bill Daley, and Trade Representative-designate Charlene Barshefsky. We intend, if confirmed, to function as a team—America's team. And we intend to be a very tough team.

Competition for the world's markets is fierce. Often, our firms go head-to-head with foreign competitors who are receiving active support from their own governments. A principal responsibility of the Department of State is to see that the interests of American companies and workers receive fair treatment and that inequitable barriers to competition are overcome. Accordingly, the doors to the Department of State and our embassies around the world are open—and will remain open—to U.S. businesspeople seeking to share their ideas and to ask our help.

In the years ahead, we must continue shaping a global economic system that works for America. Because our people are so productive and inventive, we will thrive in any true competition. However, maintaining the equity of the system requires constant effort. Experience tells us that there will always be some who will seek to take advantage by denying access to our products, pirating our copyrighted goods, or underpricing us through sweatshop labor. That is why our diplomacy will continue to emphasize high standards on working conditions, the environment, and labor and business practices. And it is why we will work for a trading system that establishes and enforces fair rules.

Although we will continue to work closely with our G-7 partners, the benefits of economic integration and expanded trade are not—and should not be—limited to the most developed nations. Especially now, when our bilateral foreign assistance program is in decline, public and private sector economic initiatives are everywhere an important part of our foreign policy. We can also leverage resources for results by working with and supporting the international financial institutions.

In Latin America, a region of democracies, we will be building on the 1994 Summit of the

Americas to strengthen judicial and other political institutions and to promote higher standards of living through free trade and economic integration. I am pleased that, in this effort, we will have the assistance of the newly designated special envoy for the Americas, Mack McLarty.

Although much poverty remains, substantial gains have been made in many parts of the hemisphere through economic reforms, increased commerce, lower inflation, and higher foreign investment. We believe that further progress can be achieved that will benefit us, as well as our hemispheric partners, through agreement on a Free Trade Area for the Americas by the year 2005. We also place a high priority on the early addition of Chile to the North American Free Trade Agreement on equitable terms and on the extension to Central America and the Caribbean of arrangements equivalent to NAFTA.

Even closer to home, we are encouraging continued economic and political reform in Mexico, with whom we share a 2,000-mile border and a host of common concerns, including crime, narcotics, immigration, and the environment.

In Africa, the overall economic outlook is improving, but daunting problems of debt, strife, environmental stress, and inadequate investment remain. It is in our interest to help the region's leaders overcome these problems and to build an Africa that is more prosperous, democratic, and stable. We know, however, that the primary impetus for development here, as elsewhere, must come from the private sector.

It is encouraging, therefore, that many African governments are facilitating growth through policies that allow private enterprise to take hold, while investing public resources wisely in education, health, and measures that expand opportunities for women.

If confirmed, I will place great emphasis on working with Africa's democratic leaders to broaden and deepen these trends. More specifically, we will work toward the integration of Africa into the world's economy, participate in efforts to ease debt burdens, and help deserving countries, where we can, through targeted programs of bilateral aid.

Promoting Freedom and Extending the Rule of Law

Mr. Chairman, the representative of a foreign power said once that his country had no permanent allies, only permanent interests. It might be said of America that we have no permanent enemies, only permanent principles.

"A principal responsibility of the Department of State is to see that the interests of American companies and workers receive fair treatment. . . ."

Those principles are founded in respect for law, human dignity, and freedom not just for some, but for all people.

If I am confirmed, I can assure you that the United States will not hesitate to address frankly the violation of internationally recognized human rights, whether those violations occur in Cuba or Afghanistan, Burma, Belgrade, or Beijing.

We will work with others to defeat the forces of international crime and to put those who traffic in drugs permanently out of business. We will pursue a hard line against international terror, insisting on the principle that sponsoring, sheltering, or subsidizing terrorists cannot be rationalized; it is wrong. And those guilty should not be appeased but isolated and punished.

We will maintain our strong backing for the international war crimes tribunal for Rwanda and the Balkans, because we believe that the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing should be held accountable, and those who consider rape just another tactic of war should answer for their crimes. And we will continue to promote and advocate democracy, because we know that democracy is a parent to peace and that the American Constitution remains the most revolutionary and inspiring source of change in the world.

The Environmental Mainstream

One final note, Mr. Chairman. Before closing I wanted to make it clear that I intend, if confirmed, to build upon Secretary Christopher's wise decision to incorporate environmental goals into the mainstream of our foreign policy. Over the past several years, I have traveled to almost every region of the world. I have seen the congestion caused by over-development and the deforestation that results when expanding populations compete for shrinking natural resources. I have smelled the air of smoke-clogged cities where the environmental techniques made possible by modern technology have not yet been applied.

The threats we face from environmental damage are not as spectacular as those of a terrorist's bomb or a hostile missile. But they directly affect the health, safety, and quality of life of families everywhere. We can choose to be passive in responding to those threats and leave the hard work to our children, or we can be active and forward-looking now. I choose the latter course and will not be shy in seeking congressional and public support.

Conclusion

Members of the committee, I am deeply honored to appear here today. I have laid out

some, but by no means all, of what I see as the principal challenges and opportunities we will face over the next four years. Clearly, we have a lot to do.

I could say to you that it had always been my ambition to be Secretary of State of the United States. But that is not true. Frankly, I did not think it was possible.

I arrived in America when I was 11 years old. My family came here to escape communism and to find freedom, and we did. My ambition at that time was only to speak English well, please my parents, study hard, and grow up to be an American. The newspaper in Denver, where we lived, had a motto that read, "'Tis a privilege to live in Colorado."

My father used to repeat that motto on a regular basis, but he would often add a reminder: "Kids," he would say, "never forget that it is also a privilege to live in the United States." Long after I left home, my mother would call on the Fourth of July to ask my children, her grandchildren: "Tell me, are you singing any patriotic songs?"

Senators, you on your side of the table and I on my side have a unique opportunity to be partners in creating a new and enduring framework for American leadership. One of my predecessors, Dean Acheson, wrote about being present at the creation of a new era. You and I have the challenge and the responsibility to help co-author the newest chapter in our history.

In so doing, let us remember that there is not a page of American history of which we are proud that was written by a chronic complainer or prophet of despair. We are doers.

By rejecting the temptations of isolation and by standing with those around the world who share our values, we will advance our own interests, honor our best traditions, and help to answer a prayer that has been offered over many years in a multitude of tongues, in accordance with diverse customs, in response to a common yearning. That prayer is the prayer for peace, freedom, food on the table, and what President Clinton once so eloquently referred to as "the quiet miracle of a normal life."

If, with your consent, I am confirmed as Secretary of State, I will ask you to join me in doing all we can, as representatives of the indispensable nation and with the help of God, to answer that prayer.

Thank you very much. ■



TREATY ACTIONS

MULTILATERAL

Children

Convention on the rights of the child. Done at New York Nov. 20, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 2, 1990¹.

Accession: Oman, Dec. 9, 1996.

Convention on protection of children and cooperation in respect of intercountry adoption. Done at The Hague May 29, 1993. Entered into force May 1, 1995¹.

Signature: El Salvador, Nov. 21, 1996.

Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Adopted by UN General Assembly at Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for the U.S. Feb. 23, 1989.

Accession: Burundi, Jan. 6, 1997.

Judicial Procedures

Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. Done at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the U.S. July 1, 1988. TIAS 11670.

Signature & Ratification: Venezuela, Oct. 16, 1996².

Convention abolishing the requirement of legalization for foreign public documents, with annex. Done at The Hague Oct. 5, 1961. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1965; for the U.S. Oct. 15, 1981. TIAS 10072; 33 UST 883.

Signature: Ireland, Oct. 29, 1996.

Accession: Lithuania, Nov. 5, 1996.

Law, Private International

Statute of The Hague conference on private international law. Done at The Hague Oct. 9-31, 1951. Entered into force July 15, 1955; for the U.S., Oct. 15, 1964. TIAS 5710; 15 UST 2228.

Acceptance: Monaco, Aug. 8, 1996.

Terrorism

Convention on the safety of United Nations and associated personnel. Done at New York Dec. 9, 1994³.

Ratification: Argentina, Jan. 6, 1997.

Weapons, Conventional

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with annexed protocols.

Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983; for the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty Doc.

Protocol on non-detectable fragments (Protocol I) to the Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983; for the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-25.

Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices (Protocol II) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983; for the U.S. Sept. 24, 1995. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-25.

Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons (Protocol III) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983¹. Succession: Macedonia, Dec. 30, 1996.

BILATERAL

Belarus

Postal money order agreement. Signed at Washington and Minsk May 1 and Nov. 7, 1996. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1997.

Brazil

Agreement extending the memorandum of understanding of May 8, 1994, as extended (TIAS 11252), concerning the Landsat System. Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia Oct. 18 and Nov. 28, 1996. Entered into force Nov. 28, 1996.

Memorandum of understanding concerning flight of the Humidity Sounder for Brazil (HSB) instrument of NASA's Earth Observing System (EOS) PM-1 spacecraft. Signed at Brasilia Dec. 5, 1996. Entered into force Dec. 5, 1996.

Mongolia

Agreement regarding cooperation and mutual assistance in customs matters. Signed at Hong Kong June 19, 1996. Entered into force June 19, 1996.

Nepal

Express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Nepal and Washington July 9 and Oct. 25, 1996. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1997.

New Zealand

Agreement regarding mutual assistance between their customs services. Signed at Hong Kong June 13, 1996. Entered into force June 13, 1996.

Nigeria

Agreement regarding the provision of commodities and services to Nigerian forces participating in ECOMOG peacekeeping operations. Effected by exchange of notes at Abuja Nov. 9, 1996. Entered into force Nov. 9, 1996.

Turkey

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara Nov. 27, 1996. Entered into force Nov. 27, 1996.

Arrangement relating to radio communications between amateur stations on behalf of third parties. Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara Nov. 27, 1996. Entered into force Nov. 27, 1996.

United Kingdom

Memorandum of understanding for cooperation in the development of combined arms tactical training equipment. Signed at Alexandria and Abbey Wood Dec. 6, 1996. Entered into force Dec. 6, 1996.

¹Not in force for the U.S.

²With reservations.

³Not in force. ■