

Secretary Albright

The Marshall Plan: Model for U.S. Leadership in the 21st Century

June 5, 1997

Commencement address, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Thank you, President Pforzheimer. Governor Weld, President Rudenstine, President Wilson, fellow honorands, all those who comprise the Harvard community, guests and friends: Thank you. I am delighted to be here on this day of celebration and rededication. To those of you who are here from the class of 1997, I say, congratulations. You may be in debt, but you made it.

As a former professor and current mother, I confess to loving graduation days, especially when they are accompanied by an honorary degree. I love the ceremony; I love the academic settings; and, although it will be difficult for me today, let's be honest: I love to daydream during the commencement speech.

Graduations are unique among the milestones of our lives, because they celebrate past accomplishments while also anticipating the future. That is true for each of the graduates today—and it is true for the United States.

During the past few years, we seem to have observed the 50th anniversary of everything. Through media and memory, we have again been witness to paratroopers filling the skies over Normandy, the liberation of Buchenwald, a sailor's kiss in Times Square, an Iron Curtain descending, and Jackie Robinson sliding home.

Today, we recall another turning point in that era, for on this day 50 years ago, Secretary of State George Marshall addressed the graduating students of this university. He spoke to a class enriched by many who had fought for freedom and deprived of many who had fought for freedom and died.

The Secretary's words were plain, but his message reached far beyond the audience assembled in this yard—to an American people weary of war and wary of new commitments—and to a Europe where life-giving connections between farm and market, enterprise and capital, hope and future had been severed.

Secretary Marshall did not adorn his rhetoric with high-flown phrases, saying only that it would be logical for America to help restore "normal economic health to the world,

without which there could be no political stability and no assured peace." He did not attach to his plan the label "Made in America" but, rather, invited European ideas and required European countries to do all they could to help themselves.

His vision was inclusive, leaving the door open to participation by all, including the Soviet Union, and—so there would be no repetition of the punitive peace of Versailles—also to Germany.

British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin called the Marshall Plan a "lifeline to sinking men." And it was, although I expect some women in Europe were equally appreciative. By extending that lifeline, America helped unify Europe's west around democratic principles and planted seeds of transatlantic partnership that would soon blossom in the form of NATO and the cooperative institutions of a new Europe.

Just as important was the expression of American leadership that the Marshall Plan conveyed. After World War I, America had withdrawn from the world, shunning responsibility and avoiding risk. Others did the same. The result in the heart of Europe was the rise of great evil. After the devastation of World War II and the soul-withering horror of the Holocaust, it was not enough to say that the enemy had been vanquished—that what we were against had failed.

The generation of Marshall, Truman, and Vandenberg was determined to build a lasting peace. And the message that generation conveyed from the White House; from both parties on Capitol Hill; and from people across our country who donated millions in relief cash, clothing, and food, was that, this time, America would not turn inward; America would lead.

Today, in the wake of the Cold War, it is not enough for us to say that communism has failed; we, too, must heed the lessons of the past, accept responsibility, and lead. Because we are entering a century in which there will be

many interconnected centers of population, power, and wealth, we cannot limit our focus, as Marshall did in his speech, to the devastated battleground of a prior war. Our vision must encompass not one, but every continent.

Unlike Marshall's generation, we face no single galvanizing threat. The dangers we confront are less visible and more diverse—some as old as ethnic conflict, some as new as letter bombs, some as subtle as climate change, and some as deadly as nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. To defend against these threats, we must take advantage of the historic opportunity that now exists to bring the world together in an international system based on democracy, open markets, law, and a commitment to peace.

We know that not every nation is yet willing or able to play its full part in this system. One group is still in transition from centralized planning and

totalitarian rule. Another has only begun to dip its toes into economic and political reform. Some nations are still too weak to participate in a meaningful way. And a few countries have regimes that actively oppose the premises upon which this system is based.

Because the situation we face today is different from that confronted by Marshall's generation, we cannot always use the same means, but we can summon the same spirit:

- We can strive for the same sense of bipartisanship that allowed America in Marshall's day to present to both allies and adversaries a united front;
- We can invest the resources needed to keep America strong economically, militarily, and diplomatically, recognizing, as did Marshall, that these strengths reinforce each other;
- We can act with the same knowledge that, in our era, American security and prosperity are linked to economic and political health abroad; and
- We can recognize, even as we pay homage to the heroes of history, that we have our own duty to be authors of history.

Let every nation acknowledge: Today, the opportunity to be part of an international system based on democratic principles is available to all. This was not the case 50 years ago.

Then, my father's boss, Jan Masaryk—foreign minister of what was then Czechoslovakia—was told by Stalin in Moscow that his

country must not participate in the Marshall Plan despite its national interest in doing so. Upon his return to Prague, Masaryk said it was at that moment he understood that he was employed by a government no longer sovereign in its own land.

Today, there is no Stalin to give orders. If a nation is isolated from the international community now, it is either because the country is simply too weak to meet international standards or because its leaders have chosen willfully to disregard those standards.

Last week, in the Netherlands, President Clinton said that no democratic nation in Europe would be left out of the transatlantic community. Today, I say that no nation in the world need be left out of the global system we are constructing. And every nation that seeks to participate and is willing to do all it can to help itself will have America's help in finding the right path.

In Africa, poverty, disease, disorder, and misrule have cut off millions from the international system. But Africa is a continent rich both in human and natural resources. And today, its best new leaders are pursuing reforms that are helping private enterprise and democratic institutions to gain a foothold. Working with others, we must lend momentum by maintaining our assistance, encouraging investment, lowering the burden of debt, and striving to create successful models for others to follow.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, integration is much further advanced. Nations throughout our hemisphere are expanding commercial ties, fighting crime, working to raise living standards, and cooperating to ensure that economic and political systems endure.

In Asia and the Pacific, we see a region that has not only joined the international system, but has become a driving force behind it—a region that is home to eight of the 10 fastest-growing economies in the world.

With our allies, we have worked to ease the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear program and invited that country to end its self-imposed isolation. And we have encouraged China to expand participation in the international system and to observe international norms on everything from human rights to the export of arms-related technologies.

Finally, in Europe, we are striving to fulfill the vision Marshall proclaimed but the Cold War prevented—the vision of a Europe whole and free, united, as President Clinton said this past week, "not by the force of arms but by the possibilities of peace."

Where a half-century ago, American leadership helped lift western Europe to prosperity and democracy, so, today, the entire

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transatlantic community is helping Europe's newly free nations fix their economies and cement the rule of law.

Next month, in Madrid, NATO will invite new members from among the democracies of central and eastern Europe, while keeping the door to future membership open to others. This will not—as some fear—create a new source of division within Europe. On the contrary, it is erasing the unfair and unnatural line imposed a half-century ago. And it is giving nations an added incentive to settle territorial disputes, respect minority and human rights, and complete the process of reform.

NATO is a defensive alliance that harbors no territorial ambitions. It does not regard any state as its adversary, certainly not a democratic and reforming Russia that is intent on integrating with the West and with which it has forged an historic partnership, signed in Paris just nine days ago.

Today, from Ukraine to the United States, and from Reykjavik to Ankara, we are demonstrating that the quest for European security is no longer a zero-sum game. NATO has new allies and partners. The nations of central and eastern Europe are rejoining in practice the community of values they never left in spirit. And the Russian people will have something they have not had in centuries: a genuine and sustainable peace with the nations to their west.

The Cold War's shadow no longer darkens Europe, but one specter from the past does remain. History teaches us that there is no natural geographic or political endpoint to conflict in the Balkans, where World War I began and where the worst European violence of the past half-century occurred in this decade. That is why the peaceful integration of Europe will not be complete until the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia are fulfilled.

When defending the boldness of the Marshall Plan 50 years ago, Senator Arthur Vandenberg observed that it does little good to extend a 15-foot rope to a man drowning 20 feet away. Similarly, we cannot achieve our objectives in Bosnia by doing just enough to avoid immediate war; we must do all we can to help the people of Bosnia achieve permanent peace.

In recent days, President Clinton has approved steps to make the peace process irreversible and give each party a clear stake in its success. And this past weekend, I went to the region to deliver in person the message that if the parties want international acceptance or our aid, they must meet their commitments, including full cooperation with the international war crimes tribunal.

That tribunal represents a choice not only for Bosnia, and for Rwanda, but for the world. We can accept atrocities as inevitable, or we can strive for a higher standard. We can presume to

forget what only God and the victims have standing to forgive, or we can heed the most searing lesson of this century, which is that evil—when unopposed—will spawn more evil.

The majority of Bosnia killings occurred not in battle, but in markets, streets and playgrounds where men and women like you and me, and boys and girls like those we know, were abused or murdered not because of anything they had done, but simply for who they were.

We all have a stake in establishing a precedent that will deter future atrocities, in helping the tribunal make a lasting peace easier by separating the innocent from the guilty, in holding accountable the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing, and in seeing that those who consider rape just another tactic of war answer for their crimes.

Since George Marshall's time, the United States has played the leading role within the international system, not as sole arbiter of right and wrong, for that is a responsibility widely shared, but as pathfinder—as the nation able to show the way when others cannot.

In the years immediately after World War II, America demonstrated that leadership not only through the Marshall Plan, but through the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin Airlift, and the response to communist aggression in Korea.

In this decade, America led in defeating Saddam Hussein, encouraging nuclear stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the former Soviet Union, restoring elected leaders to Haiti, negotiating the Dayton accords, and supporting the peacemakers over the bombthrowers in the Middle East and other strategic regions.

We welcome this leadership role not, in Teddy Roosevelt's phrase, because we wish to be "an international Meddlesome Matty," but because we know from experience that our interests and those of our allies may be affected by regional or civil wars, power vacuums that create opportunities for criminals and terrorists and threats to democracy.

But America cannot do the job alone. We can point the way and find the path, but others must be willing to come along and take responsibility for their own affairs. Others must be willing to act within the bounds of their own resources and capabilities to join in building a world in which shared economic growth is possible, violent conflicts are constrained, and those who abide by the law are progressively more secure.

While in Sarajevo, I visited a playground in the area once known as "sniper's alley," where many Bosnians had earlier been killed because of ethnic hate. But this past weekend, the children were playing there without regard to whether the child in the next swing was

Muslim, Serb, or Croat. And they thanked America for helping to fix their swings and asked me to place in the soil a plant which they promised to nourish and tend.

It struck me then that this was an apt metaphor for America's role 50 years ago when we planted the seeds of renewed prosperity and true democracy in Europe. And a metaphor, as well, for America's role during the remaining years of this century and into the next.

As this great university has recognized in the foreign students it has attracted, the research it conducts, the courses it offers, and the sensibility it conveys: Those of you who have graduated today will live global lives. You will compete in a world marketplace; travel further and more often than any previous generation; share ideas, tastes, and experiences with counterparts from every culture; and recognize that to have a full and rewarding future, you will have to look outward.

As you do, and as our country does, we must aspire to the high standard set by Marshall, using means adapted to our time based on values that endure for all time and never forgetting that America belongs on the side of freedom.

I say this to you as Secretary of State. I say it also as one of the many people whose lives have been shaped by the turbulence of Europe during the middle of this century and by the leadership of America throughout this century. I can still remember, in England during the war, sitting in the bomb shelter, singing away the fear, thanking God for American help.

I can still remember, after the war and after the communist takeover in Prague, arriving here in the United States where I wanted only to be accepted and to make my parents and my new country proud.

Because my parents fled in time, I escaped Hitler. To our shared and constant sorrow, millions did not. Because of America's generosity, I escaped Stalin; millions did not. Because of the vision of the Truman-Marshall generation, I have been privileged to live my life in freedom; millions have still never had that opportunity.

It may be hard for you, who have no memory of that time 50 years ago, to understand. But it is necessary that you try to understand.

Over the years, many have come to think of World War II as the last "good war"; for, if ever a cause was just, that was it, and if ever the future of humanity stood in the balance, it was then.

Two full generations of Americans have grown up since that war—first mine, now yours; two generations of boys and girls who

have seen the veterans at picnics and parades and fireworks, saluting, with medals and ribbons on their chests; seeing the pride in their bearing and thinking, perhaps what a fine thing it must have been to be tested in a great cause and to have prevailed.

But today of all days, let us not forget that behind each medal and ribbon, there is a story of heroism, yes, but also profound sadness—for World War II was not a good war.

From North Africa to Salerno; from Normandy to the Bulge to Berlin: An entire continent lost to Fascism had to be taken back village by village, hill by hill. And further eastward, from Tarawa to Okinawa, the death-struggle for Asia was an assault against dug-in positions, surmounted only by unbelievable courage at unbearable loss.

Today, the greatest danger to America is not some foreign enemy; it is the possibility that we will fail to heed the example of that generation; that we will allow the momentum toward democracy to stall, take for granted the institutions and principles upon which our own freedom is based, and forget what the history of this century reminds us: that problems abroad, if left unattended, will all-too often come home to America.

A decade or two from now, we will be known as the neo-isolationists who allowed tyranny and lawlessness to rise again or as the generations that solidified the global triumph of democratic principles. We will be known as the neo-protectionists whose lack of vision produced financial meltdown or as the generations that laid the groundwork for rising prosperity around the world. We will be known as the world-class ditherers who stood by while the seeds of renewed global conflict were sown or as the generations that took strong measures to forge alliances, deter aggression, and keep the peace.

There is no certain roadmap to success—either for individuals or for generations. Ultimately, it is a matter of judgment, a question of choice.

In making that choice, let us remember that there is not a page of American history of which we are proud that was authored by a chronic complainer or prophet of despair. We are doers.

We have a responsibility in our time, as others have had in theirs, not to be prisoners of history, but to shape history; a responsibility to fill the role of pathfinder and to build with others a global network of purpose and law that will protect our citizens, defend our interests, preserve our values, and bequeath to future generations a legacy as proud as the one we honor today.

To that mission, I pledge my own best efforts and summon yours. Thank you once again, very, very much. ■

Secretary Albright

Maintaining Normal Trade Relations With China

June 10, 1997

Statement before the Senate Finance Committee, Washington, DC.

Chairman Roth and members of the committee: I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify before you.

Largely as a result of strong U.S. leadership from administrations of both parties, we now have an unprecedented opportunity to integrate the world around basic principles of democracy, open markets, law, and a common commitment to peace.

Not every country is yet able to participate fully in this integration. Some are in transition from centralized planning and totalitarian rule to democracy. Some have only begun to dip their toes into economic and political reform. Some are still too weak to participate meaningfully in the international system. And a few have governments that actively oppose the premises upon which that system is based.

It is in America's interests to strengthen the system, to ensure that it is based on high standards and sound principles of law, and to make it more inclusive. We do this by helping transitional states to play a greater role, by giving a boost to the weak states most willing to help themselves, and by making it clear to the outlaw states that they cannot prosper at the expense of the rest; they must either reform or suffer in isolation.

Mr. Chairman, there is no greater opportunity—or challenge—in U.S. foreign policy today than to encourage China's integration as a fully responsible member of the international system. President Clinton's decision to extend most-favored-nation or normal trade relations with China reflects our commitment to this goal.

At the same time, the Administration fully shares many of the concerns expressed in Congress and elsewhere about some Chinese policies and practices. Principled criticism of Chinese actions that offend our values or run counter to our interests is vital—because it demonstrates that the concerns we address through our diplomacy are deeply rooted in the convictions of the American people.

We believe that America's leadership in Asia and our interests in China—including Hong Kong—can best be advanced by continu-

ing to engage Chinese leaders on a wide range of security, economic, and political issues. This would not be possible if we revoked MFN.

In two weeks, I will begin a trip to Asia that will end in Hong Kong, where I will attend the joint reversion ceremony. I will emphasize America's continued interests and our support for the Hong Kong people as they enter China. Mr. Chairman, as I will describe in more detail later, the revocation of MFN would undermine Hong Kong's prosperity at the very moment when the Hong Kong people most need to demonstrate their strength and autonomy. For this reason alone, the denial of MFN would be a bad idea.

But this morning, I want to describe the forest as well as the trees. In particular, I would like to clarify our interests in relation to China, explain how the Clinton Administration has been promoting them, and discuss how a revocation of normal trade status would harm them.

Since coming to office, President Clinton has repeatedly made clear that America is and will remain an Asia-Pacific power. In a region where we have fought three wars in the last half-century, our role continues to be vital—from the stabilizing effects of our diplomatic and military presence, to the galvanizing impact of our commercial ties, to the transforming influence of our ideals. Our commitment is solid because it is solidly based on American interests.

Because of China's relative weakness for the past several centuries, its emergence as a modern power is a major historical event. Indeed, no nation will play a larger role in shaping the course of 21st-century Asia. Already, China affects America's vital interests across the board.

China possesses nuclear weapons and the world's largest standing army. It also has a rapidly advancing industrial and technological capacity. And it seeks to reunify its national territory and to settle its contested borders with its neighbors. For all these reasons China affects our core security interests:

- The nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- The protection of sea lanes in the Pacific and Indian Oceans;
- The stability of the Korean Peninsula; and
- The peaceful resolution of issues between Taiwan and the P.R.C.

The Chinese economy is already one of the largest in the world, and many observers predict that if China's current growth rates continue, it will be the largest within several decades. Therefore China affects our primary economic interest in expanding American exports and creating a more open global trade and investment regime in the coming century.

With its 1.2 billion people rapidly modernizing, China will have a huge impact on the environment. In addition, China borders on the world's largest opium-producing areas, and it is a potentially huge source of human migration. That is why China affects our urgent global interests in preventing environmental degradation and in combating terrorism, narcotics, and alien smuggling.

Although China is undeniably more open today than two decades ago, its people still lack basic civil and political liberties. The manner in which China is governed affects virtually all of our security and economic interests in the region as well as our abiding interest in promoting respect for universally recognized standards of tolerance and law.

The fundamental challenge for U.S. policy is to persuade China to define its own national interests in a manner compatible with ours. That's why we are working to encourage China's development as a secure, prosperous, and open society as well as its integration as a full and responsible member of the international community.

In so doing, we have not acquiesced in Chinese violations of international norms—and we will not. On the contrary, we have taken determined actions to curb such violations and to protect our interests.

For example, the United States continues to be concerned about Chinese sales of dangerous weapons and technologies. Through our dialogue, however, we have built a record of cooperation on agreements to ban nuclear explosions, outlaw chemical arms, and enhance international nuclear safeguards. In addition, by stating our willingness to use targeted sanctions or by actually imposing them, we have obtained China's commitment not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and its agreement not to export ground-to-ground missiles controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime as well as to abide by the regime's guidelines and parameters. And last month, in accordance with both our policy and

U.S. law, we imposed economic penalties against Chinese companies and individuals for their knowingly and materially contributing to Iran's chemical weapons program.

The United States has also contributed to a lessening of tensions in the Taiwan Strait. In March 1996, responding to Chinese efforts to influence Taiwan's historic presidential elections through military exercises and missile tests, President Clinton dispatched two U.S. aircraft carriers to the area. Our deployment helped lower the risk of miscalculation by authorities in Beijing and Taipei. Moreover, our action reassured Asia and the world that the United States stands by its commitment to both a one-China policy and the peaceful resolution of outstanding issues. The situation in the Strait has since improved and commercial ships have sailed between Taiwan and the mainland for the first time in almost 50 years.

In the economic area, as Ambassador Barshefsky will describe in greater detail, we have made progress in opening China's markets. In February, we reached a bilateral agreement that provides, for the first time, significant steps to increase U.S. access to China's textile market. It also strengthens enforcement against illegal transshipments.

Last year in response to China's inadequate implementation of an agreement to protect U.S. intellectual property (including music, videos, and software), President Clinton prepared to apply tariffs of 100% on \$2 billion of Chinese exports to the United States. The President's action led to an important follow-up accord providing more effective protection for our intellectual property and expanded access for our movies and videos. During the past year, China has taken strong measures to implement this agreement, seizing 10 million pirated disks, closing some 40 illegal CD factories, and establishing hot-lines that are offering rewards 20 times the size of the average annual wage for tips leading to the closing of such a factory.

We also have advanced negotiations on China's accession to the World Trade Organization. The Clinton Administration has taken the lead in insisting that China make meaningful commitments to lowering its trade barriers before it could join the WTO. At the same time, we made clear that the United States supports China's membership on commercially acceptable terms. We have worked closely with China to identify the steps it must take to broaden access to its markets and bring its trade practices into line with WTO rules. Our combination of rigorous entry criteria and generous technical assistance has paid off. Although differences remain in the negotiations and the outcome remains uncertain, China has become increasingly serious in the proposals it has put

forward, and is coming to understand that membership is not a right but a privilege accompanied by responsibilities.

In the environmental field, our two governments have increased our cooperation by establishing the U.S.-China Environment and Development Forum. Vice President Gore inaugurated the forum during his recent visit to China. The forum has set an ambitious agenda for collaboration in four areas: energy policy, environmental policy, science for sustainable development, and commercial cooperation. The combined efforts of our two Environmental Protection Agencies have already resulted in China's recent decision to eliminate the use of leaded gas and in the undertaking of joint studies on the health effects of air pollution.

On human rights, overall progress has been hard to quantify. On the one hand, China's exposure to the outside world has brought increased openness, social mobility, choice of employment, and access to information. On the other hand, as we have documented in our annual human rights report, China's official practices still fall far short of internationally accepted standards.

It is our hope that the trend toward greater economic and social integration of China will have a liberalizing effect on political and human rights practices. Given the nature of China's government, that progress will be gradual, at best, and is by no means inevitable.

However, economic openness can create conditions that brave men and women dedicated to freedom can take advantage of to seek change. It diminishes the arbitrary power of the state over the day-to-day lives of its people. It strengthens the demand for the rule of law. It raises popular expectations. And it exposes millions of people to the simple, powerful idea that a better way of life is possible.

It is worth noting, for example, that China recently passed legislation that addresses some of the most serious concerns about its criminal justice system. These changes resulted in large part from China's engagement with the international community and its exposure to foreign legal systems.

We will continue to actively promote human rights in China through bilateral dialogue as well as public diplomacy. We regularly raise our concerns with Chinese officials at the highest levels. We continue to call for the release of dissidents such as Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan, who have been sentenced without due process to long prison terms for their nonviolent advocacy of democracy. We are working with U.S. businesses and NGOs to promote the rule of law and civil society. We have increased the flow of uncensored world news by launching Radio Free

Asia. And again this year we co-sponsored a resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission that urged China to improve its human rights practices.

We have important differences with China on several issues in addition to human rights.

For instance, we remain concerned about China's arms-related export practices, particularly to Iran and Pakistan. We are troubled by the growth of our bilateral trade deficit to almost \$40 billion in 1996. We are seeking closer Chinese cooperation on investigating suspected cases of prison-labor exports to the U.S. And we are concerned by recent measures to disband Hong Kong's elected legislature and to amend various ordinances on civil liberties.

Because of these and other frustrations, some members of Congress conclude that our engagement with China has failed and that we should adopt a confrontational approach: revocation of normal trade status. The Administration agrees that we are not yet where we want to be in our strategic dialogue with China; China has not evolved as thoroughly or rapidly as all of us have hoped. We believe very firmly, however, that the potential for further progress in China and for the overall advancement of American interests is far greater through continued dialogue than through revocation of MFN.

It is important to remember, first of all, that MFN is a powerful symbol of America's global commitment to open markets. Despite its name, MFN is not a privileged status accorded only to our closest allies and friends. On the contrary, it is the standard tariff treatment we extend to virtually every nation in the world, including many with whom we have substantial disagreements. We offer low tariffs because of our fundamental belief that open trade is a foundation for peace and prosperity.

Moreover, the revocation of normal trade relations would eliminate prospects for U.S.-China cooperation on a wide range of issues. Unlike the targeted sanctions we have used in specific areas, revocation would affect policies across the board, harm our interests as much or more than China's, and imperil innocent bystanders such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. Since the United States and China normalized relations in 1979, every American President, Democratic and Republican, has shared this view.

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Revoking MFN would not only damage our growing commercial relationship; it would also deny us the benefits of our entire strategic dialogue. And because China's politics are in flux, especially during the run-up to this fall's Party Congress, the withdrawal of MFN would almost surely strengthen the hand of those who have been seeking to fill the country's ideological void with a belligerent nationalism. It would postpone rather than hasten improved Chinese behavior in the areas where we have the greatest concern.

Mr. Chairman, let me explain in more detail how ending normal trade relations would harm U.S. interests.

China's economic ties with the world are important because they give it a huge incentive to participate in the international system. If the United States, the world's largest and most open economy, were to deny China a normal trading relationship, China's stake in the international system would shrink. The consequences would be grave, indeed.

First, on regional security, we could lose China's critical cooperation on dismantling North Korea's nuclear program and on pursuing a permanent peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula. We might see a renewal of tension in the Taiwan Strait and a stiffening of China's attitude on its territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Second, in the area of non-proliferation, the denial of MFN would surely undercut our efforts to get China to strengthen its export controls and to expand our cooperation in the development of peaceful nuclear energy. It would disrupt our initiatives to curtail China's transfers of advanced weaponry and technology to unstable regions.

Third, we would risk losing Chinese support for U.S. initiatives at the UN—including organizational reform, peacekeeping, and sanctions on Iraq. On other global issues, we would find it more difficult to cooperate on stopping drug shipments—especially from Burma, the world's major source of heroin. And China, destined to displace the United States as the largest producer of greenhouse gases, could withhold its participation in a global agreement on preventing climate change that is scheduled for completion in Tokyo this December.

Fourth, the withdrawal of MFN would devastate our economic relationship. It would invite Chinese retaliation against our exports, which have nearly quadrupled in the last decade and totaled \$12 billion in 1996. These exports support an estimated 170,000 jobs in the United States.

The ending of MFN would also damage future opportunities for American investment, as China would steer contracts to our many economic competitors. According to World Bank estimates, China's new infrastructure investment will total \$750 billion in the next decade alone. Revocation would also add more than half a billion dollars to the annual shopping bill of American consumers, due to higher prices on imports.

The disruption of normal trade ties would retard the progress gained from bilateral agreements to protect American intellectual property and to increase market access for American textile and telecommunications products. Perhaps most important, it would threaten the negotiations on China's membership in the WTO—destroying our chance to shape its participation in the global economy of the 21st century.

Fifth, the damage to our commercial ties could well spill over into our efforts to improve human rights in China. Because non-state firms account for half of China's exports, the revocation of MFN would weaken the most progressive elements of Chinese society. It would also create a tense atmosphere in which Chinese leaders might be even less likely to take the actions we have been encouraging: to release political dissidents, to allow international visits to prisoners and to open talks with the Dalai Lama on increasing Tibetan autonomy.

Further, our trade and investment have been helping to expand the habits of free enterprise and independent thinking throughout China. American and Chinese institutions are now engaged in thousands of educational, cultural, and religious exchanges. Although China is still far from being a free nation, it is more open today than two decades ago in part because of its economic and cultural ties with the West.

Without MFN, many of these opportunities for the long-term opening of Chinese society might be closed. This is a concern shared by the China Service Coordinating Office, an umbrella organization of more than 100 Christian groups involved in outreach to China. And this concern is equally shared by many Chinese dissidents—including Wang Xizhe, who spent 14 years in prison and escaped rearrest last fall by fleeing to the United States. Wang writes,

The goal of exerting effective, long-term influence over China can only be achieved by maintaining the broadest possible contacts with China . . . thus causing China to enter further into the global family and to accept globally practiced standards of behavior.

Sixth, as I have suggested, the denial of MFN to the P.R.C. would deal a severe blow to the free market economy of Hong Kong and also damage that of Taiwan. Taiwan's investment in the P.R.C. totals between \$20 and \$30 billion, much of which is in export industries. Similarly, Hong Kong firms own, finance, supply or service thousands of export factories throughout China's booming southern region. In addition, Hong Kong benefits from the billions of dollars of Chinese and American goods that every year pass through on the way to their final destination. The Hong Kong government has estimated that revoking MFN might cut as much as \$30 billion of the territory's trade, eliminate as many as 85,000 jobs, and reduce economic growth by half.

The United States must not undermine Hong Kong during the critical period of its reversion to Chinese authority. That is why Hong Kong leaders across the political spectrum support the continuation of MFN. In a recent letter to me, British Governor Chris Patten wrote, "Anything other than unconditional MFN renewal would be profoundly misguided." And the pro-democracy leader Martin Lee has stated:

If the United States is concerned about the handover, then the best thing is to assure the community by making sure nothing dramatic happens to Hong Kong. The Democratic Party [of Hong Kong] has always strongly supported renewal of MFN for China unconditionally.

In sum, revoking a normal trade relationship could seriously undermine our ability to influence China's development and instead turn China further in the direction of isolation, suspicion, and hostility.

No matter how hard we might wish, we will not be able to transform China's behavior overnight. With all due respect, Mr. Chairman, there is neither a single piece of legislation by the U.S. Congress nor a single act of our President that could accomplish such a feat. Promoting positive change in China's domestic and foreign policies is a long-term venture that will require the broad and steady support of the American people and the international community alike.

Mr. Chairman, for the United States to proceed with the historic and vitally important task of helping to integrate China as a full and responsible member of the international system, we require nothing less than a comprehensive engagement that is guided by a clear-eyed view of our interests and fortified by the renewal of normal trade relations. Thank you very much. ■

Secretary Albright

Denver Summit: Statement on Foreign Ministers' Progress Report

June 21, 1997

Statement at the Summit of the Eight, Denver Convention Center, Denver, Colorado.

Good afternoon. I am pleased that three of my colleagues—British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda and Leon Brittan of the European Commission—have joined me to present the “Foreign Ministers’ Progress Report” to you on behalf of our entire group.

Here in Denver and throughout the year, the Eight work together to combat the whole range of global issues which cast shadows on the lives of our citizens and the future of our global community. We face new threats that respect no borders and that no one state can defeat alone.

The Eight are meeting those threats together. This report focuses on our cooperation to promote non-proliferation, ban anti-personnel landmines, combat transnational crime, and strengthen our anti-terrorism efforts. I will also report on our progress in pursuing effective UN reform and our discussion of regional issues, complementing the Summit decisions. You will be hearing later from Secretary Rubin about our work here to expand the global economy in ways that will benefit all of us.

My colleagues and I have focused on how we can work together every day of the year, not just while here in Denver, to sustain the security of our people and the progress of democracy around the world.

To block the smuggling of dangerous nuclear materials, we have increased the sharing of information and technology among our law enforcement, intelligence, and customs services. We have also agreed that we must manage carefully our stocks of fissile material no longer required for defense purposes, and we will work together to do so.

Our governments have worked together actively over the past year to promote the negotiation of a treaty banning anti-personnel landmines, which spread indiscriminate death and suffering long after conflict has ceased.

Two of the important fora where that activity is centered are the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the Ottawa Process. We will also continue to play a major role in international efforts to detect and remove landmines. And we will provide assistance and technology to countries developing their own programs for landmine removal, as well as to landmine victims.

We are building extensive cooperation among the Eight in combating the scourge of international crime by promoting law enforcement cooperation, fighting high-tech crime, and countering alien smuggling. During the past year, we have improved procedures for extraditing criminal suspects and assisting each other in investigating and prosecuting transnational crimes. We are strengthening our programs for information exchange and cooperation against illegal firearms trafficking. And we will all place a new emphasis on effectively targeting alien smugglers.

The rapid growth of computer and telecommunications technologies has created new opportunities for criminals and new challenges for law enforcement. The Eight will combine our knowledge and resources to enhance our ability to locate, identify, and prosecute high-tech criminals. We will also work together to develop the best possible training for officials to fight this new branch of crime.

We are promoting the kind of international cooperation that led to the arrest of a suspect in the CIA shootings and the extradition to the

Foreign Ministers' Progress Report

This report, related documents, including a joint communique released following the summit, and background information are available on the Internet at <http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/summit/index.html>. □

U.S. of one who may help us determine who was responsible for the Khobar Towers bombing. Our joint message to terrorists is this: You have nowhere to run and nowhere to hide.

At our initiative, negotiations have begun among all UN member states on a Convention on Suppression of Terrorist Bombing. The Eight call upon all states to join the full number of international conventions against terrorism. Our work here will improve our ability to investigate terrorist attacks on ground transportation, improve the safety of air travelers, and do more to protect computer networks from terrorists and criminals.

The eight countries represented here have played a leading role in focusing attention on the need for United Nations reform. With help from all of us, reform efforts in all areas of UN activity have gained momentum over the last two years. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has seized the initiative and the Eight will work with him to make the UN and its specialized agencies efficient and effective partners in reaching the goals we all share.

In discussing regional issues, we highlighted the momentous changes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Eight recognize the importance of assisting the new government, but our support will depend on the new authorities' demonstration of their commitment to democratic reform including elections, sound economic policies, public accountability, and protection of human rights, including the protection of refugees.

We also expressed our concern with the situation in Congo (Brazzaville) and called on all parties to end hostilities and work for peace. We welcomed the progress accomplished by the UN Support Mission in Haiti and look forward to the Secretary General's new recommendations on our future international presence there. We called on all parties in Afghanistan to stop the fighting and work toward

forming a broad-based government that will protect the rights of all Afghans. Finally, we called upon the ruling regime in Burma to enter into a meaningful political dialogue with the leaders of the democratic opposition and ethnic minorities and to ensure the safety of Aung San Suu Kyi.

Working together, whether to reform the UN, to preserve the global environment, or to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, we attract support and resources that no country could provide on its own. We also create opportunities for our own citizens, and we are reminded that we live in a world in which progress can never again be a zero-sum game.

We have before us the opportunity to shape a future in which nations increasingly come together around basic principles of democracy, open markets, and the rule of law.

There is no region on earth that need be excluded from the benefits of an open global community or that should be excluded from its responsibilities. And there is no American—indeed, no one of our citizens—who does not stand to benefit from the creation of a world that is increasingly prosperous, secure, and free.

I believe I can say, on behalf of the Eight, that this report represents progress for all our people, working prosperously, traveling safely, and living freely. And I am happy to say that we can expect even better things when President Clinton presents the Summit Communiqué tomorrow.

So let me conclude, on behalf of my distinguished colleagues, with our thanks to our hosts here in Denver for all that they have done to make our meeting such a success. Thank you very much. ■

Secretary Albright

China on the Threshold of a New Era

June 24, 1997

Address to the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, California.

Thank you, Dr. Bitterman. Secretary Shultz, President Epstein, members of the Board of Governors, guests and friends: It is wonderful to be back here in the Bay Area and an honor to be invited to speak at the Commonwealth Club, which is to free speech what the Golden Gate is to bridges and fireworks are to the Fourth of July.

At the outset, I would like to thank San Francisco for lending me two of your leading citizens. Provided that the Senate agrees, David Andrews will be the State Department's and my new Legal Advisor, and Dick Sklar our new Ambassador to the UN on Management and Reform. I would also like to introduce my gift to San Francisco in the form of my daughter, Katie, and my son-in-law, Jake, who now live out here. So in case you ever need a speaker, you can count on me.

In preparing for today, I looked down the list of those who have spoken at the Commonwealth Club previously. I am delighted to be able to say that at last, I have something in common with Audrey Hepburn—not to mention several Presidents and most of my 20th-century predecessors as Secretary of State—including my role model in telling it like it is, George Shultz. Secretary Shultz, congratulations to you. You really do know what it is like to be bipartisan now.

This historic setting is a reminder that although we seem always to be living in the moment, our challenges are easier because of what others dared in the past, and our choices more weighty because of what they will mean to those who come after.

This continuum is reflected in the event that has brought me to this side of the Pacific en route to the other. For on the stroke of midnight Monday, one of the world's majestic places—Hong Kong—will be under Chinese sovereignty for the first time in more than 150 years.

This afternoon, while you finish lunch and try to think of polite, easy questions to ask following my speech, I would like to talk both about the promise and the perils inherent in the

reversion of Hong Kong and in the choices faced by a rapidly modernizing China as we approach the 21st century. But first, a bit of history.

Forty-seven years ago, another Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, addressed this Club on the subject of Asia. He spoke of a turbulent continent on which more than half a billion people had just emerged from colonial status into independence. Women and men in nations such as India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines were spurred on by a fierce desire to be free of foreign domination and by a deep hunger for the fruits of a better life.

In China, Secretary Acheson saw these same aspirations for independence and growth stymied by a revolutionary movement influenced by the Soviet Union and captured by a misguided ideology. He spoke of the disillusion of many Chinese who had hoped their new rulers would clear the way for economic development. And he cited a friendship between the American people and the people of China that had been tested and proven during the firestorm of World War II.

From our vantage point, we see confirmed what Acheson could only predict: that the newly free nations of Asia would one day "participate fully and equally in the international community." We see confirmed the potent power of nationalism and the desire for economic advancement. And we see confirmed Acheson's fear that China's march to prosperity would be long delayed.

But if Acheson were here today, I suspect he would update his prognosis. In a little more than two-and-a-half years, we will arrive at the year 2000. If the computers don't all break down and send us back to the horse and buggy age, we can expect that the pace of technological, social, economic, and political change will continue to accelerate.

We can expect that one of the forces propelling that change will be a China that has reached the threshold of a new era in its 4,000-year history; a China increasingly liberated

from the Communist straitjacket, increasingly engaged in global commerce, and increasingly prominent in regional and world affairs.

In our own country, there are some who see this increasing interest in China as very bad news. They point to China's rising military budget, its trade and arms export policy and poor record on human rights and say that we should oppose China, seek single-handedly to isolate it, end normal trade relations and issue threats. To them, confrontation is the only principled option we have.

I do not agree.

Effective diplomacy results not from the recitation of principle alone, but from backing principle with realistic policies—from seeing that what is worth achieving is achieved. And with respect to China and the United States, there is much that is worth achieving.

America has a security interest in seeing a China that neither threatens nor feels threatened as it advances more fully onto the world stage. We have a political interest in seeing a China that enjoys good relations with its neighbors and that plays a constructive international role. We have an economic interest in a China that opens its vast market and understands that it has a stake in a global system based on the rule of law. And we have an interest, as a people, in encouraging the development of a government in Beijing that observes international standards of respect for human rights.

In pursuing our goals, we have a variety of tools, but no magic wand. At least for the foreseeable future, we will have serious differences with China. A policy of confrontation would lock those differences in.

Instead, our policy is to seek to advance our interests with China by engaging in a strategic dialogue aimed at narrowing differences and identifying areas of common ground. For example, until a few years ago, China was selling dangerous weapons and advanced technologies with little discipline and no accountability.

Since we began our dialogue, Beijing has supported extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed a ban on explosive nuclear tests, ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, and agreed to abide by rules that restrain the export of advanced missile systems and technologies. China has also curtailed its nuclear cooperation with Iran and pledged not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in other countries.

All this is important and should matter to every American. But it is not enough. China still maintains weapons-supply relationships that we consider dangerous and its system of export

controls is inadequate. In April, we imposed economic sanctions on Chinese companies for aiding Iran's chemical weapons program. And we will take further appropriate actions if warranted.

A second topic of our discussions with China concerns our shared interest in stability on the Korean Peninsula, where earlier this century, more than 50,000 Americans and hundreds of thousands of Koreans died resisting aggression and where 37,000 U.S. troops are still stationed.

The tensions here may seem a relic of Cold War passions, but they are real. The stakes are high and China's history of good relations with Pyongyang enables it to play a potentially crucial role. In 1994, with China's cooperation, we convinced North Korea to freeze—and pledge to dismantle—its dangerous nuclear program. This preserved the peninsula's stability for the short term while preparing the way for discussions that may ultimately lead to full reconciliation.

A third issue in our dialogue with China is Taiwan. The principles that guide us are set out in the 1972 Shanghai and two later Communiqués in which the United States recognizes the authorities in the P.R.C. as the sole legal government of China. At the same time, under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, we maintain strong unofficial ties with the people there.

These U.S. policies have contributed to stability, security, and prosperity for all three parties. But this remains an intensely emotional issue. American policy must be consistent. Leaders in Beijing and Taipei must avoid miscalculation. Differences must be resolved patiently, without violence, and on the basis of free and mutual consent.

On economic matters, our dialogue is focused on continuing the trend toward a China that is more open and more fully a part of the international system.

The desire for higher living standards, which Secretary Acheson identified as a determining force in Asia 50 years ago, is a driving force in China now. Reforms begun under Deng Xiaoping have created thriving

“Effective diplomacy results not from the recitation of principle alone, but from backing principle with realistic policies—from seeing that what is worth achieving is achieved. And with respect to China and the United States, there is much that is worth achieving.”

areas of growth outside the stagnant state sector, while lifting millions out of poverty and laying the basis for a market economy.

But as the Chinese themselves recognize, continued growth will require continued reform. The resource-sapping state enterprises have to be restructured. The financial system has to modernize. The growing economic disparity among China's regions has to be addressed. And China will have to make the hard choice to open its market further and observe the international rules of the game on trade.

All this matters not only to China, but to us, for the United States has both an economic and a strategic stake in whether China's reforms continue and succeed.

Commercially, we are encouraging China to join the World Trade Organization—WTO—under rules that would require it to end unfair trade barriers, permit judicial review of trade activities, enforce its trade laws uniformly, and use WTO procedures to settle disputes. If China enters the WTO under these terms, it would give the U.S. more access to China's market; boost our exports; reduce our trade deficit; and create new, well-paying jobs.

Even more important are the strategic benefits both for us and China if Beijing is able to meet the needs of its people in a manner that does not threaten others and that steadily increases the exposure of Chinese society to new technologies and ideas.

Such a China would likely place a high value on stable relations with its neighbors; have a strong interest in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and be disposed to build on progress already made in combating the global threats of pollution, terrorism, and crime. Such a China might also begin to change in an area where we currently have very fundamental differences, and that is with respect to human rights. The United States believes that certain basic rights are universal and have been so recognized internationally. Among these are the freedoms of speech, assembly, religion, and the press.

We also believe that legitimate political power flows from the people. Some say this is wholly a Western concept, but that argument is belied by the growth in democracy worldwide, and by writers as venerable as the Confucian disciple Mencius, who wrote more than 2000 years ago that "The people are the foundation of the state; the national altars are second; and the sovereign is the least important of all."

It is true that people in China today generally have more options in their daily lives than did their parents. And progress has been made in revising civil and criminal law and in

permitting choices in village elections. But China's overall record on human rights remains dismal. Religious harassment is common. Organized political opposition is thoroughly stifled. And dissidents such as Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan have been imprisoned for years for daring to advocate democracy.

We believe those imprisoned for the peaceful expression of political, religious, or social views should be released. We have urged that international humanitarian organizations be given access to prisoners. We have stressed the value of resuming talks between Beijing and one of your former speakers here at the Commonwealth Club, the Dalai Lama, for the purpose of preserving the unique heritage of Tibet.

With others if possible, but alone if we must, the United States will continue to shine the spotlight on human rights violations in China, as we do elsewhere around the globe. We have also pledged to work with Congress to obtain increased funding for Radio Free Asia and Voice of America broadcasts to promote the free exchange of ideas in China. And we will continue to raise human rights issues directly with officials in Beijing.

The prospects for improved U.S.-China relations, and China's standing in the world, will be affected by what happens on the far side of midnight in Hong Kong six days from now. Hong Kong has been under foreign control for longer than San Francisco has been part of the United States. Next Tuesday, it will peacefully re-enter the Chinese nation as the crown jewel of Asia's economic emergence. Although possessing a uniquely international outlook, Hong Kong has retained its Chinese ethnicity and character. And polls indicate that the majority of Hong Kong's people favor its return.

Next week's feasting and fireworks will not, however, tell the full story. The world will be watching to see if Beijing meets its pledge to maintain Hong Kong's autonomy, market economy, and way of life for decades to come.

If that pledge is kept, China will benefit from its own huge investment in the Hong Kong economy, while integrating itself more fully into the international community and enhancing prospects for improved relations both within its own region and with the United States. If the pledge is not kept, China's international standing will be tarnished, and the freedom and continued prosperity of the Hong Kong people will be in doubt.

I look forward to representing our country at the transfer ceremony. My presence will reflect America's interests in Hong Kong, which range from our stake in law enforcement

cooperation, to the more than 1,100 U.S. companies that operate there, to the example of a Hong Kong whose glittering success is based firmly on free markets and the rule of law.

I will bring to Asia a message of vigorous American support for the continued freedom and autonomy of the Hong Kong people. We do not believe it will be possible to preserve Hong Kong's way of life without preserving civil liberties.

Nor will it be possible to sustain Hong Kong's prosperity without preserving the elements of good governance—an independent judiciary, a respected civil service, an honest system of customs, an open investment regime, and leaders that are accountable to the people.

The United States is a friend to democracy in Hong Kong, as elsewhere. We know that the people of Hong Kong value their freedoms. And we expect those with authority, whether in Beijing or Hong Kong, itself, to meet fully the obligations spelled out in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 and the Hong Kong Basic Law.

Earlier this year, China arranged the appointment of a provisional legislature to replace the current elected one, and to serve until a new election is held. The United States believes this action was unjustified and, since the provisional legislature includes 10 members defeated in the 1995 elections, it was also at odds with the popular will. As a result, I will not participate in the swearing-in ceremony for the legislature when I visit Hong Kong. And we will be watching closely to see if free and fair elections for a new legislature are conducted—as promised—at an early date.

Last April, President Clinton and I met with Martin Lee, a democratic leader in Hong Kong, who urged America to stay engaged with China on Hong Kong and other issues. He also expressed alarm at the proposal to end “most-favored-nation” or normal trade relations with China. Such an action would cost Hong Kong an estimated 85,000 jobs and \$30 billion in annual revenues.

It is expected that this issue will be voted on by the U.S. House of Representatives—and I am very happy to tell you, having just gotten the signal, that the resolution to defeat most-favored-nation was itself defeated quite soundly.

Trying to influence China by denying to it the trade status we accord most other countries is analogous to a doctor performing surgery with a crowbar; the intentions may be good, but the prospects for success are not. I thank very much the members of the House of Representatives who voted with us in doing the smart thing.

Aside from the impact on Hong Kong, ending MFN would severely damage our overall leadership in Asia while reducing prospects for Chinese cooperation on issues of strategic importance to the United States. These include North Korea, proliferation, Taiwan, the global environment, and matters coming before the UN Security Council, of which China is a permanent member.

What's more, denial of MFN is opposed by many leading Chinese dissidents and by U.S. groups involved in religious outreach in China because they want China influenced, not isolated, by the international community.

Now that this year's debate is over, it is a very good time to take stock. We know that ending normal trade relations with China would not be productive. But just as clearly, a policy of acquiescence in which we fail to make clear to China our own views and values would not be appropriate.

This argues, at least generally, for the current U.S. approach, not because it guarantees instant results, but because it serves American interests and reflects the reality of the U.S.-China relationship over the long term.

Engagement is not the same as endorsement. Our approach includes frank talk about differences. When warranted, it includes targeted sanctions or other appropriate measures to make tangible our disapproval. But it also includes an active search for areas where we can work with China for our own benefit, and that of the region and the whole world.

Today, the economic and security future of Asia is not a zero-sum game. China has the ability to pursue its prosperity and maintain its security without harming its neighbors or Taiwan.

The United States can—and will—maintain its alliances and other interests in the region without threatening the legitimate rights and interests of any other country. Our allies and partners in the region are thoroughly defense-oriented. And the nations of Southeast Asia are committed through ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum to resolve existing territorial and other disputes peacefully.

Some might agree with this assessment, but insist it is only temporary, that Beijing and Washington are destined to become bitter enemies as China's economic and military power grows.

The Administration does not base its policy on any assumptions—positive or negative—about the future. But we are not prepared to make the less desirable outcome more likely by treating it as inevitable. Nor can we disregard the powerful currents of change that are working to keep China on a cooperative rather than a confrontational track.

Every day, in universities from Seoul to San Francisco, Chinese students are learning how systems based on open markets and the rule of law operate. Every week, thousands of Chinese are added to the payrolls of companies that operate under a free enterprise system, while many others go into business for themselves.

The ideology that drove earlier generations of Chinese leaders cannot guide the world's largest country into the next century. Beijing's new leaders know this. And they know that the shift from central planning to private enterprise cannot be reversed except at enormous economic and social cost.

Regardless of the policy choices we make, China will be a rising force in Asian and world affairs. The history of this century teaches us the wisdom of trying to bring such a power into the fold as a responsible participant in the international system, rather than driving it out into the wilderness of isolation.

Domestically, we Americans should not let the differences aired in the debate over the U.S.-China trade issue obscure our agreement

on long-term goals. Whether our particular interest in China is diplomatic, security, commercial, or humanitarian, our overriding objective is to encourage China's integration into a regional and global system designed to solve problems peacefully and in accordance with law.

If you are a business person, you will care whether China's legal structure respects individual rights, and whether the political environment is stable. If you are a military planner, you will want to see China moving ahead with reform because you know that an open society contributes to peace. If you are a human rights activist, you will welcome the potential liberalizing effects of expanded commerce, a strong private sector, and a broad dialogue between China and the world's democracies.

And if you are Secretary of State, you will be determined to move ahead on all fronts, encouraging the evolution of a China that defines its own interests in a manner compatible with those of the United States. ■



TREATY ACTIONS

MULTILATERAL

Copyrights

Copyright treaty. Adopted at Geneva Dec. 20, 1996. Open for signature until Dec. 31, 1997. Enters into force three months after 30 instruments of ratification or accession by states have been deposited with the Director General of WIPO.

North Atlantic Treaty

Additional protocol to the agreement among the states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other states participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces. Done at Brussels June 19, 1995. Entered into force June 1, 1996¹.
Signature: Austria, Mar. 27, 1997.

Property

Performances and Phonograms treaty. Adopted at Geneva Dec. 20, 1996. Open for signature until Dec. 31, 1997. Enters into force three months after 30 instruments of ratification or accession by states have been deposited with the Director General of WIPO.

Terrorism

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532; 28 UST 1975.
Accession: Qatar, Mar. 3, 1997.

International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 17, 1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the U.S. Jan. 6, 1985.
Accession: Algeria, Dec. 18, 1996².

Convention on the safety of United Nations and associated personnel. Done at New York Dec. 9, 1994³.
Ratifications: Slovakia, June 26, 1996² Sweden, June 25, 1996; Germany, Apr. 22, 1997.
Accession: Uzbekistan, July 3, 1996.

Torture

Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 10, 1984. Entered into force June 26, 1987; for the U.S. Nov. 20, 1994. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-20.

Ratification: Iceland, Oct. 23, 1996.

Accessions: Azerbaijan, Aug. 16, 1996; El Salvador, June 17, 1996; Honduras, Dec. 5, 1996; Malawi, June 11, 1996.

Treaties

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969. Entered into force Jan. 27, 1980¹.

Ratification: Costa Rica, Nov. 22, 1996.

Accession: Tajikistan, May 6, 1996.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement concerning the imposition of import restrictions on certain categories of archaeological and ethnological material, with appendix. Signed at Washington Apr. 10, 1997. Entered into force Apr. 10, 1997.

Chile

Agreement for the establishment of a cooperative biomedical research program. Signed at Washington and Santiago Apr. 30 and May 5, 1997. Entered into force May 5, 1997.

European Space Agency

Memorandum of understanding enabling early utilization opportunities of the International Space Station. Signed at Washington and Paris Mar. 11 and 18, 1997. Entered into force Mar. 18, 1997.

Greece

Agreement for the operation of Voice of America re-broadcasting stations in Greece, with annexes. Signed at Washington May 20, 1996. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1997.

Grenada

Agreement regarding the provision of articles, services, and associated military education and training by the United States Government for anti-narcotics purposes. Effected by exchange of notes at St. George's Dec. 23, 1996 and Mar. 14, 1997. Entered into force Mar. 14, 1997.

Hong Kong

Agreement concerning air services, with annex. Signed at Hong Kong Apr. 7, 1997. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1997.

Japan

Agreement concerning cooperation on the Advanced Earth Observation Satellite-II (ADEOS-II) Program, with memorandum of understanding. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Mar. 14, 1997. Entered into force Mar. 14, 1997.

Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 29, 1988, as amended, concerning the acquisition and production of the EP-3, UP-3C, and UP-3D aircraft in Japan. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Mar. 28, 1997. Entered into force Mar. 28, 1997.

Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 31, 1989, as amended, concerning the acquisition and production in Japan of the SH-60J, UH-60J, and UH-60JA aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Mar. 28, 1997. Entered into force Mar. 28, 1997.

Kazakstan

Agreement to treat the agreement of June 19, 1995 among the states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and other states participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces as binding between the United States and Kazakstan. Effected by exchange of notes at Almaty Mar. 21 and 28, 1997. Entered into force Mar. 28, 1997.

Nepal

Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Dec. 19, 1996 and May 13, 1997. Entered into force May 13, 1997.

Russia

Agreement amending the agreement of Apr. 3, 1995, as amended, concerning cooperation in nuclear weapons storage security through provision of material, services, and related training. Signed at Moscow Apr. 8, 1997. Entered into force Apr. 8, 1997.

Agreement amending the agreement of Sept. 2, 1993, as amended, concerning the provision of material, services, and training relating to the construction of a safe, secure, and ecologically sound storage facility for fissile material derived from the destruction of nuclear weapons. Signed at Moscow Apr. 9, 1997. Entered into force Apr. 9, 1997.

Agreement amending the agreement of July 30, 1992, as amended, concerning the safe, secure, and ecologically sound destruction of chemical weapons. Signed at Moscow Apr. 10, 1997. Entered into force Apr. 10, 1997.

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 26, 1993, as amended, concerning cooperation in the elimination of strategic offensive arms, with annexes. Signed at Moscow Apr. 11, 1997. Entered into force Apr. 11, 1997.

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Aug. 13 and Sept. 9, 1996, relating to trade in certain textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Moscow Mar. 18 and 26, 1997. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1997.

Agreement regarding the rescheduling of certain debts owed to or guaranteed by the United States Government, with annexes. Signed at Washington Feb. 6, 1997. Entered into force May 7, 1997.

Singapore

Air transport agreement, with annexes. Signed at Singapore Apr. 8, 1997. Entered into force Apr. 8, 1997.

South Korea

Agreement amending the agreement of Sept. 14, 1990, as amended and extended, relating to trade in textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul Apr. 2 and 8, 1997. Entered into force Apr. 8, 1997.

Tanzania

Agreement for cooperation in the Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) Program, with appendices. Signed at Dar es Salaam Apr. 1, 1997. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1997.

United Kingdom

Agreement amending the agreement of July 23, 1977, as amended, concerning air services. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Mar. 27, 1997. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1997.

United Nations

Agreement extending the cooperation service agreement of Oct. 18, 1994, for the contribution of personnel to the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, with annex. Effected by exchange of letters at New York Mar. 18, 1997. Entered into force Mar. 18, 1997.

¹ Not in force for the U.S.

² With reservation.

³ Not in force. ■